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Colliery Engineering

March, 1937

REPORT BY MR. JOHN BRASS

Mr. Brass does not agree with Sir Henry Walker in a number of particulars. He refers to the difficulty of providing a good ventilation layout owing to the number of faults, and claims that the management were making efforts iii various directions to remedy this state of affairs. He does not agree that 95's, 14's and 29's districts should have been stopped. The mine should not be regarded as a gassy mine, and there was no hesitation on the part of the Deputies in reporting gas when found. It was suggested by some witnesses that shots were fired on occasions by the Deputies in the presence of gas. It is difficult to believe such evidence, says Mr. Brass, and the Manager had warned Deputies and shotfirers against carelessness when firing shots.

Sir Henry Walker considers that important information was withheld from the Court of Inquiry by certain witnesses with regard to doors which had been placed in the No. 4 North Return Airway near the air measurement station marked M.5 on Fig. 1, and he makes the suggestion that such evidence was withheld because it was desired to hide the lack of a sufficient quantity of air in 14's District. Mr. Brass submits that when the Manager and Under-Manager were asked if there were any regulators in the Dennis Section of the mine, they would immediately think of regulators such as are familiar to all mining men, and the significance of the doors referred to could not have occurred to them, and he does not interpret their answers in the same way as Sir Henry Walker.

With regard to the disaster itself, Mr. Brass does not agree with Sir Henry Walker that the circumstances existing in connection with 24's airway in 95's District should be looked upon with grave suspicion as the point of origin of the explosion, and comes to the conclusion that the point of origin of the explosion was near the Clutch, due to firedamp being ignited by the use of the telephone. The Clutch was the highest point of all the workings byway to 24 North and North-East of it, and was the most likely place for gas to accumulate. From the position of the bodies of the haulage lads round the telephone box, away from their usual stations, and from the fact that the telephone receiver, which was not of an approved pattern, was off its hook, Mr. Brass concludes that the telephone initiated the explosion.

Mr. Brass's general observations

Airways. — Mr. Brass does not agree with the suggestion of Sir Henry Walker that, instead of two main intakes in every seam of a mine newly opened, it is always desirable that two main return airways should be provided, and that these should be on either side of the main intake airway. There are many factors which might make such an absolute rule undesirable. For instance, the dip of the seam may have some influence on the position of the airways; unusual geological conditions; cases where the return airways are the main haulage roads, and the possibility of developments in the methods of conveying men to and from their working places, such as by electrical storage battery or diesel locomotives. It should be left to the management of a mine to decide whether the additional airways required by the Act should be a return or an intake airway, and, after consideration of all the circumstances, where it should lie in relation to the main haulage road.

Underground Fires. — The Report of the Joint Committee representing The Institution of Mining Engineers, the Mining Association of Great Britain, and the National Association of Colliery Managers makes certain recommendations with regard to the best methods of dealing with underground fires. The Committee gave full consideration to the question of laying water mains along main roads but came to the conclusion that this was not the best way of providing a supply of water under pressure at any point where it might be needed. In the case of falls of roof following an explosion, the water main might easily be put out of action, and the water supply cut off. After a period of years with the usual pit water, the mains may become furred up and the hydrants useless.

Road Dust Samples. — In Mr. Brass's opinion, it is unnecessary to keep a plan showing the zones from which dust samples are taken. The Act requires refuge holes on main roads to be numbered, and these numbers should afford a ready means of identification and reference. The suggestion for the provision of an additional plan for the marking off of sampling zones would not contribute to the efficiency of a system of stone dust sampling, as the extent of the zone can be put on record without it, and the plan would not ensure that the actual samples were taken in the correct zones. In addition to the working plan of the mine, there has to be kept a plan showing the ventilation, another on which the position of all electrical apparatus and cables is indicated, arid numbers of copies of plans of districts for rescue purposes. In addition, a plan has often to be kept for royalty requirements. Efficiency of supervision would not be assisted by increasing the number of plans to be kept and examined.

Management. — Mr. Brass concurs with the suggestion that every large mine should have a fully-qualified mining engineer in authority superior to the manager, known under the Act as "Agent," but how such a person, even though of strong personality, would always be able to resist those in charge of the commercial side of the concern is difficult to say; it might lead to his dismissal. At Gresford there was no evidence that financial considerations had prevented any steps being taken by the Manager which he considered were in the interests of safety; in fact, evidence was given to the contrary. Mr. Brass definitely disagrees with the proposal that Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, should be amended so as to give power to the Secretary for Mines to direct a formal investigation into the conditions and circumstances existing as regards safety at any mine, whether any accident happened or not.

Technical infringements of the Coal Mines Act and Regulations may have occurred, but in Mr. Brass's opinion they did not contribute either directly or indirectly to the cause of the disaster. There are hundreds of Rules and Regulations to be observed by the management of a mine, and many of them have little or no bearing on the safe working of mines. At Gresford the management were always ready and willing to put right any matter requiring attention which was brought to their notice.

Supervision. — The appointment of additional Under-managers would not, in Mr. Brass's opinion, have resulted in greater efficiency or better supervision.

The following are Mr. Brass's conclusions :–

(1) All telephones and similar apparatus to be used in safety-lamp mines should be of a type or types approved by the Mines Department for such mines.

(2) The necessity of providing at convenient points means for attacking fires in their initial stages. There is no doubt in Mr. Brass's mind that the fire resulting from the explosion caused a great loss of life, and the fire when first seen was of small dimensions.

Mr. Benjamin Edwards said in evidence that when he first saw the fire "there was not much flame" and that "it did not seem much of a fire then." Mr. Brass is of the opinion that, had such means been available at or near the Clutch, the fire near 29's junction could have been got under control and many lives saved.

(3) It may be desirable to arrange for workmen occasionally to travel the alternative roads from the working places to the pit bottom, but Mr. Brass is of the opinion that it would be better to signpost these roads effectively so as to give a clear indication of the route to be taken to reach the shaft.

(4) In mines where oil safety lamps are in general use, consideration should be given as to whether a proportion of electric safety lamps ought not to be provided. These would enable workmen to find their way out more quickly in cases of accidents in which oil lamps may be extinguished.

Drawings accompanying the article