From the previous history of the mine, the fact that no gas was found after the explosion, even when the ventilation was seriously deranged, and from the amount of air, about 15,000 cubic feet per minute, which was passing in what was practically a stone drift, it seems almost impossible that any explosive gas could have been present, and it was not suggested by any witness at the inquiry that such was the case.
The dangerous element present was dust, and this, ignited by a somewhat overcharged gunpowder shot, was, without doubt, the cause of the explosion.
Up to this time these roads were not considered "dry and dusty," although shot-firing had been prohibited without special permission, and Mr. Plummer as recently as January had been through all these roads on a knee tram, and did not notice any amount of dust on the floor, as he must have done from the position he was in on a tram within 5 or 6 inches of the ground. For the first mile or so the engine plane was in many places wet or damp, on the in-bye side of the shot the road was for some 600 yards dry, and evidence was given that water — about 360 gallons a day — was put on with a view to keeping the road in good order and prevent the grease on the tub wheels from getting thick and clogged with dust. The majority of the working places are dry, and trains of loaded tubs, drawn along the engine plane at a speed of 10 to 12 miles an hour, and meeting a large current of intake air, will be swept of all fine particles of dust, which get deposited on the roof and sides and timber, and find their way into cracks and crevices, constituting a very dangerous condition of things where blasting is carried on. From the proximity of the water tub and scoops used for distributing the water over the sides and roof, it is reasonable to suppose that some watering was (lone to the roof and sides as well as to the floor, but the fact of the explosion occurring shows that it was insufficient for safety.
It is only comparatively recently, within the last 20 years, perhaps, that dust has been looked upon as a dangerous element in coal mining, and even now some people are not willing to believe in explosions of dust without the presence of firedamp.
The explosions which occurred at the Camerton and Timsbury Collieries, in Somersetshire, where firedamp was absolutely unknown, and at collieries in this and other counties, and the experiments which have been carried on in the North of England by a committee appointed by the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers, and in Lancashire by Mr. Hall, and on the continent, prove conclusively that there is great danger in blasting where dust is present. Some of the experiments made by the North of England Institute Committee showed that nearly as severe results were obtained from a small quantity of dust as when much larger quantities were used, and Brancepeth explosion is a striking example of this.
The adjourned inquest for the purposes of taking evidence was resumed by Mr. J. T. Proud, coroner of Bishop Auckland, on the 12th of May, at the Workmen's Institute, Willington, and continued on the 13th, 14th, and 15th.
The following were in attendance :—
Mr. J. Edmondson Joel, representing the Home Office.
Mr. J. Strachan, representing the owners, instructed by Messrs. J. and R. D. Proud.
Mr. L. Atherley Jones, M.P., representing the relatives and the Miners' Association, instructed by Mr. J. Isaacs.
There were also present Mr. John Forman, President of the Durham Miners' Association, Mr. J. Wilson, M.P., Secretary, Mr. J. Johnson, Treasurer, Mr. W. Palmer, and Mr. G. McGuinness, members of the Executive Committee, and Mr. Hugh Boyle, representing the Miners' National Union, Mr. R. Donald Bain, Her Majesty's Inspector of Mines for the Durham District, Mr. John L. Hedley, Her Majesty's Inspector of Mines for the Newcastle District, Mr. W. Walker, and Mr. J. Plummer, Assistant Inspectors in the Durham District.
Mr. Strachan, on behalf of the owners, said every facility would be given to sift the matter thoroughly, and if possible arrive at a definite conclusion as to the cause of the accident, and this was faithfully carried out.
Evidence was taken at considerable length, Mr. Grieves, who has been manager of the pit for 22 years, being the first witness, his examination lasted well into the second day. He described the laying out of the mine, the ventilation and condition of the pit previous to the accident, and the position in which the bodies were found, as shown on the accompanying plan. He stated that the five men in the Cross-cut Way were, apparently, killed by the force of the explosion, as also the two men on the engine plane nearer the shaft, the first body met with, that of J. Forster, being badly mutilated. The men in the Jet seam and in the Dairy Way, and Cross-cut North, were, with one exception, not injured, and had left their work places and were met by the afterdamp and suffocated, apparently, when making their way outwards.
He expressed the opinion that the seat of the explosion was close to the place where the shot hole was, and that the shot had undoubtedly gone off. He thought the powder in the tin had also exploded, but was not prepared to say whether it was ignited by the shot or not. Mr. Dowson, the under-manager, agreed with him as to this, and generally corroborated his evidence.
A theory was propounded by Mr. W. C. Blackett, a mining engineer, who was called as an expert, to the effect that the powder in the canister, which was found blown through the stenton stopping, as already described, had gone off through the accidental dropping of a spark into it, or some other cause, and that this was the primary cause of the explosion, and the flame set up by this means ignited the shot which had already been got ready.
