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The Investigation

Nature and Scale of Examination

38. Preliminary examination of the affected area failed to disclose any obvious igniting cause and indicated that it would be far from easy to determine the point of origin of the explosion. The task was, however, undertaken in close collaboration by all concerned. National Coal Board management officials and specialists, Inspectors of the National Union of Mineworkers and H.M. Inspectors of Mines and Quarries all played their part in a sustained effort, the scale of which was illustrated by evidence given that H.M. Inspectors alone spent over 250 shifts at the mine. Scientific staff of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment (S.M.R.E.) made a meticulous inspection for indications of flame and blast and collected numerous samples and specimens for scientific examination in their laboratories. All the electrical and mechanical equipment of the district was examined in situ by specialists and many items were sent for test to the S.M.R.E.

Extent of the Explosion

39. Microscopic examination of over 500 specimens of dust and fibrous material indicated that flame had swept, as shown on Plan No. 3, through some 3,000 yards of roadway and each of the faces with the exception of O.10. Flame had traversed the main intake road, both roads serving O.10, most of the old O.9 return, the intake of O.18 and its return for 30 yards outbye from the face. The main return was affected only locally by flame through the crosscuts. There were signs of prolonged burning of firedamp in two lengths of roadway, for 70 yards outbye from O.10 intake roadhead and for about 25 yards outbye from O.18 return roadhead.

Directions of Propagation

40. The explosion was not a violent one and for this reason indications of blast were not very prominent. Those disclosed by painstaking investigation, when considered as a whole, gave the indications shown by the green arrows on Plan No. 3. On the main intake there were signs pointing in both directions from near the junction with O.10 intake. The inbye indications persisted to and along O.18 intake and continued along the face. Signs in O.10 intake, on the whole, pointed outbye from the face. In O.10 supply gate, although the doors at the entrance were blown inbye towards the face, there were signs of blast in both directions at the junction of face and roadway; in the restricted area of old O.9 face there were strong signs of blast towards the return. The brickwork sides of the O.9 Undercast were blown in directions away from the main intake, the doors in O.2 Crosscut, in O.7 Crosscut and in the crosscut near O.18 unit were all blown towards the return airways.

41. Specimens of coked dust indicated the directions of flame to have been as shown by the red arrows on Plan No. 3. These indications of direction were generally consistent with the indications of blast. Minor and local contra-indications observed were not at all unusual. There were clear signs that flame entered both ends of O.12 face. Coked dust depositions found in O.10 supply road indicated that flame had travelled from the main intake to O.9 old face and along it to O.9 return where it died out at about 200 yards from the face.

Ventilation Tests

42. A number of tests were made with the object of determining whether any reductions in quantities of air or changes in ventilating pressure would lead to the accumulation of firedamp at any point where it was not normally found. The amount of ventilation in and near the faces was greatly reduced by short-circuiting the main intake and return airways and, in O.10 unit, by blocking the old O.9 return. The trials were searching and prolonged beyond any likelihood of their duration in practice; some of them were deliberately made at a time when the barometric pressure was favourable to the appearance of fired amp. Nothing significant emerged. The firedamp ceiling in the cavity on O.10 intake lowered a little; a very thin roof layer was detected by probe and methanometer for some distance inbye but this firedamp dispersed into the general body of the air long before it reached the face. A careful watch was maintained, especially at times when barometric pressure was falling, close to the inaccessible connection between the old O.9 main gate and The Marine gob; but there was not at any time an indication of firedamp being given off.

Safety Lamps

43. The safety lamps found in the affected area, forty-eight electric cap lamps and eight flame lamps, were examined at the S.M.R.E. Twenty-nine of the electric lamps were found to be undamaged and it was concluded that damage sustained by others had resulted from the explosion. Of the eight flame lamps, four were undamaged and three were slightly damaged but shown by tests to be still safe. One was badly damaged but as this lamp had been found on the main intake the damage was considered to be consequential.

Contraband

44. A police constable who examined the clothing of the victims at the surface found an unsmoked cigarette. A. S. Jones, H.M. Inspector of Mines and Quarries, found two live matches in a haversack underground. J. T. Thirlaway, area scientist, during investigations in the district, examined a polythene bottle and found inside it a plastic bag tied to the stopper by a thread. L. G. Fear, H.M. Senior District Inspector of Mines and Quarries, and members of his staff made further extensive and intensive searches for contraband in the district but with negative results.

Roadway Dust Samples

45. An examination of colliery records showed that the procedure followed in taking and testing roadway dust samples before the explosion was in order except that samples were not taken during the months of December, 1959, and April, 1960. No explanation was given for the omission in December, but the man whose duty it was to take samples in April said that he was prevented from doing so by his daily preoccupation with the ventilation of O.18 unit.

46. Forty-four samples were collected on 21st June, one week before the explosion, and 41 of these were found to contain over 80 per cent, of incombustible matter. The other three, all taken in the vicinity of the main loading point, contained, respectively, 57, 70 and 75.6 per cent. of incombustible matter. The volatile matter of the coal worked was less than 25 per cent. so that the management could, had they notified H.M. Inspectorate to that effect, have established 60 as the minimum percentage of incombustible matter required to be maintained. They had not done so and thus, by regulation, a minimum percentage of 75 automatically applied.

