Copy of Report of Mr. John Kenyon Blackwell on the subject of the
Accident at Gethin Colliery, South Wales, in the early part of 1862.
London, 7 April 1862.
Sir,
I have the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I
attended the adjourned inquest held at Merthyr Tydvil upon those persons who
died in consequence of the explosion of fire-damp which occurred in the west
level of the No. 1 pit in the Gethin Colliery, near that place, on the 19th of
February last.
This inquest was resumed on the 4th of March, and was continued, with a
short interval of adjournment, until its close on the 13th of that month.
The pit in which this explosion occurred forms part of one of the collieries
connected with the Cyfartha Iron Works.
This colliery has been at work for about 12 years. The only seam of coal
which has hitherto been worked in it, to any extent, is that which is locally
termed the Upper Four Foot. It is the same seam of coal as that in which so
many serious explosions have occurred in the adjacent Aberdare Valley, and
among others, the very fatal ones at Lletty Shenkin, Old and Middle Dyffryn,
and Cefa Pennar.
There has, up to this period, been very little loss of life from explosions of
fire-damp in the Cyfartha collieries, or in the other collieries connected with the
great iron works in the Merthyr Valley, notwithstanding the very large quantities
of coal which for a long series of years have been worked in them.
The seams from which this coal was formerly obtained were intersected by
the valleys, and were worked by levels open to the day. In these situations the
coal was found to be nearly free from fire damp.
When the depth of the seams became greater, and pits were required, the
workings in each colliery and on each seam were continued gradually to the
deep, succeeding each other at short and regular intervals. The elastic explosive
gas, which these coals originally contained, thus escaped gradually through the
fissures by which they were traversed, the drainage extending to some distance
on the deep, and preceding the working of the coal.
The workings being carried forward on the level course, or strike of the
measures, removing successively as they progressed a narrow strip of each of
the seams, which, near this northern edge of the coal basin, are comparatively
steep, facilitated this drainage of the fire-damp. The dangers to arise from its
presence in the deeper coal measures, so soon as these should be reached by
other winnings, succeeding each other at wider intervals, where the seams had
not been relieved from the fire-damp which they contained, was therefore not
fully apprehended.
The pits in the Merthyr Valley are still shallow as compared with numerous
winnings, which have been made in the Aberdare Valley. The level of the
surface in these parallel valleys is similar ; but the more recent winnings in the
Aberdare Valley, which have been made primarily for the purpose of reaching
one particular seam, the Upper Four Foot, have been extended much more
rapidly to the deep than those in the Merthyr Valley.
The different conditions, now pointed out, under which the working of coal
has been carried on in the Merthyr Valley, as compared with those which have
existed in that of Aberdare, will account for the comparative absence of fire-damp
which has hitherto attended mining operations in the Merthyr Valley.
These circumstances appear to have induced the belief that the Upper Four
Foot coal, where worked in the Gethin pits, did not contain much fire-damp,
notwithstanding this gas frequently showed itself in the workings.
It thus failed to be recognised that the long immunity from any serious
accident from this explosive gas had been the result of conditions which were
changed, or changing, and that as the working of the coal was extended to the
deep, and the seams were sunk to, and worked in situations where they were
still full of fire-damp, it would be found that a larger and better arranged
ventilation and greater precautions, in all respects, Would be necessary to secure
the safety of the men employed in these operations, than those which had
hitherto been sufficient.
The No. 1 Gethin pit, in which this explosion occurred, is the deepest in the
Merthyr Valley, on the west or Aberdare side of the Merthyr fault. None of
the lower series of thick coals (of which the Upper Four Foot seam is the
highest) have been worked elsewhere, in this part of the valley, to the south or
deep of the west level of this pit, in which this explosion took place.
The evidence taken at the inquest proved conclusively that fire-damp
frequently showed itself in the workings in this part, of the pit. Notwithstanding
this, naked lights were used everywhere, except in the pillar workings.
Had those circumstances been considered which have attended all previous
very fatal accidents from explosions in the South Wales coal basin, it would
have been observed that the No. 1 Gethin pit occupied a similar position in its
proximity to the unworked and consequently, in respect of fire-damp, undrained
coal field, extending uninterruptedly to the deep, to that which has existed in all
the pits which have been the scene of these accidents at the time when they
occurred.