Although not, perhaps, impossible, this seems an unlikely solution of the question. The tin must have been left open for a spark to get in, and a series of circumstances combined to effect this; moreover, the position of the men's bodies would indicate that the shot had been lit in the ordinary way, and they had retired to a safe distance after lighting the squib. It would be an unusual proceeding to get the hole ready and put the squib in and then leave; and had the squib become ignited as suggested I should have expected to find the body of the person who was preparing to fire close to the shot. This theory was not accepted by the other experts who were called, namely, Mr. T. Y. Greener, the agent for Peases' West Collieries, and Mr. Simon Tate, of Trimdon Grange, nor by the Government inspectors, all agreeing in the opinion that the shot was the initiatory cause.
Mr. Blackett gave evidence of some hygrometric tests which he made after the accident, when he found the air thoroughly saturated with moisture up to where the farthest body (that of H. Hodgson) was found, in the Cross-cut Way. There were 10 degrees difference in the bulbs on the surface at the time. He considered, in common with the other witnesses, that it was a dust explosion.
Mr. John Plummer, who has acted as assistant inspector in this district for nearly 11 years, and has had mining experience extending over 40 years, and was the only inspector who had a knowledge of the condition of the mine before the 13th of April, as Mr. Walker attends principally to the mines on the east side of the county, and I had only been in the district a short time when the explosion occurred, said he had made numerous inspections in this pit. He was in the Dairy Way on a knee tram in January last, and did not notice that the floor was dry and dusty; he considered it in good sanitary condition. He had examined the mine on several occasions since the accident, and considered that the shot was badly put in ; the direction of it was bad, and he thought there was too much powder for the work done, and that it was a dust explosion, ignited by the shot, and that firedamp had nothing to do with it. In his opinion the position of the hole, and the jack or joint behind it, as in the Camerton case, caused the shot to give off flame. The watering of the floor would not affect the dust on the roof and sides, which, being very fine, would be most dangerous.
The other inspectors present agreed with Mr. Plummer's evidence.
The Coroner then summed up with great clearness, he said it had been decided by the evidence that there had been an explosion of coal dust in this mine, and the only question for the jury to decide was, had there been any culpable negligence ? He failed to see that it had been suggested by any of the contending parties that there had been. Mr. Grieves had given his evidence very straightforwardly, and shown that he was a careful and practical colliery manager. As regards the question of coal. dust, he said it may be necessary after this to take greater precautions. The rules that came into force after 1887 provided that no shot should be fired on a main haulage way without the permission of the manager or under-manager, but the manager at Brancepeth appeared to have gone a little further, and given verbal instructions that no shot was to be fired on any such place, even by the under-manager, without instructions from himself. Without conclusive evidence, he would advise the jury not to say who fired the shot. As to the theories that had been advanced, he thought the preponderance of evidence was to show that it was the firing of the shot which caused the explosion. One main object of the inquiries was to see if any recommendations could be made for future safety. He did not know whether the jury had considered that point. The first was: Should there be a higher explosive used ? The next was the question of watering, and the third was the removal of coal dust. These seemed to bear upon the elements of danger, and if they made any recommendations with regard to them he had no doubt they would be taken into consideration by the owners of the mine.
The jury retired, and after an absence of nearly an hour handed in the following verdict :—
"We find that a shot was fired, but by whom we know not, and that the said shot ignited the coal dust and caused an explosion in the Cross-cut Way, culminating in the deaths of 20 men and boys accidentally."
In answer to the Coroner, the foreman of the jury said they made no recommendations, and that there was a feeling among the jury that the matter should be left in the hands of the Government Inspector.
I may say I entirely concur with the above verdict.
The lesson to be learnt from Camerton, Timsbury, and this explosion is that the use of gunpowder on main haulage roads is attended with considerable risk and danger. To insure safety in a dry mine, none but high explosives should be used, and these, too, with every precaution. Both the English and German experiments prove that gunpowder and nitro-glycerine compounds have the lowest factor of safety of any explosives in the market, and their use should be prohibited in all dusty and fiery mines, and on all main haulage roads in coal mines, unless they are absolutely wet.
Much can be done to render the working of collieries more safe by watering the roof, sides, and floor of haulage roads, and also by sweeping the dust off the roof and sides, and removing it out of the mine. All these precautions are highly necessary, and if they were always taken, and the use of powder abolished on all haulage roads, the mortality in mines would be very materially reduced.
I have, &c.
(Signed) R. DONALD BAIN.
The Right Honourable the Secretary of State,
Home Office, London, S.W.