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Baddesley Colliery.Extracted from the Annual Mines Inspectors Report for 1884 Report of Thomas Evans (page 60) This colliery is a few miles from Atherstone, in Warwickshire, and now the property of the executors of the late Stratford Dugdale, Esq. Thirty-two lives were lost underground at this mine on the 1st of May 1882, under the following circumstances — nine men were engaged in the far end of the workings repairing the roadways, &c. Late at night it was discovered that volumes of smoke were pouring up the intake engine plane, and that the nine poor fellows could not possibly make their escape. The smoke no doubt came from a fire at the bottom of the engine plane, a very long distance from the shafts, and this fire originated at an engine boiler which had a few weeks previously been placed in a coal heading at the bottom of the engine plane. I have already reported to you upon this case, and I think that the accompanying extracts from the Report of Arnold Morley, Esq., M.P., barrister-at-law, will lay clear the facts as given before the Coroner's jury at the inquest held at Atherstone, before Dr. Iliffe, one of the Coroners for the county of Warwick. It was a very melancholy catastrophe, and resulted in the loss of many valuable lives. Report No. 2. The inquest on the body of one of the nine men who lost their lives through the conflagration in the Baddesley Colliery in the month of May 1882, which had been opened by Mr. Iliffe, the Coroner for the district, on the discovery of the body, on July 12th, 1884, was continued on July 23rd and August 7th, when the jury returned the following verdict:— "We are of opinion that William Day and others died in the Baddesley Colliery from suffocation by inhalation of noxious gases and smoke generated by fire, which was caused by flame from the boiler and and engine in the return-airway igniting the coal, the same being placed, with the authority of the consulting engineer, injudiciously, and without proper precautions being taken to prevent ignition. We are of opinion that John Parker, the manager, and Mr. Gillett are culpably negligent for not taking every precaution for the safety of the mine, and that it was an error in judgment in placing the boiler and engine there at all. Neither did the underviewers or engine-wrights do their duty in properly reporting the frightful condition of the pit, and we are of opinion that the management of the pit was disgracefully carried out. We are also sure that the most noble efforts were used to rescue those entombed." I attended the inquest on behalf of the Secretary of State, in concert with Mr. Thomas Evans and Mr. Stokes, Her Majesty's Inspectors of Mines; and Mr. J. B. Fowler, solicitor, of Leicester, appeared to watch the case for Mr. Gillett. 2. In my report to the Home Office, dated 11th December 1882, upon the inquiry which was held into the cause of the death of the 23 men who lost their lives in attempting to rescue the nine men who had been imprisoned in the Deep Workings of the Baddesley Colliery, I gave a general description of the workings, and a short account of the events which resulted in the conflagration, and the consequent lamentable loss of life. I also stated that, after anxious deliberation, it had been considered necessary to close the mine, as the only way of overcoming the fire which was raging in the Deep Workings. This determination had been arrived at in consequence of the impossibility which existed in the then condition of the mine of making any fresh attempts to rescue the imprisoned men, and the conviction, which has since been proved to have been well founded, that long before the step in question was taken, and the efforts for their release had been abandoned, their lives must have been sacrificed. At the date of my Report, which had already been delayed for some time in the hope of evidence being forthcoming as to the condition of the mine in the neighbourhood of the steam boiler, it was confidently expected that within a very short period not only would the nine bodies have been recovered, but that a thorough examination would have been made, which might throw further light on the cause of the terrible disaster which had taken place. Unfortunately, this has not been the case, as so far only five of the nine bodies have been recovered, and, although some portions of the workings beyond the steam boiler have been examined, it has been impossible to get at the actual point where it is now practically certain that the fire originated. 3. In the autumn of 1882, after the mine had been closed for nearly six months, and so far as was possible all communication with the outer air had been cut off, steps were taken to re-open the mine with a view to recover the bodies of the nine men, and to resume mining operations. From experiments which had previously been made, the temperature of the mine had been falling, and the amount of gas and choke damp had been decreasing, and it was hoped that the fire which six months before had been raging in the Deep Workings had subsided. Every precaution, however, was taken in the work of exploration, and the progress in re-opening and examining the airways was necessarily very slow, and it was not until February 1883 that the examination of the main incline was commenced. On the 10th of April three of the bodies were discovered in the main incline air passage, a short distance below No. 5 thirl, leading from the main intake into the main return-air passage. Soon after smoke in large quantities was met with, forcing its way up the incline, showing that the fire still existed in the lower portions of the workings, and it was necessary to suspend any further examination in the main intake. A heading was then driven in a slanting direction, as shown on the plan appended to this Report, in order to connect, if possible, with the levels of the Deep Workings, where it was expected the remaining six bodies would be found. A communication by means of a bore-hole with these levels was effected in September, but they were found to be so full of explosive gas at a great pressure, that it was nearly a month before a passage could be opened out and an examination made. It was discovered that the water had risen to some