47. C. A. Bilton, H.M. Inspector of Mines and Quarries, collected six samples on 17th May, 1960, from places where he considered the combustible content likely to be highest — two just inbye the main loading point, two just inbye the transfer point from O.18 gate belt to the trunk belt and two in O.18 return immediately outbye the roadhead. Analyses of these samples showed that four contained more than 75 per cent. of incombustible matter. The other two contained more than 70 per cent. but less than 75 per cent. and H.M. Senior District Inspector, in correspondence, drew the attention of the management to these results; he was assured that the zones concerned had been re-treated and that the results of re-sampling had been satisfactory.

48. The results of post-explosion roadway dust sampling and analysis are indicated on Plan No. 4. The majority of these samples contained less than 75 per cent. of incombustible matter: of the 64 samples taken in conveyor roads 29 contained more than 60 per cent. but less than 75 per cent., and 29 contained less than 60 per cent. The discrepancy between the results of pre-explosion and post-explosion samples will be commented upon later.

Mechanical Apparatus

49. K. S. Worthington, H.M. Inspector of Mechanical Engineering, made a critical examination of the mechanical apparatus in W District and of air compressing machinery on the surface. The standard of installation and maintenance was generally satisfactory. There were some minor defects but none of them contributed to the explosion.

50. A hole in a compressed air pipe had been repaired by paper and hemp nope, a malpractice which could cause a fire. A wooden plug was found to have been driven into a hole in the compressed air supply main about 40 yards from the roadhead of O.10 intake: the plug showed very slight signs of heat but this had apparently been caused by the explosion. Three compressed air pipe joints made with rubber rings were found to be 'blowing' rather badly on O.12 face, but laboratory examination of the rubber showed no sign of frictional heating.

51. The O.10 stage-loader driving motor situated about 30 yards from the face of the intake was found to be fitted with an aluminium alloy fan and cowl. The cowl had been fractured but the cracks did not seem to have been freshly produced, nor were there any recently-made indentations or abrasions. Some of the steel wires of the mesh guard covering the air inlet in the cowl had at some time fouled the roots of the fan blades, but the rubbed surfaces were not new. The fan was found to be free-running and without end play on the motor shaft, which might have allowed the fan to rub against the wires or other surface.

52. The haulage engine in O.10 supply gate was found with the throttle valve partly open, the brake off and reverse gear engaged; the rope 'lead' was underneath the drum, instead of above as it normally was. An empty supply tram was found at its outbye terminus between the two doors in O.10 supply gate. The haulage rope connected to it was very slack and a 'barhook' (backstay) was attached to and beneath the tram as though it had been over-ridden. It was suggested that the haulage engine might have been running in reverse gear at the time of the explosion and that it continued to do so until the pressure of air fell after a breakage of pipes caused by the explosion. Tests carried out after the explosion showed that when the engine was left running after the tram had reached the outbye end of the road the spare rope stayed slack on the drum until it was caught up and coiled in the opposite direction. Old indentations on a girder of the haulage framework indicated that at some time the rope had coiled beneath the drum. The evidence that the engine might have been running was tenuous as the throttle lever might easily have been moved either in the explosion or accidentally afterwards; in any event, I am satisfied that incendive sparks would not have been produced.

Electrical Apparatus

53. A. L. Alexander, H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines and Quarries, and Chief Testing Officers of the S.M.R.E. inspected all electrical apparatus in position. and 95 items were sent to the S.M.R.E. for further critical examinations and tests. The apparatus was found to comply with the certified designs and, apart from minor defects, to have been well maintained..

54. Every flameproof enclosure was twice subjected to test to find whether, under the most stringent conditions, an explosion of firedamp in air within it would ignite a surrounding inflammable mixture of firedamp in air. The external inflammable atmosphere was not ignited in any of the 124 tests made.

55. The telephone and signalling appliances were tested for intrinsic safety in methane-air mixtures. Some items had been damaged by the explosion but the tests showed that an adequate margin of safety had existed under working conditions.

56. The remote control circuits associated with eight of the gate-end switches controlling the conveyor motors were certified as intrinsically safe in 1939, but have since been found, when tested by a more modem method, to be capable of igniting methane. In seven of the circuits used, however, the remote control cables were found intact and the remote control enclosures were proved to be flameproof. In the remaining circuit, the remote control switch housings were flameproof but the connecting cable was damaged; the damage, however, was such that sparking could not have occurred.

57. A single-shot exploder found in O.18 return was tested and found to conform to its approval specification. The wire-armoured roadway cables were examined underground and tested at a voltage considerably higher than the working voltage without disclosing any defect liable to cause open sparking. All the flexible cables in use were examined at the surface and tested at a voltage considerably in excess of the working voltage, again without disclosing any defect which could have given rise to open sparking.

58. Tests were carried out on the two "Venturi" tubes to determine whether or not they could have accumulated an electrostatic charge sufficient to cause an ignition. These tests were made in conditions far more conducive to the development of such a charge than those likely to have been present in the pit, but the maximum charges developed were not capable of igniting firedamp.

 

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