Tweet

1. On Monday, the 13th day of April 1896, at about 10 p.m., an explosion took place at the Brancepeth Colliery "A" pit, which is situate at Willington, in the county of Durham, causing the death of 20 persons. The coroner for the county, Mr. J. T. Proud, held inquests on the 15th and 16th days of April, for the purpose of identifying the bodies of the deceased men and boys. The adjourned inquest was held on the 12th day of May 1896, on which day the inquiry was opened at the "Miners' Institute," Willington, into the cause of the death of one Thomas Forster and others, the men who had been killed by, or as the result of, the explosion on the 13th day of April, and was continued de die in diem on the 13th, 14th, and 15th days of May, on the last of which days the verdict was given. The inquiry was attended by Mr. R. Donald Bain, Her Majesty's Inspector of Mines for the Durham District, Mr. John Laidler Hedley, Her Majesty's Inspector of Mines for Newcastle District, Mr. William Walker and Mr. John Plummer, Assistant Inspectors. Mr. John Wilson, M.P., Financial Secretary of the Durham Miners' Association, Mr. John Forman, President of the Durham Miners' Association, Mr. J. Johnson, Treasurer of the same Association, and Mr. Hugh Boyle, representing the Miners' National Union, also attended. The owners, Messrs. Strakers and Love, were represented by Mr. John Strachan, barrister-at-law, instructed by Messrs. J. and R. D. Proud, of Bishop Auckland. Mr. Atherley Jones, barrister-at-law, instructed by Mr. Isaacs, solicitor, Sunderland, represented the Durham Miners' Association as well as the relatives of deceased men. I watched the proceedings on behalf of the Secretary of State.

2. At the close of the inquiry the jury gave the following verdict in writing, "That a shot was fired, but by whom we know not, and that the said shot ignited the coal dust and caused an explosion in the Cross-cut Way, culminating in the deaths of the 20 men and boys accidentally." On being further asked whether they desired to make any recommendation as regards the future safety of the mine, the jury answered in the negative, but further intimated that any recommendation should be left in the hands of the Government Inspector.

3. The Brancepeth "A" pit, in which the explosion occurred, is one of a group of six or seven pits owned and worked by Messrs. Strakers and Love. The agent for these collieries is Mr. R. L. Weeks, and the certificated manager of the "A" pit is Mr. David Grieves, who had managed the colliery for 22 years.

Accompanying this Report will be found a plan of the workings, so far as to make intelligible what is said, and to several portions of which reference will hereafter be made.

4. Before dealing with the evidence generally, it is desirable to state the conditions under which the mine is worked, with some particulars which will bear upon the subject of inquiry. The coal is chiefly a coking coal, and the plan indicates that the colliery is ventilated by means of a downcast shaft and two upcast shafts. The downcast shaft is 276 feet deep, extending to what is known as the Brockwell seam, and is 10 feet in diameter. The Brancepeth upcast shaft is of precisely the same depth, but is 7 feet diameter. The other upcast is at Oakenshaw. These two Brancepeth shafts communicate, and are used for the working of three seams of coal, viz.: The "Brockwell" (taking the deepest first), the "Jet" and the "B" or "Seggar" seam. Sub-dividing the total depth of 276 feet at the shafts, and taking the measurements by fathoms, as shown in a section plan which was produced, it is found that, measuring from the surface, the "Jet" seam is 27 fathoms 4 feet and 5 inches. The "B" or "Seggar" seam 37 fathoms 3 feet and 11 inches, and the "Brockwell" seam 46 fathoms and 6 inches. Taking the plan of the workings as a whole, the downcast shaft lies to the south-west, from which point the lines in blue (which indicate the intake air passage and substantially main haulage ways) begin, and the Brancepeth upcast shaft is to be found at a point a little beyond marked "U," and west of the downcast, which is marked "D."

5. Of the "B," or "Seggar" seam, little need be said inasmuch as nothing turns upon its relation to the subject of inquiry. The seam is not shown upon the general plan, being outside the ambit of the workings there delineated. It lies from the shaft to the north, rising from the Brockwell, and is worked by means of a drift. An independent plan of this seam was produced, and it was from this seam that seven men were enabled to leave the pit on the night of the explosion unhurt.