height above the original levels of the Deep Workings, and before any further examination could be earned out it was necessary by some means to get rid of the water which filled the passages and airways. While arrangements were being made for doing this by means of a pump driven by an endless rope from the engine at the foot of the shaft, the stalls above the level of the water were examined, and another body was discovered near the face of the coal in No. 18 stall. The pumping operations were commenced in May 1884, but soon after this date decided symptoms of fire appeared above the stoppings in the main incline, and near the point where the new heading commenced, and these symptoms soon increased to so serious an extent, that it became necessary to raise the working road in the neighbourhood of these stoppings into the roof of the mine, and to fill up the road in the coal with burnt earth and sand, so as completely to cut off all communication at this point with those portions of the workings where it was evident the fire was still burning. By the early part of July the level of the water had been considerably lowered, and further exploration was made, resulting in the discovery of another body, which was found in No. 18 Jig Road. As the effect of lowering the water in the levels of the Deep Workings would necessarily be to allow the current of ventilation to pass along the old air passage, and to increase the fire which was still burning in the coal in the neighbourhood of the steam boiler, and it was impossible to say how long a period might elapse before the fire, which had already been burning for more than two years, was completely extinguished, it was decided to commence the inquiry into the circumstances attending the deaths of those of the nine men whose bodies had been discovered, without waiting for the result of any further examination, which it was felt could not after the great length of time, throw much additional light on the cause of the disaster. 4. A considerable portion of the evidence in the inquiry was similar to that which had been given in the previous one in 1882, but there were one or two points upon which fresh light was thrown by subsequent inquiries, and by the further examination which had in the meantime been made of a portion of the workings. In his evidence at the inquest in 1882, Smallman stated that while he was at work with the exploring party, attempting to get down the main incline through the dense smoke which filled it, and shortly before the explosion, he distinctly saw the bell wire which extended down the incline pulled three or four times, and that from the manner in which the pulls were given, he had no doubt that the wire was being jerked by the imprisoned men whom they were attempting to rescue. From inquiries, however, which he had subsequently made, he had learnt that the wire above the point where he was working was being repaired by some of the other men in the pit, and that the pulls or jerks were given by them, and not, as he thought, from below. From a careful examination of the position of the bodies which were found in the incline, and of those which were discovered in No. 18 stall and Jig Road, and of the condition of their candle boxes and food, both Smallman and Morgan, the new certificated manager, who had assisted at the re-opening of the workings, were convinced that the men must have died sometime before the period when Smallman thought he saw the wire pulled by them, and not many minutes after the smoke found its way into the main incline intake, so that they were probably dead when the existence of the fire was first discovered, as related in my previous report by Joseph Day, the deputy, Charles Day's son. The examination of the return-airway, and of the No. 1 thirl, connecting the main intake and return passages, where the double doors were placed, showed the condition of the regulator and of the double doors. At the regulator, which was in the return, at a short distance above the point where No. 1 thirl joined it, the door was found closed, and the only aperture remaining open was a small space 3¼ square feet in area. The door was coated with tar, but not to any great extent, and Smallman was strongly of opinion that, judging by the large quantity of ventilation which was passing down the main intake into the Deep Workings, estimated by him at 20,000 cubic feet per minute, all of which would have to pass through whatever space was open at the regulator in the return-air passage, it was impossible that the door could have been closed at the time when he was working with the rescuing party in the incline, and that the door must have been shut either by the explosion, which took place shortly afterwards, or at some time after the mine was closed. The double doors were found blown away from their frames towards the return, and away from the intake, and this was accounted for by Smallman, who suggested that a slight explosion might have taken place in the return at some time before the fire was discovered, and that the back draft of air to fill the vacuum so caused might have blown the doors in that direction, and so have allowed the smoke to find its way into the main intake airway, where it was shortly afterwards discovered by Charles Day "standing like a wall" across the incline. 5. As has been already stated, it has not yet been possible to examine the actual locality of the steam boiler and engine, but both the intake and return have been carefully inspected down as far as No. 4 thirl, and portions of the Deep Workings beyond the boiler have also been examined. The result has been to fix almost as a certainty the origin of the conflagration at the steam boiler furnace at the foot of the incline in the main return-air way. The jury have indeed found that this was so, and they have added a strong expression of opinion that the boiler should never have been placed in such a position. In the face of the evidence which was given at the inquest, not only of the Inspector of Mines, but also of other witnesses who were called, they could hardly have come to any other decision, apart from what must have appeared, even to the unscientific mind, to have been the obvious danger of placing a steam boiler at such a distance from the shaft, in the main