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Appendix V.

Theories As To The Cause Of The Explosion Advanced By Counsel And By Mr. W. J. Charlton (See Page 106).

Sir Stafford Cripps.

Sir Stafford Cripps pointed to the evidence of shot-firing on 142's Deep; he quoted from the evidence of the deputy Edwards, who said that the only place in which the night-shift deputy might fire shots was the ripping in 142's Deep; he quoted from the evidence of Taylor about the re-opening of the mouth of 24's airway during the Tuesday night before the explosion and about the firing of a shot above the mouth of that airway during the night of the following Thursday and about the light of the deputy's lamp being extinguished when he put his lamp down after the firing of that shot, and then remarked as follows:— "Now Sir, that piece of evidence you will notice is an exact confirmation of what Mr. Williams said in the passage I read to you, which was that if the ventilation was going down and along 95's road, up 95's face and into 24's, then that position of firing would be dangerous because there would be the danger of the gas creeping along the roof in 24's, accumulating and coming out when the stop was removed when the firing took place; coming out into 142's just where the firing would be taking place in fact. The evidence is pretty clear that it is almost certain that on the Friday night just about snapping time, which was the ordinary time for Matthias to arrive at this point, that is about 2 o'clock in the morning, there would probably be a shot fired at that point."

After quoting from the evidence of John Hughes, Stephen Lewis, Bert Jones, David Williams, Norman Parry, Robert Edwards, Osborne Jones, Ralph Roberts and Richard Jones, Sir Stafford Cripps went on to say:— It is quite clear I think that the ventilation was passing down 95's, back up the face and then down again, down 24's jig. If that is so there obviously would be the liability for any gas that was carried by that air to tend to scale off and accumulate in what was a dead end of 24's road, and that would account for the circumstances which Taylor found there on the preceding night when he had fired the shot with Matthias, when the volume of gas came out immediately that hole was opened and the passage was left clear for it to pass into 142's.

"That place having been stopped up again for 16 hours before the night shift on Friday, there would have been a fresh opportunity for gas to accumulate there. There was the probability, almost certainty, of further firing taking place on the Friday night about snapping time at that place. You had, according to Mr. Williams's evidence, all the circumstances of danger if the ventilation was passing in the way in which I submit it is clearly proved to have passed, that is up 95's face. In those circumstances you have all the elements of danger. You have the extreme probability of shotfiring contrary to Regulations. The road was in a condition of special danger, because immediately above was the hole behind which gas was accumulating, where, if there was any movement of the sleepers covering that hole, gas could immediately escape and would rise up almost exactly to the point where the shot was being fired.

"Therefore one is bound to regard this bottom end of the pit where there was practically an absence of ventilation, where there was this particular circumstance arising on the night in question, where there was this accumulation of dangerous incidents, as certainly being one of the points where it is very possible that the explosion may have started."

Then, having reviewed and quoted the evidence in reference to 14's district, Sir Stafford Cripps said :— The evidence is absolutely clear that on the night before the explosion there was a large accumulation of gas in the top end of 14's. Whether it went down 10, 15, 20 or 30 yards there may be some doubt as to the accuracy of the men's ability to measure, hut there is no doubt at all about it as several men lost their lights that there was a large volume of gas there, and several of the men who had been accustomed to working up there definitely say that it was worse on that occasion than it had been previously.

"Why? Of course it is impossible for us to tell. There may have been some blower there. There may have been some particular escape of gas taking place in the top end which it was more difficult to clear. Or, what is an equally likely and more probable thing — remember this was the Friday night when the doors of 29's were constantly open, and when the ventilation coming into 14's was therefore much worse than normally — it may well be that a particularly bad leakage of air was taking place lower down in the ventilation system, and then you would get even less air than normally along the 14's level, and that would of course lead to the gas being more pronounced in the top end of 14's.

But whatever the conditions that produced it, in my submission it is perfectly clear that on the night of the explosion you had conditions in 14's which were absolutely ripe for causing an explosion if anything careless or anything untoward happened — an accident with the cutter, an accident with a lamp, a shot misfiring — anything that may have happened, all those many things which do happen from time to time, in mines, and when they do happen, if the state of the mine is a state of danger, then you get the sort of tragedy which occurred at Gresford.

"Taking the whole of the evidence as regards the conditions of this pit, I do not think anybody can read through the evidence of these 187 witnesses without getting their minds firmly fixed upon 14's as the danger spot. It is quite true that 95's and 24's was also a danger spot, but not of the same magnitude. The gasometer there was smaller than the gasometer in the 14's district."

Mr. W. J. Charlton.

