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III. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE EXPLOSION

In December, 1950, water appeared in a place on the south side of the 3rd East Flat. A small pump was installed, but later withdrawn when all workings south of the return were abandoned. There was no doubt that this water had come through fault planes from the waterlogged Yard Seam workings above. Within four months the water filled the abandoned south side workings and, when it approached the return airway, an 80 gallons per minute pump was installed but proved insufficient to deal with the make and had to be duplicated.

The appearance of this water indicated the approach of the end of the district and provision for a replacement was put in hand, an area of coal at the end of the South Conveyor road being chosen for exploitation by an advancing longwall face in the top leaf of the seam.

The water was kept in check until August, 1951, when it began to rise again and a 350 gallons per minute turbine pump was installed: by mischance its suction end was laid into sludge and it had to be dismantled and re-sited. Unfortunately, before this was accomplished early in September, the water level reached the return airway where it had a disastrous effect upon the fireclay floor, which heaved, breaking props and so letting down the girder supports. The resultant falls, although of a minor character, so reduced the cross-sectional area of the return airway that the ventilation became seriously restricted, the quantity entering the first working place being reduced to 5,000 c.f.m. A further result of this damage was that the shuttle cars were unable to gain access to the charging station and production was brought to a standstill in the 3rd East Flat. The men employed in the latter were placed on the repair work, which had now become urgent.

The 3rd North Flat, however, was kept going, the shuttle cars serving it being brought to the bottom of the 3rd North road, at which place their batteries were charged by a makeshift and illegal arrangement which involved the use of cables laid from the charging station across the conveyor road.

On Tuesday, 25th September, a large fall occurred in the return airway at a point between Nos. 29 and 30 stentons, completely blocking it and thereby cutting off the second means of egress. Thereupon the number of men working in the 3rd North Flat was reduced to eight, in compliance with Section 36 (3) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and the remainder were set to work to clear the fall. On the back shift of that same day the manager inspected the district, and there and then decided that this further restriction on the quantity of ventilation made it necessary to short-circuit all the available air directly through the turbine pumphouse so as to ensure that the pump could be kept running. He did this by opening the door and screen situated on the conveyor road just inbye the charging station.

Although this achieved the desired object, it entailed the complete cessation of ventilation in the two Flats and, in view of the probability of firedamp accumulating, they were forthwith examined on the manager’s instructions by an overman and a deputy (the latter the now deceased T. Whitney). They checked that the switches on the shuttle car parked at the top of 3rd North were open, stopped all the auxiliary fans and isolated all the other cables and apparatus fed from either of the two banks of gate-end switches. The respective cables supplying these switches could not be isolated, however, for the reason already stated.

This final examination followed immediately upon the short-circuiting of the ventilation, and hence it is not surprising to learn that no inflammable gas was observed during the course of it. The following day, however, a deputy attempting to inspect the workings encountered inflammable gas and fenced them off at points three pillars up the 3rd North road and in the stentons to the left of the conveyor road inbye of the charging station. On the next day the accumulation was found to have extended down the 3rd North road, necessitating the erection of a fence in the second pillar up. No further extension of the accumulation occurred and, from this time until the shift on which the explosion occurred, both Flats remained gassed out, no person passing beyond the fences during this period.

On Friday, 28th September, a passage having been made over the fall, much of the restriction on the ventilation was thereby removed and the quantity circulating increased, but to what amount is unknown as it was not measured.

The working week finished with the Friday nightshift and, throughout the following week end, the pump was kept running under the supervision of deputies who worked six-hour shifts, the last of which ended at midnight on Sunday, 30th September, at which time Whitney arrived at the mine to make a pre-shift inspection of the district prior to admitting his shift of men, who were due about an hour later.

He had been regularly employed as a deputy in this district and was fully aware of, and indeed he had been actively concerned with, the difficulties of the previous week. Before descending the mine he was informed by the fore overman, Thomas Short, that until further notice his shift would comprise five men whom he was to employ on pumping and repair work in the district. He was instructed to report by telephone to Short at 3.0 a.m. Having received these instructions, Whitney descended the mine, carried out his inspection. and later admitted a pumpman and three other workmen who, collectively, were experienced in the use of all the equipment in the district. The fifth man, Vincent Love, was left in charge of the conveyor delivery point at the 3rd East Junction.

As previously arranged, Whitney telephoned his overman, Short, at 3.0 a.m. and according to the latter reported everything in order. Short instructed Whitney to send out a coalcutter trailing cable, which was required urgently for the new face due to start production that day. In accordance with this, shortly after 4.0 a.m. Whitney arrived at the 3rd East Junction, accompanying the cable which was being transported on the conveyor, and there assisted Vincent Love to coil it up as it ran off the conveyor. Whitney then returned inbye. just a few minutes before Love received a telephone enquiry from Charlton (one of the men subsequently killed) from the transfer point as to Whitney’s whereabouts. From that time onwards no one spoke to or saw any of the five men alive.

 

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