return-airway, and under conditions such that it was impossible to travel or to examine a considerable length of the return at any time when the furnace was lighted. Mr. Gillett, in his evidence, stated that as consulting engineer to the colliery he gave his consent to the boiler being so placed, but only on the distinct understanding that it was to be bricked both above and round the sides, and that it would only be necessary to work it one day in the week. Neither of these conditions were fulfilled, but even had they been so, I think there can be no doubt that there would have been considerable danger, and that the placing of the boiler and furnace in the position which it occupied, was, to say the least, an error of judgment. Mr. Gillett's responsibility, however, does not rest alone with the original sanction given to the erection of the boiler and furnace in the mine. He paid a visit to the workings and inspected the locality after the boiler had been in use some days. There were present at this visit, which took place on the 26th April, and only five days before the fire broke out, besides Mr. Gillett, Parker, the certificated manager, and Pogmore the financial agent for the colliery, both of whom lost their lives through the explosion, and Thomas Walker, the man in charge of the engine. Mr. Gillett states that upon his expressing surprise at the brickwork not having been erected, Parker explained that he had been prevented doing so by the water getting into the foundation. Mr. Gillett's attention was not called to the condition of the coal in the roof above the boiler, which was at that time, and, in fact, had been to a greater or less extent ever since the furnace was first lighted, on fire, but he was aware that the engine had been working continuously for nearly a fortnight, and that the brickwork which he considered necessary had not been erected, and yet, although neither of the two conditions which were considered by him to be indispensable to the safety of the mine had been complied with, it can hardly be doubted, after reading his evidence given at the first inquiry, that before leaving the colliery he did give his sanction to Parker to continue working the boiler and engine for some time longer, and under the same conditions in which he had just seen it working. Parker, the certificated manager, was one of the victims of the explosion, and was therefore unable to give any account of his action in relation to the placing the boiler in that part of the mine. It was stated, however, by the witness Congreave, a bricklayer, who had built the foundation for the boiler, that in the course of a conversation which he had with Parker about the necessity for arching over the boiler, the latter had said that his instructions were to put the boiler in without arching, and that "he could not help it," and that "his hands were tied behind him." It would be unwise to place too much reliance upon a statement of this kind, but it serves to illustrate the serious danger which results from the system of divided responsibility which too often exists in the management of coal mines. 6. Mr. Gillett considered that he was, in relation to the colliery, in the position of consulting engineer, and in his evidence in the course of this inquiry, he stated that he had no authority to give orders, but merely to advise as to what should be done in connexion with the underground workings. At the previous inquiry, however, he had stated that with reference to any important matter in the colliery he had the absolute right of ordering any change to take place, or of prohibiting any change, and that Parker would have had no right to put the engine in the mine unless he (Mr. Gillett) had been previously consulted, and had given consent, and that with reference to any arrangements will respect to the engine, it was Parker's duty to carry out his instructions. If these statements were correct, and they were made by Mr. Gillett himself shortly after the explosion, and either while he still retained his official connexion with the colliery, or immediately after he had ceased to act in an official capacity, it is, I think, clear that his connexion with the official staff of the colliery was something more than that of a mere consulting engineer in the ordinary sense of the words, and that he came within the definition of agent given in section 73 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1872. That definition is as follows :— The term "agent," when used in relation to any mine, means any person having, on behalf of the owner, care or direction of any mine, or of any part thereof, and superior to a manager appointed in pursuance of this Act: Mr. Gillett admitted that he was "superior to the manager" in the sense that Parker had to obey his orders, and to carry out his instructions, and independently of the active interference in the management of the mine, which he admits, the word "superintendence," which occurs in the correspondence which constitutes his appointment at the colliery, is conclusive that he had "on behalf of the owner, care or direction of the mine." There may be cases in which it would be difficult to say whether the appointment was that of "agent" or merely of "consulting engineer," but I would submit that when once the freedom of action of the responsible manager is interfered with, and power is given to another person to control and modify his conduct of the mine, the appointment of agent has been made, and that the responsibility and liability under the Act, up to that time mainly, if not exclusively, resting upon the certificated manager, is shared by the agent so appointed. 