VI - FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The disquieting feature of this explosion was the ready propagation of
the flame by coal dust along roadways on which conveyors had either been used
or were in use, and there seems little doubt from the evidence left by the
explosion that after having been initiated by firedamp it received its main
"kick-off" by a coal dust explosion about the loading point on the
2nd East gate.
The treatment of coal dust on conveyor roadways in seams where the coal is
friable and the natural conditions are dry, so maintained as to be at all times
in compliance with the Coal Dust Regulations, is admittedly a difficult problem
and one for which, as I have already stated, the only effective remedy is prevention
of dust at the source by means of water. I therefore recommend that more active
steps should be taken at the more dusty collieries to adopt this method in
one or more of its different forms at the coal face.
These measures are now being taken at many collieries, more especially in
South Wales, in an endeavour to reduce the hazard from pneumokoniosis, and
in curtailing the explosion hazard from coal dust they serve a dual purpose
in health and safety.
(2) The danger from coal dust on disused roadways was demonstrated by this
explosion and I would stress the necessity for adequate treatment of such roads
so long as they remain accessible, as required by the Coal Dust Regulations;
and that when these roads become untravellable they should either be sealed
off or otherwise protected by a substantial barrage of stone dust at each end.
(3) In view of the increased hazard from coal dust brought about by mechanised
mining, I further recommend that in respect of No. 10 of the Coal Dust Regulations
the Modification Order of 1939 made under the Defence Regulations, 1939, be
revoked to allow the minimum percentages of incombustible matter laid down
by the Schedule to Regulation 3 to have full application in the case of coals
having a volatile matter content exceeding 27 per cent.
(4) The igniting cause of this explosion can, in the last analysis, be attributed
to "mixed light" conditions, and I recommend that unless the different
sections of workmen are completely segregated from the surface inbye the use
of open lights should be prohibited in any mine where safety lamps have been
introduced into any part (other than as a temporary precaution).
(5) The potential danger of an emission of firedamp from the intervening strata
due to the concurrent working of a lower seam or seams needs to be emphasised
and a careful watch should be kept for such a contingency, especially in that
part of the workings overlying the abutment areas of coal ribs in the lower
working, to enable suitable precautions to be taken in time.
(6) I consider it expedient that the searching of persons for contraband should
be made compulsory in all mines or parts of mines in which safety lamps are
used, whether or not they are required by the Coal Mines Act, 1911.
(7) Lastly, the question of inculcating a safety lamp outlook amongst the
miners of North West and Mid Durham in particular remains to be tackled. Many
of these men have at some time or other worked under open light conditions,
and following a change of mine or the later adoption of safety lamps at mines
previously on open lights, they find it difficult to give up old and ingrained
habits of smoking while at work ; hence their apparent indifference to, and
disregard of, rules prohibiting the taking of contraband below ground.
It is a sad reflection on Durham that four explosions of firedamp. each involving
loss of life, which have occurred in the county during the past eighteen months
have been due to contraband; and in the case of a fifth explosion, in 1944,
probably due to sparking at coal face switchgear, contraband was found on the
body of the victim.
I am well aware this question of contraband has exercised the minds of the
representatives of the workmen for some time, but I suggest they should intensify
their efforts to overcome the apathy of many of their members to this menace
to the safety of the Durham mines.
It is fitting to conclude this Report with a reference to the excellent work
done by the three deputies Younger, Shanley and Robinson, and Overman Hutchinson,
immediately after the explosion. These men were called upon to take what, in
the circumstances, might be described as a judicious risk of a further explosion,
and they acted with commendable promptitude and courage, and displayed great
resourcefulness and circumspection. At no time were they tempted to do anything
foolhardy, and it is to their great credit that not only did they discover
and bring out to fresh air five badly injured men and ensure prompt first-aid
attention to them but they also satisfied themselves at an early stage there
were no other persons remaining alive in the district. High tributes to their
conduct were paid at the Inquest by the Coroner and all the representatives
of the various parties. The National Coal Board have formally recommended that
recognition be given to these men for their work, and a case is now being prepared
by the Divisional Inspector for your consideration.
I desire to express my thanks to the local Mines Inspectorate and the staff
of the Research and Testing Branch for their valuable assistance; and to the
National Coal Board and the representatives of the officials, deputies and
workmen for their helpfulness during my investigation. I would also like to
express my appreciation and thanks to the National Coal Board for the excellent
plans prepared by Mr. S. Bott and his surveying staff, which were a feature
of the Inquest.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
R. YATES.