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Investigation(34) It was at once clear that an explosion had taken place within the area contained by the stoppings on No. 9 East Main Level and No. 9 East Top Level. No effects of violence had been observed except the displacement of part of the Main Level stopping; survivors had seen dust and smelled something burning, but had seen no flame. The deceased men had been overcome by carbon monoxide gas and their bodies showed no sign of burning or other external injury. (35) When the two stoppings were first begun on Friday, the 9th October, there would be some immediate restriction of ventilation through No. 9 Face, and when they were finally plugged at about mid-day on the 10th, all ventilation would cease except for possible leakage through the stoppings. Now the estimated amount of 100 cubic feet of methane entering the air current per minute with normal ventilation might diminish with the cessation of ventilation but it would continue to be the main cause of change in the atmosphere within the stopped-off area. In fact with the completion of the seals the eventual production of an inflammable atmosphere was inevitable. Before such areas become sufficiently deprived of oxygen it can be assumed that the atmosphere, in its composition, passes through the inflammable range. (36) When Mr. Lawson, the manager, decided to seal off No. 9 Face and roads, he was confident that the heated material found at the left hand side of No. 9 Top Level had been effectively dealt with. Samples of atmosphere from No. 9 Top Level continued to be taken until 7 a.m. on the 10th October, some 5½ hours before actual sealing took place. Although these samples were analysed for carbon monoxide alone the amount of this gas found was not abnormally high. In fact, over the whole period of 5th to 10th October, the average amount of this gas found here was 0.0022 per centum, the maximum, on one occasion only, being 0.0063 per centum. The site of the heating at the left hand side of No. 9 Top Level was last seen some four hours before actual sealing took place. (37) There are, of course, other possible causes of ignition than spontaneous combustion. At the Inquest, the manager, Mr. Lawson, mentioned the possibility of frictional sparking occurring from a fall of material somewhere on the face or in the roads within the sealed area. Explosions of inflammable gas have been attributed to this cause, when in the absence of any more positive indication such falls of material have been identified with similarly positive evidence of where the ignition took place. I have also considered the question of sparking from electricity but the evidence of an electrician from Bickershaw was to the effect that all electric power to No. 9 Face was cut off on the 9th October, preparatory to the construction of the stoppings. After considering the remote possibility of frictional sparking I am bound to conclude that a much more likely source of ignition was the heating in No. 9 Top Level, and that the general confidence in the conditions there was misplaced. (38) To support this conclusion it is necessary at this point to consider the experience with No. 8 Face, the one immediately to the rise side, and which was worked before No. 9. This face had no experience of spontaneous combustion during its life: it was abandoned on 9th August, 1957, and stopped off on 11th November, 1957. Later the stoppings were gradually increased in length by the disposal of waste dirt. In July, 1959, samples taken on the No. 3 Brow on the return side of both No. 8 and No. 9 revealed an increase in the carbon monoxide content from about 0.002 to about 0.007 per centum. A closer search for the origin of this gas identified it with leakage out of No. 8 Main Level Stopping. Various attempts were made to improve the seal there, the main purpose being to reduce the amount of carbon monoxide on what was the main man-riding road, a concentration, which, although not dangerous, could not be tolerated. The measures adopted, which included the building of a brick wall as a face to the Main Level Stopping, were effective in reducing the amount of carbon monoxide reaching the No. 3 Brow. (39) I am informed that when No. 8 Face was working it was customary to leave packing about 8 yards thick on the lower side of the Main Level. Between this pack and the coal rib side being formed by the advance of the face, a small airway was left so that air could circulate round the fast end. A continuous small airway of this kind which would in time become inaccessible could not be contemplated in a seam so liable to spontaneous combustion as the Plodder; consequently this small airway was cut off periodically by cross drivages through the pack about every 40 yards, the abandoned portion behind being then sealed. Now when No. 9 Face advanced later taking out all the coal, these small spaces, and the adjoining pack would be re-exposed, with the result that within a few yards of the left hand corner of No. 9 Face there would, temporarily, be only about 8 yards of packing separating No. 9 Top Level from what remained of No. 8 Main Level. Despite the thickness of stoppings at the outbye end of No. 8 Top and Main Levels, it is probable that small leakages of air occurred between No. 9 Face and No. 8 Face. A small pressure due to the ventilation causing such leakage would be assisted by the gradient, and by the high resistance of the outer part of the No. 9 Top Level which was the proper path of flow for the air. Small leakages of this kind are all that are