6. As to the "Jet" seam, that is indicated on the plan shown as lying to the east, and almost in a direct line along the main haulage way, proceeding in-bye from the "downcast." The "Jet" is also worked from the Brockwell, by means of a drift, which drift begins at a point about one mile from the "downcast," called Staple Curve, and the furthermost limit in that direction is 2,530 yards east. All the "Jet" seam air returns to the Brancepeth "upcast" shaft of the "A" pit. In the course of the inquiry the names of certain points or places were frequently referred to as places of importance, as will hereafter be found. Along the same line of way, from the downcast shaft in an easterly direction to the point one mile in-bye, marked as "Staple Curve," the road or way is almost straight, but here is a sharp curve. From this point ("Staple Curve"), going northerly, the road is carried by means of a drift across what is a "fault" in the Brockwell seam (and which road is called the "Cross-cut Way"), and passing in-bye this way, the plan shows the region of the colliery known as the "Dairy Way" and "Cross-cut North." From the downcast shaft to the extreme limit of the "Cross-cut North" is 4,200 yards, and it is about the same distance to the limit of the "Dairy Way." Here we have the face of the coal, and it may be stated at once that traces of the effects of the explosion were found right up to this extreme point in the "Dairy Way."

7. As to the ventilating districts, the red lines on the plan indicate the exact course of the "returns," and the manner in which the air, more or less vitated in its passage through the mine, is regulated.

The "Cross-cut" and "Dairy Way" intake is from Brancepeth "A," and the return to "Oakenshaw," that is the northern section of the mine. All the southern returns are to the "C" pit, which adjoins the "A" pit on the south. The engine planes, or haulage ways, vary in width — in places, 12 feet wide, by 5 feet or 5 feet 6 inches high. And the south "returns" are to be found one on each side of the engine plane, on the south side 3 feet 6 inches high, by 8 feet, 10 feet, or 12 feet wide. North of engine plane it is 6 feet by 6 feet. or, in some places, 3 feet 6 inches by 10 feet. After the Main Air Crossing the return way is a horse-way, and is 6 feet by 6 feet. A "ventilation return" was put in evidence for the months of January, February, and March, 1896, which showed that the average amount of air passing into the mine was 39,364 cubic feet per minute, and of this quantity 15,104 cubic feet was carried into the Brockwell seam through the Cross-cut Way.

The manager, Mr. Grieves, said the air had been quite sufficient to keep all the airways clear of stythe and other foulness, but, as will presently be seen, he believed that no firedamp had been given off.

8. I have already referred to the drift from "Staple Curve" along "The Cross-cut Way." It is here that the first large "fault" or "trouble" is found. It is at the Jet seam bank; at this point the Brockwell coal is thrown down 78 feet, and so is driven to on the other side by the drift which is called "Cross-cut Way." The second fault, called the "Brandon Hitch," is 1,000 yards from the first fault, and is a riser, N. of 45 feet. From the "downcast" to the Jet seam bank is about one mile, and to just beyond "Staple Curve," and from the Jet seam bank or Staple Curve to the extreme limit of the "Dairy Way" is about 2,500 yards. It is along the whole of this passage or way that the interest centres, inasmuch as the region of the explosion was soon demonstrated to have been at the point marked X on the plan, and which is about 148 yards in-bye of "Staple Curve." Following up the description of the mine, the colliery is a very old one, and no coal is being worked in this portion of the mine, except in the Dairy Way and the Cross-cut North, in the Brockwell, and also in the "Jet" seam. Close to the Staple Curve there is "goaf;"the largest portion of "goaf" is shown on the left, on the level of the engine plane, and the Brockwell is also "goafed" between the "faults" and underneath the "Cross-cut Way." The "Cross-cut Way" itself dips, and is 50 feet above the Brockwell "goaf," which was laid down about six years ago.

9. The mine was worked in two shifts, that is to say, the fore shift, which went in at 4 a.m., and came out at 11 to 11.20 a.m., and the back shift, which went in at 9.30 a.m., and came out at from 4 to 4.30 p.m. About 200 hewers were employed during these shifts in the three seams, i.e., Brockwell, Jet, and B or Seggar, during the three months preceding April 1896, and also 150 putters and shifters, or, all told, about 350 men and boys. The average out-put of coal had been 540 tons per day. Besides the general oversight of Mr. Grieves himself, the manager, a Mr. J. Dowson, an overman of great experience, acted as under-manager, Thomas Laws as back overman; J. Rogerson (who was one of the killed, and whose duty and actual conduct at the time of the explosion involved a most important point in the inquiry) was master shifter. The overman had charge of the fore shift, and the back overman, Laws, of the back shift. There were 12 deputy overmen. Such was the officering of the mine. The master shifter, Rogerson, who had the same position as an overman, in respect of the night shift, had a staff of 24 men under him, who were stone-men and shifters, and whose duties embraced the going into the mine in the intervals between the fore shift and the back shift, to attend, within the scope of the authority vested in Rogerson, to such matters as required attending to after the back shift had "ridden," involving such work as the renewing of timbers, clearing of ways, removing stones, &c., and generally to make the workings fit for the miners. These shifters and stone-men under Rogerson go down at 4 p.m. and "ride" or return at 11 p.m.

