Evidence was given by persons who knew the Browns (the stonemen), that Samuel Brown lay on the stones thrown by the shot, and that William Brown was under the tub. It is probable that an empty tub, blown back over a man's body lying on the main road across the rails would, if one of the wheels passed over the head, inflict on it with the flanges a cut; and that one of the wheels on the other side of the tub, forced against his legs when lying face downwards, would inflict a cut on the inner side of the left thigh; and that a force applied to the tub capable of doing this, would probably drag the body with it, tearing off the covering of the chest. It also appeared probable that the big stone, in falling on a man's body, would break his arms and legs, and at the same time fracture his lamp. It appeared difficult, however, to reverse the causes of these injuries. Dr. Wilson knew neither of the Browns, and could not personally identify them. They had been differently named to him on his first examination, and it appeared probable that he had described the son's injuries as those of the father, and vice versa. The evidence of a man, who assisted in removing the bodies from the place where they lay, proved that the body under the place from which the big stone had fallen had a broken leg. As none of the bones of the other body were broken, this established the probability of the men having been wrongly named to the doctor.
The work the stonemen and wagonwaymen were engaged upon was urgent. The main road would require to be set free upon the pit starting work on the arrival of the night-shift workmen — hewers, putters, drivers, etc. These persons were waiting on the surface to descend at the time of the explosion; 9 p.m. being the time when they commenced to descend. Under the circumstances, it would be difficult to imagine why the wagonwaymen should have left their work, unless a shot was to be fired.
The loose stone hanging at the place where the shot had been fired afforded strong evidence that the stonemen had done no work at the shot after firing it.
It was urged that the stenton D was an improbable place for the stonemen to retire to after lighting the shot, for two reasons — first, the usual practice amongst stonemen is for one man to go out-bye and the other in-bye from a shot, to warn persons not to approach; second, the position taken up would be dangerous.
With regard to the first objection, there was, in this case, no reason for one of the stonemen going in-bye, as the road was already guarded in this direction by three men — the two wagonwaymen and the deputy overman. It was found that out-bye from the shot, the road being straight, a distance of more than 120 yards could be seen in that direction. The stonemen, before lighting the shot, could assure themselves that no one could approach from in-bye, and that out-bye no one was within 120 yards of the shot. There were only two persons likely to be moving along this road at the time of the explosion, one was the horsekeeper, who had been to the stables, a short distance down the Narrow Board haulage road, and had put the harness on the horses and ponies there, and must have passed the stonemen on his way to the stables in the Middle North, where his body was found. The other person was the master shifter or official then in charge of the pit. His body was found in the Middle North, and the stonemen may have been aware of his movements.
The second objection, that the position was dangerous did not appear well founded. The drill hole was fifteen inches long, and was nearly at right angles to the road. By retiring as far as the first door the stone men would be round a corner and eight yards from the shot. It was not possible for any stone, thrown by the shot, to reach the stonemen, if they retired to the door. It is not improbable that if the stonemen had been alone, the danger of the concussion, produced by the shot, extinguishing their lamps might have caused them to retire further, but, as a deputy overman was near, they knew that they would have had no difficulty, in such a case, in relighting their lamps.
If the stonemen and wagonwaymen had been engaged at their work at the time of the explosion, the writers would have expected that the four lamps would have been found hanging at the place of work, undamaged, and the gauzes free from oil, like the deputy overman's lamp. They would also have expected a movement, out-bye from the place where they were working, would have been evident, as in the case of the deputy overman.
The fact of the two stonemen both lying with their heads in-bye was difficult to understand, except upon the assumption that they had come out of the stenton D.
The writers conclude that a shot had been fired in the centre of the undisturbed portion of the main road, at the moment of the explosion, and this being the only source of naked flame, they assume that it was the point of origin of the explosion.
In order to account for this explosion on the assumption that it was caused by fire-damp and air, the greatest difficulties arise at every step. Thus, it is necessary to account for the presence of fire-damp in large quantities on the main intake air way, for its presence on some of the branch intakes, and its absence on others. No single source of fire-damp could account for such a state of things.
To account for fire-damp, in sufficient quantity, on any of these roads, it is necessary to assume some extraordinary occurrence — such as had never been observed before, and of which there was not a trace of evidence.
It is necessary to account for the absence of alarm amongst the workmen scattered at different points over these roads, or otherwise, it is necessary to assume that the roads had simultaneously and instantaneously been invaded by fire-damp from unknown sources.
Almost equal difficulties present themselves if it is assumed that there was even so small a quantity as one per cent, of fire-damp in the air on the roads over which the explosion extended. It would be necessary to assume the point of issue near the shaft, as it is difficult to conceive a comparatively small issue backing against a large current of air. It would be necessary to assume it entering the air with great regularity, for if it had come off in greater quantity, at one time than at others, it would have been observed on the lamps of the workmen, and could not have failed to attract their attention.
It would, under any circumstances, be pure assumption, as no source of gas was known near the shafts. 32,000 cubic feet of air per minute passed into the district of explosion, and it would require an issue of 320 cubic feet of fire-damp per minute to give one per cent. of gas in the air.
