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General DiscussionContraband and Searching 84. The statutory requirements relating to the systematic search of underground workers for smoking materials had not been carried out at the No. 5 Pit since February, 1959, when the workmen who had been carrying out the searching ceased to do so because of a matter of payment. The manager said that he had then arranged for under-officials to search instead. It came to his notice a fortnight before the explosion that his arrangements had broken down. He thereupon confirmed his earlier instructions to the under-officials but there was no evidence of any follow-up action to see that these were observed; after the explosion, it was discovered that they had not been. The manager is, of course, responsible for ensuring the observance of the arrangements for searching and for securing that when these arrangements are not in operation no person goes below ground. But I think that others, upon reflection, may not feel satisfied that they did all they might have done in the matter. 85. Searching is very necessary as a constant reminder against carelessness and, where it is done efficiently, it can be a deterrent to those who might otherwise wilfully attempt to take smoking material's below ground. I was particularly disturbed by the evidence that smoking materials had been taken below ground at Six Bells Colliery and was shocked to find no dissent from the implication that the plastic bag found in the water bottle was a provision intended by someone at some time to defeat a searcher with the object of smoking below ground. Roof Support 86. The general standard of roof control on O.10 face was good. The seam roof at the intake roadhead was not insecure but the system of support at this place, and the implementation of it, left something to be desired. The system of support could with advantage have incorporated the use of chocks. The hydraulic props used were eminently suitable for use at roadheads but the prop density there was less than on the remainder of the face ; additional supports should have been set at the margins of ground to be brought down by shotfiring. Long experience has shown a need for more than average density of supports at roadheads, especially where, as in this case, there is a machine stable which increases the distance from pack to face. The enlarged view on Plan No. 2 shows that the packs were not completed as close to the face as they should have been, a matter of prime importance at roadheads. Similar criticisms apply to the support of O.18 return roadhead. 87. Intensive support of the roadhead is particularly necessary when, as in O.10 intake, the road is along a coal rib. Roof settlement over the coal rib may not be arrested but it is delayed and the higher rate of settlement over the packs must result in sharp deflection of the roof at the ribside, with the risk of extensive fracturing there. Because the higher beds are better supported at the ribside, the lowering of the immediate roof above the roadway tends to the formation of bed separation there. The advantages and disadvantages •of the practice of forming roads along the ribside, and the necessary precautions if roads are so situated, are fully considered and well documented in a report issued in 1952 by the National Coal Board's South Western Divisional Committee on Strata Control[9]. 88. Some months before the explosion the roadway had met the faults. The roof had not then been held and the consequence had been the large cavity. A proper standard of roof control and support at roadheads should ordinarily prevent the development of cavities. Where they do occur, perhaps in association with a seam abnormality, their extent can be limited by improved support at and ahead of the rippings. Many cavities develop between the last-set arch and the ripping face where the usual method of initial support of the newly exposed roof is by fore-poling. Even where this is carried out well its effectiveness depends upon the resistance of the supports, usually steel arches, which carry the straight girder 'poles'. Recently-set arches, especially those incorporating means of accommodating the inevitable height loss, are often lightly loaded and a comparatively small load on the advancing end of a fore-pole can cause the inbye supporting arch to lower and thus produce a magnified drop at the end of the pole. There is need for the development of better practice in fore-poling and of means whereby road supports, though capable of accommodating height loss, offer greater resistance when newly set, at the time when support from them is most valuable. 89. In roof conditions which predispose cavity formation at roadheads, the original excavation may be made smaller, and thus easier to control, by the adoption of the pilot method of roadway formation. In this method, which is not uncommon in South Wales, a small roadway is taken near the face and a larger one made a short distance outbye. Alternatively, where the floor is not liable to excessive heave, unduly thick roof rippings may be avoided by floor ripping or by a combination of roof and floor ripping, as was adopted in O.18 intake. The development of mechanical, perhaps pneumatic, means of conveying stone from the excavation to the pack spaces in either of these systems would be very helpful ; much more difficult problems in mining engineering have been successfully overcome. The desirability or otherwise of adopting either of these alternatives would fall to be determined in the light of all the circumstances. 