1880 Seaham Colliery Disaster
Inquest Report
Seaham Colliery Inquest, 13th April 1881 (cont.).
Mr. Thomas Bell sworn.
8,172. (Mr. Wright.) Do you produce a joint report made by Mr. Willis and yourself? — I produce the joint report of Mr. Willis and myself.
The witness then read the following report
8th September 1880.
"SEAHAM COLLIERY EXPLOSION.
An explosion occurred at this colliery at about 2.20 a.m. on the 8th September, by which 164 lives were lost.
"The colliery is the property of the Most Hon. the Marquess of Londonderry; it is situated near to Seaham Harbour, in the County of Durham, about 1½ miles from the sea coast.
"There are two shafts upon the colliery ; that to the east, for coal drawing purposes, is divided equally by a brattice, and is known as the Nos. 1 and 2 pits; for ventilation it is as one shaft, and is the downcast. The west shaft, about 150 yards distant, is the No. 3 pit, and is also used for coal drawing, and as the upcast for ventilation.
"The plan attached hereto shows three principal districts of workings — the No. 1 Hutton seam, No. 3 Hutton seam, and Maudlin seam — to which the effects of the explosion, more particularly as regards the loss of life, was confined. These districts are practically at the Hutton seam level, viz.: at a depth of 255 fathoms at the East shaft, and the same at the West shaft, or No. 3 pit. The Maudlin seam district being thrown down nearly to this level by a dislocation, to the north of the pits, of 105 feet, from whence it is reached by stone drifts of suitable gradients. The ventilating power of the whole colliery is also upon this level.
"Two other districts are worked in the colliery, first, the Hutton seam, north from the East shaft, and which, by the dislocation above referred to, and stone drifts thence, is brought down to the Harvey seam level, or at a depth of 281 fathoms at the East shaft. From this district the coals are drawn, and the ventilation effected by means of the portion (half) of the East shaft, known as the No. 2 pit. The position of this district in reference to those shown on the plan, is immediately underneath the Maudlin seam workings, the main lines of way running concurrently with those of the Maudlin seam above. And, second, the main coal seam, west from No. 3 pit, the coals whence are 'dropped' to the Hutton seam level by a staple, situated about 350 yards to the west of No. 3 pit, up which the coals are drawn. It is not necessary to make further reference to these two districts, otherwise than to state that all the workmen employed in them at the time of the explosion were rescued, and all who were aware of an explosion having occurred, agreed as to a 'rush of air' having gone in-bye. Forty-three workmen escaped from this Hutton seam, and 19 from the main coal workings, or 62 from these two seams.
"Here it may be well to refer to the remainder of the workmen who were rescued alive. Of these four escaped by the 'returns' from the South way in No. 3 Hutton seam; 13 others in these workings, who refused to accompany them, perished. One man was saved who had been acting as onsetter at the No. 1 pit, Hutton seam level. Thus, in the whole of the workings shown on the plan, five men were saved, making 67 in all who were rescued.
"Ventilation. — As has already been stated, the East shaft is the downcast, and the West shaft the upcast. The ventilation is produced by two furnaces, two ranges of boiler fires of three each, and one single boiler fire. These are all on the Hutton seam level, both the furnaces and No. 2 boiler fires being fed by return air, the No. 1 boiler fires and the Maudlin boiler fire being fed by fresh air; they are shown on the appended plan. The air passing them, by staples, stone drifts, and drifts in upper seams, ultimately reaches the West or No. 3 pit at a level of 9 fathoms above the main coal seam, so as, in the regular working, to keep the 'hanging on' at this shaft bottom free from heated and return air. By these means a ventilating current of from 310,000 to 320,000 cubic feet per minute is usually produced. Appended is a tabulated statement compiled from the ventilation reports' book, in which fortnightly measurements are entered, showing, along with other information bearing on the subject, the distribution in detail of the figures being based upon what we consider a fair average of the fortnightly measurements of air; and hence it will not be necessary here to more minutely particularise the mode in which it is dealt with, beyond naming the quantities entering the districts within which we are dealing; in fact, at the outset we feel at liberty to state our opinion, that such a ventilation is quite adequate in the ordinary working condition of the colliery, to meet all the requirements for which it is intended.
"In this district a gross quantity by actual measurement of 76,620 cubic feet per minute is sent, and it is unnecessary to enter into detail here, as this will have again to be referred to further on. Of this quantity about 45,000 cubic feet reach the workings, the remainder 31,620 being absorbed by No. 1 boiler fires, Hutton steam engine house, three ranges of stables, and sundry small leakages, of which it may fairly be assumed the boiler fires, engine house, 1st east stables, and 1st west stables take (to bring the figures into round numbers), 21,620 cubic feet per minute. Thus, from the 1st east and 1st west stables, assuming to this point no other leakages than those mentioned and covered by 21,620 cubic feet, there will be passing along the intake 55,000 cubic feet per minute.
