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The Cross-Measure 2 Section of the Mine

20. This area of the mine was developed from two main roadways driven from the 560 yards and 660 yards horizon laterals from the No. 2 and No. 1 Shafts respectively. When the Big Seam was reached a longwall face was opened out and advanced to the dip forming three roadways from which subsequent production faces were worked on both flanks. Plan No. 1 shows the general layout and system of ventilation.

21. The development face was served by a centre intake (Road 2) with returns on the left side (Road 1) and the right side (Road 3). In 1968 it ceased production because of geological difficulties; subsequently the inbye portions of the roads became untravellable; Road 1 became closed inbye of Panel 11, Road 2 inbye of Panel 13 and Road 3 inbye of Panel 4. In the intervening period flank faces were worked and, as shown on Plan No. 1, Panel 13 and Panel 2 were in production at the time of the outburst.

22. In order to re-establish the ventilation circuit in this forward development area two coal headings were started, one at the inbye end of Road 2 and one re-opening Road 3. They were being driven by outside contractors, under the statutory supervision of National Coal Board officials.

Panel 13

23. Panel 13 is a longwall face 130 yards (119 metres) long advancing slightly to the dip with a gradient on the face of 1 in 12 from return to intake. Coal was being produced on day and afternoon shifts using a 125 horse power ranging drum shearer loader which extracted the top seven feet six inches (2.25 metres) of the seam. The mudstone roof was supported by six-leg powered supports. The main conveyor gate was supported by 14 feet by 11 feet (4.2 by 3.3 metres) arched girders and had a coal rib on the right hand side and a five yard (4.6 metres) pack to the other. The return supply gate was 12 feet by 9 feet (3.6 by 2.7 metres) supported by arched girders with a four yard (3.6 metres) pack on the right side and skirting the partially closed roadway which served Panel 11.

24. Production commenced on 8 February 1971 and the face was soon advancing at a regular rate giving a gross output of up to 12 000 tons (12 200 tonnes) per week.

The Road 2 Cross-cut Drivage

25. The Road 2 Cross-cut Drivage, in which the outburst occurred, started from the side of Road 2 and was being driven roughly parallel to the old face line, leaving a pillar about eight yards (7.3 metres) wide. It had been advanced a distance of 16 yards (14.6 metres) in the seam and was supported by 12 feet by 10 feet (3.6 by 3 metres) arches. The coal was won by means of explosives fired in large rounds between shifts in accordance with the Outbursts Code and was then filled on to a conveyor by a compressed air powered shovel loader. The heading was being worked on three shifts, normally advancing four feet (12 metres) per shift. The depth of cover at this point was 680 yards (620 metres).

26. Until shortly before the outburst conditions at the face of the heading were considered normal; there was no visible geological disturbance and the coal itself appeared normal and reasonably strong.

Ventilation

27. Plan No. 1 shows the ventilation arrangements. The total quantity of air entering the main intake lateral to the Cross Measure 2 Section of the mine was 102 926 cubic feet per minute (48.6 cubic metres per second) when last measured and 32 436 cubic feet per minute (15.3 cubic metres per second) reached the face of Panel 13. The positions of all regular air measuring stations are shown with the quantities of air passing and the firedamp percentages determined prior to the outburst. Situated in the Road 2 main intake at a point about 20 feet (6.1 metres) outbye the entrance to Panel 13 main gate was an electrically powered auxiliary fan forcing 6148 cubic feet of air per minute (2.9 cubic metres per second) through reinforced ducting to the face of the Road 2 Cross-cut Drivage. Once this air had ventilated the drivage it returned along Road 2, rejoined the Panel 13 ventilating current and passed round that district.

The shifts before the outburst

The Day Shift of 5 April

28. Work in the Road 2 Cross-cut Drivage proceeded as usual; the loose coal got by the previous shift was filled out, an advance of four feet (1.2 metres) was attained and an arch girder was set. Conditions were said to have been normal; the coal was bored in preparation for shotfiring between the day and afternoon shifts. The shotfirer, D Lyndon Davies, was killed in the outburst but records show that he fired a volley round of twelve shots containing a total of 18 pounds (8.2 kilograms) of Group P5 explosives. In accordance with the Code of Practice this operation was carried out with no men at all on the downwind side in case the shock of the shotfiring should induce an outburst. No outburst occurred.

