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III. — NARRATIVE OF THE EXPLOSION
The mine was one of eight forming the No. 3 Area of the Durham Division of the National Coal Board. The principal officials were
The explosion happened at 4.35 a.m. on Tuesday, 29th May. By a tragic trick of fate this was a time when there were two shifts of men in the district, 38 belonging to the stone-shift and 43 to the fore-shift. Only one of these men was rescued alive, and he died of his injuries a few hours later. According to the medical evidence, all the others, mercifully, died almost immediately.
The names of the victims are given in Appendix I and Plan No. 2 shows where the bodies were found. Two members of rescue teams lost their lives in the recovery operations and so in all 83 persons were killed in the disaster.
None of the 895 persons at work in other parts of the mine was seriously affected.
We have unfortunately no direct evidence of what happened on the shift of the disaster. The men on the stone-shift, who were due to leave the district at about 5.0 a.m., had been engaged in coal cutting on the retreating longwall face, in erecting permanent supports in the duckbill headings, in building an air crossing at No. 22 stenton and in stone dusting. The fore-shift went underground at 3.30 a.m. and in the ordinary course of events the fillers would have arrived at the face before the explosion occurred. The fact that none had done so suggests that they had been kept hack because the conditions on the Third South longwall face were not normal, but, whatever the reason, it does not seem to have given rise to any great alarm for those outside the district received no appeal for help. The first intimation of disaster was a loud bang followed by a cloud of dust.
Frank Leadbitter, a shaft wagon-way man, who was just outside the shaftbottom stables, acted promptly and, though the dust was so thick that he could not see, led the men working with him to the shaft bottom, and within a few minutes had telephoned a report to the undermanager, Mr. Emery, at his home. He then returned inbye to the West Main Curve and tried to get in touch with the Duckbill District by telephone, but getting no response telephoned a warning to the men at the South haulage junctions. Soon after he was joined by William Cook, fore-overman in the Seven Quarter and Old Five Quarter Districts, who had heard a sound like a heavy fall when he was in the Seven Quarter engine house and had come 500 yards through a thick cloud of dust to investigate. After hearing Leadbitter’s story Cook telephoned to Mr. Hopkins, the manager, and arranged for the withdrawal of the men from the rest of the mine. Then very gallantly he and D. Smith, a head wagon-way man, went along the Main Coal West Haulage Road in an attempt to get to the Duckbill District. About half way to the main loading point they heard what they thought was another explosion and felt the air current reverse. Not unnaturally they started to go back but, as the ventilation soon resumed its normal course, turned again inbye.
I am satisfied that what these two men thought was a second explosion was, in fact, an extension of a fall that they reached shortly afterwards. But I have no doubt at all that they believed it was an explosion and it is to their great credit that they went on in spite of what they must have felt about the risk of further explosions. About 150 yards from the loading point they came to a large fall and quite properly decided that it would be foolhardy to attempt to get over it by themselves. They therefore returned to report, and near the West Curve met the undermanager, Mr. Emery.
Meanwhile, amongst other emergency measures taken on the surface a call had been made on the Central Rescue Station at Houghton-le-Spring. At 5.30 a.m. when the first team arrived underground they were sent almost immediately to examine the fall. Finding it impassable they returned and were sent to explore the West Main Coal Return. It was, however, thought unlikely that rescue operations would be possible by this route and when Mr. Fry, the Area General Manager, arrived it was decided to employ colliery workmen to make a road through the fall with the utmost speed and to explore the airway from the Seven Quarter Second South District, for this connected with the Duckbill District return drift where it passed through the Seven Quarter Seam. This road proved to be quite travellable and though some props and doors had been blown out, Mr. Fry, Mr. Emery and Station Officer A damson reached the Duckbill Drifts without much difficulty. Further progress was impossible without the use of rescue apparatus. The air was quite still, indicating that the air crossing at the foot of the intake drift had been damaged. The separation doors in the stenton connecting intake and return had been destroyed and the air was so foul with afterdamp that the canaries carried by the party were overcome almost immediately.
Clearly rescue operations had to be organised immediately to deal with a disaster of the first magnitude. Arrangements ware made, therefore, to establish a fresh air base in the Second South Seven Quarter airway about 100 yards back from the Duckbill District return drift. This was by no means an ideal site, for materials had to be manhandled for considerable distances, both in getting them to the base and on to the place of use. However, there was no alternative until a travellable road could be made over the fall on the West Main Coal Level, and in spite of the difficulties the first team left the base (marked on Plan No. 2 as the First Fresh Air Base) just after 8.0 a.m. to explore outbye along the intake drift. Near the loading point they found a datal hand, Matthew Williams, alive but so badly injured that, as mentioned earlier, he died a few hours later. They saw the bodies of several other men and found that the air crossing had indeed been destroyed.
This team and others following reported that the stoppings between intake and return had been destroyed over a large area. It was decided, therefore, to arrange for two teams to operate simultaneously, one sealing off at selected points to re-establish ventilation and the other extending to the utmost the search for possible survivors. This arrangement worked well for a time and one of the exploring teams penetrated to the end of the Straight North headings, a distance of about 1,100 yards. However, J. Y. Wallace, the captain of a colliery rescue team, lost his life in exploring in the First West roads, and it was then decided that the brigades were penetrating too far into the irrespirable atmosphere and, therefore, that both teams should be used to restore the ventilation.