90. Most cavities are small to begin with and special measures taken in good time may halt their extension. If, however, a roadhead cavity is allowed to extend as the roadway advances, it may become virtually unmanageable. A stage must arise in the development of such a cavity when it is necessary to stop the face so that proper measures may be taken to prevent its further development. The identification of such a stage is the concern of all officials the decision, except in emergency, may be a function of the senior management of the colliery. 91. Another problem which requires consideration is whether, once a large cavity has formed, it should either be filled or otherwise supported and kept ventilated. This again is a matter of judgment in each case, but generally speaking, filling is to be preferred. The means of filling large cavities have been much improved recently. In his report for 1958[10], H.M. Inspector of Mines and Quarries for the South Western Division referred to the filling of roof cavities by pneumatic stowing with material fed into a crusher-stower situated beneath the cavity. More recently, II. Wright, in a Paper[11] has described how cavities may be filled by pumping into them a light-weight compressible material. I hope that managements will, in appropriate circumstances, give careful consideration to the adoption of such methods of filling cavities. In weak ground, falls of stone will generally continue in any cavity not completely supported until, in time, the void is largely filled. But it must be borne well in mind that before then there is some risk of firedamp being expelled from the cavity or even ignited therein by a large fall of stone. Firedamp Determinations 92. The firedamp content of the general body of the air at the statutory point of determination had on occasions exceeded one per cent., but the manager had failed to give notice of these results to H.M. Inspectorate. There were also a number of irregularities in connection with the making and recording of determinations. Some of the results had not been entered in the book provided at the colliery for the purpose and some of those recorded referred to determinations made at times other than the latter part of a cutting shift. There was no record for O.12 unit. 93. The person responsible to the manager for making firedamp determinations and taking air measurements was not solely concerned with ventilation. He was responsible also for the collection of roadway dust samples and for monthly examinations of fire-fighting equipment. When difficulties with firedamp were encountered in O.18 unit, he had insufficient time to give proper attention to all his duties. Nevertheless, the deficiencies and irregularities should have been avoided. Careful consideration of these and related matters led me to the conclusion that the manager might have been greatly assisted by the employment at the colliery of a ventilation specialist who could, if necessary, have devoted all his time to this work. The "Bryan" Report recommended that "local management, when confronted with difficult ventilation problems, should take advantage of the expert advice which should always be available within the National Coal Board". Something more now seems to be necessary in the direction of providing such continuous expert attention to the ventilation of each mine as may be necessary to prevent difficulties arising. Consideration of this suggestion could well form part of a wider concept which Sir Andrew Bryan had in mind when, in his closing address on behalf of the National Association of Colliery Managers and the British Association of Colliery Management, he suggested That there was a need for operational research to discover ways and means of improving the effectiveness of the large manpower now employed in the field of safety. Firedamp Detection 94. A number of the persons carrying flame safety lamps had not been trained and certified in their use. Unsuccessful attempts have been made at many mines to persuade workmen to become qualified and to carry and use firedamp detectors. I understand that a payment for carrying and using them has now been arranged and I hope that the last has been heard of these difficulties. 95. It was suggested at the Inquiry that deputies should be provided with methanometers and probes for examining places otherwise inaccessible to them. I feel sure that there is a case for the wider use of these aids by ventilation officers in special investigation work — one aspect of which I shall refer to later — but not, for the time being at any rate, by deputies in routine inspections. I would, however, agree entirely with a suggestion that deputies should be provided, as soon as possible, with a better mean's of examining for firedamp in high places, not only because it is difficult for them to reach the roof of such places with their lamps, but because it is known that present types of lamps may not give accurate indications of thin roof layers. Flame safety lamps so equipped that a sample may be brought down from the roof to the lamp by an aspirator and a tube are becoming available, and the National Coal Board is carrying out complementary development work with a view to producing a flame lamp detector which will give direct and improved performance in the