(h) On the Application of the Moss Regulations
In his final submission, Mr. Morison argued that the Moss Regulations applied only where there are visible indications of moss on the surface. On this point he argued as follows
"Now, Regulation 29 raises even more difficulties of construction, and the first point which I make — and it is a legal point, of course — as a matter of the construction of the regulation, is that the regulation only applies where there are visible indications of moss on the surface, and not in a case such as the present where there were no indications diagnostic of moss upon the surface at all. Some support — no doubt this is entirely irrelevant from the strictly legal point of view — but it is, of course, noteworthy that the Stanrigg disaster, which was the occasion of this regulation was, I understand, a disaster where the moss was visible on the surface, but I say as a matter of construction of the regulation that is what it means and for this reason. The regulation reads :—' Where coal or other mineral is being worked under moss, quicksand or other liquid matter other than water, the following precautions shall be taken: (1) the nature and thickness both of the moss, quicksand or other liquid matter and of the strata lying between it and the workings or roads shall be ascertained as accurately as possible by boring at a sufficient number of points or otherwise'. Now, I say that that regulation can only apply where the presence of moss is known or can be ascertained from surface examination because of precaution (1); that is to say, if you can only ascertain the moss by boring, then quite clearly the regulation does not apply, because the regulation directs that when you have ascertained the moss you must bore."
Though I have doubts, it is not for me to express an opinion whether this interpretation of the regulation is correct or not; that again is a matter for the Courts. But I cannot accept the statement on matters of fact by which Mr. Morison sought to apply his interpretation to this particular case, namely, "a case such as the present where there were no indications diagnostic of moss upon the surface at all". As I have already said, moss was seen on the surface ; the officers of the Geological Survey had observed it, mapped its extent and marked it on the geological map of the district; the farmer knew very well it was there; and, as previously indicated, I am convinced that had the examination of the surface which was made by the various responsible officials comprised even an elementary examination of the nature or character of the ground, they would also have found peat or moss.
Mr. Morison also suggested that the Regulation applies only to liquid matter and that unless it was proved that the peat was liquid matter before the moment of final disaster there was no breach of the Regulation. On these points his argument was
"My second point is this, that in any event it is not proved that the peat was liquid matter before the moment of final disaster and it seems plain that the Regulation only applies to liquid matter. It begins 'Where coal is being worked under moss, quicksand or other liquid matter . . . ' that is to say, implied in the Regulation is the view that moss or quicksand is liquid matter because of the word 'other' which precedes 'liquid matter' in the second line of the Regulation. Now, Sir, if it is not established on the evidence to your satisfaction that the peat was liquid matter before the moment of the final disaster, then no breach of the Regulation can be suggested, apart altogether from the legal construction which, in any event, I have submitted should be put upon it. On the two grounds, therefore, that the Regulation does not apply as a matter of law and, secondly, that the regulation does not apply upon the facts as they are established on the evidence I submit that there is on breach of Regulation 29.
Again, I refrain from argument in matters purely of interpretation of the law, but on the issue of fact, as I have previously indicated, I consider that liquid matter, that is to say, moss in a fluid state, was present at and before the actual moment of the disaster. I must conclude, therefore, that the requirements of Regulation 29 did apply in the circumstances of this case and that they were not applied.