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IV. — Cause of the Accident.

The only definite evidence available in regard to the cause of the disaster is that of the fireman, Rowley, quoted above, and measurements of the depth to the water in the Moss Pit shafts.

Rowley's evidence of his conversation with Copeland is, in my opinion, sufficient to establish that water entered at a spot somewhere in the immediate neighbourhood of the face of the No. 7 level in the Eight Feet Banbury.

The normal depth to the water in the Moss Pits prior to the inrush was known to be about 22 yards from the top of the shafts. A few hours after the occurrence the water had subsided to a depth of 83 yards from the same point, and was then within about 40 feet of No. 5 level in Maryhill Colliery. Subsequent measurements showed that the water rose again at the rate of several feet daily until it regained its normal position on 26th March, and it rose at the same rate and to the same level in Maryhill Colliery.

These facts leave no doubt in my mind that the Moss Pit pound of water was tapped at the end of the No. 7 Eight Feet Banbury level in Maryhill pit. At this point at the moment of the inrush there was a pressure due to a head of about 445 feet of water or nearly 200 lbs. per square inch.

The water remains in the Maryhill workings and is likely to do so indefinitely; the estimated cost of pumping operations to lower the water even to No. 7 level, with a view to exploration or further working, being prohibitive.

In the absence of any positive evidence as to the spot in the Moss Pit working with which No. 7 level made a connection, only an opinion on the matter can be expressed.

I have already referred in Section II of the Report to a working in the Moss Pits from the end of the South Cruts which is described on the Moss Pit plans as being in the Bullhurst seam. The Northern end of this working, as shown on the Plans (Plates 1 and 2) was within 15 yards of the end of No. 7 Eight Feet Banbury level of Maryhill Colliery; there is no other working in the Moss Pits within many yards of this point.

It appears, therefore, only natural to conclude :—

(1) That the water entered Maryhill Colliery from the abovementioned working in the Moss Pits.

(2) That this working is in the Eight Feet Banbury seam and not in the Bullhurst seam as shown on the record plans.

There can, I think, be no two opinions in regard to the former. As regards the latter, with the exception of Mr. Weir, the agent. all the expert witnesses who gave evidence at the inquiry were unanimous in expressing the view that the workings from which the water came must have been Eight Feet workings in the Moss Pits. Mr. Dakin, the Manager, replying to Mr. Abbott, said: "I fail to see how we could connect with any other than the Eight Feet seam" ; and later, replying to Mr. Norris : "It is my opinion that this accident has happened because 'Bullhurst' was wrongly put upon the old Moss Colliery plan." Mr. J. R. L. Allott, a mining engineer of great experience in North Staffordshire, dismissed without ceremony the suggestion that a working in the Bullhurst seam in the Moss Pits could have been the cause of an inrush of water into the Eight Feet Banbury seam at Maryhill Colliery. He declined, however, to accept the suggestion that the designation "Bullhurst" was incorrect and, as an alternative, put forward a theory that there were workings in the Eight Feet Banbury seam northwards from the South Cruts and that these workings for some reason were omitted from the plans.

Mr. John Watts, a mining engineer also with a wide experience of mining in North Staffordshire who gave evidence on behalf of the North Staffordshire Miners' Federation, scouted the suggestion that the Maryhill Eight Feet workings could possibly have met with workings in any seam other than the Eight Feet seam in the Moss Pits, and was most emphatic in maintaining that the so-called Bullhurst level on the Moss Pit plans was, in fact, in the Eight Feet Banbury seam.

Mr. Weir declined to express an opinion either way, i.e., whether the naming of the working in the Moss Pits was incorrect, or if it were correct, whether it was possible for the water to have come from Bullhurst workings into the No. 7 Eight Feet level of Maryhill Pit. His attitude was that he had relied upon the record plans being accurate.

I am not altogether convinced that either of these two theories — namely, that there was a working in the Eight Feet Banbury Seam not shown on the record plans, or that the working shown on these plans as being in the Bullhurst Seam was really in the Eight Feet Banbury Seam — is correct. They both assume a serious error on the part of the Surveyor, a man of high professional reputation, unless, indeed, it were the case that the error in mistaking the Eight Feet Seam for the Bullhurst Seam occurred in the mine and not merely in making the plan. I find it very difficult to believe that this could have been so. The extent of the working, whichever seam it was in, would indicate that it took something like 12 months to carry out. During all that time officials and colliers, most of whom would possess intimate knowledge of the characteristics of the two seams, were at work in and about the seam daily. It is almost inconceivable that they were all mistaken as to which seam it was.