So far all the operations had been carried out from the original base in the Seven Quarter airway. By noon the next day, 30th May, after the ventilation had been re-established in the drifts up to No. 2 stenton, the Training Section in the Main Coal Seam sealed off, and a road made over the fall on the West Main Coal Level, the fresh air base was advanced to a point just outbye of No. 2 stenton.
By midnight the fresh air base had been advanced to No. 14 stenton on the First West Materials Road, travelling being easier on this road than on the Belt Road. As no survivors had then been iound and as samples of the atmosphere brought back by the exploring teams were highly lethal, it was agreed by all parties that there was no longer hope of finding anyone alive.
Before any further advance could be made, it was necessary to increase the quantity of air reaching the fresh air base. The foul air in the First South District was sealed off and air crossings were erected to carry any seepage direct to the return.
At this time a cover base was set up at the First West Materials Road junction. This permitted adequate reserves to be kept close to the fresh air base and allowed oncoming brigades to rest before going forward for active duty.
About 7.45 a.m. on 1st June, the fresh air base was moved in to No. 16 stenton and exploration along both belt and return roads reached No. 25 stenton. Some two hours later H. Burdess, a member of a rescue brigade exploring the inbye end of the First West Roads, collapsed and died. At the time it was thought that he might have been affected by having to pass a number of dead bodies, and, though it slowed down the rate of advance, arrangements were made to bring out all the bodies on the line of travel. Further difficulty arose when it was found that the West Materials Road was blocked by a large fall ahead of No. 20 stenton. To by-pass this, the fresh air base was transferred to the Belt Road.
On 2nd June the base was advanced to the junction of the Belt Road and the Third South Materials Road. Brigades erected stoppings at the entrance to the Second South Headings and built a tube air crossing over the Third South Materials Road so as to convey any afterdamp seeping from this area into the return airway at No. 26 stenton.
On 4th June the base was advanced to just outbye of the junction of the Third South Materials Road with No. 27 stenton; more bodies were recovered and the Third South face was explored to where it was closed by a fall about 17 yards from the conveyor gate. Both 27 and 28 stentons were also closed and though an attempt was made to clear a road through them, it soon became obvious that little further progress could be made by men wearing apparatus. Colliery workmen were then brought in, but when afterdamp began to leak into the Materials Road at the tube air crossing it was decided to withdraw everybody and clear the afterdamp from the First and Second South areas. Teams re-ventilated these areas in turn and at 6 a.m. on 7th June it was possible to re-establish the base at No. 27 stenton. A way was made over the fall in this stenton on 8th June but the air in the return was found to be foul. However, when rescue men started clearing the fall in No. 28 stenton air began to drift over it. By 8.0 p.m. the ventilation was re-established and the whole of the Third South had been cleared of afterdamp. The rescue teams were then withdrawn to the outbye end of the First West Materials Road and from there they inspected the Straight North and the Third West headings and found them clear. At 9.45 p.m. on 8th June, their task completed, they withdrew from the mine.
The rescue operations covered a period of 257 hours, during which time 11 officers, 48 permanent corps men and 291 trained colliery rescue workers were engaged. Between them, these men wore apparatus 1,168 times and 13,277 pounds of liquid air was used.
Later I shall have to make some comments on the circumstances connected with the deaths of J. Y. Wallace and H. Burdess. In so far as I may appear to criticise, it will be solely in the hope that what I have to say will contribute to safety in future, and I wish to make clear beyond all question my great admiration of the way in which the rescue teams worked. It may be that the temperatures were not excessive nor travelling conditions unduly arduous, but the work was prolonged, the distances travelled considerable and the atmosphere so lethal that anyone making a mistake or raking a liberty was likely to pay for it with his life. Nevertheless, and in spite of the death of two of their comrades, these men never faltered and their morale throughout was maintained at a level that reflected the greatest credit on them as individuals and on the system in which they had been trained.
Tribute must also be paid to the large number of colliery workers who manhandled supplies to fresh air bases and with each move forward removed bodies, strengthened stoppings and cleared paths. Their work, though not so dangerous as that of the trained rescue teams, was arduous, unpleasant and not without strain, and I am glad to have the opportunity of recording sincere appreciation of their services.
Investigation went on concurrently with the work of the rescue teams but it was not until 9th June that an inspection could be made of the whole of the area in the Five Quarter Seam. The Training Section in the Main Coal Seam remained sealed until the end of August.
Immediately on returning from a tour of duty, each rescue team made reports from which the surveying staff marked on plans the position of bodies and other information. A staff of surveyors and one or more of H.M. Inspectors of Mines were in constant attendance at the fresh air base and they followed each advance as it was made, noting and marking on plans all signs of violence and of the passage of flame. Much of this information is shown on Plans 2 and 3.