detection of very thin layers. Emission of Firedamp 96. The O.18 face was advancing into an area not likely to have been drained of firedamp to any appreciable extent by previous workings; the nearest seam extracted was the upper leaf of the Black Vein, some 60 yards above. A fairly substantial firedamp emission was therefore to be expected and did in fact occur. When last measured before the explosion, the quantity of air in the return airway was 9,450 cubic feet per minute, and it contained one per cent. of firedamp at a point 30 feet from the face. The 'make' of firedamp was thus about 94 cubic feet per minute. Firedamp appearances were quite frequent, mainly in the intake rippings, the highest point in the unit, until the thickness of the roof ripping was reduced from six feet to three feet by the substitution of eight feet arches for the twelve feet arches previously used and by taking some floor ripping. 97. The 'make' of firedamp in O.10 unit was small — less than 17 cubic feet per minute when last calculated before the explosion; the percentage of firedamp at the return end of the face was only one-quarter of one per cent. Nevertheless, firedamp was quite frequently reported by the deputies mainly at or near the return end of the face. Firedamp Drainage 98. It was suggested at the Inquiry that had a system of firedamp drainage by boreholes over the gob been practised this accident might have been averted. I do not find the evidence strong enough for me to subscribe to this view, but I consider it very likely that had such a system been adopted in O.18 unit it would have saved many people a great deal of trouble and anxiety. The National Union of Mineworkers' lodge chairman was apparently concerned, because of shotfiring, about the appearances of firedamp in O.18 unit and he discussed this with the manager on at least one occasion just before the explosion. Long before this, however, the manager and, indeed, the group manager, had demonstrated their concern by taking part in special methanometer surveys. 99. The adoption of firedamp drainage was considered by the management. I think that this unit was one in which firedamp drainage might well have been adopted. It could conceivably have been much more effective than the local air deflection measures taken, by assisting the naturally buoyant firedamp to rise to the drainage holes and so away from the edges of the working. One of the objections advanced by the area ventilation engineer was that, for successful drainage, holes would have had to be bored from the intake road as well as from the return. This would not necessarily have been the case. There are many examples of firedamp drainage from the return side only and on faces longer than in O.18 unit. An ascentional ventilation lay-out, although not called for by other considerations, might have simplified the problem here but there are instances of successful drainage, with proper precautions, from intakes. 100. Firedamp drainage could well be, in some conditions, one of the best ways of minimising dangerous emissions from the waste. The very important Section 56 (2) (b) of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, imposes upon managers the duty of securing that appropriate steps are taken for this purpose. The waste conditions can only be ascertained by investigation such as is made, for instance, in the gassier seams of North Staffordshire where ventilation officers regularly observe the firedamp content near roof level in the accessible wastes by means of methanometers and probes. I strongly recommend procedures which have been set out in papers by R. H. Clough and J. Carver[13] and by E. Steele and D. C. Yates[14]. Air Velocities 101. The O.10 unit made less than one-fifth of the amount of firedamp given off in O.18 unit but the air quantity was also less by about one-half. The velocity of air on O.10 face was of the order of 100 feet per minute and thus substantially below the figure of 150 feet per minute recommended originally as a dust preventive measure in the Third Report of the Research Committee of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' Association[12], and subsequently quoted by the National Coal Board as desirable for faces in new and reconstructed collieries. The air velocity on the face is, of course, generally related to the velocity in the roadways serving the face; in thin seams a face velocity of 150 feet per minute might mean a low velocity in the roadway, which would be conducive to roof-layering of firedamp. Where the air has a fairly high velocity, it does to some extent sweep places just out of the general airflow and it can be directed with some force to such places as ripping edges. Many explosions in recent years have occurred in seams which are not very gassy and have been attributed to the unexpected emission of firedamp, often in no great quantity and probably at a moderate rate. As the emission of firedamp can rarely be predicted accurately. the possibility, or indeed probability, of occasional abnormal emissions should be catered for by producing enough air to deal with such a situation. Had there been available on O.10 unit the quantity of air that there was on O.18 unit, and a means provided of deflecting a substantial part of this air into the ripping, I do not think that firedamp would have accumulated in quantity sufficient to have started a coal dust explosion. Air Ejectors 102. These air-moving