Tweet

17. It is therefore necessary to indicate shortly what the evidence really was on this point. It cannot be said that the evidence, if such an order was given, was as clear and satisfactory as it might have been.

The first limitation of Rogerson's general authority was, it seems, soon after the Mines Act of 1887 was passed.

The Special Rules under head of "Master Shifter" have no express rule as regards his duties in shot-firing. He has, inter alia, responsible charge underground of the mine, or portion of the mine, in his shift during the absence of the overman or back overman. There was no rule or order in writing to the effect that Rogerson was to have express sanction from the manager or under-manager to fire a shot in a main haulage road, and no record of any such instruction was produced; the only written rule in Rogerson's hands would be Special Rule 114, Sub-Rule A., "that no shot was to be fired except by or under the direction of a 'competent person' appointed by the manager," and also Sub-Rule D." (see below), and it was admitted that if a shot was to be fired at all in such a place, Rogerson would be a competent person so appointed generally for the purpose (subject, of course, to the alleged unwritten modification of his power). Whilst under Sub-Rule "C." of Special Rule 114 "such authorised person is to fire or direct the firing in the manner approved from time to time by the manager," there was no evidence that "the manner" of firing shots had in the least been recently regulated (i.e. , as regards the abandonment of gunpowder and the additional or exceptional watering of haulage ways). All the processes were left, as formerly, to the discretion of the persons subordinate to the manager, and no special precautions appeared to have been adopted. Even if Sub-Rule "D." of Special Rule 114, as to obtaining authority to fire a shot in a main haulage road, had been in operation, and the permission of the manager or under-manager sought by Rogerson, there was nothing to show that it would not have been readily granted to fire a shot in the Cross-cut Way by means of common gunpowder. On this point it should be stated that even Mr. Grieves had misunderstood the effect of Special Rule 114, as well as General Rule 12, and repeatedly said be believed they only referred to such parts of the mine as required the use of "locked safety lamps," notwithstanding his attention was drawn to the disjunctive word "or," which would read the rule, "In any place which is dry and dusty, no shot, &c.," and it was with difficulty he could be got to accept this reading of it. Mr. Grieves said also that no special method of firing shots had been prescribed anywhere, and so recently as March 1896, Dowson, the under-manager, had fired, by authority, three shots near the Lady Curve, which was a verbal authority (and of which there was no note or record), and although he could not remember authorising any shot to be fired in the Cross-cut Way, yet Dowson might have, on his own responsibility, given such order or consulted him, Grieves, he could not say which, and he was quite unable to say whether Dowson and Rogerson had ever consulted as to firing such shot on a main road, nor could he say if such shot had ever been fired on such main haulage road." The instruction to Rogerson not to fire any shot in a main haulage road without Mr. Grieves's sanction was said by Dowson to have been first communicated to him (Dowson) three months before by Grieves, and then by him to Rogerson. It was urged that this was "ex-abundante cautela," even Dowson was now not to fire on a main haulage road without Grieves's sanction. It became obvious, if this were true, something must have induced the manager to make a more stringent rule. The safety of this mine was absolutely believed in, and it was insisted that it was not "dry and dusty" in any sense. The evidence of Mr. Greener, the manager of Peases' West Colliery, which adjoins the Brancepeth Pit, disclosed why such precaution was taken, who said that in December 1895 he and Mr. Weeks, the agent of Brancepeth, agreed that shots should only be fired by permission of the manager, and this whatever was the character of the place. It had also been recorded in his book, and this agreement was the result of the experience of a recent explosion of dust from the use of gunpowder at Blackwell, in Derbyshire, and led him to determine also that the use of gunpowder should be discontinued for shot-firing in favour of higher explosives, and he had therefore limited the authority to fire shots in a main haulage way in Peases' West Colliery, since December, to the manager, and not the undermanager, and he had used, not gunpowder, but a higher explosive.

18. The conclusion, therefore, I think, to be drawn from this is that the attention of Mr. Weeks, the agent for the owner, was drawn to the growing serious consequences in mines, under certain conditions, to have dust explosion in main haulage roads or air ways, and particularly where common gunpowder was the explosive used. That, probably, in conjunction with Mr. Greener, he arrived at the common understanding to further limit the master shifter's authority, and also the under-manager, as to shot-firing in such main haulage ways, and did, in fact, communicate such his wish verbally to Mr. Grieves on or about December 1895 or January 1896.

