VI. - GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Ventilation. Mention is made earlier in this Report to the rather precarious method of ventilation, largely inherent to "brokens" working, and reference to Plan No. 2 shows how the pillars in course of being extracted were largely "in the air" and, consequently, difficult to ventilate constantly and adequately. It is open to question whether electrical apparatus should be used at all in such circumstances in any seam where firedamp is a hazard. At any rate, nothing but apparatus of a high flameproof standard should be considered.
Under these conditions it is sound practice to maintain a high marginal standard of ventilation, and there was no apparent reason why more of the available air entering 69A District was not utilized to attain this margin instead of allowing the majority of it to escape back into the return airway.
The need for adequate ventilation at all times, as a first and main line of defence, has been stressed in previous reports of this kind and it is, yet once again, true to say that failure to maintain this standard was the root cause of this explosion.
(2) Firedamp Detectors. These were provided in the form of ordinary flame safety lamps in the proportion of one for each Joy loader operator and one for the arcwall cutter driver on each shift, in addition to the flame lamps carried by the deputy and the shot firer. This was quite in line with the requirements of the Coal Mines General Regulations (Firedamp Detectors), 1939.
I have no reason to doubt that the selected workmen regularly took these lamps into this district or that they were properly trained in the estimation and detection of firedamp, but whether they were always used to advantage as required by the Regulations is another question. All the witnesses stated that it was the usual practice to make frequent tests and keep the gas detectors close behind the advancing face, and we have the one instance related when W. Wilson, a cutter driver, found firedamp during the previous back shift at the face of No. 8 Left (the place of the explosion). But it is sad to relate that the three gas detector lamps in the district at the time were found after the explosion at points remote from the working face, where they were serving no useful purpose whatsoever.
The proper use of these gas detectors is a necessary adjunct to safety, especially where electrical apparatus is in use at the coal face. This is a last but highly important line of defence against an explosion of gas.
It is an established fact that intensive working of a seam brings about an increased rate of emission of firedamp and, consequently, a greater need for frequent gas testing to meet the changing conditions in particular, during coalcutting and after the face has been blasted down.
This was the position in 69A District. The lifts were being advanced about 30 feet daily and, in addition, there was the proximity of upstanding goaf likely to contain firedamp ready to encroach into the faces on any temporary failure of the ventilation.
I am satisfied the men engaged in flitting the different machines had been duly impressed with the necessity of immediately renewing any canvas sheets their machine happened to foul while passing through, but I am not sure that the selected workmen were sufficiently imbued with the absolute necessity for the proper use of their flame lamps under such potentially hazardous conditions.
It is true the now deceased deputy, N. Holmes, had inspected No. 8 Left, probably within an hour of the explosion, but the fact remains that if the Joy loader operator had taken his flame lamp with him when he flitted his machine to the face - and it is deduced from the evidence that the machine had not been running there many minutes when the explosion occurred - it is not unreasonable to suggest the explosion might have been averted.
The value of this means of gas detection is not, unfortunately, realized by the workmen as a whole and I am afraid this attitude is fairly general and not confined to the men working at this mine.
I am aware the indifference to these detectors has been a source of concern to colliery managers generally over many years and it is high time that this state of things was remedied. It is not unlikely that many explosions of varying magnitude which have occurred during recent years might have been obviated if proper use had been made at the time of this means of gas detection.
I recommend that the National Coal Board should make a further endeavour to obtain a more reasonably-minded approach by the men to this matter. The men, for their part, should appreciate that in this way they can make an important contribution to safety and also assist the management in the successful running of the mines.
There are now reliable automatic firedamp detectors available, but these again require the full collaboration of the workmen if they are to be of any avail and there is need for some simple arrangement which would automatically cut off the electric power in an atmosphere containing a pre-determined percentage of firedamp (of the order of 1¼).
(3) Coal Dust. It is relevant and certainly of interest, I think, in view of the experience of several explosions which have occurred over recent years having been initiated by firedamp and propagated throughout the whole of the road conveyor system by coal dust, to discuss possible reasons why this explosion was not extended outbye similarly in this instance.