The plan which accompanies this report shows the workings connected with
the west level of the No. 1, Gethin Pit. The small letters on the plan mark the
places where the persons who lost their lives were at work at the time of the
explosion, and the capital letters those where their bodies were found when this
part of the pit was re-entered. A comparison of the list of names, which is
appended, with the same letters of reference attached to each name which are
used on the plan, will enable the particular facts connected with the case of each
sufferer to be ascertained, and the immediate cause of death, whether from
burning or from suffocation.
There were 111 men and hoys in the workings connected with the west level
of the No. 1 pit, or in the level itself, at the time of the explosion. Of these,
all who were outside, or nearer to the pit shaft than the mouth of No. 14 cross
heading, escaped, but all who were inside, or further from the shaft than that
point, perished, with the exception of two who were in the level near No. 14
cross heading.
The number of persons who lost their lives on this occasion was 47 ; of these
12 only were found to have suffered from burning, or to have been injured
by the violence of the blast ; 35 of this number were suffocated by the after
damp.
One of the 12 persons who were burnt, a haulier, engaged in driving loaded
trams out in the west level, near the bottom of No. 15 cross heading, at the
time of the explosion, was brought out of the pit alive, but died during the
next day.
The two persons spoken of above, who escaped from inside No. 14 cross
heading, were burnt by the explosion, but were reached in time to be brought
out alive, and are recovering. These were the day fireman, and his son, a haulier.
The son, who was engaged in driving loaded trams out, had just been passed
by the father, who was proceeding in the same direction toward the shaft,
when they were both reached by the explosion between Nos. 14 and 15 cross
headings.
The extent of coal connected with this colliery is about 200 acres. The colliery
contains four pit shafts, namely — No. 1, in the west level, of which this
explosion occurred ; No. 2, situated about 450 yards from No. 1, to the north
west, or on the half rise of the measures. Both of these are balance-winding
pits, and downcast shafts. 3. The furnace pit, or flue, used for ventilation only,
and forming the upcast shaft to both Nos. 1 and 2, situated about 400 yards
nearly directly north, or on the full rise of the measures from the latter. 4. The
pumping pit, contiguous to No. 1, used for pumping the water from the two
balance winding-pits, but not for any other purpose.
No. 1 pit is an oval shaft, 17 feet long by 10 feet wide. Its sectional area is,
therefore, about 135 square feet. It is about 124 yards deep. The furnace pit
or flue is circular, 10 feet in diameter. Its sectional area is, therefore, about 75
square feet, leaving an area of 37½ feet only for the upcast air from each of the
two downcast winding pits. The ventilating furnaces, situated at the bottom of
the upcast shaft, are double, their grates being eight feet wide by seven feet long.
The return air currents from the workings connected with both Nos. 1 and 2 pits,
unite before reaching these furnaces.
The west level of the No. 1 pit forms the intake air course for all the west
workings of that pit, whether situated on the rise or on the deep of the level. At
the time when the explosion occurred, it was 1,925 yards in length. The tract
of coal in progress of working in connexion with it, extended about 260 yards
toward the rise of the measures, up to the west level of the No. 2 pit. The principal
workings were situated near the western end of the level.
About 75 acres of the upper 4-foot seam have been wholly or partially worked
on the rise side of this level, and 20 acres on the deep. About 10 acres of the
yard seam, lying three or four yards above the upper 4-foot near the No. 1 pit,
and coming gradually down almost into contact with the latter seam, have also
been worked from this level.
The roof of the upper 4-foot seam is very bad throughout the western part of
the level. On account of this badness of the roof, the sectional area of the level
has been contracted for some distance between Nos. 14 and 15 cross-headings by
stone arching to 30 square feet. Its average sectional area from this point to its
western extremity, through which it is constantly crowded with men, horses, and
large trams loaded with coal, when the pit is at work, is not more than about 40
square feet.
It was proved that at the time when the explosion occurred, there were five
horses, and their drivers, with 10 large trams loaded with coal going out, close
to each other, in a contrary direction to the intake air coming in, in the most
contracted part of the level.
That portion of the intake air which reached the face of the west level, in
returning to the upcast shaft, was conducted in one current from stall to stall,
and through each of the cross-headings successively from No. 20 to No. 15, with
the exception of two small scales which were allowed to escape into the return
airway to the rise at the tops of Nos. 17 and 15 cross-headings. A large part of
this current passed in No. 14 cross-heading into this return airway, but another
part was carried through the pillar, and abandoned workings lying beyond.