At a point 100 yards south of the stables the intake is separated, and from thence there are two intakes, afterwards rejoining at a considerable distance further in. It is probable that 30,000 cubic feet of this quantity will pass along the engine plane, the remaining 25,000 cubic feet passing along the second intake or 'travelling way.' We have thus to deal with a current, in the engine plane or main intake of 30,000 cubic feet per minute in passing an average area (measured) of 10 feet x 7 feet = 70 feet, and hence with a velocity of 428 feet per minute or 7 feet per second.
"At the same time of measurement as in the above case, 61,850 cubic feet per minute were passing into this division of the pit. The 'ways' with which we have to do, viz., the south way, and the incline way receiving 13,680 and 12,960 cubic feet respectively, the balance being absorbed in the ventilation of the North Main Coal workings, the feeding of the Maudlin engine boiler, and in scales and leakages.
"Into this seam working is sent 45,676 cubic feet per minute, 29,000 of which reach the workings, the remainder being used for stables, and otherwise in various unimportant leakages.
"CONDITION OF MINE AFTER EXPLOSION.
"It does not appear to us to be necessary to load this report with minute details, which have been well given in evidence and minutely worked out in cross-examination, regarding the condition of the mine after the explosion. We may refer, however, to the work of exploration and recovery of the bodies having been much prolonged by the damage done to the shafts, and the consequent difficulty of getting into the workings ; and also to our admiration of the heroic bravery and devotedness of workmen and officials belonging to the colliery, and of numerous volunteers of these classes from the surrounding district.
"The general appearances indicated that the greatest destruction, and, in fact, almost the whole 'field' of the explosion, was largely confined to the 'intakes,' very trifling damage being in the 'returns.' The main ventilating doors, which in a somewhat complicated mine like this are necessarily numerous in the vicinity of the shaft, appeared in all cases to have been blown inwards, i.e., from the intakes towards the returns. The main air crossings also appeared to have been destroyed by a force from the intakes. The stoppings, where damaged, also showed the same general direction of force.
"Before entering into more particular details as to appearances and indications found, it may be well for the use of such of the jurymen as are not familiar with the effect of explosions in mines, to state very briefly the action which accompanies such an explosion, and it is the more necessary to do this, as unfortunately in the whole field of destruction there was only one man (the onsetter at No. 1 pit already mentioned) who escaped with life, and hence we have no other evidence available than that presented by the appearances and indications caused by the explosion.
"The destructive effects of an explosion are caused — first, by the enormous expansion of the explosive mixture, by the intense heat evolved by its combustion after ignition. This destructive force, proceeding in every direction from the point of ignition, is of such enormous pressure as to carry everything before it, crushing to fragments the ventilating doors, dislodging the timbering, shattering the air crossings, tearing up rails and twisting and bending the same, smashing tubs, and scattering stone and rubbish in every direction. By reason of the intense pressure mixtures of gas and air, inexplosive at ordinary atmospheric pressure, may take a part in the explosion, and it is possible that the coal dust present in the air currents, under such abnormal pressure, assists materially within certain limits in the increase of force and prolongation of the effects. This continues until the flame is forced into air containing gas, in smaller and smaller quantity, when combustion becomes more feeble, until ultimately the temperature falls too low and the explosion terminates. Hitherto it will be seen the whole force of the explosion has been away from the point of ignition, but now commences a reverse action. The seat of the explosion being left in a state of vacuum more or less complete, the atmospheric pressure beings to re-assert itself, and hence a backward force is established, sometimes called a backward suction, of more or less energy, but of sufficient power to move loose materials, already disturbed by the original force, with great violence, and hence it will be seen with what discriminating care appearances of 'direction of force' should be regarded.
"Returning to the condition of the mine after the explosion, it is very noteworthy that at various points were found unmistakeable evidence of divergence in the direction of force. In No. 1 Hutton seam, at a point near the Old Polka way, about 700 yards south from Nos. 1 and 2 shafts, was an instance of this. From this point the indications of the force of the explosion were inwards towards the workings, and also outwards towards the shaft; also at a point in No. 3 Hutton Seam Incline, an abandoned way, about 450 yards west from No. 3 shaft, were indications of a similar nature. At No. 3 shaft end of the 'curve' between the shafts, were indications, in our judgment not so well defined, of the same kind, and at the Main Coal Staple, and in the neighbourhood, the indications show the force to have been in all directions.