Was it purely fortuitous or was it due to the apparently high standard of stone dusting, as shown by the results of sampling of the mine dust collected over a period before, and after the explosion, and, furthermore, that the running of the shuttle cars between the faces and the belt conveyor had given a better admixture of stone and coal dusts on the roadways ? The nature of the seams and the natural conditions were similar in all cases and the explosions initially had many features in common.
It is tempting to ascribe the limited spread of flame and the failure of the explosion to develop into a major dust explosion as due to the raising of a noninflammable dust cloud rich in stone dust. Unfortunately this cannot be supported. The evidence of numerous samples of "explosion dust", i.e., dust raised by the explosion and subsequently deposited, collected by Dr. F. Y. Tideswell of S.M.R.E.. showed that the average composition of the raised dust cloud was only 35 per cent. and 40 per cent. incombustible matter on the intake and return airways respectively. Analysis of specimens of aggregated coke confirmed this estimate of the content of the cloud at the moment of passage of flame. Dr. Tideswell has kindly given me his observations on this matter, as follows :-
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An important point is the extensive goaf, filled with firedamp. This is normally ventilated along its outbye edge by air passing northward from No. 8 Left towards Nos. 7 and 8 old and partly stowed car roads: a parallel belt of inflammable mixture would therefore normally lie some little distance within the goaf.
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It is assumed that a defective canvas sheet robbed No. 8 Left of its needed ventilation, allowing the inflammable fringe to approach and encroach on to the working face.
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The inflammable fringe, almost as soon as it had encroached on No. 8 Left face, was ignited at the Joy loader. On its outbye edge the flame died out almost at once for lack of gas and before it could raise an inflammable cloud of dust; but on its inbye edge it spread back into the adjacent goaf, mixing the available air into the gas and spreading northward through the goaf. The immediate result was to expel the hot but extinct products outbye along the intake (No. 4 Main Road).
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Probably, though it is not so certain, the flame front reaching No. 6 Bord similarly died out before it had developed sufficient blast to raise an inflammable dust cloud. It seems to have been followed by a hot or burning blast, reinforced from No. 7 Right goaf, which raised dust and, spreading into Nos. 7 and 6 Cross-cuts, caused the notable coking found there. Whether this blast contained enough unburnt air for the coal dust actually to burn (or explode) it is impossible to say. But there is evidence in the distribution of the coke to indicate some build-up of pressure in these cross-cuts, causing some of the molten cloud to be pushed back towards the return but most of it to spread southwards and, reaching the intake, to debouch in either direction.
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Confirmation of this continued, or renewed, push outbye of the products of combustion in the intake is found in the observation that whilst the outbye limit of burning of fixed material is at the junction with No. 5 Right Cross-cut, the deposit of explosion dust was found to be burnt for 350 feet further outbye. There was insufficient data on the return for a similar confirmation.
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Thus the indications are that the gas in the goaf was ignited at its outbye fringe and that the burnt products formed a barrier between the still burning mixture later expelled and the cloud of inflammable dust raised and swept along the roads ahead of the hot blast. Such an effect could only be expected, and then rarely, in retreating work, with an extensive goaf.
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Although coal dust played no serious part in extending this explosion, it is disturbing to find that the cloud of dust raised was of inflammable composition. To judge from samples taken after the explosion, the general level of stone dusting, though not so good as could be wished, particularly inbye, was very much higher than corresponded to the composition of the cloud raised. The explanation appears to be that there were many points on both intake and return (but particularly the former), and in the stentons, where there were accumulations of coalrich dust, and that these as well as coal-rich surface layers contributed in large part to the dust cloud raised.
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I consider this description of the behaviour of the explosion gives a very feasible reason for its limited magnitude. The explanation is somewhat disquieting in its emphasis on the disparity in the degree of inflammability between the "explosion dust" raised by the blast and that of the mine dust on the roadways as ascertained by periodic sampling in accordance with the coal dust regulations. This is attributable to accumulations of coal dust lying about the structure of the conveyor and elsewhere and to fine dust on the belt itself.
I do not think I need say more here on this subject, except to add that the problem is now engaging the urgent attention of this Ministry and the National Coal Board.
(4) The Need for Flameproof Apparatus at all Places where Firedamp is a Hazard. The moral of this explosion is undoubtedly that the use in the safety lamp mines of this country of all electrical apparatus not up to British flameproof standard should be stringently reviewed.
