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It will be observed from the doctor's report that he ascribed some of the deaths to shock of the explosion and some to carbon monoxide poisoning. I am reluctant to criticise his conclusions, but he appears to have too readily accepted the view that when a man was burned and had been in the flame area he had been so subject to shock that in conjunction with the hums it was the immediate cause of death. Shock may have caused the death of No. 9 (Rollin) who had been in the track of the explosion where it had exerted considerable force and who had received injury to the skull; No. 13 (Oswald) had been equally exposed to shock, but being in a position where fresh air reached him immediately after the explosion was found alive, and No. 15 (Yeardsley), who was found near him, survives.

All the other victims were near]y equally exposed to shock, but some were just outside the flame area, and none of them had sustained any serious injury beyond burning in the case of those in the flame area; they all had moved some distance after the explosion, those unburnt the farthest, but I believe all these persons had died from inhaling after-damp in a situation where fresh air would not return to them until after death, and that neither the shock of the explosion or the burns some of them had received would have caused immediate death whereas they were at once exposed to the after-damp which the doctor admitted was the cause of immediate death in the case of those not burnt. When the doctor was questioned at the inquest as to whether the persons who were burned and whose death he ascribed to shock showed any signs of carbon monoxide poisoning, he replied in the negative, but I examined all the bodies and found some of those which were burned showed the characteristic pinkness due to carbon monoxide.

In the case of an explosion under similar circumstances which occurred at Urpeth Colliery on the 17th December, 1906, where four lives were lost, Dr. Wilson, of Birtley, ascribed all the deaths to carbon monoxide poisoning. Two of these, a deputy and a hewer, were badly burned, and occupied practically the same position as No, 1 (Ashman) and No. 2 (Cowen) in relation to a shot which caused the explosion, a third victim, also burned, had been more exposed to shock as well as to flame, but whose body exhibited no signs of violence, while the fourth was unburned and uninjured.

Again, in the explosion initiated by an ignition of fire-damp at a defective safety lamp and carried forward by coal dust which occurred at Benwell Colliery on the 19th March, 1907, and where all the four victims of the explosion were in the flame area, the doctor reported at the inquest

Professor Louis, whose assistant, Mr. H. Dean, made the analyses of dust given in Appendix II. and the points at which they were collected, shown on Fig. 1, Plate I., and Fig. 1, Plate II., gave valuable evidence at the inquest.

The dust was collected, in wood chip boxes 2k¼ inches diameter and about the same depth. In the collections so described in the table, a point which appeared to be average as to the amount of material on the floor was selected, and the box pushed down on to the floor and a card then slipped underneath. Professor Louis found that the amount of material so collected represented in Nos. 4 and in the table 4½ lbs. of material per square foot, and of this, lb. passed through a sieve of 120 meshes per square inch. He further stated that sample No. 3 had practically the same composition.

Mr. John Cadman's evidence was instructive, and his presence in the County at the time of the explosion fortunate.

The analyses of air collected in the mine given in Appendix I. and the points where they were collected shown in Fig. I., Plates I. and II., speak for themselves. The samples collected did not disclose anything unusual. The samples A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A10 and A11 collected at or near the face of culs-de-sac with the ventilation not thoroughly restored were much what might have been expected, and showed that there was a considerable, but by no means unusual, flow of fire-damp from the newly exposed strata.

The trace of carbon monoxide left in the samples A1 and A6 collected in sheltered places on the day after the explosion was also what might have been anticipated.

The samples A8, A12, A13 taken where there were considerable volumes of air passing, and which would contain practically all the fire-damp issuing from the workings in the district where the explosion originated, probably represent approximately the condition of the main current at the time of the explosion and would in the absence of dust have been quite incapable of transmitting flame.

When these samples were taken a canvas door on the main road inbye of the 1st South wagonway, forced the air current across a fall on that road and through the stenton immediately outbye; the current then passed round the workings and back to the upcast shaft by the left main winning.

Mr. Cadman went fully into the question of testing for fire-damp with the safety lamp, and stated that he found from tests made in the mine at points where subsequent analysis of the air showed that from 3 to 3½ per cent. of fire-damp was present, as well as from tests made when analyses had been conducted on the spot, that this amount was not observed by the average deputy when testing with a safety lamp flame which was not sufficiently lowered to eliminate white light ; he further stated that it was possible for a careful observer to detect as low as 1 per cent, by lowering the flame to s small blue testing flame of about 1/10th inch high.

This is a matter to which I have often called attention when underground; by testing with the small blue flame, it has been generally understood that 2 per cent. was practically the least amount of fire-damp which could be detected, but this method of testing for gas is not generally adopted; in the first place, there is considerable risk of losing your light altogether, and secondly, it takes more time. The ordinary method adopted by deputies and shot firers, is to reduce the flame to about half the ordinary size and then cautiously raise the lamp, and if the flame elongates or flickers, gas is known to be present, but by this method, if the air in a place contains fire-damp thoroughly diffused and the lamp has already been burning in the atmosphere, it may be raised to the roof and show no indication whatever, and the only means of discovering its presence under these conditions is by testing with the light so reduced that only blue flame is present, when the cap can be seen.

If a safety lamp is already burning in air containing, say 2 per cent. of firedamp, and is raised with a slightly reduced flame into air nearer the roof containing, say 3 or 4 per cent., the pull or elongation of the flame would be much less than if it had been raised out of pure air.