The difficulties in the way of accounting for this explosion by gas are so great that the occurrence must be considered inexplicable, unless we turn to coal dust. There was coal dust in abundance on the roads over which the explosion extended, and although, after the explosion, owing to peculiar circumstances, there was no large quantity at the point of origin, yet the writers are of the opinion, that before the explosion there would be sufficient dust at hand here to account for its initiation in the absence of any gas whatever.
The coal at Usworth, in the district of the explosion, even in the whole or first working, was very dry and dusty, and when water appeared it was from the floor of the seam. Singing rarely accompanied the issue of gas from the freshly exposed coal.
The explosion was confined to the major portion of the intake air roads, and the working face of the Narrow Board, Cross-cut, and Low North districts. The whole of these roads were dusty; and coal was hauled, by means of steam and compressed air engines, over the greater part of them. The return air roads were undamaged, and free from coal dust. The damage was entirely confined to the haulage roads.
The vicinity of the downcast shaft was wet, owing to shaft water. There was a slight dropping of water near the air crossing, a short distance out-bye from the Middle North. The bottom, and part of one side of the stone drift, was wet, and there was an issue of water at the face of the Narrow Board. These were the only natural sources of water in the field of the explosion.
For 67 yards out-bye, from the point of origin, was the wettest part of the main road, and this circumstance appeared, at first sight, to render it unlikely that any quantity of coal dust could exist here.
On Plan 3 is shown the leader of the ten yard dip trouble, crossing the stone drift. At this leader, on the south side of the road, a small feeder of salt water issued, and trickled down the side; no flow of water could be observed, but the side of the drift was wet for 8 yards from the leader ; the whole of the wet side was covered with a paste of coal dust to the depth of 3 or 4 inches, and this wet dust could be taken off in handfuls. The water, after reaching the bottom, was almost entirely confined between the rails where it stood in small pools. This wetness continued up to within two yards of the shot, the water then found its way into the stenton D, and the main road beyond was dry. The north side of the drift, the top, and south side, with the exception of the 8 yards next the leader, were dry. The space between the rails and the side of the drift was damp, and this dampness extended a few inches up the side at some points, more particularly at one or two places, where time hauling rope appeared to have surged.
The sides and top of the drift, being in stone, were more or less rugged, the remains of an old coating of dust were visible both on the sides and top after the explosion, and a considerable quantity of dry dust was on all the parts of the drift clear of the water.
A current of 26,700 cubic feet of air per minute passed down this drift, and the tubs were hauled up it by the compressed air engine at the Middle North, The coal being dry and dusty there would be a quantity of coal dust blown out of and from the tops of the tubs while in the drift, and some would lodge on the sides and top. The conditions were favourable for the deposition of a large amount of coal dust on time upper parts of the drift, and the writers, speaking from experience of drifts, under similar conditions, have no doubt that the higher parts of this drift would be clothed with a thick deposit of flue dry coal dust of the inflammable nature already described. This dust would be readily shaken into the air by the concussion of a shot. It would be hanging to the top and sides, all the ledges would support it, and the tremor communicated to the stone by the shot would cause the dust to fall off. Part of this dust would be shaken off by the concussion of the shot, and the rapid movement of the air accompanying and succeeding the explosion would dislodge most of the remainder. Some would appear to have been carried out-bye, and the writers think it probable that a large quantity of the dust observed in the stenton D, would be thrown in from this drift. All the dust falling on the wet bottom would be lost as dust.
The deposit of dust, probably existing on the upper parts of this drift, would be the result of several years growth under unvarying conditions. It would be swept off at the time of the explosion, and a small portion only would re-settle, hence the appearance of the drift, as regards dust, after the explosion, would be very different to its appearance before that event.
It was urged that the passage of men and horses, and the shaking of the "cow" (an iron bar attached to the last tub of a set of full tubs, to prevent them running back in case of a broken rope or chain), would cause splashing, and wet the whole of the drift. There was no appearance to lead to the supposition that any splashing had reached the sides of the drift, and none could have reached the upper parts. The writers do not think there is any reason to doubt that there had been sufficient dry coal dust in this drift to account for the origin of the explosion.
Observations, with the wet and dry bulb thermometer, were taken at Usworth after the explosion, and are given on page 17. The readings at the top of the stone drift and 4 yards out-bye from the leader, were: dry bulb, 69½ degs. F.; wet bulb, 63½ degs. F. At the shot, or about 2 yards in-bye of the wet bottom, they were: dry bulb, 69½ degs. F.; wet bulb, 63½ degs. F. The air was as dry after passing the wet bottom as on reaching it.
The shot fired appeared to have been an overcharged shot. The drill hole was 15 inches long, nearly at right angles to the road, pointing slightly out-bye, and its axis was level. The big stone had been loosened by the powder cutting upwards, or acting in a direction not intended. The stone thrown by the shot was in small pieces, and great shattering appeared to have taken place. This would increase the concussion, and the comparatively short hole was favourable to the production of flame. The hole was drilled nearly midway between roof and floor. The area of the drift at the shot was 33 square feet, the height being 5 feet 6 inches, and the width 6 feet.