I would like, if I may, to ask you to consider this area in the neighbourhood of the Clutch. We find that the coal was won on that Dennis side of the pit down towards a fault which is familiar to all of us, the fault down which 142's road was driven. I would particularly ask you to take notice of this, that in working out that coal, with one particular exception which I shall refer to later, the whole of the coal was extracted. It was worked by long wall. For some reason when the coal was won out on the dip side of that fault probably, but won out quickly, we find that 142's road is supported by large pillars of coal on either side. Now you have presented to you here a goaf area on the high side of the fault with the broken up roof above it which is buttressed by a pillar of coal which extends down to the dip at a certain point. That buttress as a fact ceases at a certain position. It ceases just where a continuation of the Dennis Main touched the fault. It is quite true that there is a considerable difference in level between the seam at the high side of the fault and the seam on the low side of the fault; and we were told by Mr. Bonsall in his evidence that the listing of that fault never had been pierced; he told us where it was pierced and the order in which certain drifts were driven.

But I ask you to look at that pillar and to consider particularly the edges of the pillar, and I appeal to you, Sir, as a mining expert, and to your Assessors, to consider this. You have there a road which was the return airway from 14's and 109's coming to the rise on the edge of a pillar of coal, and then suddenly just at the point where this buttress ceases it plunges away down to the dip again. There at this highest point where I say the buttress ceases and where inevitably, I think, whether the fault will be pierced or not, the listing will be broken between the two sides of that fault. I conceive this, that even if day by day Firemen, Inspectors and others inspected for gas in that return airway or combined return intake airway at that peak point, although they would find no evidence of gas I put forward the suggestion for consideration that the gas was there. The gas was overhead in the broken ground above; it was always there.

"I put it no higher than this, that I conceive the possibility that with the ground being broken on the two sides of the fault that gas could find its way to the high side of the fault — to where? It finds its way into an area which I look upon with the greatest suspicion — in an area which is bounded by the fault, by the 142's road, by the connecting road between the Clutch and Martins and the Martin itself. There is a goaf area, not a very large goaf area, but I conceive that that was more or less a gasometer. So much for that.

"On the other side, that is towards the goaf area of 61's and 20's, you have the same state of affairs. You have the broken edge of a pillar. You have the fault buttressed by a pillar of coal to a point and then that point is broken. I suggest to you that there you have a distinct breaking of the listing. You have there the fault pierced by a drift and you have again the possibility of gas finding its way from the low side of the fault to the high side of the fault. That goaf area which I have described as being one which is more or less a gasometer had, of course, been worked out many years ago; there were roads driven up to the fault and abandoned many years before. I conceive that when those roads were abandoned to prevent wastage of air from the intakes to the returns, those particular roads would be thoroughly and systematically sealed. So that you have that area as I say always containing a certain amount or indeed a considerable amount of gas.

Now what new factor had been introduced immediately before this terrible explosion? The only factor that I can suggest is the driving of this so-called drift a continuation of Dennis Main which was being driven forward. We had varying evidence given about it. We had suggestions that the air pulled into the face and so on. I suggest it to you as a possibility (and I put it no higher than that) that on this fatal shift connection was made between that goaf area and the intake air which was passing that point and going inbye the Clutch. If you expose an area like that, would the gas readily issue? Remember that you have the whole pressure of the air coming in on Dennis Main tending to keep it in its place. There is one other point to which I should like to direct your attention on that plan, and that is this.

There was a drift once driven from the high side of the fault in continuation of Dennis and there was a straight place driven — the first straight place you see on the low side of the fault. That road was used for quite a time as an airway. But when in course of time the development face on the right-hand side of 29's reached a point opposite Martin's return, a drift was then driven and the old road could now be abandoned; it was done with and could be finally put out of commission. Now how would that be prevented? I suggest to you the probability is that that was prevented by a stowing of dirt which we see in the entrance of that first straight place on the low side of the fault from 14's return. We have been told that at some time less than a year before the explosion a cross cut was driven over the second pillar to the low side of the fault.

"When that cross cut was driven apparently from a view of the plan a very considerable portion of the stowing of dirt which was put into that straight place — the first straight place to the low side of the fault — would have to be removed; and I suggest it is possible that after that date, after that considerable amount of stowing had been removed, there was from that place possible free access from 14's return into the sealed off goaf area which I have indicated as a danger point. The importance of that, of course, is this: that if at a later period a complete blockage of the old Dennis Main was passed, if the face of the drift reached a point on this fatal night beyond where there was a complete seal in the old Dennis Main, then there you had two means of air finding its way into the sealed off area, one on the low side and one on the high side.

