| | (1) |
The disaster was due to an inrush of peat which broke through from the surface into the face of No. 5 Heading in the South Boig District of the Main Coal Seam on the night of 7th September, 1950.
|
| | (2) |
The No. 5 Heading had been driven up towards the surface and had holed through on a deposit of boulder clay, sand and gravel at or near the base of a hollow or channel which had been eroded along the softer parts of the coal bearing rocks.
|
| | (3) |
This hollow had a maximum depth of about 44 feet, was lined with a bed of boulder sand and gravel, above which was a layer of almost impervious mud overlain by a deposit of peat which extended to the surface.
|
| | (4) |
The maximum depth of the peat deposit was about 12 feet, of which the top layer, about 2 feet thick, was consolidated above the level of the field drains, the remainder being water-logged and in a fluid condition.
|
| | (5) |
The No. 5 Heading holed through when a shot was fired in the "breast" coal at the face of the heading on the night of 30th August and released a flow of water draining from the surface through the bed of boulder sand and gravel.
|
| | (6) |
This flow of water remained almost constant until the morning of the disaster when, owing to an extraordinarily heavy rainfall, the flow trebled with the result that it washed away debris under the base of two hardwood pillars which had been built to give extra support to the roof, causing them to collapse. A fall of roof resulted and rapidly extended and so weakened the thin supporting barrier of rock and coal at the face of the heading and next to the base and side of the hollow, that it finally collapsed. The bed of boulder sand and gravel gave way, then the layer of mud, and the peat flowed into the heading.
|
| | (7) |
The peat continued to flow for some time and soon filled up miles of underground roadways and blocked all means of exit from the underground workings to the surface, resulting in the loss of 13 lives and the trapping of 116 other workmen.
|
| | (8) |
Although the position of this deposit of peat was shown on the geological survey map of the district and this map had been consulted in the planning department, the symbol indicating the presence of peat in the field concerned in this disaster had been overlooked.
|
| | (9) |
The field concerned had been visited on several occasions by officials, but they were misled as to the true nature and character of the ground by its superficial appearance due to the limited effect of the field drainage system.
|
| | (10) |
A proper examination of the nature and character of the ground in the field was not made by the colliery management nor by the planning engineers at any time either before the No. 5 Heading approached the surface or after the heading had reached the outcrop beneath the superficial surface deposits.
|
| | (11) |
In my opinion and subject to questions of legal interpretation, there was a contravention of Regulation 29 of the General Regulations, 1920 (Working under Moss, etc. — Precautions) in that the No. 5 Heading had been worked under a deposit of peat with a depth of cover of less than 60 feet or ten times the thickness of the seam, without taking the precautions required by the Regulation.
|
| | (12) |
There was a weakness in organization in that insufficient arrangements were made to ensure that the planning engineers were kept adequately informed of the subsequent changes disclosed by the progress of the workings in the No. 5 Heading Section to enable them to check the accuracy of the forecasts in the development plan, made in April, 1950, for that district of the mine.
|
| | (13) |
In my opinion, and subject to questions of legal interpretation, there was no contravention of Section 67 or of Section 68 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911.
|