needed to start spontaneous combustion: the air flow is insufficient to carry away the heat being generated so the temperature of the material rises continuously. One measure against such leakage through roadway packs is to raise the floor of the roadways by leaving down part of the face ripping until the floor level of the roadway being formed is above the roof plane of the coal extracted in working. This is a long established practice, in certain conditions, and could have been carried out in the Top Level of No. 9 Face where the Plodder Seam was being worked first over the immediately contiguous Haigh Yard seam. But in the converse case, which is sometimes adopted, of working the Haigh Yard first, the burying of packs in this way would be impracticable. (40) While "digging out" operations were in progress at the heating in No. 9 Top Level, those engaged did not notice any movement of the air towards the abandoned No. 8 Face, but I feel that, having found distinctly hot material, and in the absence of any significant amount of carbon monoxide in the immediate atmosphere, the officials should have suspected that most of the products of combustion were in fact moving through the pack away from No. 9 and into No. 8 Face. Such movement would also seem to explain the observed rapid cooling of the road surfaces. It is possible that the heated material dug out was only part of that actually raised to a high temperature, and that the remainder was still active behind the packing by which the roadway had been restored. The air leakage referred to, while feeding more oxygen to the fire, would also, because of its direction of flow, tend to conceal the real conditions from those working there. If some fire continued at this point, it is reasonable to assume that the accumulating firedamp in No. 9 Face, once the main stoppings were built, would first reach an inflammable or explosive concentration at the higher corner of the face and be ignited there. Although new packing had been inserted between any continuing fire in No. 8 and No. 9 Top Level, it would not be "flameproof", and it is conceivable that the ignition of an explosive mixture first occurred in No. 8 Face and was propagated through the new packing into a larger accumulation of firedamp then present in No. 9. (41) There is other and perhaps more reliable evidence that the signs first observed by the deputy Hodgson on the 4th October were indicative of only a fringe of what might have been a heating of fairly high intensity somewhere on the lower side of No. 8 Main Level. I have already referred to the detection in July last of excessive amounts of carbon monoxide from the stopping on No. 8 Main Level. While the leakage might have been due to expansion of residual gas under falling barometric pressure, it did in fact occur during periods of very stable pressure, and therefore is more likely to have been caused by leakage coming in from No. 9 Face under the influence of ventilating pressure and some buoyancy. Indeed it would seem that the progressive advance of No. 9 Face was to some degree unsealing No. 8 or at least aggravating the leakage of air, and I can imagine a similarly progressive tendency to self-heating along the right hand side of No. 8 Main Level. If heating did occur it would probably be stifled by the consolidation of the packing as No. 9 Face advanced, and so I envisage the greatest intensity of heat, or tendency to self-heating would be just behind No. 9 Face. Once this face stopped, leakage would continue for some time at one place and the heating would grow in intensity until its effects began to be noticed within the No. 9 Face and were, of course, eventually detected by Hodgson on 4th October. (42) There is further support for this view, but for this purpose I will have to digress on the question of analysis of the constituent gases in mine atmospheres, which has long been established as a reliable indication of the rate of oxidation (and of self-heating) of coal substance. With the oxidation of coal a variable amount of carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide is produced. With oxidation of coal at normal temperatures a very small quantity of these gases is produced in relation to the amount of oxygen absorbed. However T. F. Winmill and J. I. Graham* working together as long ago as 1915 found that the proportion of carbon monoxide varies more particularly with the temperature, and this gas is readily and conveniently determinable with modern apparatus in very small proportions, down to a few parts per million. Accordingly, spontaneous heating of coal substance is always associated with a rise in the ratio of carbon monoxide produced to oxygen absorbed usually expressed as a percentage, thus:—
and Graham suggested this ratio as an indicator to be used in the early detection of heating. Its value is maintained even when the temperature continues to rise and actual fire results, though in open workings, with constant examination, other and more obvious signs will then have become evident. Since there is some very small amount of carbon monoxide produced with normal oxidation, the ratio as calculated will have a normal value for every seam, or group of workings, or for a mine, depending upon where the carbon monoxide present and the oxygen loss, respectively, are assessed: the indication of spontaneous heating lies in the rise of this ratio above what is known to be its normal value. From the experience of sampling over several years I am advised that the normal value of this ratio for the Plodder Seam at Bickershaw was 0.4 to 0.5 per centum. (43) I have already mentioned in paragraph 38 the increase in carbon monoxide in the No. 3 Brow (return) which was later identified with an increase in the expulsion of this gas from behind the stoppings on No. 8 Face. Sampling of the atmosphere from inside these stoppings was also continued, and I would refer in particular to samples collected during the period 5th to 10th October, 1959, which are also typical of those collected earlier in August and September. The results range as follows