"It is then only a question of what happened. Would the air from the high side go down that fault or would it come up? I am suggesting that the density of the air inside the sealed area was so much below the density of the air outside that what happened is that it came up. The probability is that what happened at that particular time was this; that suddenly in the process of clearing them up from the shot-firing or in the drilling of a hole (and we know that a man was drilling a hole) the gas teemed out of the face of that drift and fouled the drift. It would not be able to go up Dennis Main because that was to the rise. It could not. Very well; the current was too strong and it carried the gas along with it, to where? Well, it carried it towards the top of this drift which goes plunging down at about 1 in 4 on 142's road. Now it is not very willing to go down there and it lingers. It lingers where? You will see on the plan there is a fault crossing 142's deep parallel with the main fault just about where Dennis crosses 142's, and as I understand from the witnesses that was a point where there was high tension. At that point the root is 12 ft. above the floor. The air there was beating upon it and nevertheless I conceive that in the conditions I have tried to picture you would have a fair amount of gas accumulating against that tension.

I want now for just a moment to turn your attention to what was found in that drift. We did not see a tremendous lot of it, but we did see this, that the drifter had been in the act of drilling a hole with the bandjack on the right-hand side; he had as a fact drilled a hole just about 1 ft. deep. Now if a man has driven a hole with a bandjack, he generally goes on; he finishes the job he has started and he goes on with it. What was the position that we found at this pit? We found in the face of that drift lying on the floor two safety lamps in the dark. We had a plan put in showing where the bodies were found of the men who were killed in the explosion. The nearest body to the face was about 25 or 26 yards therefrom; that was the nearest body. Obviously a tub of muck had just been brought from the face. We have heard that from Ben Edwards. There was a tub of muck he said about half full. After the explosion a pony was found blown over or was found over on his side with his head almost in the connecting road between the main Dennis and the Martin. The tub behind the pony was lying over on its side, on the corresponding side to the horse. You there had several bodies. You had three near the telephone box, and Dr. Fisher described all these bodies as being severely burned.

* * *

But there is a remarkable feature about some of the other bodies, particularly that of the man Archibald who was the man who was the driller on the face of the drift. That man was close to this tub which was turned over; and while it is significant that all these bodies were more or less lying with their heads pointing away from the Clutch itself, with, I think, one exception, the first man was more or less at right angles to the wall.

All the others were heading in from the Clutch towards the drift, and this poor man was no exception, the man who was close to the tub; he was the driller who might have been at the face of the drift — as a matter of fact his lamp was at the face of the drift. This man's whole attitude tells me a story which I put forward with deference, but which does impress me.

The Doctor tells us that this man was not burned at all; he was not injured at all, but he was in a posture such as was described to us by Ben Edwards. This poor fellow was in an attitude suggestive of the fact that he was trying to protect himself from some danger which he could see. He was down on his knees; his head was straight down towards the ground and his hands were to his face — in the attitude of a man, I suggest, who was protecting his face from some danger which he visualises.

"The picture which that presents to my mind is this, that this man saw the beginning of things. We do know this much, that there is a distinct lag when you get firedamp. We know men who have been there and they see the thing taking place. We had many cases of a man who flings himself on the ground; the explosion takes place, he gets up and he is all right except perhaps for being slightly burned. But if an explosion is in full blast, after that first initial stage he gets no warning at all; he is caught unawares. I suggest that Archibald was not caught unawares — that Archibald saw the beginning of things; he saw something which was taking place and from the consequence of which he sought by an instinctive action to protect himself.

"I have asked myself many times, and I ask you, why did these men leave lamps in the face? Would they ordinarily come out say with a tub of muck towards the Clutch and leave their lamps hanging on the fence? I see no reason why they should. The lights of the men in the Clutch would be of no use to them.

Only one would be in their view and the distance was quite considerable, we have been told about 50 yards. I put forward this possibility to you, Sir, for consideration, that as a fact those lamps were put in the dark at the face. The men were working at the face, and they suddenly discovered that the lights went out. Well, they did not stop to collect their dark lamps. They were in the dark. They sat on the horse or walked behind him to the Clutch where they knew there would be other men with lamps. The other men's lamps were put in the dark from the same cause as the drift men."

Mr. Charlton was quite frank in admitting that, if his theory was correct, it was surprising that these men did not attract the attention of the night fireman Chester, who was in his cabin near the Clutch. After referring to the possibility of the telephone at the Clutch being capable of producing an electric spark which would ignite firedamp, he proceeded:

I would ask you to picture what the position of these men at this spot might be. They were in the dark, and in the dark for a considerable time. They say to themselves: ‘Well, if this is gas, it is going on inbye. We cannot telephone down to the junction to say what has happened, because they have no telephone there; but we can telephone down the road to 61's junction to let them know,' and I conceive that when the man turned the handle to give the signal he blew that pit up. That is a conception which I put forward here as a possibility of what did take place."

