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Copy of Report of Mr. John Kenyon Blackwell on the subject of the Accident at Gethin Colliery, South Wales, in the early part of 1862.

 

London, 7 April 1862.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I attended the adjourned inquest held at Merthyr Tydvil upon those persons who died in consequence of the explosion of fire-damp which occurred in the west level of the No. 1 pit in the Gethin Colliery, near that place, on the 19th of February last.

This inquest was resumed on the 4th of March, and was continued, with a short interval of adjournment, until its close on the 13th of that month.

The pit in which this explosion occurred forms part of one of the collieries connected with the Cyfartha Iron Works.

This colliery has been at work for about 12 years. The only seam of coal which has hitherto been worked in it, to any extent, is that which is locally termed the Upper Four Foot. It is the same seam of coal as that in which so many serious explosions have occurred in the adjacent Aberdare Valley, and among others, the very fatal ones at Lletty Shenkin, Old and Middle Dyffryn, and Cefa Pennar.

There has, up to this period, been very little loss of life from explosions of fire-damp in the Cyfartha collieries, or in the other collieries connected with the great iron works in the Merthyr Valley, notwithstanding the very large quantities of coal which for a long series of years have been worked in them.

The seams from which this coal was formerly obtained were intersected by the valleys, and were worked by levels open to the day. In these situations the coal was found to be nearly free from fire damp.

When the depth of the seams became greater, and pits were required, the workings in each colliery and on each seam were continued gradually to the deep, succeeding each other at short and regular intervals. The elastic explosive gas, which these coals originally contained, thus escaped gradually through the fissures by which they were traversed, the drainage extending to some distance on the deep, and preceding the working of the coal.

The workings being carried forward on the level course, or strike of the measures, removing successively as they progressed a narrow strip of each of the seams, which, near this northern edge of the coal basin, are comparatively steep, facilitated this drainage of the fire-damp. The dangers to arise from its presence in the deeper coal measures, so soon as these should be reached by other winnings, succeeding each other at wider intervals, where the seams had not been relieved from the fire-damp which they contained, was therefore not fully apprehended.

The pits in the Merthyr Valley are still shallow as compared with numerous winnings, which have been made in the Aberdare Valley. The level of the surface in these parallel valleys is similar ; but the more recent winnings in the Aberdare Valley, which have been made primarily for the purpose of reaching one particular seam, the Upper Four Foot, have been extended much more rapidly to the deep than those in the Merthyr Valley.

The different conditions, now pointed out, under which the working of coal has been carried on in the Merthyr Valley, as compared with those which have existed in that of Aberdare, will account for the comparative absence of fire-damp which has hitherto attended mining operations in the Merthyr Valley.

These circumstances appear to have induced the belief that the Upper Four Foot coal, where worked in the Gethin pits, did not contain much fire-damp, notwithstanding this gas frequently showed itself in the workings.

It thus failed to be recognised that the long immunity from any serious accident from this explosive gas had been the result of conditions which were changed, or changing, and that as the working of the coal was extended to the deep, and the seams were sunk to, and worked in situations where they were still full of fire-damp, it would be found that a larger and better arranged ventilation and greater precautions, in all respects, Would be necessary to secure the safety of the men employed in these operations, than those which had hitherto been sufficient.

The No. 1 Gethin pit, in which this explosion occurred, is the deepest in the Merthyr Valley, on the west or Aberdare side of the Merthyr fault. None of the lower series of thick coals (of which the Upper Four Foot seam is the highest) have been worked elsewhere, in this part of the valley, to the south or deep of the west level of this pit, in which this explosion took place.

The evidence taken at the inquest proved conclusively that fire-damp frequently showed itself in the workings in this part, of the pit. Notwithstanding this, naked lights were used everywhere, except in the pillar workings.

Had those circumstances been considered which have attended all previous very fatal accidents from explosions in the South Wales coal basin, it would have been observed that the No. 1 Gethin pit occupied a similar position in its proximity to the unworked and consequently, in respect of fire-damp, undrained coal field, extending uninterruptedly to the deep, to that which has existed in all the pits which have been the scene of these accidents at the time when they occurred.