At first glance, the air content of these respective groups of samples might be accepted as not being abnormal for a sealed area presuming some inleakage of air through the Main Level stopping which was the original intake. However, the general composition of the samples does not support this. Those from the Top Level show a low carbon monoxide/oxygen ratio and a high carbon dioxide content, and therefore no evidence of heating but rather vitiation from ordinary oxidation. However, the samples from behind the Main Level stopping give a high carbon monoxide content (air free) and a high carbon monoxide/oxygen ratio, and are thus typical of an atmosphere on the return side of a serious heating. In the absence of any known heating near the No. 8 Main Level stopping itself (a possibility which cannot be ruled out) the atmosphere behind this stopping must be related to the known heating where No. 8 and No. 9 Faces joined. The continuance of an abnormally high carbon monoxide/oxygen ratio from the samples collected from behind No. 8 Main Level stopping after the heating in the left hand side of No. 9 Top Level had been dug out should have awakened some doubt of the complete efficacy of the measures there taken. (44) I do not suggest that the reasoning I have employed should have occurred readily to the manager of the colliery and in fact there appears some little doubt of the reliability of the carbon monoxide/oxygen ratio when applied to stopped off areas, and this feature of its application is worthy of further investigation. Nevertheless, I think it reasonable to expect that the manager's advisers, and in particular the Area Scientific Service, who were responsible for providing him with the analyses of the samples of atmosphere, might have shown more concern, and made a wider investigation of the series of results from No. 8. (45) In justice to the management of Bickershaw, I must record that members of my staff, Mr. J. Lane, H.M. Senior District Inspector, and Mr. R. N. Forster, H.M. District Inspector, were in close touch with the developments during the few days preceding the explosion. In fact, Mr. Forster visited the No. 9 Stoppings during the morning of the day of the explosion. These two Inspectors, from their own knowledge and observation, shared the confidence of the management that no active fire was being sealed off, but at that time they were not aware of the character of the range of samples taken from behind No. 8 Stoppings which, as I have already suggested, was significant evidence of fire more deep seated in No. 8 Face than was suspected. However, in the light of subsequent and closer examination of the nature of these analyses from No. 8 Stoppings I am bound to conclude that fire existed somewhere in No. 8 Main Level, or adjacent thereto. This fire might not have been of large extent, but was probably of high intensity. Whether this was part of the fire found in No. 9 Left Hand, or another, is conjectural. (46) In sealing off active fire there is a code of General Regulations first made in 1913, and now re-enacted under the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, as the Coal and Other Mines (Fire and Rescue) Regulations, 1956. Among other things, these Regulations require the withdrawal of all persons from a mine during the process of sealing, or damming off, except those necessary to the work of building the stoppings. In addition to these Regulations there is an accepted code of safe practice within the coal mining industry based on a large amount of experience. In 1944 this experience was embodied in a Memorandum prepared by a Committee appointed by the Council of the Institution of Mining Engineers on "Sealing Off Fires Underground".* This Memorandum, among other matters, dealt with the position leading up to the final sealing of stoppings already erected in part and, on sealing being completed, advised the withdrawal of all persons during a period of 24 hours. This time interval can only be an arbitrary one, but from the accumulated experience of the Committee it was felt that if in any circumstances an explosion inside the stoppings was to occur, it would come about well within that period. I feel sure that if Mr. Lawson, or the other members of the executive management at Bickershaw, had felt a remote possibility of fire continuing in the region of No. 9 left hand side, or No. 8 right hand side, the final sealing of the stoppings on the 10th October would have been conducted in accordance with the recommendations of the Memorandum, in which case no one would have been at risk when the explosion occurred. (47) Another factor which must have contributed to the rate at which firedamp collected behind the stoppings on the No. 9 roadways was the fall in barometric pressure which began about 1 p.m. on Friday, the 9th October, after an unusually long period of stable pressure which accompanied the summer and autumn months of 1959. The fall of pressure continued into the 10th October (the day of the explosion); the maximum rate of fall was one of 2 millibars per hour