Further, it is possible that Mr. Grieves also told Dowson, the under-manager, but unfortunately, not Mr. Rogerson direct; and it may be that this instruction was passed on by Dowson to Rogerson, but it cannot but be a matter of regret that so important an order should have been passed from one to another, and it would have been more satisfactory if some record of a meeting of responsible persons to lay down such a new rule, and a record of it, such as Mr. Greener was able to produce in evidence, could have been obtained, and, moreover, the fact that gunpowder was continued to be used raises some doubt whether such limitation of authority was as clearly understood. by Dowson and Rogerson as it was by Mr. Weeks and Mr. Grieves.

19. It remains now to direct attention to the other questions, and the evidence bearing upon them, viz., (d.) Was the main haulage road a "dry and dusty place?" and if so (f.) What was its condition on the night of the explosion as regards watering and other precautions ? I have already referred to the misunderstanding of the application of General Rule 12, Sub-Rules "F.," "H.," and " I.," and Special Rule 114. "In any place where locked safety lamps are required to be used, or which is dry and dusty, no shot shall be fired unless, &c.," coupled with the fact that it was emphatically asserted by the managers that no part of the haulage roads was, in their opinion, "dry and dusty," it necessitated a great deal of examination to as certain whether, relying on this opinion and belief, the Staple Curve and the Crosscut Way had received, either before or at the time of the shot-firing, all the attention as to damping which, assuming a shot was to be fired within the rules, was necessary to ensure safety.

20. It cannot be said that the evidence on this point was satisfactory. Perhaps, unfortunately, the managers, relying upon the belief that it it was in no sense a "dry and dusty" place within the rules, did not think it a part of their duty, in examination-in-chief, to discharge this onus, and give affirmative evidence by proper persons to show what, if any, steps had systematically been taken to damp the dust in the main haulage road. It was left to cross-examination to extract from the managers the facts which tended to show that the intake air tended to dryness, and the traffic of coal towards the downcast, to produce dust in more or less quantities, and likewise for others to investigate into the system of watering. Indeed, it was either Mr. Grieves himself or Dowson who, in answer to questions on this point, gave the name of Thomas Laws, the back overman, as the person who could speak definitely to the watering prior to the 13th April. Yet he was not called by them until late in the inquiry, at the request of the jury. It then transpired that he was in the pit until 4.30 that day. "It was his duty," he admitted "to see that the haulage roads were watered. He knew of the rule that they were to be watered daily, but could not say if they had been watered that day. He had given orders (general) to the onsetter to have the tubs run out, but he relied upon Forster, the waggon-wayman, to water the roads. His particular attention had not been directed to that portion of the mine for any purposes that day, and, in fact, he could not speak to its condition, notwithstanding the rules 19 to 26." (see back overmen rules.) It was obviously unsatisfactory, and the jury required Forster to be called. He was brought from the pit hurriedly, and in evidence he did say "that at about 11 a.m. on the 13th April four tubs of water had been brought from the shaft and put on the main haulage way at the bank, coming clown from the hitch (see plan); that each tub had 80 or 90 gallons, so that from 320 to 360 gallons had been run out on to the road at that time," but there was no evidence that the sides or roofs had been in the least watered, and there was no definite evidence that dust had been, by any other process, removed from the upper parts of the ways within recent times. In short, except the foregoing and general statement that a similar quantity of water per day was required to be used on the roadway, not a single witness was called who could or did actually prove the condition of the mine in the Cross-cut Way as to the extent of dust adhering to roofs and sides, or its actual condition as regards dampness, and the experts frankly admitted that, not having seen the place immediately before the accident, its actual condition, as seen after the explosion, did not enable them to say definitely whether the Cross-cut Way was "dry and dusty," so as to be a dangerous place in which to use gunpowder for shot-firing. Mr. Grieves said that such watering as was done during the last 10 or 12 years was for the purpose of keeping the place sanitary, not for the purpose of damping down dust adhering to sides, timber, or roofs. He pointed out places where water flowed through the g oaf, north of an engine plane. with percolations over the floor of the road between the shaft and Staple Curve, tending to damp the air, but from the shaft to Staple Curve watering by tubs had not been done, not being in his opinion necessary. "It was damp for a short distance down the Cross-cut Way at the side of the floor. He was unable to say if, before the explosion, it was damp where the shot had been fired and the stone fell, although after the explosion it was wet. A responsible man would only water it if it required it, which was if it was dangerous, and it would be dangerous, he thought, if it was dry and dusty." Mr. Grieves could only speak to the condition of the road three weeks before. "Such dampness in the air," Mr. Grieves admitted, "would not take the place out of the category of dry and dusty if it were dry." He also said "Dowson was authorised to fire, and fired three shots near the shaft at the Lady Curve, but could not recall any case where water had been applied to the roof at this part of the pit."

