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V. — The Attempt To Re-Open The North Side Districts

(12) After the fire in No. 4 East had been sealed off for five months, it was felt that it would then be safe to re-open the district while the pit was idle for the annual holidays in the latter part of July. Samples taken from behind the seals from the bottom of the drifts had shown that the atmosphere had rapidly become extinctive once the seals were completed and it was felt that sufficient time had elapsed to allow all heated material to cool off sufficiently so that it would not re-ignite when exposed to the normal atmosphere.

(13) It was estimated that a volume of 1¾ to 2 million cubic feet of methane was contained behind the seals and this had to be swept out, diluted to a harmless concentration and removed to the surface by restoring the ventilation. An operation of this nature and magnitude obviously calls for careful and detailed planning beforehand. The potential risk of disaster is indeed ever present until the last of the gas has gone.

(14) The two stoppings at the bottom of the drifts presented a somewhat unusual problem. It was known that the atmosphere immediately behind them was practically pure methane and they had been strengthened with masonry walls, together with injections of considerable quantities of neat cement. Any attempt to remove the stoppings by manual labour was out of the question because of the risk of igniting gas by sparking from tools, and because of the risk, particularly at the return stopping, that the workmen might become enveloped in an irrespirable atmosphere. After extensive enquiries and consultations with experts it was decided to breach the seals by blasting, the charges being fired electrically from the surface while no one was underground. In order to ensure that the gas could not come into contact with the explosive while it was being fired, considerable quantities of water were pumped through the stoppings, and the drifts behind them filled to such an extent that there was a head of water of at least five feet above the tops of the seals. The seals were safely, though only partially, breached when the charges were fired at 10.40 a.m. on Saturday, 16th July. Inspection later in the day showed that a hole had in fact been blown through the return seal but that the wall on the inbye side of the intake seal was only cracked. The latter was not really opened up until 2 a.m. on Sunday, 17th July, when the fractured brickwork was pushed over with a hydraulic prop.

(15) Before operations started the National Coal Board's Divisional Mobile Laboratory was brought to the colliery and in addition air sampling apparatus was set up in the electricians shop. This enabled samples to be analysed immediately they were brought to the surface and the results were in the hands of the management at the earliest possible moment.

(16) The methane drainage pipe range had been opened up close to the outbye wall of the seal in the return so that samples of atmosphere from the return could be drawn off at the surface without exposing anyone to the risk entailed in collecting them on the spot. This arrangement proved very successful and samples taken in this way showed that about three-quarters of an hour after the blast 11 per cent. of firedamp was present in the return and that it rose to just over 20 per cent. one hour after the blast. Air samples were drawn (and analysed) from this pipe at regular intervals until it was re-connected with the inbye methane drainage range at 1.30 p.m. on Monday, 25th July, a few hours before the explosion. All these samples were analysed for carbon monoxide but "NIL" results were obtained except on three occasions, all within eleven minutes of the blast, when small percentages were found (0.034, 0.011 and 0.003), and these were considered (rightly I think) to have originated from the firing of the explosive.

(17) I consider that as soon as the water had drained away from the fire seals some air started to circulate through them. The doors in No. 1 East Air Crossing had been deliberately left open when the districts were sealed up in January, so that once the seals were breached very little ventilation pressure would be needed to cause some air to flow in the drifts. By 10 a.m. on Sunday, 17th July, air measurements indicated that 2,100 cubic feet per minute were passing in through the intake seal and indeed samples containing up to 68 per cent. methane were collected at the "Breach in the Return Stopping". By noon the quantity had risen to 5,500 cubic feet per minute. It was not, however, until the afternoon of Monday, 18th July, that a really clear passage was made through the stopping in the return drift. At the time the seals were inserted, doors were built in the drifts near the inbye ends of the stoppings and the door in the return had jammed shut. In order to open this door a team, wearing breathing apparatus, had to be sent round through No. 1 East Air Crossing into the return drift to take it off its hinges and this was accomplished by 3.30 p.m. Meanwhile air measurements taken by the Area Ventilation Engineer showed that 6,200 cubic feet per minute were passing inbye through the hole in the seal. Whether any of this fresh air reached the face of No. 4 East at this time is problematical since later inspection showed that the doors in the air crossing at No. 4 East had been destroyed by an explosion, which it would appear, happened when the district was sealed off in January. Later the same day, doors in the road connecting the two drifts on the outbye side of the stoppings were closed and a "fresh air base" established at No. 1 East Junction. A rescue team then explored the main intake and found it flooded inbye from No. 3 East Junction and that the edge of the water in the right-hand common return was lying at its junction with the Peeler House. The doors at No. 1 East Air Crossing were then closed (in the early hours of Tuesday, 19th July) and it was possible to walk down the intake to the edge of the water without breathing apparatus.

(18) In the meantime air samples had been systematically collected (1) from the site of the return stopping by means of the methane drainage pipe, (2) from the Fan Drift on the surface and (3) a few were also obtained, at much longer intervals, from the breach in the return stopping. As already indicated the results of the analyses of these samples did not give cause for any uneasiness. An additional sampling point was then established in the main return from the east side at No. 1 East Overcast and samples were collected once every hour from 1 a.m. on the 19th July, until 11 a.m. on the 20th. The analyses again seemed to indicate that all was well. In the morning of Wednesday, 20th July, the Area Ventilation Engineer took measurements showing there was a current of air passing inbye over the water, and that this had risen to 4,700 cubic feet per minute. The doors in the Peeler House were replaced by a Rescue Brigade, and an electric pump was taken inbye to the edge of the water, arriving on the site about 4 p.m.

(19) There was systematic sampling at four points from that day. The results were considered to be satisfactory at the time, but, as shown in Section 7 of the Report, I consider that the implication of those results was not properly appreciated.