7. It may well be doubted whether Parker, although he held a certificate, was fit for the post of certificated manager. It was stated by several of the witnesses that he was well aware of the fire in the roof of the return-airway during the whole time that the boiler was in use, and that when the furnace under the boiler was finally extinguished on the night of Sunday, April 30th, he was informed that the place had been left with the burning coal still remaining above the boiler, and that he allowed this fearful source of danger to remain, without taking any precaution against its development into the terrible conflagration which ultimately was the result. Whether Parker had been originally averse to the placing the boiler in the return-airway in the condition in which it was so placed, and his judgment had been over-ridden by someone superior to himself, as suggested by his words repeated by the witness Congreave, or whether he was in favour of the plan, and, in fact, himself suggested it, as stated by Mr. Gillett, such conduct as this would go far to prove that he was not a fit person to have the control of a mine, and to be responsible for the safety of the lives of so many of the men employed in the workings. The appointment of consulting engineer, or even of agent, can give very little additional security when the person who has the duty of daily superintending and of personally inspecting the details of the workings is unfit for the post which he holds, and this is especially the case when the agent lives at some distance from the colliery, and only visits the workings at rare intervals. 8. The jury have again drawn attention by their verdict to the bad management of the mine, and to the neglect by the underviewer and the enginewright to report the true condition of the mine, in accordance with the rules laid down by the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1872, and the special rules in force in this colliery. It is true that no special report appears in the deputy's book of the condition of the return-airway, but the general rule (2) in section 51 of the Act of 1872 provides that the report shall be of the condition of the mine, so far as ventilation is concerned, and it was suggested that the burning coal in the roof of the return-airway, although constituting a serious danger to the safety of the mine, did not in its then condition affect prejudicially, or in fact materially alter, the ventilation of the workings. Charles Day, the principal deputy, however, stated that he frequently reported the existence of the fire to Parker, and as it also appeared that he was unable to write, and that he was in the habit of getting Parker to write his reports for him in the report book, the responsibility for the absence of any such special reference to the state of the return-airway, should it have been made, would appear to rest upon Parker rather than on Charles Day, who, certainly so far as it was possible to judge from his demeanour as a witness, seemed to be in all respects, except that of education, a thoroughly competent and experienced man for the post. It was also stated by several of the witnesses that the existence of the fire in the coal above the boiler was well known to the men in the mine, who frequently came to look at it on their way to or from their work. Neither the general nor the special rules provide that the enginewright should report as to the condition of the airways, and Joseph Ball, who was in charge of this engine, would naturally consider that any responsibility which attached to him ceased as soon as Parker was made acquainted with the condition of the return. 9. The Inspectors of Mines for the district were not aware that the engine and boiler were being placed in the workings, and Mr. Evans stated that had he known of it, he certainly would not have given his sanction to the proposal, on the ground that no possible precautions in the way of brick-arching could have altogether obviated the danger which must necessarily have resulted from the placing of a boiler and furnace in the main return airway at such a distance from the shaft. Mr. Evans, in fact, agreed with Mr. Smallman in the opinion that the decision to resort to the expediency of placing an engine at the foot of the incline, instead of working the pump by an endless rope, was on every ground most unwise and injudicious, and in view of the fact that the use of steam boilers and furnaces underground, except, perhaps, at the foot of the shaft, is necessarily attended with so much risk and danger, I would suggest that it might be wise in the event of any revision of the general rules applicable to the management of coal mines, without unduly interfering with the responsibility of the officials, to provide that, before any such step were taken, notice should be given by the owner, agent, or manager of the mine, to the Inspector of Mines for the district, who would thereupon be able to examine the locality, and to satisfy himself that the conditions under which it was proposed to work the engine in question, were of a nature, if properly carried out, to secure the safety of the mine and of the lives of the men employed in it. 10. In conclusion I would draw the attention of the Secretary of State to the verdict of the jury, which, so far as it relates to Mr. Gillet, and to Parker, who is no longer alive, although in terms it does not amount to, yet practically does not differ much from, a verdict of manslaughter. The evidence at the inquest as to the position which Mr. Gillett held, and as to his share in the responsibility for placing the boiler in the return-airway, was in one sense unsatisfactory, as it depended entirely upon his own evidence, since the lives of Mr. Dugdale, Mr. Pogmore, and Parker had all been sacrificed, and they were unable either to confirm or to contradict the statements which he made. I do not suggest, however, that Mr. Gillett in any way attempted to evade responsibility, or that, with the exception of one matter upon which his statements at the two inquiries appeared to be conflicting, his evidence was other than a straightforward narrative of what had taken place ; but the fact that he alone was able to state what had occurred, and to describe the position which he held in the staff of the colliery, and that he came forward and tendered his evidence on these points, and on all others upon which he was examined, and also the fact of the length of time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the events which have been the subject of inquiry, are considerations which cannot be overlooked in determining whether any public advantage would be gained by the institution of proceedings, which, under the circumstances I have briefly alluded to, would, in my opinion, be not unlikely to fail. Arnold Morley. 2, Temple Gardens, 25th September 1884.
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