"So far as we are able to observe, the indications in the Maudlin seam previous to the sealing stoppings being inserted, did not appear to us to show anything to lead to a conclusion other than that the explosion took place outside the limits of these workings. We have, therefore, presented to us at least four points where indications are found, not altogether inconsistent with the possibility of the explosion having commenced at any one of them. The second place mentioned, viz., the No. 3 Hutton Seam Incline, may, however, be dismissed at once, so far as to its being possible that the explosion originated there, inasmuch as no workmen were engaged at this point, or anywhere near it, and consequently no lights could be present to give rise to an explosion. However, in thus dismissing it from our minds, we attach much importance to the indications presented, as being in our judgment precisely similar in their general character to those presented in the first-mentioned place, viz., in No. 1 Hutton Seam, near the Polka way. The only difference we find exhibited between the two points is the existence of the 'fall' from the roof; so frequently alluded to in the evidence of the mining engineers, and by them more or less positively offered in explanation of the cause of the explosion. Briefly stated, we understand the evidence given by them to be this — that this 'fall' liberated a sufficiently large quantity of gas to render the current highly explosive, and this explosive mixture coming into contact further in-bye with the safety (Clanny) lamp carried by Ramshaw, at a velocity such as it is known will permit flame to pass a lamp of this description, was ignited, and hence the explosion. We have repeatedly and minutely examined this 'fall,' and have failed to discover any indication whatever that gas was or might have been given off from it. Large fissures, or 'jacks' are to be seen in the roof, which it is alleged were never observed previously, otherwise it does not appear to us that this particular fall is in any respect different in character from many others of equal magnitude in the same seam and in the same 'way.' Gas has never been seen since the explosion issuing from these fissures, and although it was one of the first places reached after the explosion, no gas was being given off then, and it appears highly improbable that in such a fall, liberating a large quantity of gas, some discharge would not afterwards have been visible. Moreover, we have carefully considered the velocity at which the air-current, supposing it to have become explosive, from gas given off at this 'fall,' would be passing the place where Ramshaw was working, and seeing that it has been shown, in discussing the distribution of the air generally (see page 2), that it would not be travelling at more than seven feet per second, we consider it highly improbable that an explosive current would have become ignited at this lamp, unless, indeed, the lamp was defective, which we have no right to assume, seeing it would have been examined in the usual careful manner. We do not consider the damaged condition of the lamp after the explosion points to its having had anything to do with the ignition of an explosive mixture, as very many lamps were found in a similar condition. It has already been intimated that, apart from the 'fall' alluded to, the observed phenomena near the Polka way were precisely similar in character to those observed in No 3 Hutton Seam Incline, where we can positively assert the explosion did not take place, and hence we conclude that these appearances are to be explained in precisely the same manner at one place as at the other, and have no connection either with the adjacent 'fall' or with the initiation of the explosion. These indications or appearances, moreover, do not, as stated by Mr. Stratton in his evidence, and with which we agree, present anything inconsistent with the explosion having commenced at some other point more or less remote from the Polka way. We have now to deal with the two remaining places, viz., the No. 3 shaft end of the 'curve,' and the Main Coal Staple, and the positions will be sufficiently understood by the designations 'curve' and 'staple.'
"Taking the staple first, we have evidence that immediately before the explosion a man named Rawlings had been ordered to go to the bottom (Hutton seam) to send up empty tubs against full ones which were to be sent from the top. Rawlings appears to have been sent to this duty, because Smith, the master shifter, who appears to have arranged to be at the bottom to attend to this work, had not arrived. Smith's duty also included the lighting of some paraffin lamps at the staple bottom for use during the succeeding day's work. From the position of the bodies of Rawlings and Smith after the explosion, it is every way likely that on Rawlings reaching the staple bottom he found Smith there, and it is equally likely they would at once proceed to light the open lamps to obtain a better light than that afforded by the safety lamps they carried, to assist them in hanging on and receiving the tubs spoken of. Here, then, we have naked lights. The ventilation in this staple and for some distance away from it having the choice of more than one way has been liable, we have been told, to be occasionally in one direction and sometimes in the opposite. This does not by any means necessarily imply an improper mode of ventilating the mine, but it does show that it is possible that for short distances away from the staple bottom (especially) and in the staple itself, the air might be in a more or less stagnant condition, so that any gas being generated in the airways where such stillness of the air existed might, especially in the presence of coal dust suspended in the air, become dangerous. And here also we have a disturbing cause by which coal dust was likely to get mixed with the air, inasmuch as the two Venners, Hindson, and others, were engaged at this point enlarging refuge holes, and had apparently recently fired shots, we have also Smith and Jos. Rawlings close by, and exposed lights, of course assuming that some of the paraffin lamps had been lighted. The ventilation in this neighbourhood is necessarily of a somewhat complicated character, depending largely upon doors, &c., in the mainways. Workmen being engaged in various parts within a short distance of this staple, it has been a point of great interest to us to discuss the effects of certain doors being improperly left open for a time, notably the one in the crosscut opposite Venner's shot, where Robert Rawlings was engaged stowing stone. Of course such a thing would entirely disarrange the ventilation and very shortly produce a dangerous condition of the mine, but when we consider the class of men at work at the time, and the undoubtedly good discipline of the colliery, we feel we have no right to suppose such a possibility.