The plan which accompanies this report shows the workings connected with the west level of the No. 1, Gethin Pit. The small letters on the plan mark the places where the persons who lost their lives were at work at the time of the explosion, and the capital letters those where their bodies were found when this part of the pit was re-entered. A comparison of the list of names, which is appended, with the same letters of reference attached to each name which are used on the plan, will enable the particular facts connected with the case of each sufferer to be ascertained, and the immediate cause of death, whether from burning or from suffocation.

There were 111 men and hoys in the workings connected with the west level of the No. 1 pit, or in the level itself, at the time of the explosion. Of these, all who were outside, or nearer to the pit shaft than the mouth of No. 14 cross heading, escaped, but all who were inside, or further from the shaft than that point, perished, with the exception of two who were in the level near No. 14 cross heading.

The number of persons who lost their lives on this occasion was 47 ; of these 12 only were found to have suffered from burning, or to have been injured by the violence of the blast ; 35 of this number were suffocated by the after damp.

One of the 12 persons who were burnt, a haulier, engaged in driving loaded trams out in the west level, near the bottom of No. 15 cross heading, at the time of the explosion, was brought out of the pit alive, but died during the next day.

The two persons spoken of above, who escaped from inside No. 14 cross heading, were burnt by the explosion, but were reached in time to be brought out alive, and are recovering. These were the day fireman, and his son, a haulier. The son, who was engaged in driving loaded trams out, had just been passed by the father, who was proceeding in the same direction toward the shaft, when they were both reached by the explosion between Nos. 14 and 15 cross headings.

The extent of coal connected with this colliery is about 200 acres. The colliery contains four pit shafts, namely — No. 1, in the west level, of which this explosion occurred ; No. 2, situated about 450 yards from No. 1, to the north west, or on the half rise of the measures. Both of these are balance-winding pits, and downcast shafts. 3. The furnace pit, or flue, used for ventilation only, and forming the upcast shaft to both Nos. 1 and 2, situated about 400 yards nearly directly north, or on the full rise of the measures from the latter. 4. The pumping pit, contiguous to No. 1, used for pumping the water from the two balance winding-pits, but not for any other purpose.

No. 1 pit is an oval shaft, 17 feet long by 10 feet wide. Its sectional area is, therefore, about 135 square feet. It is about 124 yards deep. The furnace pit or flue is circular, 10 feet in diameter. Its sectional area is, therefore, about 75 square feet, leaving an area of 37½ feet only for the upcast air from each of the two downcast winding pits. The ventilating furnaces, situated at the bottom of the upcast shaft, are double, their grates being eight feet wide by seven feet long. The return air currents from the workings connected with both Nos. 1 and 2 pits, unite before reaching these furnaces.

The west level of the No. 1 pit forms the intake air course for all the west workings of that pit, whether situated on the rise or on the deep of the level. At the time when the explosion occurred, it was 1,925 yards in length. The tract of coal in progress of working in connexion with it, extended about 260 yards toward the rise of the measures, up to the west level of the No. 2 pit. The principal workings were situated near the western end of the level.

About 75 acres of the upper 4-foot seam have been wholly or partially worked on the rise side of this level, and 20 acres on the deep. About 10 acres of the yard seam, lying three or four yards above the upper 4-foot near the No. 1 pit, and coming gradually down almost into contact with the latter seam, have also been worked from this level.

The roof of the upper 4-foot seam is very bad throughout the western part of the level. On account of this badness of the roof, the sectional area of the level has been contracted for some distance between Nos. 14 and 15 cross-headings by stone arching to 30 square feet. Its average sectional area from this point to its western extremity, through which it is constantly crowded with men, horses, and large trams loaded with coal, when the pit is at work, is not more than about 40 square feet.

It was proved that at the time when the explosion occurred, there were five horses, and their drivers, with 10 large trams loaded with coal going out, close to each other, in a contrary direction to the intake air coming in, in the most contracted part of the level.

That portion of the intake air which reached the face of the west level, in returning to the upcast shaft, was conducted in one current from stall to stall, and through each of the cross-headings successively from No. 20 to No. 15, with the exception of two small scales which were allowed to escape into the return airway to the rise at the tops of Nos. 17 and 15 cross-headings. A large part of this current passed in No. 14 cross-heading into this return airway, but another part was carried through the pillar, and abandoned workings lying beyond.

