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The morning shift on Monday, 9th December (the day of the explosion) descended at 5.30 a.m. It included 13 men and the deputy Miller who were to work in No. 2 district, and John McMullen, normally a stone worker but who was sent that morning to work at the transfer point at the entrance to No. 2 district, where the belt conveyor in No. 3 heading delivered its coal on to the main trunk belt. They were accompanied by the overman, William Hoodless.

The task confronting these men was to get the accumulation of firedamp cleared as quickly as possible so that normal coal getting operations could proceed in Nos. 2 and 3 headings. Since the night shift deputy had reported No. 4 heading and No. 5 right thirl extension fit for work it was considered apparently that these could start at once, and the positions of three of the bodies indicates that they had either started or were about to do so. Two others were to be employed in withdrawing supports in the old shuttle car workings and here they were found.

Most of the others presumably were to assist in restoring the ventilation – the overman directing operations; the plan of action, as explained by the overman to Glaister, was to advance the air tubes from No. 2 fan until No. 3 fan was clear of gas and then to run the No. 3 fan. Evidence was also given by Glaister of seeing two bales of canvas being taken inbye and being told by John Fox (one of the deceased) that he and his mate Pflaumer were going to erect a canvas screen on the inbye side of the fan which had been moved up on the Sunday. The canvas bales would be taken up No. 2 heading to the return wheel, it was suggested, by means of the haulage engine in that road and then carried forward by hand.

J. W. Glaister, who had helped to move the fan up on the Sunday, went into the No. 2 district on the Monday morning to seek some tools he had left at the old charging station; he arrived there about 7 o’clock and left about 7.45 a.m. to go into No. 1 district in which he was to work.

When he left R. H. Brown the maintenance engineer in charge on that shift was still at the charging station.

Glaister said the main belt in No. 3 heading had not then been started as, if it had been running, he would have heard it from where he was at the charging station and also Brown would have proceeded at once to the heading. Nor was it running when he passed the transfer point and spoke to McMullen on his way to No. 1 district.

On the other hand, John McMullen, whose job it was to control the running of the No. 2 district belts and who although seriously injured by the explosion was able, fortunately, to give evidence at the Inquiry, said the main belt was running from about 7 o’clock almost continuously, though very little coal was being delivered by it at the transfer point – mostly in small intermittent patches of a few shovelsful as though of cleanings up.

He was actually engaged in cleaning up spillage (of which there was more than usual) at the transfer point, and so probably was not paying very great attention to the belt delivery.

Some minutes before the explosion occurred the deputy, Miller, came outbye to the transfer point. He asked McMullen what had been wrong with the belt, to which McMullen replied that the trunk belt on the main road had been standing. The belt, however, had then been re-started and was running. Miller then retraced his steps inbye along No. 3 heading, and had only proceeded about 15 yards when, as McMullen put it, "I knew no more."

McMullen was later found unconscious – he had been burned on the left side of the face, right hand and the left thigh, and badly shocked.

Glaister was working at a conveyor in No. 1 district about 600 yards from McMullen when the explosion occurred. He said it was like a heavy fall of stone and the blast which accompanied it flung him over the conveyor and threw stone dust from the sides into the air. It was followed by a smaller explosion, perhaps seconds after the first one.

Along with a mate working with him he came out to the transfer point of No. 1 district with the main trunk belt and tried to telephone but could not do so – the lines had been damaged. On No. 2 level he found the deputy who was going in to bring out his men, but the men were already on the way outbye. Together they all travelled out by No. 2 level, the usual travelling road, some distance and then through a thirl on to No. 3 level (the trunk belt road) and reached the transfer point of No. 2 district where they found the conveyor structure piled up in the roadway and other damage. It was not until later that McMullen was found here. From this point Glaister telephoned to the undermanager at the surface giving the alarm.

Thomas Barton, deputy in No. 4 district said the explosion sounded "like a big dull thud or the closing of a big door" and the auxiliary fan in his district stopped. He heard only one bump. He proceeded inbye, met some haulage boys coming out and then some men from No. 3 unit, and then passing the transfer point of No. 2 district where the air was thick with dust and smoke, was going into No. 1 district when he met men coming out and turned back with them. On the instructions, by telephone, of the undermanager he went to examine some of the airways but collapsed and was sent outbye.

Rescue and Recovery Operations – Rescue operations were set in motion without delay and everything possible done to penetrate the affected workings to render such help as might be of avail to any of the unfortunate men.

It was soon evident that the explosion had travelled outbye right to the transfer point on No. 3 road with considerable force, the air crossing (which was of substantial construction) having been demolished, doors and other ventilation arrangements destroyed, and numerous (and some heavy) falls had resulted. All this made the work difficult, and because of the wet conditions unpleasant, but no effort was spared by officials or workmen of this and other collieries to reach the entombed men. By 9.45 on the morning of the explosion the first trained rescue team from Brigham Central Rescue Station had arrived complete with equipment under the direction of the Superintendent, Mr. Charlton, and they were quickly followed by the brigades from other collieries in the coalfield, reserves standing by to undertake duty as needed. In all, twelve brigades took part in the operations.

A few men outside the No. 2 district who earlier had been slightly affected by afterdamp in the return were treated by the rescue teams, but unfortunately by the time those in the affected district could be reached they were dead, death in most cases having been instantaneous.

By the Tuesday night all the bodies had been located, except that of the deputy Miller – he was not then known to have come outbye just before the explosion took place – and his was found on the Saturday night, several falls having, in the meantime, been cleared in an effort to locate it.

Investigations by mines inspectors, colliery officials and others were pursued after the ventilation had been restored, further falls being cleared to examine electric apparatus and cables, some of which was brought to the surface for closer inspection.

The positions of the bodies, pieces of apparatus, falls, etc. were carefully noted, and these are shown on Plan No. 1. The direction of force as shown by the displacement of stoppings, apparatus and supports was also recorded. I personally made an inspection of the mine on 20th December accompanied by mines inspectors and officials of the colliery.