(20) The electric pump was started up at 1.10 a.m. on Thursday, 21st July, and at once the level of the water began to fall. At 11.25 a.m. the Area Production Manager, J. Lawrie, and F. Tootle, H.M. District Inspector of Mines, made their way in through the water and reached the intake of No. 4 East. They found the doors at the air crossing completely smashed on the right-hand side and partly damaged on the left-hand side, and such fresh air as was reaching the air crossing appeared to be short circuiting directly into the return on the south side. Tests made with a flame safety-lamp showed that the flame was extinguished at a point in the intake 30 feet inbye of the air crossing. It was at this time that signs of a previous explosion, which had probably occurred at the time when the district was sealed off in January, were found. In addition to the damage to the air crossing doors a stone dust barrier installed near the end of the intake was found to be discharged, the planks at the outbye end were lying on the floor, but those inbye were still in position although with no dust left on them. Some metal ventilation tubing which had been used before the air crossing had been constructed, and which had been left hanging up in the road, was also found flattened. Later the same day a canvas screen was erected in an attempt to restrict the leakage through the air crossing doors, and the Area Ventilation Engineer, wearing breathing apparatus, made a measurement in No. 4 East right-hand return showing that about 700 cubic feet per minute was coming out.

(21) On Friday, 22nd July, at 7.30 a.m. an attempt was made to restrict the leakage at the doors of No. 3 East and No. 4 East with canvas, and measurements taken by the Area Ventilation Engineer showed that 11,000 cubic feet per minute were now passing inbye over the water, and 7,500 cubic feet per minute were coming out at No. 4 sampling point. The flow in the right-hand return of No. 4 East had risen to 2,000 cubic feet per minute. Between 12.25 and 1.15 p.m. the right-hand return was explored by a rescue brigade wearing apparatus, who took temperatures getting readings of 720 F. dry bulb, and 710 F. wet bulb. Work continued to improve the doors at the overcast. At 2 p.m. another rescue team moved a tub, filled with rubbish from under the "back brushing" in the common return, which had been a considerable obstruction to the free flow of air in the return. This brigade then explored the intake of No. 4 East. In the evening another rescue brigade collected samples from the left-hand return when it was estimated that about 1,000 cubic feet per minute were coming outbye and being diluted with a leakage of approximately 3,000 cubic feet per minute of fresh air at the air crossing. Between 6.45 and 7.25 p.m. a rescue team went into the face of No. 4 East left-hand return, and by using their electric lamps were able to see down the face as far as the cutting machine. Everything seemed to be in order, the atmosphere was clear and the props were standing.

(22) On the same day special air samples were collected in the No. 4 East District. The results, set out in Section VII of the report, show that all except one contained carbon monoxide in measureable quantities.

(23) On Saturday, 23rd July, further improvements were effected to various doors along the intake, including those between the intake and the West side return.

(24) On Sunday, 24th July, the openings through the stoppings at the outbye ends of the main drifts were expanded by clearing the passageways up to the roof. By 1 p.m. the return had been dealt with, and by 4 p.m. the intake. A measurement made at 8 p.m. that day showed that the amount of air passing inbye had increased to 17,752 cubic feet per minute.

(25) On Monday, 25th July, at 9.30 a.m. an exploration was made by a party without breathing apparatus, and they were able to get as far as the face of No. 4 East intake. The roadway thus far was clear of gas, though the atmosphere felt warm. Tests with a flame safety-lamp through the north side doors at No. 4 air crossing showed that the atmosphere in the left-hand return was explosive. The party also travelled the right-hand return finding some 2 per cent. of firedamp in the general body of the air at the outbye end, rising to 3 per cent. in the general body at the roadhead. A quantity of 11,000 cubic feet per minute was passing inbye over the water in the Trunk Road.

(26) In the afternoon an attempt was made to run the methane drainage plant in order to draw gas from the left-hand return in No. 4 East. The attempt failed, apparently because the pipes were blocked with water. Two mechanics, J. Dewar and T. Stenzel, together with W. Murphy, an experienced deputy, were sent into the return to see if they could find out what was wrong, and to drain off any accumulation of water they could find. A party consisting of W. G. Neilson, the Group Manager, F. Tootle, District Inspector, J. Henderson, an overman and rescue man, W. Hamilton, a deputy, T. Davidson, a deputy, A. Bridges, a rescue man, D. Scott Snr. and D. Scott Jnr., workmen (and two others) were sent into No. 4 East in order to clear an airway through the fall which was known to have occurred on the left bank of the face at the time of the fire. The two rescue men wore breathing apparatus but it. was not "coupled up". Tootle went with the mechanics into the return and left, after watching them for some time, when he was satisfied that they would finish their work within a matter of 20 minutes. He then went round and assisted the party at the face. By 6.30 p.m. an airway had been opened up through the fall 3 to 4 feet in width and approximately 18 inches in height. Tootle and Neilson crawled through the hole, looked up the face using their cap lamps, and saw that conditions appeared to be normal. The atmosphere was clear and the props were standing.

(27) In the meantime the two other workmen had been sent to do further repairs at the ventilation doors. These workmen, fortunately for themselves, ran out of material and had to return to the surface. In the return the mechanics had also finished their work on the methane drainage pipes and reported progress to the surface on the telephone at No. 2 West. They received instructions from the Deputy Area Production Manager to go back into the return and make a further examination of the range. They did so but so far as is known they did not take any tools with them on this occasion. The deputy, Murphy, again accompanied them.

(28) Having opened up the passage through the fall the party at the face turned for home, and were making their way outbye along No. 4 East intake. Such was the state of affairs immediately before the explosion.

 

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A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.

 

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