"Here, then, we have a possible somewhat stagnant condition of the ventilation, with a possible oozing off of gas from the coal walls along such stagnated airways, and probable open lights at staple bottom, and also the possibility of dust suspended in the air by movements of workmen above alluded to. In addition, we have effects and indications left by the explosion which, in our opinion, are not inconsistent with the explosion having originated in this immediate locality.
"At the curve, nearly opposite the engine plane entrance to the Maudlin seam, there can be no doubt a shot had been fired at the precise moment of the explosion. This is indicated by the positions of the bodies of the two workmen who had prepared the shot. They were found at about equal distances from it, one in one direction, and the other in an opposite direction, showing that the straw or fuse had been ignited, and that they had retreated in opposite directions, like careful workmen, for the purpose of warning anyone moving about the pit to keep out of dangerous proximity to the shot.
"With the velocity of air current passing around this curve it is very probable that the man retreating against the current or towards No. 1 pit would, especially if running, so disturb the dust, always lying in large quantities all round this curve, that the current would become very much mixed with fine dust, a condition of things, as shown by Professor Abel's report, very favourable to its taking an active part in initiating or adding materially to the destructive effects of an explosion. From the point where the shot was fired the Maudlin engine plane (crosscut) proceeds eastwards about 250 yards until it joins the main intake from Nos. 1 and 2 pits, this crosscut passing through the large dislocation or trouble mentioned in the descriptive portion of this report, and also passing other smaller troubles. We have been informed, although it has not appeared in evidence, that in this crosscut, the air current having the choice of entering the Maudlin seam in a straight line from the downcast shaft, the ventilation was sometimes in one direction and occasionally in an opposite course; or in other words, this drift was in a stagnant condition as regards ventilation. Judging from the relative positions of the 'ways' in this neighbourhood, and the directions of the main currents, it is more than probable that such a condition would arise. Moreover, although this drift is for the greater part of its distance in stone, and also arched in brickwork, and therefore not likely of itself to give off gas to any considerable extent, yet, passing as it does the troubles already spoken of, there can be no doubt that in a feeble or stagnant condition of the ventilation, gas might be given off from the leaders of the troubles.
"Professor Abel's valuable experiments and report have shown its that 2.5 per cent. of gas (such as he experimented with) in a current in which the most sensitive of the Seaham dusts was suspended, passing a lamp flame at only 600 feet per minute, became ignited and produced explosive effects. In the whole length of this possibly stagnated airway, it would not require more than 1,000 cubic feet of gas to give a proportion of 2.5 per cent., a proportion by the way not discernable by the ordinary mode of testing for gas by the flame of a safety lamp.
"At this point we thus have coal dust suspended in the current of air raised by Simpson retreating from the shot ; we also have a possible contamination of the air between the curve end and the junction of the Maudlin crosscut with the main intake current going into the Maudlin ; and also the exposed and forcible flame of the shot, which bears some indications of having been an overcharged shot; and hence all the elements necessary for an explosion.
"It is noteworthy that at almost equal distances from the curve occurs the apparent divergence of forces so frequently spoken of near the Polka Way, and in the Old Incline of No. 3 Pit, and if the phenomena at these two points are to be explained as having been produced in the same manner, this of itself would be sufficient to cause a search for the seat of the explosion somewhere between the two points.
"Moreover the various positions of fire (active) after the explosion all radiate from this centre, whereas no fire was found south of the Polka Way.
"At one of these two points, the curve or staple, we believe the explosion to have originated, and of the two we think the curve offers the most acceptable solution of the difficulty. Taking this point, we hold the opinion that all the phenomena may satisfactorily be explained, whilst on the other hand to fix the Polka Way as the seat of the explosion, many of the indications could only, in our judgment, be explained on the supposition of two at least, if not more distinct explosions having followed in succession.
"Whilst it must be regretted that any doubt or uncertainty should exist in a matter of such momentous importance, it may be somewhat satisfactory to think, that, as all the possible points of origination, as it is believed, have been carefully and exhaustively considered by these concerned, the varied lessons to be deduced from the consideration of such diversity of circumstances will tend to increased safety in the future, not only in this particular mine, but also, as the inquiry has been so exhaustive and of such public interest, to all the mines in the district.
THOMAS BELL.
JAMES WILLIS."