The air returning from the face of the west level, while confined in one current in its passage through the cross-headings from No. 20 to No. 15, was compelled to travel through the circuitous airways leading from stall to stall, which had a sectional area of only 16 square feet.

The return airway, formed through the old stalls on the rise of the abandoned workings, also presented a sectional area of only 16 square feet.

The return air had to travel a distance of about 3,000 yards from the face of the west level to upcast shaft.

The return air from the dip workings on the upper 4-foot seam, and from the yard seam, is carried by a bridge over the west level near No. 6 cross-heading, beyond which it joins the returns from the rise workings.

The neglect of all systematic arrangement in the workings at this pit had led to their being dispersed at the time of the explosion throughout the whole of the western half of the level. This rendered it impossible to convey a proper quantity of air to the face of the level, and rendered the permanence of even the weak ventilation which existed most insecure.

The separation between the intake and return air currents was entirely dependent on the numerous doors, which it was necessary to place in the mouth of every cross-heading in which there were workings, to seclude all these scattered workings (which were everywhere in communication with the return air), from the intake air current entering by the level.

Although the doors in each cross heading were double, it was not possible to prevent large quantities of air from leaking through them at all times. The constant opening and shutting of the doors, which was necessary when the pit was at work, increased this leakage. They were liable to be left open through carelessness, and to be destroyed by explosion, as actually occurred, leaving all the workings without ventilation and filled with afterdamp.

There were 20 cross-headings on the rise side of the west level and five on the deep, communicating with the workings in the upper four foot seam.

The openings into 13 of these had been built up, but the separation between the intake and return air currents was maintained by doors only at 12 of these cross-headings, situated partly on the rise and partly on the deep, which were spread along the whole extent of the level.

There were doors in No. 1 rise cross heading, distant 75 yards from the No. 1 pit shaft; in No. 6 rise, distant 575; in No. 1 dip, distant 800 ; in No. 10 rise, distant 1,075; in No. 12 rise, distant 1,260; in No. 5 dip, distant 1,300 ; in No. 15 rise, distant 1,540; and thence in all the five succeeding rise cross headings communicating with the principal workings, situated at from 70 to 80 yards from each other, and extending to the western end of the level, 1,925 yards from the shaft.

It will be seen upon reference to the plan, on which the directions of the intake and return air currents are indicated by arrows, that the breaking down or accidental leaving open of any of these numerous pairs of doors would cause the whole of the intake air to turn back into the return air course, at the nearest point to the shaft where the separation between these currents was removed ; and that all that part of the level, and of the workings, lying beyond or further from the shaft, would immediately, on such occurrence, be left without ventilation.

It is desirable to call attention to the fact, that a long underground level, forming the only channel of access to workings situated at a great distance from the pit shaft, in which the intake air entering the pit is thus everywhere insecure, is even a more dangerous feature in those pits where it exists than a single bratticed shaft.

The number of doors thus spread along the west level, at so many different points, in addition to the danger which they created of the sudden and entire abstraction of the whole of the intake air current, at any of the points where they were situated, rendered it impossible to carry an adequate quantity of air to the west face of the level, from the amount of leakage which they occasioned, and which could not be prevented in the existing state of the workings in this pit.

The quantities of air going in by this level, and passing through the workings near its western extremity, were measured on the 28th of February, nine days after the explosion, when the ventilation had been restored, but when, this part of the pit not being at work, the intake air current was not obstructed by trains of horses and loaded trams in the level, nor diminished by the additional leakage occasioned by their passage into and out of the cross-headings.

On the above day, 20,500 cubic feet of air per minute were found passing in the intake current between Nos. 5 and 6 cross-headings, but this current had been so diminished by leakage, between this point and the face of the level, that only 5,000 cubic feet per minute were found in the return airway between Nos. 20 and 19 cross-headings.