The claim that, for example, the types of Joy loaders and shuttle cars in use at Eppleton Colliery satisfy General Regulation 132 - that in the normal working thereof there shall be no risk of open sparking - should no longer be accepted, in the light of experience now of some six years.
In this connexion, the Report of the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines 1938 (on page 349) states that :-
The terms of General Regulation 132 are tantamount to a requirement of flameproof enclosure but are not precise enough and should be supplemented by a specific requirement of the use of certified apparatus in certain areas.
The arrangement on these Joy loaders of cable glands and asbestos cord seals gives a direct entry for some 20 subsidiary cable entries, each of which may be a source of open sparking if not properly maintained. This method of cable attachment is not in line with the standard of flameproof enclosure laid down by the Ministry of Fuel and Power’s Flameproof (FLP) Certificate and defined in B.S. 229, as follows :-
A flameproof enclosure for electrical apparatus is one that will withstand, without injury, any explosion of the prescribed inflammable gas that may occur within it under practical conditions of operation within the rating of the apparatus (and recognized overloads, if any, associated therewith), and will prevent the transmission of flame such as will ignite the prescribed inflammable gas which may be present in the surrounding atmosphere.
This standard is accepted generally by all manufacturers of mining electrical machinery in this country.
The shuttle cars, having a similar arrangement of cable entry and cable protection, are in the same category but have an added danger from the protected but open ventilated battery containers - to allow for safe dispersal of hydrogen gas discharging from the cells - which provide a further likely source of open sparking in the event of damage to the cells causing a short circuit.
Furthermore, experience has shown there is also a fire hazard with these machines. Since their inception in this country about six years ago, six serious fires on shuttle cars have been reported as "dangerous occurrences". They were mainly due to the abrasion or flexing of the subsidiary cables. In fact, one of these fires occurred in 69A District in 1948 on one of the two cars (ET 1049) involved in this explosion. Two fires also occurred on Joy loaders during 1951, one due to a burst trailing cable and the other to arcing at a subsidiary cable junction box.
I recommend accordingly that the principle of British standard flameproof enclosure for all electrical equipment used at or within 300 yards of the coal face in all safety lamp mines should be accepted, and that steps should be taken forthwith to conform to this standard as soon as possible. This would, of necessity, be a long-term policy and immediate effect should be given to the following :-
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No electrical machinery or apparatus which is not in line with British flameproof standards to be used in the vicinity of the coal face where General Regulation 132 applies, on the presumption that the Regulation applies whenever safety lamps are used, unless there is clear proof of the absence of inflammable gas.
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No shuttle cars to be used in any "brokens" workings nor, except with the written consent of the Inspector of the Division, in any other working place in direct contact with, or about to hole through on, any goaf in any safety lamp mine.
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Having regard to the country’s urgent need for additional coal output. I realize the importance of not suggesting any action likely to restrict or even hamper experimental trials with electrical machinery from abroad which may not be in line with the British flameproof standard, and there is no reason, in my view, why such trials should not be continued, provided they are made under proper safeguards. But as a commanding principle, once these prototype machines have passed the experimental stage their design should be modified to come into line with our standards. In the interim period, the introduction and use of these machines in any safety lamp mine should only be with the special consent of the Chief Inspector of Mines and subject to whatever conditions he may consider it necessary to lay down in the interests of safety.
(5) Electricity Regulations. The existing General Regulations governing the use of electricity in mines under the Coal Mines Act, 1911, have been in force since 1913 - when there was comparatively little electric power consumed in mines; few, if any, conveyors were in use, and electrically-driven coalcutting machines were employed to a limited extent only at the coal face - and have served the industry very well. Nevertheless, it is patent that amending regulations are long overdue to bring the law into line with modern practice and to cope with ever increasing mechanization with special reference to coal face machinery.