The air returning from the face of the west level, while confined in one
current in its passage through the cross-headings from No. 20 to No. 15, was
compelled to travel through the circuitous airways leading from stall to stall,
which had a sectional area of only 16 square feet.
The return airway, formed through the old stalls on the rise of the abandoned
workings, also presented a sectional area of only 16 square feet.
The return air had to travel a distance of about 3,000 yards from the face of
the west level to upcast shaft.
The return air from the dip workings on the upper 4-foot seam, and from the
yard seam, is carried by a bridge over the west level near No. 6 cross-heading,
beyond which it joins the returns from the rise workings.
The neglect of all systematic arrangement in the workings at this pit had led
to their being dispersed at the time of the explosion throughout the whole of
the western half of the level. This rendered it impossible to convey a proper
quantity of air to the face of the level, and rendered the permanence of even the
weak ventilation which existed most insecure.
The separation between the intake and return air currents was entirely dependent
on the numerous doors, which it was necessary to place in the mouth of
every cross-heading in which there were workings, to seclude all these scattered
workings (which were everywhere in communication with the return air), from
the intake air current entering by the level.
Although the doors in each cross heading were double, it was not possible to
prevent large quantities of air from leaking through them at all times. The
constant opening and shutting of the doors, which was necessary when the pit
was at work, increased this leakage. They were liable to be left open through
carelessness, and to be destroyed by explosion, as actually occurred, leaving all
the workings without ventilation and filled with afterdamp.
There were 20 cross-headings on the rise side of the west level and five on the
deep, communicating with the workings in the upper four foot seam.
The openings into 13 of these had been built up, but the separation between
the intake and return air currents was maintained by doors only at 12 of these
cross-headings, situated partly on the rise and partly on the deep, which were
spread along the whole extent of the level.
There were doors in No. 1 rise cross heading, distant 75 yards from the No. 1
pit shaft; in No. 6 rise, distant 575; in No. 1 dip, distant 800 ; in No. 10 rise,
distant 1,075; in No. 12 rise, distant 1,260; in No. 5 dip, distant 1,300 ; in
No. 15 rise, distant 1,540; and thence in all the five succeeding rise cross
headings communicating with the principal workings, situated at from 70 to 80
yards from each other, and extending to the western end of the level, 1,925
yards from the shaft.
It will be seen upon reference to the plan, on which the directions of the
intake and return air currents are indicated by arrows, that the breaking down
or accidental leaving open of any of these numerous pairs of doors would cause
the whole of the intake air to turn back into the return air course, at the nearest
point to the shaft where the separation between these currents was removed ;
and that all that part of the level, and of the workings, lying beyond or further
from the shaft, would immediately, on such occurrence, be left without ventilation.
It is desirable to call attention to the fact, that a long underground level,
forming the only channel of access to workings situated at a great distance from
the pit shaft, in which the intake air entering the pit is thus everywhere
insecure, is even a more dangerous feature in those pits where it exists than
a single bratticed shaft.
The number of doors thus spread along the west level, at so many different
points, in addition to the danger which they created of the sudden and entire
abstraction of the whole of the intake air current, at any of the points where
they were situated, rendered it impossible to carry an adequate quantity of
air to the west face of the level, from the amount of leakage which they occasioned,
and which could not be prevented in the existing state of the workings
in this pit.
The quantities of air going in by this level, and passing through the workings
near its western extremity, were measured on the 28th of February, nine
days after the explosion, when the ventilation had been restored, but when, this
part of the pit not being at work, the intake air current was not obstructed by
trains of horses and loaded trams in the level, nor diminished by the additional
leakage occasioned by their passage into and out of the cross-headings.
On the above day, 20,500 cubic feet of air per minute were found passing in
the intake current between Nos. 5 and 6 cross-headings, but this current had
been so diminished by leakage, between this point and the face of the level,
that only 5,000 cubic feet per minute were found in the return airway between
Nos. 20 and 19 cross-headings.