appliances are referred to in mining terminology as "Venturis". It was suggested at the Inquiry that the two in O.18 unit were objectionable. Neither contributed to the explosion but attention was, quite properly, drawn to the hazard inherent in inefficient earthing — one of them was open to criticism in this respect — and the risk of recirculation. It was pointed out that in some European countries there are requirements fixing minimum lengths of tubing to prevent recirculation[15], and it was suggested that in this country the use of any such device was, by virtue of the provisions of Section 58 (4) of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, subject to the consent of an Inspector. In ventilation legislation, provisions governing earthing, siting and recirculation are laid down only in respect of auxiliary fans. In view of recent developments in the use of air ejectors the time has arrived when the safety aspects should be discussed by the Ministry of Power with other interested parties. Air Separation Doors 103. The prolonged opening of any separation door may adversely affect face ventilation and I heard evidence which suggested that this had happened from time to time in W District. Materials for O.10 unit had to pass through three sets of doors and be man-handled part of the way, a process not satisfactory either from the aspect of ventilation or of transport. The wider adoption of long trunk conveyors in places where it is not possible to keep a separate track for materials alongside the conveyor has added to the difficulty of supplying material to faces and calls for careful consideration in planning the working of such a district. Aluminium Alloys 104. I had no difficulty in excluding as a possible source of ignition the aluminium alloy component of the stage loader motor situated some 30 yards from the face of O.10 intake. It is well known, however, that incendive sparks can readily be produced by friction between aluminium alloy and rusty steel. Following the explosion at Glyncorrwg Colliery in 1954[16], restrictions on the use of equipment consisting partly or wholly of aluminium alloy were imposed upon managements by instructions from the Headquarters of the National Coal Board, after discussion with the Ministry of Power, but these restrictions applied only at the coal face. I think that the subject should now be re-examined with a view to extending the area of restriction to all parts of a mine where firedamp may be a hazard. Shotfiring Practice 105. Some very conflicting evidence was given on shotfiring practice. Many of the workmen witnesses said that they had never seen a break detector used; witnesses who fired shots maintained that they had always used one. Only one was found after the explosion and there was no evidence to suggest the existence of any other in W District, The regulations require the owner of a mine to provide one break detector for each shotfirer on duty. It was contended by those concerned that one shotfirer normally fired all the shots on his shift but that if, as happened occasionally, a deputy also fired shots, the shotfirer and the deputy arranged not to fire at the same time so that each could in turn have the use of the detector. This expedient could have been avoided by the proper provision of a detector for each shotfirer and for each deputy who fired shots. The break detector produced had clearly been very much used at some time. The point of the prong had become worn to such an extent that it did not satisfy the requirement of the official approval and, with the prong in this condition, a shotfirer could well fail to detect a completely longitudinal break wide enough to be dangerous. 106. Another serious irregularity alleged by many witnesses was that the specially provided stemming bags of fireproofed paper were sometimes partly, or even wholly, filled with fine coal instead of with suitable inert material. Twenty-two bags filled with fine coal were found on O.10 unit after the explosion. It is possible that the Inquiry disclosed an isolated instance, but managements generally will be well advised forthwith to check the position at their collieries. The proper provision of suitable stemming material at any place where a shot is to be fired is a very important safety matter and it seems to me that from all points of view there must be a method better than one involving the use of paper bags, especially those intended to be filled by hand below ground. One way might be to prepare stemming material only on the surface and in a form readily recognisable by those who are to use it below ground. 107. The round of four shots in O.10 intake ripping on the night shift before the explosion were fired when the only persons in the unit, other than the deputy, were the shotfirer and his assistant; they did not advance the horsehead supports to the ground exposed by shotfiring. It was apparently not unusual to fire shots towards the end of one shift and leave the setting of support to the newly-exposed ground for a following shift. The practice of shotfiring at times when as few persons as possible are at risk is commendable, and there is much to support the view that shotfiring should be carried out between shifts. It is, however, essential that the operations associated with shotfiring — the preparatory setting of additional supports around the margins, the withdrawal of the supports from beneath the roof to be brought down and the supporting of the newly exposed ground — should be carried out in sequence with the minimum of delay between stages after supports have been withdrawn. This is important in mines generally as a contribution to good roof control and as a safeguard against accidents caused by falling stones. 