Mr. Hartley Shawcross.

"Unfortunately at this stage it is not possible to prove with certainty where it (the explosion) did occur, although one can establish with certainty certain places where it could not have occurred. But where did, it occur? I am content to consider the matter for a moment upon such evidence and such knowledge as we have, limited though it is at this stage owing to the course which the Inquiry has necessarily taken. It must have been somewhere about the neighbourhood of the Clutch or somewhere about the 29's turn. That is where in this pit this disaster must have had its source.

"Now, Sir, we have had one theory exploited by Mr. Charlton in regard to the possibility that there was a sudden outburst of gas through the stone drift at the Clutch. From the way in which it was reported in certain of the newspapers it might have appeared to the uninitiated that that was something in the nature of a new theory, or a surprising theory; but of course that was one of the probabilities which were present to the minds of all the experts seeing the conditions at the Clutch and the conditions in the stone drift itself. It was expounded by Mr. Charlton with the expert knowledge which he possesses, and expounded, if I may say so, with the greatest lucidity. I could not usefully add a word to its discussion.

All I say in regard to that possibility that the explosion originated through an outburst of gas suddenly coming up through the drift, owing to the drift having penetrated some area of pent up gas, is a very possible, and indeed a very probable explanation of the disaster which so suddenly overtook the mine.

"But there is another possibility. As I say, although one can eliminate certain causes, one cannot at this stage point with certainty to what the particular cause ‘may have been. But one can say there is this thing which is a very probable cause, or there is that thing which is a very probable cause. Either may have done it. Which of the two it was has yet to be finally determined.

"When I put forward the other possibility, it is not put forward with any intention of detracting from the importance of the theory advanced by Mr. Charlton. That is a theory of great probability, one which could easily and quite probably have accounted for the causes of the disaster. I mention this other one because this also is a possibility which may account for it.

This would not be the first time that within recent years disasters of this sort have arisen through the spontaneous combustion of a gob fire. North Wales on the whole has been fortunately free from heating of that kind. But there have in fact been instances of heating in the same main seam of coal as ran through the Gresford Pit. It is an odd circumstance-which may be no more than an odd circumstance, or an odd coincidence — that when many years before Mr. Charlton with his expert knowledge visited the pit he should have suspected that there was in fact a gob stink there.

"There was one place in particular where it appears that the conditions were favourable to such a state of affairs arising. There is a pillar of coal there lying top side and against the 45-70 foot fault, which crosses the Dennis area. The old working plans give a good deal of information as to the history of that particular pillar of coal. It stands in an area which was being worked out at the time when the stoppage occurred in the mining industry in 1926. Work there, as in the rest of the pit, was stopped, and when later on it came to be commenced again that pillar of coal lying right up against the fault, on the top side of the fault was left unworked. It is a pillar of coal which is surrounded by a large area of goaf upon all sides except of course upon the side where the pillar comes right up against the fault.

Immediately adjoining the pillar of coal on the other side of the fault, below the fault, 142's Deep has been continued down between pillars of coal, with slits splitting the pillars, and there were connections at intervals through the fault between the pillars of coal and the goaf above the fault. More over, that length — and it is a length of about 270 yards of solid coal — lying alongside and on the low side of the fault, would necessarily tend to prevent a uniform and continued subsidence of the superimposed strata which you would normally expect to get when the coal had been extracted and removed from underneath. As a consequence of that, putting it at the lowest, it is highly probable that there was gas in the goaf, and a very considerable cavity running along top side of the fault in which that gas would tend to accumulate.

Then the pillar of coal itself has several sharp projections which stick out so to speak into the surrounding goaf, and there would be a heavy crush on the edges of it, a crush tending to break the coal up into small pieces more likely to be heated. If any in-leakage of air did occur at that point, that was a place in which you were most likely to get the pent up gas — gas which had been accumulating in the cavity there — diluted to an explosive mixture; and at the same time get heating set up in the pillars there, and eventually igniting the gas which had been accumulating and been diluted to an explosive mixture by the in-leakage of the air. The old working plan shows that there was there a maze of old roads, and one can examine that plan and trace out how the air may filter through if leakages of air occurred at various points.

"That there was some in-leakage of air is of course certain, and that it may have caused heating round that pillar of coal is, if not certain, at all events a perfectly possible and perhaps a probable thing.

