53. It is necessary to comment on several matters considered at the Inquiry which are important for safe winding and although some of these are not relevant to the accident I consider that they warrant attention.
54. The centre rod in the spring nest is an example of a 'single line' component as the safety of the men in the cage was completely dependent upon it. Such components should either be eliminated or so designed as to prevent danger, for example, failure of any 'single line' component in a braking system should cause the winding system to be brought safely to rest. Overspeed and overwind protection should not rely on single components, but where this is not possible they should be reliable and monitored to give warning of failure, or, alternatively, they should fail safe. All winding engines which are dependent upon only one brake path should be modified as should those where automatic application of the brakes is dependent on a single solenoid. Furthermore, there should be indication of any electrical fault in a safety circuit which could render it ineffective or, alternatively, the winding engine should be automatically brought to rest if a fault occurs in a safety circuit which would give rise to danger.
55. A similar rod in a brake spring nest at Ollerton Colliery broke on 14 January 1961 and it was stated by P. Wood, Head of Shafts and Winding Section for the National Coal Board, that tests on this rod showed that stresses induced by bending were the cause of failure. Following this incident the Divisional Chief Engineer, National Coal Board, issued an instruction that the centre rod in all Briggs spring nests should be examined. This instruction did not give any guidance as to the nature and frequency of examinations required or to the use of non-destructive tests. Records showed that an external examination of the Markham rod was made on 19 February 1961, but probably because of lack of guidance, it appears that the rod was not removed for complete examination at that time or subjected to non-destructive testing at any time during its life.
56. Laboratory tests on the Markham rod by the magnetic particle method revealed cracks of various dimensions in thread roots on each side of the fracture. Ultrasonic tests, which can be carried out in situ, did not detect these cracks but could have detected one inch or more in depth. The probability of detecting the crack which led to failure by the ultrasonic method would, therefore, have depended on its rate of propagation and the interval between tests.
57. The winding engine was tested by the Area Overwind Testing Engineers every three months and was stated by G. Godfrey, Area Chief Engineer, to have complied with all the statutory requirements. The National Coal Board draft memorandum entitled 'Testing the Safety Equipment on Drum Winders' prescribes the manner of testing and draws attention to the commissioning tests, which should be used for reference purposes. These were not available to the Area Overwind Testing Engineers. The loads used for testing were only estimated, and, on occasions, were greater than the equivalent man load. On other occasions no load was used. There was disagreement at the Inquiry between the testing engineers and the winding enginemen regarding the maximum torque applied to the drum during the statutory brake holding tests. Although I am satisfied that the way in which the tests were carried out had no bearing on the accident I consider that the requirements of the Testing Memorandum, which has been in process of development over 15 years, should now be made mandatory. The commissioning test records should be displayed in the engine house so that the results of all statutory tests can be compared. Area Overwind Testing Engineers should be suitably trained and qualified.
58. The loose grub screw found in the automatic contrivance was a potentially dangerous defect which could only have been discovered at the colliery by thorough internal examination, and design of the automatic contrivance should be improved to prevent this type of defect. Automatic contrivances, and the other parts of winding engines which are vital to safety, should be examined by persons with specialised skills, and provision for these examinations should be made in the manager's scheme of maintenance.
Training of winding enginemen
59. It became evident during the Inquiry that the winding enginemen used different operating techniques and the inconsistencies which resulted indicate a need for review of the training arrangements. The present practice of 'on the job' instruction is generally satisfactory but Colliery Engineers should play a more active part in this to ensure that the best methods of control are applied. In addition, a manual should be prepared for each winding engine and, without prejudice to the ability of enginemen to exercise their initiative and judgment, should explain the consequences of operation of the controls and protective devices.
60. Neither the Area Mechanical Engineer, the Area Electrical Engineer nor the Colliery Chief Engineer had statutory responsibilities although, in the normal course of their duties, they would issue instructions to the Colliery Engineers who have statutory responsibilities. The view was expressed, and I agree, that the authority of these Engineers would be strengthened if they were appointed under section 1 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 or section 1 of the Mines Management Act 1971. The Area Overwind Testing Engineers should also be statutorily appointed.
61. Section 81 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954, requires that 'All parts and working gear, whether fixed or movable, including the anchoring and fixing appliances, of all machinery and apparatus used as, or forming, part of the equipment of a mine, and all foundations in or to which any such appliances are anchored or fixed shall be of good construction, suitable material, adequate strength and free from patent defect, and shall be properly maintained'. It should be considered whether, in the circumstances, there has been a contravention of this section which it would have been practicable to avoid or prevent.
62. Evidence given at the Inquiry showed that the trunnion bearing did not operate as designed and caused fluctuating stresses to be induced in the centre rod of the spring nest which it could not sustain. R. Jeffrey, Senior Scientific Officer, Safety in Mines Research Establishment, said that any crack which had penetrated to a depth of inch could have been detected by ultrasonic tests without removing the rod, but not by visual examination with the unaided eye. There is uncertainty as to the frequency of ultrasonic testing which would have been necessary to discover the main pre-existing crack as its rate of propagation beyond inch could not be established. It appears that the persons at the colliery having responsibility for maintenance had no reason to suspect that the rod was overstressed and, therefore, did not appreciate the need for special methods of testing. Nevertheless, the rod was shown to be of inadequate strength for the stresses induced and the main pre-existing crack could have been found by available means of testing. Also, there was a precedent for this type of failure in a similar rod at Ollerton Colliery in 1961.
National Coal Board Instructions
63. During the investigation it was found that some keys and nuts in the brake system had not been secured in accordance with the requirements of National Coal Board Production Department Instruction PI 1956/10 which has been mandatory for 17 years. Several witnesses expressed the opinion that Production Department Instructions should be re-issued and reviewed periodically to ensure that their requirements are being implemented. I consider that a scheme for this purpose, which has been introduced in one National Coal Board Area, should be extended to all areas.
64. The Colliery Mechanical Engineer was not informed and did not hear about the accident until he was on his way to work at his usual time 1½ hours later. He should have been informed immediately and colliery emergency procedures should be reviewed to ensure that all essential persons are notified.
65. There was delay in identifying some of the casualties because their cap lamps and self rescuers were removed during the recovery operation. It was suggested that, to avoid confusion, all persons going underground should wear an identification disc and this is worthy of further consideration.
66. A serious disadvantage of many colliery automatic telephone systems is their inability to select priority calls when the exchange is busy during an emergency. The National Coal Board has developed a system which will give priority to emergency calls and this should be incorporated in existing installations as soon as possible.