It is, however, evident, from the circumstances which have been stated above,
that even the small quantity of air, which was found on this day to have reached
the west end of the level, must have been materially larger than what would
reach it under the ordinary conditions of the pit, when at work. It appears,
therefore, to be probable, that under such conditions (even when none of those
additional and unforeseen abstractions of air from the intake current took
place, which might at any time occur through carelessness or accident, and to
provide against which a considerable margin in the amount of ventilation ought
to be allowed,) not more than about 3,500 cubic feet of air per minute would
find its way into the extreme western workings.
The amount of ventilation in pits yielding fire-damp ought to be in proportion
not only to the number of men employed, but to the extent of the surface
of coal exposed. In this pit, although the workings were widely dispersed, and
were advancing further and further from the shaft, the leakage from the intake
air into the returns, which occurred on every side, increased with the extension
of the level, and caused a constant diminution in the quantity of air reaching the
workings near its face.
The weakness and inadequacy of the ventilation in these workings is evident
from the fact proved at the inquest, that a small fall in the roof over the coal
having occurred in No. 20 cross-heading, during the night previous to the
explosion, this hole was found to be filled with fire-damp, which the ordinary
current of air coming down the heading and passing through the airway, from
No. 20 to No. 19, was not strong enough to dilute and carry away until a door
was placed across No. 20 heading, to direct this feeble current over it into the
hole in the roof.
A somewhat larger volume of air found its way into the current, returning
through the cross-headings farther back from the face of the level to No. 15
inclusive, the air in this part of the workings having been increased by the
leakage at the intermediate doors ; but the ventilation in this part also was
still very inadequate in quantity, and must have been mixed with a good deal of
fire-damp, being confined to a single current passing successively from stall
to stall, and returning from cross-heading to cross-heading from No. 20 to
No. 15.
The evidence proved that fire-damp was not unfrequently found in the workings
on the west level, in quantities sufficient, in the opinion of the managers,
to necessitate the occasional use in places of safety lamps ; and it was proved
that this gas had, from time to time, been similarly found in the abandoned
workings nearer to the pit shaft. However, notwithstanding the weakness of
the ventilation, and this admitted occasional necessity for the use of safety lamps,
naked lights were retained in general use throughout the workings from
No. 20 to No. 15 cross-headings, even on those days when safety-lamps were
found to be required in parts of these workings.
The presence of fire-damp in the roof of No. 20 cross-heading, on the day of
the explosion, was well known to both the firemen of the pit whose immediate
duty it was to watch the state of the ventilation ; yet the use of naked lights, in
the workings through which the air out of No. 20 cross-heading was returning,
was permitted to be continued, except in one stall near the top of No. 17.
There had been a rapid and considerable fall of the barometer shortly preceding
this explosion, it being at the time when this occurred still near the
lowest point which it had reached. The thermometer was very high for the
time of the year.
It is probable that in a dry and dusty coal-pit, where a large quantity of finely
divided carbonaceous matter, or coal dust, lies thickly strewn on the roads, that
whenever the atmosphere of the pit becomes so charged in any part with fire-damp
as to originate an explosion, this dust is gathered up by the rush of air
which takes place, and is thus brought into intimate contact with the volume of
inflamed gases. The dust is thus decomposed and furnishes large supplies of
carburetted hydrogen, which feed and extend the limits of the explosion.
When an explosion occurs the expanding gases travel out through the channel
which presents the least resistance. The circumstance that the intake air course,
extending from the pit shaft to the workings, usually offers this channel,
generally determines the course of an explosion along it. It furnishes the
supplies of oxygen necessary for the complete inflammation of these gases, which,
as they travel forward, abstract it entirely from the intake air, and leave behind
a fatal atmosphere of after-damp.
This explosion appears to have originated in No. 19 cross-heading, down
which it passed into the level, travelling along it as far as the bottom of No. 14
cross-heading, a distance of about 300 yards. There were men severely burnt
at B, at M, and at O, in the level, at D, at G, at h, at I, and at K, in Nos. 19,
18, and 17 cross-headings; but five men who were found sitting down at their
dinner at A, near the extreme eud of the level, at the time of the explosion,
were suffocated and not burnt. The men who were at work in the stall g, near
the top of No. 18 cross-headings, who would be secluded from any explosion
passing up that heading, were found suffocated at F. Those who were at work
in the stalls in Nos. 17, 16, and 15 cross-headings were either not burnt, or in
one or two instances only slightly, but lost their lives from suffocation, their
bodies being found at the points which they had reached while endeavouring to
escape, distant 100, 200, 300 yards from the places where they were at work.