21. Then as regards the air current and the traffic, it was admitted by the witnesses generally, that a predisposing cause of dust adhering in considerable quantities to roofs, sides, and projections, was the rapid transit of coal along the haulage road, meeting, as the coal would, the intake air current. On this point it was stated that the tubs travelled 10 or 12 miles an hour on a level way, and that there were, on the 13th April, between 11 a.m. and 4 p.m., three runs of tubs of 60 tons each to the shaft. At the shot hole the road is a 44-feet area. In the course of the inquiry evidence had been given of the volume of air in cubic feet per minute during January, February, and March, 1896, at given points. The total volume of air, it has already been shown, was altogether 39,364 cubic feet per minute going down the shafts. At the Cross-cut Way, at the point Staple Curve, 148 yards from the scene of the explosion, the average volume of air passing for the same periods was, per minute, 15,104 cubic feet. To find out what its effect might be as regards traffic in coal and production of dust, it was ascertained by me what the velocity of the air per second was. The area at the shot hole being 44 feet, it was admitted by the expert Blackett that the velocity of air at the same point would be 5.7 cubic feet per second. From reports before me, I felt justified in putting certain questions to Mr. Blackett as to the effect that a velocity of 5.7 cubic feet of air per second would have (1) as a drying agent, (2) as a cause of sweeping out dust from tubs of coal travelling 10 or 12 miles an hour against the air. Mr. Blackett was of opinion that this velocity of air would not tend to make the place dry. He had tested the condition of the air (after the explosion, when the conditions were altogether changed) by means of the hygrometer, and found no degrees of dryness. Neither did he think such a velocity would produce great dust, but that of course depended, he admitted, on the quality of the coal. I felt justified in putting to him a result found by Mr. Martin, who had reported officially to the Home Office in the "Timsbury Explosion" (February 1895), which presented so many features similar to the present case. The point was (see p. 18) "that notwithstanding a wet floor, a current of dry air (hygrometric readings indicated 4 to 6 degrees of dryness) passing along the road, a speed of 6 feet per second for 3 or 4 days, without any corresponding counter effects, would have a very drying tendency." But Mr. Blackett did not appear to accept this as a necessary result. As to the character of the coal, there was some evidence that it varied in different parts, but that the greater part of it was dry coal, but although dry in substance, it was often wet. I also endeavoured to get Mr. Blackett's opinion as to the peculiar inflammability of the Brancepeth dust. This he denied emphatically, and I therefore put before him the comparative tests made for inflammability of Durham and other coal ascertained, and given (see Mr. Henry Hall's report to Royal Commission on Explosions from Dust in Mines, 1893) in the tables of the report, which showed that in three tests made in July 1893 of dust gathered from Brancepeth Colliery "Jet seam," collected from the bars and sides underground, 1 cwt. of dust in suspension, with a charge of 1½ lbs. of gunpowder in ignition had produced a very violent explosion, and flame 60 feet above the pit top (the test was applied at the foot of a selected shaft) ; that from dust collected from a hopper on the surface, 2 cwts., with a charge of 1½ lbs. gunpowder, had produced a most violent explosion, and flame 40 feet above the pit top; and finally, a further charge of 1½ lbs. of powder had produced explosion and flame 30 feet above the shaft. Mr. Blackett was, notwithstanding, still of opinion that the dust, speaking generally, from the pit was not inflammable. This view did not accord with the evidence of other experts. Mr. Hedley, Her Majesty's Inspector of Mines, ascertained from some of the witnesses that the coal brought from the Jet seam (which was of the inflammable character demonstrated) would some of it, in its passage, be distributed along the region of the Cross-cut Way and Staple Curve, so that what coal adhered there would partake of this inflammable character.