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Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
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The following conclusions as to the explosion may be submitted :—

 1. 
The flame causing ignition was that of a fire burning in Hogg's brow.
 2. 
An explosion of fire-damp and gases due to the fire mixed with air in the unventilated parts of Hogg's and Gilmour's brows was the primary explosion.
 3. 
The extension of this explosion from the unventilated parts of Hogg's and Gilmour's brows to the engine dip was direct down Gilmour's brow, and may have been caused by fire-damp, gases due to the fire, coal dust, or a combination.
 4. 
The extension of the explosion up the engine dip to the stopping at S1, may have been caused by fire-damp, gases due to the fire, or to coal dust, or to a combination, but would have been extended by coal dust alone.
 5. 
The extension of the explosion from the stopping at S1 to the downcast shaft was due to coal dust alone.

In the district in which the explosion occurred gas was reported from time to time as well as in other parts of the Main band; during the three months before the explosion it had been reported on 25 occasions. In Hogg's brow gas was not reported, but it was stated that the gas could be heard singing at the face. This place was probably making gas freely, but the precautions taken in conducting the air current to the face prevented its being seen on the lamp. It appeared in evidence at the inquest that on the Saturday preceding the explosion a deputy, W. Tunstall, who was killed by the explosion, fired a shot prepared by James Hogg, also killed by the explosion, in Hogg's brow, feeders of gas were ignited by the flame of the shot and continued burning, and were only extinguished after great exertions. This occurrence was very improperly not reported, and the officials who survived the explosion stated they had no knowledge of it. It was also stated that during the week of the explosion two shots had been fired in Hogg's brow without causing any ignition of gas feeders. Inflammable gas had been reported in the ventilating district in which the fire occurred at two of the last four inspections under General Rule 4, and it would have been a breach of General Rule 12 if an ordinary gunpowder shot had been fired, unless it was found "that such gas has been cleared away." The deputy, W. J. Beaty, who fired the shot in Hogg's brow on the day of the explosion, had examined the ventilating district previously that day, and made a written report under General Rule 4, in which report there is no mention of gas, and the presumption is that the gas reported had been cleared away. The place where the shot was fired was not dry and dusty. General Rule 12 requires that a shot shall not be fired "in any place in which the use of a locked safety lamp is for the time being required" until an examination is made by a competent person and he has "found such place safe for firing." Hogg's brow was safe for firing so far as causing an immediate explosion was concerned, but it was not safe as regards causing a fire the existence of which led to the loss of 30 lives.

The officials in charge of the mine were responsible for and were aware of the altered conditions of the mine that led to the explosion. If with this knowledge they anticipated or feared the occurrence of such an explosion as did occur they were not justified in exposing so many lives ; the manager and overman, surviving officials, and some of the workmen stated that such a catastrophe was not expected. Mr. Johnson, the manager, admitted that he thought a slight explosion might occur near the fire. It is not probable that anyone would have risked his life in the face of such danger had it been apprehended for the saving of property only. The officials had been present all day, and Mr. Johnson, the manager, had left the pit for a short time only, to attend a consultation in the office on the surface, at which consultation some mining engineers in the district, including Mr. Liddell, of the Whitehaven Collieries, and Mr. Oswald, the Assistant Inspector stationed in Cumberland, were present, and who were on the point of descending the shaft when the explosion happened.

It is probable that the influence of coal dust in extending explosions of gas and air was not understood by the officials. Had the mine been uniformly damp the operations that were being carried out at the time of the explosion would probably have been accomplished without any loss of life.

During the erection of the stopping at A, and the attempted erection of a stopping at E, the persons employed were exposed to the danger of an explosion of gas and air in the vicinity of the fire (as well as to the danger of a more general explosion such as eventually occurred); explosions of gas and air in the unventilated parts of Hogg's and Gilmour's brows did probably take place while workmen were near. No one, however, was then burnt or injured; on the removal of the workmen 600 yards from the fire to the stoppings at S1, S2, and S3, the officials, while aware of the probable continuance of explosions of gas and air near the fire, would no doubt be of opinion that all workmen were safe so far as regarded the influence of such explosions, if the operations consequent upon the reversal of the air caused, or was likely to cause, the intervening passages to become explosive from the presence of fire-damp, or of gases due to the fire, then it is apparent that the remote source of danger was made a source of present danger. It is not probable that the reversal of the air current would cause the intervening passage to become filled with an explosive mixture of gas and air, although the operations would increase the percentage of gas present in the air.

Ignitions of fire-damp must have taken place at intervals during the day near the fire. An ignition of a more extensive character and sufficient to raise the dust and initiate an explosion, the flame of which reached the shaft, eventually took place.

The extension of the fire from the face of Hogg's brow was probably greatly assisted by the canvass brattice cloth; had a non-inflammable brattice been in use the fire might have been checked before getting into the thirl, where it had burned most fiercely.

 

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