108. There was no evidence at the Inquiry to support a suggestion made there that shots had been fired in the presence of firedamp, but A. Davies and L. R. James both expressed the view that it is potentially dangerous to fire a shot in a ripping where a hurdle sheet is in use to remove firedamp, and three published reports made by H.M. Inspectors about 30 years ago were referred to in support of this view. The matter is not relevant to this explosion if it originated, as I believe, in O.10 intake roadhead, but the question raised is one which merits further thought in the light of present day conditions and related considerations. Any step likely to militate against the use of hurdle sheets as precautionary measures might be a retrogression; many more might well be so used, preferably of a type such as was suggested in Safety Pamphlet No. 26[17]. The shotfiring danger to be guarded against could perhaps be effectively lessened by an appropriate increase in the amount of general ventilation provided or the adoption of firedamp drainage, possibly localised, or both. 109. My observations in O.18 return roadhead led me to think that shotholes were perhaps not being positioned as well as they might have been; too many of them were bored at an inclination steeper than the strata and therefore were the more likely to intersect any bed separation breaks present. So far as practicable. shotholes should be drilled parallel with the bedding planes. 110. Every advantage should be taken of the new methods and materials that are continually becoming available for use in shotfiring. A much safer explosive than the present "equivalent sheathed" has recently been developed. Under regulations soon to be made, approved types may be used, without exemption, to fire delay action rounds with approved detonators and exploders in any place where explosives may be used. This new explosive is certainly weaker than others now in use but the great advantages to be derived from short-delay blasting may well make it worth while to use heavier charges, or even to bore more holes. Mining engineers aided, I think, by more specialist advice should carefully examine the possibility of using this less incendive type more extensively. 111. Following a report by the National Coal Board's North Eastern Divisional Shotfiring Committee[18], trials have been carried out on the injection of foam into ripping shotholes before blasting, as a means of reducing the risk of ignitions in breaks. H.M. Inspector for the North Eastern Division described the progress of these trials in his report for 1959[19]. I understand that the trials are continuing satisfactorily and that similar trials, but on a smaller scale, are being carried out in South Wales. These trials should be encouraged because, in principle, the method provides a valuable safeguard against an ignition of firedamp by the potentially dangerous ripping shot. Coal Dust Dangers 112. I have already recorded the results of the pre-explosion and post-explosion roadway dust samples at Six Bells Colliery and pointed out that, although the pre-explosion samples were generally satisfactory, a widespread explosion occurred. 113. Many attempts have been made to correlate results of pre-explosion and post-explosion dust samples and the position was well summarised by F. V. Tideswell in a Paper published in 1952[20]. This paper cites examples which tend to show that in rope haulage roads and walking returns the results of post-explosion samples give a fair guide to the composition of dust in those roads at the time of an explosion. In other roads, notably those where coal is carried by belt conveyor, wide differences may be expected; before an explosion there may be imperfect mixing of coal and stone dust, a situation particularly likely to arise on conveyor roads where rich deposits of coal dust can easily collect under the conveyors and on the conveyor structures. The deposits of coal dust under the conveyors are by no means easy to sample and this, together with dust from any coal being conveyed, may account for considerable discrepancies in the results of samples collected before and after the explosion. 114. There was evidence that the roadway conveyors were not kept clean; but cleaning and stone-dusting even to standards which would be regarded as very good practice are, unfortunately, not a complete safeguard against a coal dust explosion. 115. Published work by Godbert, Bradshaw and Leach[21] [22] gave results of observations they made at several collieries on the rate of deposition of coal dust on roadways inbye of loading or transfer points and in returns. They showed, among other findings, that during a coal filling shift the quantity of dust in the coal actually on a conveyor may be, of itself, quite sufficient to propagate a coal dust explosion. 116. An ignition of firedamp alone in the relatively small quantity and in the conditions visualised near the face of O.10 loading gate could conceivably have occurred without anybody knowing much about it. The propagation of the explosion by coal dust again emphasises what I consider to be the biggest single problem of safety in modern coal mines — that of keeping in a safe condition those roadways in which coal is transported by conveyers. 