|
|
|
|
|
 |
 |
|||
8. Between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. the majority of the 40 men killed descended. The numbers on the plan show the places where their bodies were found after the accident. Two or three hewers were engaged in the Low North district, but the large majority of the men consisted of repairers, tub fillers, waggon-way men, stonemen, drivers, and deputies. William and Samuel Brown, stonemen, were engaged in removing a face of stone wall in the main intake at the spot marked 18 and 19 in the plan, and for this purpose they were, by the orders of the manager, and with due authority from him, to fire shots in the stone. Their object was to enable some rails in the rolley-way which were being laid a few yards east of their working place by two waggon-way men to be directed into the stenton about two yards west of their working place. A cross cut was being driven into the coal out of the stenton above referred to in a north-westerly direction from the main intake way. This cross cut was driven to a level considerably below that of the main intake way, and extended about three yards inwards. The waggon-way men were employed in laying from some points a. few yards east of Brown's working place rails, which, when the Browns had removed the stone, would be directed in a slanting course north-westerly into the cross-cut above mentioned, and which, with the stenton, will be hereafter referred to as Brown's cross cut and Brown's stenton. At some time between their arrival at their working place and the occurrence of the explosion it was admitted by all parties that the Browns fired a shot. With this exception nothing appeared in the course of the inquiry to have taken place, or to have been contemplated as about to take place, before the explosion, which in any sense can be called unusual. At 8.58 the explosion occurred, and 40 men and every horse then in the West Pit perished.
9. The effects of the explosion, as indicated in the mine subsequent to its occurrence, gave rise to much controversy between the witnesses.
It was, however, common ground between all —
| (i). |
That the indications in the main intake in the Narrow Board Crosscut and Right-hand districts, everything in fact in the main intake way east and south-east of the spot marked 21 in the plan, showed that the force of the explosion had gone in an easterly and south-easterly direction, or in pit language, "in bye".
| |
| (ii). |
That the exact reverse of this was evident from the Low North way to the shaft, the indication in the main intake way showing that between these points the force of the explosion passed westwards or "out bye."
| |
| (iii). |
That the space in the main intake way between the spot marked 21 and the loftings near the Hitch, a place about 70 yards west of Brown's working place, although presenting surfaces equally favourable for force to vent itself upon was almost entirely free from all evidences of violence.
|
10. The representatives of the miners stated, without hesitation, that the condition of the way and, above all, of a set of tubs which were standing partly in the Low North way and partly in the angle where that way joins the main intake, showed that from some point east of the Low North the force of the explosion had passed westward. This was as stoutly controverted by the officials of the colliery, who pointed to the condition of the loftings near the Hitch, the bending inwards of a baulk, and the marks of bricks upon a door as supporting the opposite view. The facts deposed to by the miners were supported and confirmed by Mr. Atkinson. The indications as seen after the explosion in the main intake way are the most important, as the blast clearly passed along the entire length of it. The return ways were absolutely unaffected by it, nor were any evidences of the explosion discernible in the Hitch North. The condition of the Middle North also does not seem to have called for observation. In the Low North the balance of evidence appeared to me to show that the force of the blast had passed up the Low North way from the main intake, some doors in that way being blown under a fall some yards to the north of their position. There were some conflicting symptoms in the travelling way which communicates with the Low North way, but the most decisive of these was the blowing of the doors in that way in a westerly direction. A more detailed description of the condition of the main intake way between the places marked 22 and 23, and 21 will be given hereafter.
11. It will be gathered from the preceding description of the radiation of the forces that the explosion must have fired at some point in the main intake way between the places marked 22 and 23 in the plan and the place marked 21, and the three theories which were advanced to account for the explosion concurred in limiting to this space its origin.
12. Theory advanced by Messrs. Robson, Baker Foster, and Daglish, mining engineers, called on behalf of the owners :–
| (I.) |
That a heavy fall took place in the main intake in a place which by reason of apprehension of fire is now built up from a point about 15 yards west of the Low North way to a distance of about 60 or 70 yards westwards therefrom; that this fall caused an outburst of gas which was carried in the full current of the air passing down the main intake against the lamp of either Quin or Harlow, whose bodies were found at the spot marked 22 and 23.
| |
| (II.) |
Alternatively that a fall took place in the goaf lying above the Low North district, which forced gas out with great velocity and drove it into the main intake through the bords west of the Low North waggon-way or through the waggon-way itself, and fired it at the lamp of Quin or Harlow in the way before suggested.
|
13. Stated concisely the reasons relied on to justify their theory were as follows :–
| (a.) |
The indications that throughout the main intake way everything eastwards of 22 and 23 proved that the blast had gone from west to east.
| |
| (b.) |
The impossibility of the shot causing the explosion.
| |
| (c.) |
The impossibility of accounting for the existence within the limited area above referred to of gas sufficient to cause the explosion by anything except an abnormal outburst.
|
14. There is no palpable impossibility in either of these theories. Explosions have occurred for which no cause other than a sudden outburst of the kind suggested could be assigned. But difficulties of a serious kind impose themselves upon the acceptation of either theory as probable. In respect to (I.), these may be classed thus :–
| (a.) |
The gas released by such a fall would have been carried a distance of 20 to 30 yards by the main current of air before it met the lamp at which it is supposed to have fired. In that distance it must have been considerably diluted, and the original quantity necessary to have been released by the fall must have been very large indeed.
| |
| (b.) |
The fall is purely hypothetical. No evidence of imperfection in the roof prior to the explosion likely to render probable such a fall was given; on the contrary the roof was stated to have given very little trouble. The condition of the stones in a fall in the western extremity of the part afterwards built up made it manifest that these at any rate had fallen subsequently to the explosion.
| |
| (c.) |
The colliery was not unusually gassy, and no occurrence of the kind suggested was alleged ever to have taken place in the mine, where but one sudden outburst of gas, and that from the goaf, had taken place during 10 years.
| |
| (d.) |
The absence of all symptoms of violence in the undisturbed portion of the main intake way above referred to makes it necessary to believe, that if the explosion fired at 22 and 23, the blast which did great damage on both sides of it leapt over a confined part of the main intake way, where for 70 yards there were no stoppings to admit of any relief of pressure, and where surfaces existed if anything more favourable than elsewhere whereon force could exert itself. The comparative freedom from dust of a considerable part of the undisturbed portion does not in my judgment sufficiently account for this phenomenon.
| |
|
To the alternative theory (II.) obstacles even more serious exist.
| ||
| (e.) |
According to one witness no gas had been seen in the Low North for two years, and the condition of the ventilation there would seem to imply that the managers of the colliery anticipated no danger from the goaf edges.
| |
| (f.) |
The supposed outburst of gas rushing at highest velocity from the goaf is assumed to have passed harmlessly by the lamps of six men (whose position is shown by the numbers 26 to 31 on the plan) and to have fired at 22 and 23, when it was diluted and when it was moving with less velocity than when it had freshly burst from the goaf edges.
| |
| (g.) |
If gas passed through the bords of the Low North, to reach the main intake it would have to pass through the air currents of the return, through the stoppings, as shown in the plan, and harmlessly by the lamps of the men at 32, 33 and 34.
| |
| (h.) |
As above stated the balance of the evidence seemed to be that the main force of the explosion passed continuously westwards from the loftings near the Hitch.
| |
|
Objections (a.) and (d.) apply equally to (II.) as to (I.).
| ||
Contains public sector information licensed under the 
