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Colliery Engineering

March, 1937

REPORT BY MR. JOSEPH JONES

Mr. Jones' conclusions are as follows :–

(a) In the circumstances of an explosion of such magnitude it is difficult to rule out any place likely to contain gas, or the possibilities of ignition from any cause, and of these there were several in this mine. Yet he thinks the explosion could hardly have occurred in 29's. Nor does he think it could have occurred in the neighbourhood of the "Clutch." Indeed, he regards the suggestion that "the ignition was at the telephone when it was about to be used for warning those inbye of the influx of gas in the Drift" as being extremely unlikely, and entirely unsupported by any reliable evidence whatsoever. Mr. Jones considers the possibility of ignition by spontaneous combustion to be also insufficiently supported by evidence. The only isolated suggestion of "smell" was, according to the evidence of the undermanager, "not the smell of gobfire" who came to this conclusion after seeing smoke in 29's return. Other possible danger points have been mentioned, but Mr. Jones is convinced that of them all, the most likely was 14's. As regards this area a definite chain of corroborated evidence established beyond all dubiety that 14's was a veritable "gasometer" awaiting the unfortunate coincidence of ignition which would produce such a catastrophic explosion as happened with such dreadful consequences on the morning of September 2, 1934.

(b) The inadequate supervision of the Inspectorate and Management must he regarded as a contributory factor, since the conditions in 14's and elsewhere could hardly have persisted in the presence of effective supervision and stricter conformity to the law and existing regulations.

(c) The system of stonedusting was entirely unsatisfactory, and could not be regarded as conforming to Clause 2 of the General Regulations. The evidence of Henry Tomlinson to the effect that he "always found stonedusting and cleaning going on" was too flippant and sweeping to be reliable or truthful. On the contrary the evidence revealed that whilst a sufficient quantity of stonedust was sent down the mine, it was allowed to accumulate near the pit bottom, so much so that for some distance the men had to walk through it. Many men testified to their boots being covered, but it did not reach the places where it was intended for, or where it was required. The job was done perfunctorily and inadequately. It was further ascertained that the spreading of stonedust was entrusted to odd men and boys, each of whom carried a small bag. This work should not be assigned to other than those who fully appreciate the significance of the duty allotted to them.

(d) In Mr. Jones' general report he has confined himself to the disaster which caused the loss of 261 lives. During the course of a disastrous and ill-conceived exploration of No. 20's return, other four lives were lost. In support of his charge of complete demoralisation amongst the officials at this mine, he desires to direct attention to the fact "which has proven" that a rescue team of five men were sent into this return on the instruction only of a deputy named Harold Thomas. Notwithstanding the fact that the condition of the atmosphere was ascertained within six yards of the entrance to this airway by using a canary which instantly dropped dead, Harold Thomas sent a Brigade forward without a life line, and without a reserve Brigade in attendance. It is, therefore, difficult to escape the conclusion that Harold Thomas was guilty of manslaughter in respect of the loss of four men of a brave Rescue Team. Only one of the five emerged alive.

(e) As regards the manager of the mine, Mr. Win. Bonsall, who accepted full responsibility, the evidence, in Mr. Jones' opinion, clearly establishes that he was guilty of the following serious breaches of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and of the General Regulations :–

Failure to keep books, copies thereof, Section 24.

Failure to maintain adequate ventilation, Section 29. 1.

Failure to measure and enter quantity in every split, Section 29. 1.

Failure to supply separate means of egress in top end of 14's, Section 36. 3.

Failure to cut off electric current in 14's face when over 1¼ per cent. of gas was present, Section 60. 2.

Failure to comply with requirement regarding telephone apparatus, Section 60.

Failure to comply with sub-section 5 of Section 62. 4 dealing with coal dust.

Failure to carry out instructions for withdrawal of workmen. Section 67.

Failure to comply with Section 88 (b) to supply workmen with abstract.

Failure to enforce General Regulations 11, Part 1 dealing with wafting gas.

Failure to observe Statutory Rules and Orders on Explosives, Part 11.

Failure to observe C.M.R. Limitation of hours, &c., 1908-32.

He did not cause dust samples to be taken beyond 142's at any time.

He left matters involving breaches of law to his under-officials, and had never attempted to inculcate respect for the law among the officials appointed by him to supervise the day-to-day operations of the men.

The under-manager and the other subordinate officials, deputies and shotfirers have also been similarly guilty of flagrant and persistent breaches of the Coal Mines Act and General Regulations, and all should be dealt with as the law directs.

(f) It is Mr. Jones' considered opinion that the Chief Inspector of Mines, or any of his assistants, should not in future be called upon to conduct formal investigations of this kind. In stating this he does not impute incompetency or unfairness to the Commissioner at this Inquiry. He does assert, however, that it imposes upon any person directly associated with the Inspectorate a dual loyalty which must inevitably strain impartiality to the farthest limits.

The seriousness of such investigations demands that they be entrusted to members of the Judiciary, whose training and experience is required, but with whom there might sit persons of practical experience in mining to advise them only on matters concerning current mining practice and conditions.

Drawings accompanying the article