10. It was at a very early stage in the inquiry proved by evidence, which was subsequently substantiated, that the pit was considered by all responsible persons as "non-gaseous," and not a "fiery" pit, and, indeed, in that respect a very safe pit. Mr. Grieves said that until 1882 naked lights only had been used in every part. In that year in the Dairy Way, at a hitch, or fault, with a 10 feet rise, gas was given off, and a caution board was then put up, on the in-bye side of which locked safety lamps had been used ever since, but that out-bye from the hitch, and in all other places, naked lights had been used down to the time of the accident. But there had been indication of gas since 1882, for in 1891, on the 9th day of January, at the "Badger flat," in the Dairy Way (a part which is now in goaf), there was a small giving off of gas, so small, indeed, that the men were not even withdrawn. The gas did not then fire, and it was removed, and since then there had been no indication of gas whatever. There was also some evidence that in 1890 some dust in a box in a hopper at the surface had ignited, and three lives were then lost, but the evidence showed that on no previous occasion had dust, either alone or mixed with gas, ignited in any part of the mine, or caused any mischief. There was, therefore, on the part of all concerned in the management, the most complete reliance on the safety of the "A" pit as a non-fiery or a non-gaseous mine, and no one had even suggested the discontinuance in such parts, as they were permitted, of the use of naked lights. I had no reason to doubt the truth of this evidence, and in this branch of the inquiry it was obvious that unless it could be demonstrated that,' suddenly and unexpectedly, gas had somehow been given off in a region where naked lights were or might have been present at the time of the explosion, and at a spot consistent with the genesis of the destructive force, then the "cause" of the explosion would have to be sought for in a direction not involving the question of "gas" or "firedamp." And it may now be stated, once for all, that no evidence was subsequently given which admitted the possibility of such sudden escape of "firedamp" at or near the point at which ultimately the locale of the explosion was absolutely fixed.

11. Enough has now been said to justify a short narrative of the facts and circumstances of the explosion itself on the night of the 13th of April. The master shifter, John Rogerson, and at least 19 other persons, stone-men and shifters, had gone into the mine at the usual hour (4 p.m.), the back shift miners having about that time left the pit. The pit had, as usual, drawn coals until 4 p.m. There had been no communication that day between the manager (Mr. Grieves) and Rogerson, and no special direction to execute any special work (what his general instructions were will hereafter appear). Rogerson was was last seen by Dowson, the overman and under-manager, at 6 a.m. on the morning of the 13th April (which was a Monday), and Rogerson had then told Dowson that some timber wanted renewing at the point marked (see plan) by the bodies of Cook and Hodgson in the "Cross-cut Way." At that time nothing had passed between Rogerson and Dowson as to removing any stone or as to firing shots, and Dowson, if he is to be believed, gave no authority or direction then to Rogerson as to blasting any stone in the Cross-cut Way or elsewhere, and was not consulted as to the necessity for doing so, and Dowson declared that if such permission had been asked to remove stone by firing in the main haulage road he would himself first have examined the place. Be this as it may, nothing further was known as to the specific work to be executed by Rogerson's men in the Cross-cut Way than the renewal of the timber. This point in the Cut-cross Way is called the "Swalley," being a depression. "Here," said Dowson, "Rogerson would select his men, and would have to remove some timber and put up fresh timber, and if he found any timber dangerous, he might also repair it, and in doing so, he might also have to remove or take down stone if necessary." It was also admitted that Rogerson's personal duties might have taken him to any part of the pit that night, and a body of evidence was directed to showing that in all probability he had been in the "Jet" seam immediately before the explosion. At any rate, he had express orders as to work to be done that night in the Dairy Way, but as to having been in the Jet Way just before the explosion, it was quite hypothetical. Rogerson having gone down with his men at about 4 p.m., nothing further was known (every man who could have thrown light upon the subject having unhappily perished) until about 10 p.m., when the rapper man, Wilson, who was on duty 30 yards from the shaft bottom, heard a great noise, and immediately saw a flash of light. He felt at once the force of an explosion, and knew no more until he was brought to bank. Having regained consciousness, he was sent by Dowson for the manager, Grieves, and from this stage all the evidence, beginning with the explorations conducted for several days, and the discovery of bodies, wreckage, and so forth, indications of explosion, was of a circumstantial character, and became the subject during the inquiry of searching investigation by the representatives of the several interests, with due regard to the proper inferences to be drawn from them, in favour of or against the theories which were, or were not, to be accepted as to the nature of the explosion.