The men whose bodies were found in E and H, and at J, were not in the level
when the explosion occurred.
The explosion appears to have acquired sufficient force and volume as it passed
along the level towards the shaft to cause it to extend up the horse-roads of
Nos. 18 and 17, and possibly up those of Nos. 16 and 15 cross-headings.
The separation doors which divided the intake from the return air were
entirely destroyed by the explosion throughout the western end of the level from
No. 20 rise cross-heading to No. 15, inclusive; beyond this point the doors in
No. 5 dip crosscheading, situated between Nos. 13 and 12 rise, were burst open,
and those in Nos. 12 and 10 rise were broken.
The ventilation thus ceased entirely in the principal workings for a distance of
more than a quarter of a mile along the western end of the level, which had
been traversed by the explosion and was left full of after-damp. It was only
gradually and after the lapse of several hours that this ventilation could be
restored, when the whole of the men in this part of the pit had long perished.
The same species of insecurity in the separation between the intake and return
air currents as that which existed throughout the west level of this pit has been
in almost every instance upon record, the cause of by far the larger part of that
loss of life which has followed serious explosions, to the more frequent occurrence
of which it directly contributes from that deficiency in the supply of air reaching
distant workings which always accompanies it.
No practical difficulty existed at this pit to the adoption of a system of working
which would have insured ample ventilation, and in a great degree its
permanence, even in the event of an explosion, while the extent of such an
accident would have been materially limited ; nor would such a system have
entailed any greater cost.
The west level, forming the intake air-course, was too small in its sectional
area to carry a sufficient volume of air to workings which were more than a mile
distant from the pit shaft. Had due provision been exercised, the necessity
would have been seen of driving another intake airway parallel to the level to the
deep ; and to this, had the workings of this pit been systematically arranged,
there would have been no impediment.
A proper return airway should have been driven on the rise of all the workings
parallel to the level, and, together with the latter, should have been kept at
all times in advance of the workings.
The cross-headings extending from the level to the return airway on the rise,
should have been each successively driven through between these air-courses
before commencing to work the coal headstalls. It would not then have been
necessary that the level and intake air course should throughout its whole extent
have been connected with cross-headings closed only by doors, opening laterally
to the returns both on the rise and on the deep, and rendering the intake air
everywhere insecure ; but all the cross-headings, those in progress of driving out
and those working both the whole coal and the pillars, might have been concentrated
together within about 300 yards of the face of the level.
The number of cross-headings required to be in work at one time being thus
reduced, all the others might have been securely built up as they became
exhausted, since under such a system there would have been amply sufficient air
returning from the extreme workings to have provided for the proper ventilation
of the old wastes through which it would have been carried toward the upcast
shaft, without any abstraction of intake air for the purpose.
The whole of the intake air would then have been conducted without leakage
on its way to the workings near the face of the level, where by proper gauging on
regulators to control its passage into the returns, it would have split itself into
the various cross-headings without the aid of any doors, except mere bearing-up
doors.
The ventilation of even the contiguous cross-headings in work would thus
have been independent of each other. An explosion in one of them if it had
occurred would in all probability not have afflicted those on either side, and the
intake air not being retained in its course solely by doors, it would immediately
afterwards have poured again into the workings, thus preventing the loss of life
from after-damp, or greatly limiting its fatality.
There can be no doubt that a general use of the safety lamp in all fiery mines
would be an important safeguard against the occurrence of explosions. The tests
to which this lamp has been subjected show that it affords perfect security if
properly used. The experiments on this point have in fact been of such a severe
nature, that it is certain it must be either to bad construction, breakage, or
improper usage of the lamp that all of the very rare cases in which it appears to
have been connected with explosions are to be attributed.
This lamp ought, however, not to be used to supersede ample and well
arranged ventilation, but merely as a complement to it, and as a protection
against danger in those exceptional cases which cannot be provided for by it.
Ample ventilation, together with such a system of arrangement as is not liable
to be destroyed throughout a great part of a pit by explosion or other accidents,
and any interruption of which is necessarily limited, not only as to the district
which it affects, but also as to the duration of such interruption, ought to be
provided in all pits. These conditions did not exist in the pit where this explosion
took place.
I have, &c.
(signed) J. Kenyon Blackwell.
The Right Hon. Sir George Grey, Bart., G.C.B.