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VII. — FINAL OBSERVATIONS

One of the most disturbing features of this explosion is that the igniting medium was a flame safety lamp of an approved type and with no defect which might have reduced its standard of safety. A consoling feature, however, is that all the evidence goes to show that this lamp was quite safe when used as an ordinary flame safety lamp, and that it was some abnormal and highly improbable effect of pyrophor ground off by the relighter mechanism which ignited the external explosive mixture.

The suitability of the phyrophor relighter device for use in the flame safety lamps has previously been questioned. In his "Report on the Causes of, and Circumstances attending the Explosion which occurred at Ingham Colliery, Thornhill, Yorkshire, on the 9th September, 1947"* the then Chief Inspector of Mines, Mr. A. M. (now Sir Andrew) Bryan, criticised it on the grounds of its unreliability and recommended that an effort should be made to devise a more positive and efficient relighter device. The explosion at Bedwas Colliery gives additional weight to this recommendation and also shows that any new device should be one which does not produce or project particles of incendive material.

As a result of the recommendation in the Ingham Report, work has been proceeding at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment but, although some success has been achieved, it has not yet been possible to develop a new type of relighter device to the point at which it would be acceptable for general use below ground. There is reason to believe that results obtained recently on another type are more promising.

The possibility of pyrophor being a source of risk of external ignition would appear to be greater in the case of miniature lamps due to the closer proximity of the gauzes to the source of pyrophor particles as compared with full size lamps.

The advisability of discontinuing the use of these miniature lamps has already been under consideration on the grounds that due to their small size they were often subjected to careless treatment in the mine which might render them unsafe. The evidence now provided that they may be unsafe even when properly maintained is a more potent reason for discontinuing their use. It is appropriate and pleasing here to record that action has already been taken by the South Western Divisional Board of the National Coal Board to dispense with the use of miniature lamps at all their mines as soon as replacements can be provided.

Another aspect of the use of internal relighters is that there is always the likelihood of less careful treatment being given to a lamp so fitted than would be given to an ordinary flame safety lamp in which the extinguishing of the flame might seriously inconvenience the user. Steps should therefore be taken to ensure that such lamps are issued only to fully responsible persons with sufficient knowledge and experience to appreciate the hazards involved in any misuse or careless treatment of a safety lamp.

It has been stated earlier in this Report that the repairer employed in the Companion Road usually carried a flame safety lamp for use as a firedamp detector but omitted to do so on the shift of the explosion. Had this flame lamp been available it is probable that the presence of firedamp, suspected by the repairer, would have been confirmed, when steps would surely have been taken which would have prevented the occurrence of the explosion. This brings home once more the necessity for everything being done by all concerned to ensure full compliance with the letter and spirit of the Coal Mines General Regulations (Firedamp Detectors), 1939.

From the way in which the deputies concerned gave their evidence during the investigation it was obvious that they had been under the impression that the Arcade, being an airway, required inspection only at intervals not exceeding seven days. (Section 66(2)(a)(iii), Coal Mines Act, 1911, as amended.). The fact was, of course, that the Arcade was a part of the L.21 deputy's district which required to be ventilated and therefore required inspection at least twice each shift. (Section 64(1) and 65 of the said Act.) It is a reflection on deputies and management that there should have been such a misunderstanding and consequent breach of statutory requirements.


* Cmd 7434.

 

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