Cause of the Accident and Conclusions.
The cause of the accident was smoke from a fire in the return upset penetrating the workings. How the fire was caused there is no evidence to show. The reason why the smoke from the return flowed into the intake air way may be explained as follows:—
The movement of air in the mine was caused by the difference in weight of the column of descending air in the downcast section of the shaft and in the main incline, and the column of ascending air in the return upsets and upcast section of the shaft.
The difference in weight was greater than usual at the time of the fire, owing to the heat of the fire expanding the air in the return and so lessening its density.
The cold and heavier air in the descending column pushed out the lighter air in the ascending column.
The amount of motion that ensued was limited by the force necessary to give velocity io the air and the force necessary to overcome the friction of the air against the sides of the passages traversed.
The tension of the descending air at the 160 fathom level would be considerably greater than the tension of the descending air at the 80 fathom level, due to the vertical distance of 58 1/3 fathoms between the two points.
Under ordinary conditions the frictional resistance offered to the passage of the air in traversing the air ways from the 120 fathom level and from the foot of the main incline to the return at the 80 fathom level, together with the deduction of the weight of the ascending air between the 160 and 80 fathom levels, more than absorbed the difference of tension of the descending column at the 80 and 160 fathom levels, and consequently theflow of air was from the intake to the return at the door A.
The fire having burnt out the regulating door, marked R. on Plans III. and IV., at the foot of the return upset, the column of descending air pressed directly on the ascending air, and it is probable that most of the air would pass direct from the main incline to the return upset; and it would appear that under the altered conditions the frictional resistance encountered by the ascending air was so much greater above the 80 fathom level than below that point that the tension due to the weight of the column of descending air at the 160 fathom level was transmitted by the ascending air to the 80 fathom level, arriving there in excess of the tension on the intake side of the door A., and consequently the flow of smoke and hot air into the intake took place.
In other words, the weight of the descending air below the 80 fathom level more than overcame the weight of the ascending air below that point as well as the resistance of friction.
The flow of hot air and smoke past the door A. ceased when the direct road between, the descending and ascending columns of air was closed or contracted by falls although the fire was still burning.
There is no evidence to show how the fire originated or that it was due to want of care on the part of the management of the mine.
If the effect of the fire had not been to reverse the direction of the flow of air at the door A. it is not probable that there would have been any loss of life. The miners would have escaped by the intake air ways.
It does not appear to ine that the secondary cause of the accident, the inception of a current of hot air and smoke from the return upset to the main incline at the 80 fathom level, was anticipated or might reasonably have been anticipated by the management of the mine. I am not aware of any previous loss of life from a similar cause, although cases somewhat parallel, but unattended with loss of life, have been observed, and are recorded under the title of "Paradoxes in the Ventilation of Mines." (See Transactions of the North of England Institute of Mining Engineers, Vol. XIL, page 93.)
The practice of taking a scale of air from the intake to the return air way, such as was in force at the 80 fathom level, is common and made use of for various purposes.
It is a somewhat irregular mode to allow leakage past a loosely fitted door instead of through a well defined opening ; in this case the two modes were combined. It must be stated, however, that leakage past doors is very common, and often serves a good purpose, and is not necessarily attended with any danger.
Had the mine been a fiery mine the door A. would have been doubled, but if the same amount of air had been allowed to pass the double doors as passed the single door the result would probably have been the same.
It is not usual to place any fastening on a door in every day use, such as the door A., and consequently when a reversal of pressure takes place it tends to open the door, and had the door A. been a closely fitting door it is probable that it would have been pushed open by the reversed pressure; it is not improbable that it was forced open a few inches by the reversed pressure at the time of the accident.
The door A., as has been described, was liable to remain open if opened wide. The evidence, however, did not show that it was open during the fire.
In my opinion there should have been a door in the 160 fathom level between the foot of the main incline and engine-house, separating the west side intake air current from the east side return air current; had there been a door here, I think it probable that the miners would have escaped, as the short circuiting of the air would thereby have been prevented, and the intake air would have been forced round the workings where the frictional resistance encountered would have so reduced its tension that the return air at the 80 futhom level would probably not have had a tension in excess of the tension of the intake air at that point, and consequently the flow of hot air and smoke past the door A. would nor have taken place.
Assuming there was no movement of air in the 160 fathom level between the engine-house and foot of the main incline a door here would, under the ordinary conditions of the mine, have had no effect on the ventilation and would have been inconvenient as regards the haulage of mineral.
Had the air been split at the 160 fathom level as used to be tho case, no door would have been required here, and the fire would then probably have had similar results to what did occur.
It was urged on the part of the miners that the main incline and return upsets were "shafts or outlets" from the 160 fathom level within the meaning of section 16 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, and that if this was so the provisions of the section were not complied with.
I am of opinion that the Mauricewood and Greenlaw shafts and the communication road between them satisfied the requirements of section 16, and while there were, in this case, two available roads from the 160 fathom level this double communication in the seam worked is not statutory.
I may say, however, that the miners and many mine managers have viewed this section as having a much more extended application than the above, and in any future Act I think that the application should be extended by providing that in any district of a mine where more than a specified number of persons are employed at one time there shall be at least two roads of a specified size to the surface, separated at all parts by a specified distance, and such roads shall be available for ingress and egress, and shall be regularly examined and reported upon by a competent person.
This accident shows the danger that may arise in steep workings from a fire in the return air way, accompanied by short circuiting of the air, owing to the changes in the direction of pressure and flow of air that may result.
The precautions suggested are —
1st. The prevention of fire, particularly where the heat from steam pipes in a return air way causes unusual dryness.
2nd. The separation of the intake and return air ways so as to avoid short circuiting of air.
3rd. Means to prevent air flowing from the return to the intake air way where these roads are highly inclined.
This latter object may be attained by having no communication between such intake and return air ways, except openings completely closed by snecked doors, but having in view the extreme rarity of the accident and the serious inconvenience that would in many cases be caused by following such a rule, I am not inclined to recommend it as a practical remedy.