It is, however, evident, from the circumstances which have been stated above, that even the small quantity of air, which was found on this day to have reached the west end of the level, must have been materially larger than what would reach it under the ordinary conditions of the pit, when at work. It appears, therefore, to be probable, that under such conditions (even when none of those additional and unforeseen abstractions of air from the intake current took place, which might at any time occur through carelessness or accident, and to provide against which a considerable margin in the amount of ventilation ought to be allowed,) not more than about 3,500 cubic feet of air per minute would find its way into the extreme western workings.

The amount of ventilation in pits yielding fire-damp ought to be in proportion not only to the number of men employed, but to the extent of the surface of coal exposed. In this pit, although the workings were widely dispersed, and were advancing further and further from the shaft, the leakage from the intake air into the returns, which occurred on every side, increased with the extension of the level, and caused a constant diminution in the quantity of air reaching the workings near its face.

The weakness and inadequacy of the ventilation in these workings is evident from the fact proved at the inquest, that a small fall in the roof over the coal having occurred in No. 20 cross-heading, during the night previous to the explosion, this hole was found to be filled with fire-damp, which the ordinary current of air coming down the heading and passing through the airway, from No. 20 to No. 19, was not strong enough to dilute and carry away until a door was placed across No. 20 heading, to direct this feeble current over it into the hole in the roof.

A somewhat larger volume of air found its way into the current, returning through the cross-headings farther back from the face of the level to No. 15 inclusive, the air in this part of the workings having been increased by the leakage at the intermediate doors ; but the ventilation in this part also was still very inadequate in quantity, and must have been mixed with a good deal of fire-damp, being confined to a single current passing successively from stall to stall, and returning from cross-heading to cross-heading from No. 20 to No. 15.

The evidence proved that fire-damp was not unfrequently found in the workings on the west level, in quantities sufficient, in the opinion of the managers, to necessitate the occasional use in places of safety lamps ; and it was proved that this gas had, from time to time, been similarly found in the abandoned workings nearer to the pit shaft. However, notwithstanding the weakness of the ventilation, and this admitted occasional necessity for the use of safety lamps, naked lights were retained in general use throughout the workings from No. 20 to No. 15 cross-headings, even on those days when safety-lamps were found to be required in parts of these workings.

The presence of fire-damp in the roof of No. 20 cross-heading, on the day of the explosion, was well known to both the firemen of the pit whose immediate duty it was to watch the state of the ventilation ; yet the use of naked lights, in the workings through which the air out of No. 20 cross-heading was returning, was permitted to be continued, except in one stall near the top of No. 17.

There had been a rapid and considerable fall of the barometer shortly preceding this explosion, it being at the time when this occurred still near the lowest point which it had reached. The thermometer was very high for the time of the year.

It is probable that in a dry and dusty coal-pit, where a large quantity of finely divided carbonaceous matter, or coal dust, lies thickly strewn on the roads, that whenever the atmosphere of the pit becomes so charged in any part with fire-damp as to originate an explosion, this dust is gathered up by the rush of air which takes place, and is thus brought into intimate contact with the volume of inflamed gases. The dust is thus decomposed and furnishes large supplies of carburetted hydrogen, which feed and extend the limits of the explosion.

When an explosion occurs the expanding gases travel out through the channel which presents the least resistance. The circumstance that the intake air course, extending from the pit shaft to the workings, usually offers this channel, generally determines the course of an explosion along it. It furnishes the supplies of oxygen necessary for the complete inflammation of these gases, which, as they travel forward, abstract it entirely from the intake air, and leave behind a fatal atmosphere of after-damp.

This explosion appears to have originated in No. 19 cross-heading, down which it passed into the level, travelling along it as far as the bottom of No. 14 cross-heading, a distance of about 300 yards. There were men severely burnt at B, at M, and at O, in the level, at D, at G, at h, at I, and at K, in Nos. 19, 18, and 17 cross-headings; but five men who were found sitting down at their dinner at A, near the extreme eud of the level, at the time of the explosion, were suffocated and not burnt. The men who were at work in the stall g, near the top of No. 18 cross-headings, who would be secluded from any explosion passing up that heading, were found suffocated at F. Those who were at work in the stalls in Nos. 17, 16, and 15 cross-headings were either not burnt, or in one or two instances only slightly, but lost their lives from suffocation, their bodies being found at the points which they had reached while endeavouring to escape, distant 100, 200, 300 yards from the places where they were at work. The men whose bodies were found in E and H, and at J, were not in the level when the explosion occurred.