A detailed examination of the area from the aspects of passage of flame, signs of coking and residual dust was made by Dr. Tideswell and his colleagues, Dr. Woodhead and Messrs. Shaw and Bradshaw, of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment.
H.M. Inspectors of Mines collected samples of dust, in the way prescribed by the Regulations, over the whole area affected.
All electrical plant was examined on site as soon as practicable and all damaged or defective pieces of apparatus found were taken to the surface for further examination and, where necessary, for test at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment. All the conveyors were examined for signs of heating and all safety lamps found were collected and sent for test, as also were two pairs of chock releases found in the tripped condition. The five auxiliary fans were brought to the surface and examined by Mr. A. E. Crook, H.M. Principal Inspector of Mechanical Engineering, and later by Mr. H. Robinson of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment.
There was little evidence of severe mechanical damage to the supports and structures on the roadways, but many supports had been dislodged and roof falls were numerous and extensive. Examination of the supports remaining in position showed that the loads on them were by no means high, and it is probable that the falls were caused by the explosion pressure dislodging lightly loaded props. There was evidence that some falls had occurred during the actual explosion; some had extended after the explosion.
The bodies, except for five on, or in the vicinity of, the longwall face, were found at widely separated parts of the roads. Most of the fore-shift men were on the Third South Materials Road.
(c) Conditions on the Longwall Face
A very severe weight had occurred on the face which was closed by a fall of roof extending from some 12 yards to 27 yards from the intake and, except for a few yards at each end, the remainder of the roof was fractured and displaced (see the cross-sections on Plan No. 2). Many of the wood props and bars and many of the wood chock pieces were broken. Nine of the mechanical releases with which the chocks were equipped were found "tripped" . A few feet behind the chocks the roof had fallen, mostly in large blocks, to a height locally at least ten feet above the seam.
The coal cutting machine was found about 12 yards from the return gate in circumstances which left little doubt that it was cutting when the explosion happened. The bodies of the three machinemen were several yards nearer the return roadhead. The control handle was in the full "on" position, the haulage and cutter chains were in gear and the kirvings were close up against the jib. An examination of the cable supplying the gate-end box showed that it had been damaged at a point near No. 27 stenton whilst live, the blow received causing a short circuit. In view of the violence needed to cause the damage found — the wire armouring had been pierced and brick dust was found even in the insulation of the cores — there can be little doubt that the cable must have been struck, whilst still passing current to the cutting machine, by a brick propelled by the blast of the explosion.
The bodies of two stonemen were discovered at the face about 30 yards from the intake road and those of two others at the intake roadhead near that of the master shifter, J. Charlton, whose relighter flame safety lamp was found nearby. The flame safety lamp belonging to J. Godsman, one of the cutter men, was found in the Belt Road some distance back from the face. No flame safety lamp or other means of detecting firedamp was found on the face.
The spread of flame (see Plan No. 3) was exceptionally large, amounting to roughly 16,000 yards, though as Dr. Tideswell stated, signs of severe burning were few and local. Indications of its passage were found in almost all parts of the Duckbill District and there was also evidence of flame in the Main Coal Wor kings 500 yards west of the foot of the Drift. On the West Main Haulage Road flame travelled about 100 yards east of the foot of the Drift. No signs of flame were found in the Third South Materials Road south of No. 27 stenton, the Third South Belt Road for 150 yards south of this stenton, and No. 29 heading. Plan No. 3 also shows where signs of coking were found.
There was general agreement on the direction of the main blast of the explosion. It was outbye on all roads in the First West area east of No. 21 stenton and down to the West Level, except for the projection westwards along that road. The Second South, First South, Straight North and Third West areas all showed directions of blast pointing from this main path. In this path of the explosion from outbye of No. 18 stenton the blast traversed the intakes first and burst through the stoppings in the stentons towards the return.
Inbye of No. 21 stenton the indications were less consistent. The two intakes of Third South showed a general blast towards the face, but in the return the direction of blast was outbye, except for a stretch between No. 26 and No. 27 stentons and one near the face. In all the stentons inbye of No. 18, the blast was from the return towards the intake. In Nos. 21, 22 and 24 headings the explosion was towards the faces of the headings. At the junction of No. 22 heading with the return, blast radiated in all directions.
As is usual after an explosion, everything was found to be covered with explosion” dust, which had been raised up by the blast and had subsequently settled. This deposit, Dr. Tideswell stated, was of varying thickness and appearance but averaged 1/50 inch in thickness. Examination under the microscope showed that much of it had been subject to flame. Some 400 samples of this dust were tested in the laboratory. Nearly 300 of these were grouped as being those least likely to have been contaminated with dust other than that which had been raised in the explosion cloud, and with few exceptions they contained between 30 and 55 per cent. of incombustible matter.
Mr. W. J. Badger, H.M. District Inspector of Mines, sampling in accordance with the Regulations, collected 163 samples. Of the 28 samples taken in the Training Section of the Main Coal Seam 25 contained less than the minimum 75 per cent. of incombustible matter required by the Regulations. Of the 135 samples collected elsewhere in the affected area, 113 were found to be up to the required standard.
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