A committee appointed in 1939 for this purpose by the then Secretary for Mines, on the recommendation of the Royal Commission of 1938, formulated a code of general regulations which, however, had to be deferred owing to the outbreak of World War No. 2. This code has still not been made, partly because other more urgent matters for new regulations have arisen, partly because the supply situation would make any considerable replacement of electrical equipment a difficult matter, and partly because it has been necessary to re-consider with the industry certain changes in the draft code to meet developments since it was prepared. To a very considerable extent, however, the standards laid down in the draft regulations have been adopted in respect of new equipment by voluntary action in anticipation of new statutory requirements. Nevertheless, I consider that it is desirable that statutory effect should be given to the draft regulations, suitably amended in the light of later experience and developments in electrical apparatus, as soon as the claims of other regulations, and an easing of the supply position, permit.
(6) Supervision. I understand early effect is to be given to the recommendations of the Royal Commission regarding status and certification of colliery electricians so I need not discuss this matter here. The question of the duties and authority of the electricians has, however, been discussed by the Committee of 1939-40 and I quote their summarized proposals below :-
Duties. Electricians should have specific responsibility, within the scope of their authority, for the installation, maintenance and testing of all apparatus and cables, including telephone and signalling circuits and appliances.
Authority. Electricians in charge should have authority to stop immediately the use of any apparatus or cable observed to be in a dangerously defective condition, and they and their assistants should be required to report to an official of the mine, with a view to prompt remedy, any condition or use that is likely to affect the safety of the electrical installation.
The Committee have included these proposals in the draft code of regulations and I do not think mining engineers will quarrel with these recommendations.
It is clear from what I have already said in this Report, that if these proposals had been fully adopted at this mine prior to this explosion they would have gone some way towards preventing the ignition of gas by defective apparatus.
In these days of progress and high efficiency, the dictum should be accepted that where proper maintenance of equipment is of vital importance to ensure safety this can only be obtained where soundly constructed apparatus is installed at the outset. This has particular application to electrical apparatus installed in the vicinity of the coal face, and British standard apparatus ensures this position.
Neither the Joy loaders (in their present form) nor the shuttle cars in use at this mine conformed to this desirable standard, which thus conduced to imperfect maintenance. By way of contrast the arcwall coal-cutter machine, constructed to British standards and subjected to equally rough usage, was found to be in safe working order after the explosion.
(7) Examination and Reports on Electrical Apparatus. The Royal Commission recommended that apparatus at or within 300 yards of the coal face should be examined by an electrician once in 24 hours, and the Committee of 1939-40 have made proposals which, in effect, include this recommendation.
It is interesting to note that the Model Code of Safety Regulations adopted by the International Labour Organization for Underground Work in Coal Mines calls for daily examination of all electrical apparatus and cables in use at the face, also for the use of certified flameproof apparatus, in places where there is risk of firedamp and or coal dust explosions.
The examinations of the coal face apparatus, in particular at this mine, appear to have been made very sporadically and evidently not sufficiently often to prevent danger, as required by General Regulation 131(c).
The electrician is required by the regulations to keep at the mine a log book made up of daily log sheets in a prescribed form, M. & Q. Form No. 10, and an Explanatory Memorandum issued by the Ministry, M. & Q. Form No. 11, advises that
The report must be precise - i.e. it must identify the apparatus or cable and record the nature and result of the examination or test applied thereto, so as to serve, inter alia, as evidence of the due performance by the electrician of his statutory duty.
The results of tests and measurements, in particular, may be summarized with advantage in ledger form in another book in such a way as to serve as a history of each part of the installation, thus facilitating observation of progressive deterioration, or of frequent defect, for the information of the management.
Furthermore, it is suggested in the Memorandum that the flameproof enclosures of apparatus in use where firedamp is a hazard should be examined daily.
Electrical defects found from time to time on the Joy loaders and shuttle cars in 69A District were entered in written daily reports submitted by the shift foremen electricians to the head electrician, but no specific mention was made of these matters by the latter in the log book.
In this respect, however, the log book in its present form is admittedly somewhat out-of-date, inasmuch as it does not allow for the greater detail and frequency of examinations of apparatus at the coal face. Here again, the Committee of 1939-40, in line with a recommendation of the Royal Commission, have proposed that a standard form should be prepared by the Ministry of Fuel and Power for prescribing the necessary details of examination, test and overhaul. They also make the further proposal that any plant which by reason of its function is severely used, e.g. coal face machinery and flexible cables, should be brought to the surface for thorough overhaul at regular intervals.
Both these recommendations are vitally important and should be implemented.