117. The limitations of general stone-dusting on conveyor roads led some years ago to the conclusion that an additional safeguard was necessary and then to the suggestion that stone dust barriers should be used for this purpose. They cannot prevent an ignition of coal dust but they can limit the extent of an explosion. Although for some years barriers had been used abroad, notably in Germany. it was not until 1952 that a decision was taken to use them in this country. It may well be that some mining engineers are still not convinced of the vital need for barriers. This may stem either from reluctance to accept that general stone-dusting cannot provide complete protection or from a fear that the very presence of barriers will lead to the neglect of general stone-dusting. I am convinced that stone dust barriers arc necessary, but I must emphasise that general stone-dusting is an equally essential part of the protection; the absence of general stone-dusting could permit a coal dust explosion to develop a speed which barriers could not arrest. 118. A National Coal Board's Production Department Instruction was issued on 1st September, 1953, requiring managements to provide stone dust barriers on conveyor roads and setting out very clearly the reason for the provision. Regulations, which were not made earlier because it was considered that insufficient was known on the subject, came into force on 1st October, 1960. These regulations require managers to prepare schemes specifying the position and type of each barrier, and it is thus of the greatest importance that they should be convinced that the proper provision of stone dust barriers is a vital requirement which, if neglected, might have disastrous consequences. 119. The National Coal Board's Production Department Instruction in force at the time of the explosion at Six Bells Colliery may not have been altogether free from ambiguity but, on my reading, it seems to have required 'primary' barriers in the W District at the following places :—
The extent of the explosion might possibly have been much less had barriers been provided at these places. In the present state of knowledge I cannot dissent from the views expressed in evidence that barriers might have prevented the spread of the explosion from O.10 unit to O.18 unit. 120. As a coal dust explosion is, fortunately, a comparatively rare occurrence, the period of seven years since barriers were first introduced into this country has provided only three instances of their operation in practice. W. Brown, in his special report on the explosion at Horden Colliery, Co. Durham, in 1953[23] referred to the destruction of a stone dust barrier in the following words — "Therefore, while it is uncertain how far the explosion would have propagated had there been no stone dust barrier, it is worthy of record that the explosion did, in fact, stop at, or very near the barrier and that despite the very mild explosion the barrier was satisfactorily destroyed and a substantial amount of its stone dust was dispersed." Two recent incidents seem to indicate satisfactory functioning of barriers. in the first, an explosion occurred during the re-opening of a mine which had been temporarily closed as a result of a fire ; investigation after the explosion showed that it had been confined to the intake roadway leading to the affected face; a stone dust barrier at the outbye end of this roadway had been discharged, but a second barrier in the main roadway outbye had not been disturbed. The second relates to a district of a mine which was sealed-off to smother an underground fire; when the district was re-opened some five months later, it was found that an explosion had occurred, but that it had been confined to a 300 yard length of roadway between the face and the site of a stone dust barrier, which had been discharged; a detailed examination was not possible because the district had immediately to be re-sealed following a second explosion. 121. The S.M.R.E., who have been working on the problem of dust explosions for many years, are to construct a large experimental gallery, which will be most valuable in the further research work quite clearly needed. 122. The Safety and Health Committee of the Coal Industry National Consultative Council has devoted much time and energy to the problems of coal dust explosion risks and continues to do so. A Sub-Committee of the Safety and Health Committee is considering the siting and construction of stone dust barriers. The report of the Sub-Committee on Mining Explosions[24] referred briefly to the danger from wet coal dust, to which attention had been directed by the report on the explosion at Kames Colliery in 1957[25] and recommended that a Working Party of experts on coal dust explosions should be set up. This Working Party, having considered the results of experiments carried out by Dr. Cybulski in Poland and other evidence, has recently completed its report on wet coal dust and is to consider a review of the whole problem of coal dust explosions, which is now being prepared by the S.M.R.E. This consideration should include, as a matter of urgency, the adoption of precautionary measures in the zone of the greatest risk of firedamp ignition — that is within, say, 100 yards of the face.
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