The explosion appears to have acquired sufficient force and volume as it passed along the level towards the shaft to cause it to extend up the horse-roads of Nos. 18 and 17, and possibly up those of Nos. 16 and 15 cross-headings.

The separation doors which divided the intake from the return air were entirely destroyed by the explosion throughout the western end of the level from No. 20 rise cross-heading to No. 15, inclusive; beyond this point the doors in No. 5 dip crosscheading, situated between Nos. 13 and 12 rise, were burst open, and those in Nos. 12 and 10 rise were broken.

The ventilation thus ceased entirely in the principal workings for a distance of more than a quarter of a mile along the western end of the level, which had been traversed by the explosion and was left full of after-damp. It was only gradually and after the lapse of several hours that this ventilation could be restored, when the whole of the men in this part of the pit had long perished.

The same species of insecurity in the separation between the intake and return air currents as that which existed throughout the west level of this pit has been in almost every instance upon record, the cause of by far the larger part of that loss of life which has followed serious explosions, to the more frequent occurrence of which it directly contributes from that deficiency in the supply of air reaching distant workings which always accompanies it.

No practical difficulty existed at this pit to the adoption of a system of working which would have insured ample ventilation, and in a great degree its permanence, even in the event of an explosion, while the extent of such an accident would have been materially limited ; nor would such a system have entailed any greater cost.

The west level, forming the intake air-course, was too small in its sectional area to carry a sufficient volume of air to workings which were more than a mile distant from the pit shaft. Had due provision been exercised, the necessity would have been seen of driving another intake airway parallel to the level to the deep ; and to this, had the workings of this pit been systematically arranged, there would have been no impediment.

A proper return airway should have been driven on the rise of all the workings parallel to the level, and, together with the latter, should have been kept at all times in advance of the workings.

The cross-headings extending from the level to the return airway on the rise, should have been each successively driven through between these air-courses before commencing to work the coal headstalls. It would not then have been necessary that the level and intake air course should throughout its whole extent have been connected with cross-headings closed only by doors, opening laterally to the returns both on the rise and on the deep, and rendering the intake air everywhere insecure ; but all the cross-headings, those in progress of driving out and those working both the whole coal and the pillars, might have been concentrated together within about 300 yards of the face of the level.

The number of cross-headings required to be in work at one time being thus reduced, all the others might have been securely built up as they became exhausted, since under such a system there would have been amply sufficient air returning from the extreme workings to have provided for the proper ventilation of the old wastes through which it would have been carried toward the upcast shaft, without any abstraction of intake air for the purpose.

The whole of the intake air would then have been conducted without leakage on its way to the workings near the face of the level, where by proper gauging on regulators to control its passage into the returns, it would have split itself into the various cross-headings without the aid of any doors, except mere bearing-up doors.

The ventilation of even the contiguous cross-headings in work would thus have been independent of each other. An explosion in one of them if it had occurred would in all probability not have afflicted those on either side, and the intake air not being retained in its course solely by doors, it would immediately afterwards have poured again into the workings, thus preventing the loss of life from after-damp, or greatly limiting its fatality.

There can be no doubt that a general use of the safety lamp in all fiery mines would be an important safeguard against the occurrence of explosions. The tests to which this lamp has been subjected show that it affords perfect security if properly used. The experiments on this point have in fact been of such a severe nature, that it is certain it must be either to bad construction, breakage, or improper usage of the lamp that all of the very rare cases in which it appears to have been connected with explosions are to be attributed.

This lamp ought, however, not to be used to supersede ample and well arranged ventilation, but merely as a complement to it, and as a protection against danger in those exceptional cases which cannot be provided for by it.

Ample ventilation, together with such a system of arrangement as is not liable to be destroyed throughout a great part of a pit by explosion or other accidents, and any interruption of which is necessarily limited, not only as to the district which it affects, but also as to the duration of such interruption, ought to be provided in all pits. These conditions did not exist in the pit where this explosion took place.

I have, &c.

(signed) J. Kenyon Blackwell.

The Right Hon. Sir George Grey, Bart., G.C.B.

 

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