It is not impossible that the record plan was correct in its designation of the seam as the Bullhurst Seam and that, in fact, the inrush of water came from the Bullhurst Seam in the Moss Collieries into the Eight Feet Banbury Seam of Maryhill Colliery.

As has already been stated, the strata in this area had been subjected to very violent disturbances resulting in extraordinary distortions and abnormalities. One of these abnormalities was disclosed in the driving of the No. 7 level at Maryhill Pit. Where the crut from the incline intercepted the seam there was a thickness of some 10 yards of coal instead of the normal 10 feet or so (see Plate 3). This thickening of the seam persisted throughout the length of the No. 7 level and, in fact, at the time of the accident two roadways had been driven in the coal on the same horizon some 10 yards apart, one next to the roof of the seam and the other next to the floor. (See Plates 1 and 2.) The cause of this abnormality has not been ascertained. Further, in the No. 7 level, a fault had been encountered some 15 yards back from the face as it stood at the time of the accident, and throughout this distance the coal was "dumpy," a local term, used to indicate a condition resulting from disintegration by crushing. Whether or not these conditions indicate the presence of some type of faulting or folding which resulted in the Eight Feet Banbury and Bullhurst Seams being brought into juxtaposition I am unable to say, but it is possible that they do.

I come now to the question of the responsibility of the owners and management.

When the Maryhill royalty was acquired in 1910 the lessees were aware of the presence of the extensive accumulation of water in the old workings of the Moss Pits and other pits in the locality, and they were alive to the fact that inadvertently to tap the pound meant in all probability the total loss of nearly the whole pit and of the lives of many of those engaged in it. They kept themselves informed as to the level of the pound of water by periodically taking measurements of the depth to it in the Moss Pits. This level corresponded with a vertical depth of about 165 feet from the top of Maryhill incline, so that persons at work in Maryhill below that level would be placed in serious danger in the event of the pound being tapped.

As a result of my Inquiry, I am satisfied that the management realised their responsibility in the matter and that the available sources of information to enable them to guard against an inrush of water were conscientiously explored.

Mr. Weir obtained copies of the deposited plans of the Moss Pit workings and transferred the relevant portions of them to the working plans of Maryhill Colliery, so that at any time the relative positions, in plan, of the two sets of workings were clearly to be seen. On account, however, of irregularities in the direction and rate of dip of the strata it was a matter of great moment to know accurately the relative positions of the workings in a vertical plane, and Mr. Weir, before the accident, appears to have done his best to obtain this information by calculation from such data as were available.

There was no difficulty in obtaining the reduced level of any point in the Maryhill workings, and such levels were systematically recorded on the working plans. Unfortunately, no levels had been recorded on the Moss Pit plans and the data available for calculating them. were far from satisfactory.

The depths to the seams at the shafts were given on the plans and the reduced level at the top of the shafts was known. The amount of rise or fall between the shafts and any given point in the workings could be obtained only by a calculation involving two factors, viz., (1) the distance from the shaft to that point, and (2) the average rate of dip over that distance. The former of these two factors could be determined with reasonable accuracy by measurement. The latter could be determined only approximately from arrows and figures on the Moss Pit Plans purporting to indicate the general direction and rate of the dip of the strata.

As has already been stated in Section II of this report, there was around the Moss Pit shafts an area where the strata were horizontal, and from this area the measures dipped in all directions at gradients varying, as shown on the deposited plans, between 1 in 5 and 1 in 8. There was nothing on the plans, however, to indicate where the strata ceased to be horizontal and commenced to dip.

Working on such data — insufficient, but all that were available — Mr. Weir calculated the reduced level at the entrance to the South Cruts to be 791 feet. To ascertain approximately the reduced level of the suspected Moss Pit working adjacent to the No. 7 level in Maryhill Colliery, it is necessary to add not less than 50 feet as an allowance for (1) a rise along the cruts; (2) a rise along the level in the coal; and (3) a further rise on the plane of the seam from the level to the air heading. According to this estimate, therefore, since the reduced level at the face of No. 7 level in the Maryhill Pit was 931 feet, there was a difference in vertical height of 931 - (791 + 50) = 90 feet between these two points.

Mr. John Watts, with the same data at his disposal, estimated the reduced level in the suspected Moss Pit working to be about 943 feet, or actually several feet higher than the No. 7 level in Maryhill Colliery. This calculation, however, includes an allowance of 60 feet for a fault which Mr. Watts contended had an upthrow of that amount towards the East. I have carefully examined the original working plans and the record plans but cannot find any indication of a fault which could affect the question. Making no allowance for a fault, there is still a difference of 42 feet between the two estimates.