"It is not necessary for the purposes of a theory such as this — and of course one advances it merely as a theory — to postulate any new source of leakage having occurred. It is possible as you know to have pillars of coal remaining for years without giving rise to difficulty, and then without any perceptible change in the conditions in the mine and the conditions as to leakage, for sweating and heating to arise. Air somehow gets in in enough quantities to cause heating, but in quantities too small to keep the area cool, and if that condition does start it tends naturally to introduce its own increased supply of oxygen through the original source of the leakage until eventually you get spontaneous fire.

I say it is certain that there was some in-leakage of air. There were of course several places where in-leakage of that kind may have occurred, and it certainly did occur for some time at all events at the stone drift by the Clutch. There was abundant evidence — and it was for this reason that I called attention to it at an earlier stage in what I have had to say to you — that in that drift by the Clutch there was a draw-in of air.

"The fact that at that stage there was a draw-in of air there, was, as I said, by no means inconsistent with the possibility that later on, as the heading was driven further in — as for instance it may have penetrated over the fault — there may have been some piercing into that area of pent up gas, liberation of that pent up gas and outrush of that gas. But at one stage it is clear from the evidence there certainly was a draw-in of the air. That air may have drawn, and apparently would have drawn across the old goaf, diluting the gas, and possibly, you may think probably, going to that pillar of coal and giving rise to heating and sweating in that pillar of coal.

There is a similar possibility, although there is less direct evidence in regard to it, in the heading which was being driven further inbye 37 heading. That was being driven, as you will remember, to the rise and it had passed the thirling into 142's Deep. They had done some ribbing off along that thirling, you will remember. It was done with the idea of taking the pipes of the pipe ventilation system into 142's at a point nearer to the face of the heading, and they had done some ribbing off along the thirling although they had not worked right through on 142's. But in the course of doing that ribbing off, they had found a draught of air coming through that thirling apparently or coming through somehow to that point from 142's Deep.

Of course there is the possibility — and this is a third one although I am not attaching much importance to it — that that air coming in through that thirling at that point may have caused some heating in the pillars there, but it is also possible that the heading work which was being done was in itself causing an in-leakage of air which would find its way through the old roads to the pillar on the top side of the fault, and finding its way to the top side of the fault, would eventually cause sweating, and eventually cause spontaneous fire in that place.

"If there was heating there in that pillar of coal caused by an in-leakage of air, you would ultimately get flame which would ignite the surrounding area of gas which together with the gas generated by distillation in the course of the heating itself would be ample to create the damage which was in fact done by the explosion which occurred. You would have a very rapid expansion down the drift and through the fault there, and so through the slits cutting the pillars of coal and coming out probably somewhere in the neighbourhood of 29's junction. When it got to 29's junction it would tend of course to advance against the intake air, the fresh air coming in supporting its combustion. And if it came out at that point from a cause such as that, it might well have caused the flame which was known to have existed immediately at or immediately after the explosion by the Clutch. Certainly there was very great damage done at 29's turn. 142's Deep was completely closed by falls on the low side of 29's, and there was considerable damage there as there was damage further outbye.

"That in my submission strongly suggests an explosion of which the main force was somewhere very much further outbye than 14's, 24's, or 95's, and this outrush of gas at the Clutch is an alternative possibility which seems to us to be worth consideration, and especially so when you look at it in the light of that rather curious evidence which was given by several witnesses as to the odd smell that they had noticed for some day or two before the explosion.

"One ought to remember perhaps, as to that, that the men working in the North Wales mines have for the most part no experience of smells of this kind; and, as I said, are apparently not familiar with gob stinks; and for that reason those who noticed that smell may have attached no significance to it at the time, and some of them may not have remembered it at all. But there was definite evidence from several witnesses — I am not going to take up time now in referring to it in detail — that on the 20th and again on the 21st, two days before the explosion, a smell was noticed, and you may think it might have been in fact the smell which was the forewarning of what occurred — a gob fire explosion.

"There is one other thing which certainly tends to that view. The presence of afterdamp in 20's return is more consistent with something having originated outbye of 61's road rather than further inbye down at the bottom end or in 14's. When the rescue men went in, I think it was in May, 1935, you will remember there was evidence that their eyes smarted, which is again a fact which suggests that even at that time there was in that district the continued existence of a fire.

"On the other hand, the fact that some of the men were fortunate in getting out of 29's district, the possibility that, but for other matters which I need not go into here, a great number of men in 29's might have got out does strongly favour the view that the explosion could not have had its origin in 14's. If it had occurred there, 29's would not only have felt the physical effects of it, but would have immediately become foul with poisonous gas.

 

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