during the four hours 12 noon to 4 p.m. This rate of fall, though not abnormal, is quite appreciable, and would have a significant effect in producing an inflammable mixture in the sealed area at an earlier stage after the stoppings had been finally plugged. Bickershaw Colliery, amongst others in the North Western Division, receives warnings from the Meteorological Office of approaching severe barometric depressions, a service initiated by the National Coal Board as a measure of assistance to those in charge of gassy seams. It has been confirmed that such a signal was sent out by the Meteorological Office of an expected rapid rate of depression and was received at Bickershaw Colliery about 3 a.m. on the 10th October; but, both before the sealing of No. 9, and afterwards, this knowledge by the officials of a sharp fall of barometric pressure would not be expected, under the circumstances, to create any great anxiety in their minds about the conditions in the No. 9 area, unless they knew, or were suspicious, that material at high temperature was being sealed off. Without this knowledge, or suspicion, the precautions to be taken would consist simply of greater vigilance towards the appearance of inflammable or noxious gases near the stoppings at which men were working. The evidence I have heard is to the effect that the deceased officials, and the trained rescue men who were with them, had been constantly on the watch for such gases. (48) In the described circumstances of an explosion behind stoppings which were largely left intact, and outside of which no flame was seen to pass by those who survived, I cannot be certain what part was played by coal dust in carrying the explosion towards the stoppings on No. 9 roadways. The No. 9 Main Level had been a coal transport road during the working period which ended on 14th August, 1959, and the manager, Mr. Lawson, stated that until that date a stone dust barrier erected in accordance with a National Coal Board internal Directive was in position about 200 yards from the face. However, Mr. Lawson recollects that after production ceased this barrier was removed so that the fittings could be used elsewhere in a productive unit. The volatile content of the Plodder Seam is 38.1 per cent. which, to comply with the Coal Mines (Precautions against Inflammable Dust) Regulations, 1956, requires the maintenance of at least 75 per cent. incombustible matter in admixture with the roadway dust when sampled in the prescribed manner. Samples of roadway dust were last collected from No. 9 Main Level and No. 9 Top Level in July, 1959. The records at the colliery show that the lowest proportion of incombustible matter found in the Main Level was 91.5 per cent, and in the Top Level, 89 per cent. These samples were collected some four weeks before coal production and transport ceased and therefore do not necessarily represent the conditions at the time of the explosion. It was stated by the manager, Mr. Lawson, that it was unlikely that any further inert dust treatment had been given to these roads after coal winning stopped on the 14th August, since the main production of coal dust would then cease. (49) I therefore conclude that the explosion on the 10th October was mainly one of firedamp which inevitably collected on the No. 9 Face and in the Main and Top Levels when the stoppings on these latter two roads were finally plugged and sealed. The firedamp would probably reach inflammable proportion first in the top corner of No. 9 Face adjacent to where I think spontaneous combustion persisted. I believe the firedamp was there ignited by some heated material lying possibly within the old right hand packing of No. 8 Face just beyond the reach of the excavation carried out at that point on 4th and 5th October. I think that the danger of explosion following sealing was accentuated by the rapid fall of barometric pressure experienced before and during sealing. Having in mind the character of No. 9 Main Level as a coal transport road, it is possible that coal dust played some part in propagating the explosion towards the Main Level stopping. (50) Before concluding this report I would place on record my appreciation of the exemplary behaviour of all persons in the neighbourhood of the stoppings when the explosion occurred. Everyone seems to have acted with immediate concern for the safety of the five men near the Main Level stopping, and in particular, the act of putting the roadway conveyor into its normal running direction (top belt moving outbye) was a resourceful move made in the hope that some survivor would not be too disabled to use this means of getting to safety. That it was unavailing does not detract from the inspiration which prompted it. I would especially mention the two members of the Permanent Rescue Corps, W. Sturgeon, and K. Shaw, who, with their supporting brigade companions, made necessarily brief but observant examinations of the two stoppings after the explosion. They, above all, from their training and experience, would be aware of the danger of a second explosion, and their subsequent reports of the condition of the stoppings and the information that no fire existed in the open roads outside provided a valuable and comforting reassurance to all concerned with the remaining operation of sealing off the Plodder Seam. * Safety in Mines Research Establishment, Research Report No 142. "Research on Spontaneous Combustion of Coal in Mines — A Review." H F. Coward. Page 52. * Trans. Inst. Mining Engineers. Vol. CIII, Part 9.
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