This discrepancy arises mainly on account of disagreement between Mr. Weir and Mr. Watts as to the distance over which the fall from the Moss Pit shafts to the entrance to the South Cruts should be calculated. In both cases the fall was calculated at an average rate of dip of 1 in 6.

In order to get an independent opinion on the matter, uninfluenced by any knowledge of the arguments put forward by either of these gentlemen in support of their respective estimates, I have submitted the record plans to an experienced colliery surveyor who, working solely on data furnished by the plans, has estimated the reduced level at the entrance to the South Cruts to be 805 feet as against the estimates of 791 by Mr. Weir and 817 by Mr. Watts.

In the light of the accident it is, in my opinion, reasonably evident that the workings are in fact much nearer together in a vertical plane than any of these three estimates makes them out to be.

In searching for an explanation of the error, I have come to the conclusion that it arises in calculating the fall from. the Moss Pit shafts to the entrance to the South Cruts. In the light of the disaster I feel sure that the assumption of an average dip of 1 in 6 between the Moss Shafts and the South Cruts — the rate which was used in all the calculations — was wrong. I feel certain that the dip at this rate applies only to a part of the distance, and to obtain a correct result a considerable allowance must be made for the flat area around the shafts. The total distance from the shafts to the South Cruts is about 450 yards; of this distance it is not unreasonable to assume that one-third (or 150 yards) is in reality approximately level. If such an assumption is correct, then the fall over the total distance is reduced by 450/6 feet 75 feet, a figure more than sufficient to account for the error.

I have gone into the question of the levels at some length, in order, if possible, to demonstrate beyond dispute that, under such conditions as existed in the Moss Pits, figures purporting to give the general direction and rate of inclination were entirely unreliable, and likely only to lead to confusion and disaster.

It is most essential, on the ground of safety alone, that spot levels should be plentifully recorded on all plans of abandoned workings at the limits of the main workings and more especially in all exploratory headings or cruts in advance of the main workings.

It was urged strongly by Mr. Watts that, irrespective of any question of levels, there were obvious reasons for suggesting that the suspected working was in the Eight Feet Banbury seam. He called attention to the fact that the lines of the workings in the Eight Feet "Rearers" at the end of the East Crut in the Moss Pits and in the No. 7 Level at Maryhill Colliery were approximately coincident with each other and also with the line of the suspected working further to the South in the Moss Pits. The coincidence of the two former is evident from the plans but, since these workings are approximately on the same horizon, it is natural to expect them to be in line. The line of the suspected working, however, is not approximately in line with the No. 7 level. It crosses the latter at a considerable angle. Further, in estimating the level of the suspected working Mr. Watts allowed for a fall of 219 feet in the Seven Feet Banbury seam between the Moss Pits and the South Cruts. Now, the East Crut appears to be level and to originate at the level of the Eight Feet Banbury seam in the Moss Pit shaft, so that on these figures the South Cruts should be about 219 feet - 90 feet = 129 feet lower than the East Crut — 90 feet being the vertical distance between the Seven Feet and Eight Feet Banbury seams. Even if the alleged 60 feet fault referred to above were taken into consideration, the South Cruts should, according to these figures, be 69 feet below No. 7 level. If this is accepted, then the suspected working must be either in a seam lying underneath the Eight Feet Banbury seam or, if it is in the Eight Feet Banbury seam, then the seam must be vertical, whereas at the end of No. 7 level it was inclined at 60°.

In this connection it was also urged that the gradually decreasing thickness of the Bullhurst seam, until it practically disappeared in approaching the Maryhill incline from the North, was an indication that it would be absent from the measures proved by the South Cruts. The area in Maryhill Colliery from which the seam was proved to be absent was a belt about 250 yards long and 60 yards wide on the line of the incline. Reference to Plate No. 2 will show that a short distance westwards of this belt the Bullhurst seam was worked fairly extensively from the Moss Pits; and there is no proof that the seam does not resume its normal thickness further South in Maryhill Colliery. The question which I have had to consider, and which has caused me great anxiety, is whether there was any neglect of their responsibilities on the part of the owners or officials of Maryhill Colliery. I have found it most difficult to picture to myself the position and duty of the management, in the circumstances as they existed before the accident, fairly and without colouring the picture from the accident itself and from the information disclosed by investigation of the accident. I have done so to the best of my ability, and after full deliberation, I do not find the owners or management to blame.

 

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A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.

 

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