The Afternoon Shift of 5 April

29. When the afternoon shift arrived at the face of Road 2 Cross-cut Drivage they found that the shotfiring had produced an unusually large amount of loose coal. The work of filling proceeded throughout the shift, but because of the amount of loose coal, the advance was insufficient to permit an arch to be set.

The coal produced more dust than usual and much time was spent using water sprays to keep it down. The deputy in charge of the heading, Edgar John Evans. noted that coal was spalling off the face and sides, particularly on the left hand side so that the face at roof level was six feet to seven feet (1.8 to 2.1 metres) in advance of the last arch by the end of the shift and there were signs that the roof was beginning to rise slightly. He made tests with a flame safety lamp but found no increase in the firedamp percentage during the shift. Neither the deputy nor the workmen heard any 'pouncing'; they attached no significance to the change in conditions.

The Night Shift of 5-6 April

30. The workmen on the night shift continued filling the loose coal which was still spalling from the face and sides and eventually were able to set another arch. The deputy in charge, Glyn Howell Jones, confirmed that the coal was dusty and friable and when he left the heading at 5.15 a.m. the face at roof level was about nine feet (2.7 metres) ahead of the most recently set arch. By this time an abnormality was clearly visible with the roof rising away sharply at about 1 in 3; the spalling coal on the left hand side had also produced a space of about nine feet (2.7 metres) behind the arch at roof level. During the shift the deputy did not detect any firedamp using his flame safety lamp. On reaching the surface at the end of the shift the deputy reported the conditions in Road 2 Cross-cut to P K Lewis, under-manager, W Luther Davies, day shift overman (later killed in the outburst) and John Jones Rees, the oncoming deputy.

The Day Shift of 6 April

31. Normal operations proceeded on Panel 13 and Panel 2 and Road 3 Development. In Road 2 Cross-cut Drivage two contractors' workmen, A G Miller and H Itzi, continued to fill loose coal at the face of the heading and to pack material behind the arches.

32. In the course of the morning the heading was inspected by P K Lewis, under-manager, John Jones Rees, deputy, W Luther Davies, overman, D Lyndon Davies, shotfirer, F Knoedl, contractors' engineer, and J Steinmann, contractors' shift supervisor.

33. When John Jones Rees, deputy, arrived at the face of Road 2 Cross-cut Drivage at about 8.30 a.m. he found conditions much as the night shift deputy had reported to him. The coal was soft and dusty and still spalling from the face and sides. The ventilation conditions were normal and he did not hear any 'pouncing'. He left the heading at about 9.00 a.m. to inspect other parts of his district, leaving the workmen to fill loose coal into bags and pack them behind the arches. He expected this work to occupy the whole shift and did not return before the outburst.

34. The same conditions were observed by J Steinmann who entered the drivage at about 8.30 a.m. and remained until about 9.30 a.m.

35. P K Lewis, under-manager, and W Luther Davies, overman, arrived at the drivage at about 10.00 a.m. According to Lewis they found that the coal had fallen away from the face for about 10 feet (3 metres) forward of the last arch at roof level and that the roof curved upwards to a height of about four feet (1.2 metres) above normal. Using a methanometer he found that the firedamp content near the face of the heading was normal at 0.20%. He amplified the instructions previously given by the deputy and told the workmen to get nine feet (2.7 metres) long flat timbers and place them behind the arches to support the bags of coal dust. P K Lewis telephoned for the surveyor to record the disturbance and spoke to D Austin Thomas, an expert on outbursts, whom he asked to make an inspection and give his opinion on the conditions. Neither person arrived before the outburst occurred. Lewis left the No. 2 Cross-cut Drivage about 10.30 a.m. and summoned F Knoedl and gave him instructions concerning the work to be done in the drivage.

36. F Knoedl had made three earlier visits to the drivage and after receiving the instructions from the under-manager, arrived at the face of the heading soon after 11.00 a.m.

37. At that time the workmen were cleaning up using hand shovels in the final stages of preparing to set an arch and the shovel loader was not in use. Shortly before leaving the place Knoedl saw a workman's flame safety lamp hanging near the face and noted that the flame was burning normally. When he left the drivage the two workmen, Miller and Itzi, were near the face and D Lyndon Davies, a shotfirer who had come in on a split shift, was near the drive-head of the conveyor serving the drivage. It was then 11.50 a.m., about 10 minutes before the outburst occurred.

 

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