Mr. S. Tate in his evidence called attention to the danger attending the use of the inflammable case or covering of the explosive used, and Mr. Blackett produced some of the material and demonstrated its inflammability to the Jury.

The statutory regulations applying to this accident, so far as shot firing is concerned, are contained in two Acts of Parliament, a Code of Special Rules and an Order by the Secretary of State.

(1.) The earliest regulation in point of date is General Rule 12 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887.

(2.) In the Special Rules for Washington Collieries, established on 20th June, 1888, under the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, there are five rules relating to shot-firing.

(3.) The Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1896, which amends General Rule 12 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, as regards the provision and use of clay for stemming.

(4.) The Explosives in Coal Mines Order of 17th December, 1906, is the last legal enactment.

The only apparent breaches of these regulations were (1) that Cowen carried the explosive in his jacket pocket, and presumably had not brought it into the mine "in a secure case or cannister," in contravention of General Rule 12 (b), and (2) that the shot was fired in a dry and dusty place without watering; in contravention of General Rule 12 (h), and the last was the only breach that had any bearing on the explosion.

Sub-head (h) of General Rule 12 was not carried out at Washington, nor is it generally carried out.

It is contended that the Explosives in Coal Mines Orders, founded on the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1896, supersede the previous regulations, and it may be pointed out that Mr. H. Hall, Inspector of Mines for the Liverpool district, practically adopts this view in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Mines now sitting, see questions and answers 1,385 to 1,403. There is no doubt some reason for this view, but the fact remains that a regulation which, if carried out, would probably have prevented both the initiation and extension of the explosion under discussion was not observed, although it has not been formally repealed.

The only provision as regards watering in the Explosives in Coal Mines Order of 17th December, 1906, is contained in Section 3, where it is prescribed as a precaution in one of the alternative conditions under which shots can be fired on main haulage roads and in the intakes, but it will be noticed that this is followed by a proviso expressly excluding from its operation "main haulage roads and intakes as are within 100 yards of the coal face."

Even before, the issue of the Explosives in Coal Mines Orders the watering at the face in dry and dusty places was not generally carried out ; it was, in the absence of any definition of the words, not admitted that working places were "dry and dusty," or it was contended it was not "reasonably practicable" to water there.

It may be held by some that a Permitted Explosive "is of such a nature that it cannot inflame gas or dust" (General Rule 12 (h) (2) ), but this contention cannot be upheld. It may well be, however, that shot-firers look upon Permitted Explosives in this light, and do not take precautions such as they would take if using gunpowder. This would be a veritable playing with fire. I do not altogether share the view held by some of my colleagues, that the decline in explosions in recent years is principally due to the employment of Permitted Explosives. I think it is more probably due to the increased knowledge of the causes of explosions generally, and unless it is insisted on that no explosive that gives off flame or heat should ever be used unless where it would be perfectly safe to fire a gunpowder shot the use of Permitted Explosives may become a source of danger rather than of safety. Safety should be sought outside the shot hole and the use of Permitted Explosives should only be looked upon as an additional safeguard.

In the North of England within 16 months four explosions due to Permitted Explosives have occurred – viz., at Wingate Grange Colliery on 14th October, 1906, due to geloxite, and causing the death of 24 persons; at Urpeth Colliery on 17th December, I 906, due to westfalite No. 2, causing the loss of four lives; at Whitehaven Colliery on 26th November, 1907, due to saxonite, causing the loss of five lives, and, the present case. This is a worse record so far as the North of England is concerned, than ever occurred when the use of gunpowder was universal.

The use of explosives that give off heat or flame must always be attended with some risk in gaseous and dusty mines, but I believe that with a thorough appreciation of the conditions under which danger may arise and a rigid adherence to the statutory regulations the risk may be made very small.

If the main roads of mines were kept free from coal dust this risk would usually be confined to one district, and then, having regard to the fact that the danger from coal dust at the working face is so much less than when it is present in a state of very fine division (accompanied by swift air currents capable of maintaining and carrying forward a cloud), blasting might be permitted at the face in some dry mines in the first working of the bord and pillar system and in longwall workings, with some provision as to watering or removing dust somewhat different to those contained m General Rule 12 (A) (2), and with some provision as to the planting of shots so as to obviate the possibility of a cloud of dust being raised from the floor.

Whatever may happen in the future as to the invention of safer methods of dislodging coal and stone, it is clear that at present many collieries could not he profitably worked was the use of the existing explosives forbidden, and in the interests of the community at large it seems necessary to allow their use under proper safeguards.

The most important point to aim at appears to me to be a thorough knowledge of the conditions of danger by the men who fire the shots, and I would submit for consideration whether some steps should not be taken to insure that shot-firers in fiery and dusty mines are possessed of this knowledge.

My experience teaches me that in the case of explosions due to firing shots, had the persons firing the shots been possessed of the knowledge now available as to the conditions of dangers, none of the shots would have been fired without some additional precaution.

But although experts who have studied the question have this knowledge it has not yet filtered down to the persons who actually fire the shots, and whose action may imperil the lives of hundreds of men.

The existing statutory regulations are fairly well adapted to meet the danger arising from shot firing under the varying conditions that exist although open to criticism in some respects. One great improvement would consist in consolidating the regulations contained in the two Acts of Parliament, the Special Rules and the Explosives in Coal Mines Order.