Logo Museum
Museum
Friends of Durham Mining Museum
Events Calendar
e-Books and Books for sale
Photograph Gallery
Document Archive
Master Name Index
What's new in the site
Mining
Mining History
Colliery Index
Colliery Maps
Company Overviews
Who's Who
Mineral Information
Managers Certificates
Educational Material
Bibliography
Statistics
Workers/Employee Lists
Notes for Family Historians
War Service information
Disasters
Disaster Reports
Disaster Report Text
Disaster Report Name Index
UK Disaster Report Text
UK Disaster Report Name Index
Inquest Texts
Names of those killed
Disasters in the 1700s
Disasters in the 1800s
Disasters in the 1900s
Memorials
Awards for Gallantry
On this day ...

Links to other sites of interest
Industrial Heritage Days Out
Former www.pitwork.net web site

Index to site

Contact and address details

Share Page with Social Media

Share on Facebook

Share with Reddit

Share on Delicious

Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
/   \

The remembrance of the various witnesses as to the number of shots they heard fired was somewhat conflicting, but taking their story in conjunction with what was observed at the face of the drift after the explosion it is probable that the two opening or sumping holes were fired simultaneously and did their work and would be heard as one report, then the first hole to the right was fired and did its work, then the second hole to the right was fired and blew out and this would be when the door at the drift bottom opened and was said to have jammed; this hole was then recharged and blew out a second time and was the cause of the ignition of the fire-damp.

The mechanical effects of the explosion were not considerable and were least near the face and at the bottom of the drift.

The flame accompanying the explosion probably did not reach as far down the drift as the burning sleeper and smouldering brattice cloth; as already suggested the latter was probably blown out-bye after having been ignited. Some of the survivors from the bottom of the drift said they were burned slightly while others said they were not, and the bodies of the two men killed showed no sign of burning.

There was practically no coal dust in the drift; the greater part of its length was dry, dampness appearing as the face was reached. Where it was dry there was a considerable quantity of fine grey stone dust on the floor mixed with coarser particles, and on the timber there was a coating of this dust, mostly on the out-bye-side and no doubt deposited at the time of the explosion.

The atmospheric conditions were not unfavourable to the appearance of fire-damp.

Observations taken in the pit in the cabin at the "friction-gear" on a mercurial barometer on the day of the explosion were as follows

At 6 a.m. —Barometer 29.75 inches.
 Temperature 64½ °F.
 
About 2 p.m. —Barometer 29.00 inches.
 Temperature 64½ °F.

Although the jury did not so find it was not disputed that the flame originating the explosion arose from the firing of the blown out shot in the coal seam, and as already indicated there may be some suspicion as to the nature of the stemming or whether it was stemmed at all.

The cause of the explosion was undoubtedly fire-damp, which must have been present in considerable quantity, and it is difficult to conceive how it had escaped the notice of the persons in the drift. If fire-damp had issued in considerable volume from the face either due to the boring of the holes or to the effect of the shots fired, as was suggested by some of the witnesses at the inquest, it could hardly have escaped the notice of the men working there or of Burns the shot-firer, and the evidence of Evans proved that the face was clean after the sumping holes were fired.

Again if the gas issued from the face it might have been expected that the explosion would have been more violent in the air pipes down which it would be carried by the air current, and that some at least of the pipes would have been burst open rather than flattened. Had there been an explosive mixture both outside and inside the pipes it is probable that they would have been flattened, as the resistance of such pipes to internal disruption is much greater than to external flattening.

At the point where the drift caused the fault some difficulty had been experienced with the roof, and on one occasion a considerable fall of stone had taken place here for which, it was stated by the Contractor at the inquest, from 60 to 100 tubs of stones had been filled away and lofting put in, and that some time after another fall took place on to the lofting; beyond the fault where the 17 inch coal seam formed the roof of the drift open fissures were observed in it, and Mr. Atkinson found gas lodging here after the explosion when none could be observed in the lamp flame at the face.

The question of the fire-damp exuding through fissures possibly extending to the old workings in the Main Band above was considered, but it was stated at the inquest that the creep had probably closed these workings, that in any case there was direct access from them to the return air ways, and that if fissures existed the flow would naturally be from the drift up them and then into the return air way rather than that gas should come down them into the drift. It was further stated that more black-damp than fire-damp had been observed in the vicinity of the old workings.

The runaway tubs bad not damaged the air pipes or other arrangements connected with the ventilation, and they had not blocked the entrance to the drift, but it is possible that the rapid motion of the tubs may have had some effect in drawing gas into the drift especially in conjunction with the falling barometer.

The door at the bottom of the drift as already stated opened with the concussion of one of the shots, and according to one witness stood partly open for from 5 to 10 minutes. This would reduce the air coming down the tubes considerably if the fan was also standing, but not probably to any great amount if the fan was working.

The drift was being driven in virgin ground charged with fire damp, and although a sudden fall in the barometer has more effect on the issue of gas from unventilated and abandoned workings or goaves than from the solid strata, yet it has some effect in the latter case, and where the ventilation is feeble the effect is more pronounced. It was clear that when the fan was not being worked the ventilation was not sufficient to clear away the normal issue of gas, and when the fan was being worked, which would always be, to some extent, an intermittent operation, the margin was not sufficient to meet the issue of an extra quantity of gas which in the present case was probably largely due to the fall of the barometer, assisted by the effect of the runaway set of tubs, by the effect of the blown out shots and by the accompanying opening of the door.

It seems probable that from the combined effect of these causes a quantity of fire damp was present in the drift, principally near the roof, and gradually moving forward was ignited by flame from the last shot and had not up to that time shown itself at the face, although it is only reasonable to assume that it must have been present over Burns s head when he turned on the current the last time at a distance of 56 yards from the face. Whether Burns knew (as it was proved he did know earlier in the shift) that gas lay next the roof near the battery must remain a mystery, but the suspicion must remain that he was aware of the presence of the gas and relied on the presumed safety of the Permitted Explosive.

It is usual to ventilate stone drifts by a split of air which, after leaving the drifts, passes into the return air-way, so the mode of ventilating in this case was unusual. The reason for its adoption was the fact that access to a return air-way was not available, as was the case with No. 5 Drift, where pipes were used to convey fresh air to the face, which then passed up the drift and direct into the return air way, and here it was stated no difficulty had been experienced as regards gas, which, however, would be largely due to the fact that the drift dipped instead of rising to the face.

As already stated, the flame did not reach the engine-plane, which contained coal dust (due to the carriage of the coal against the air current), in considerable quantity both on the floor and as fine dust on the upper surfaces of the road and on the timber and girders, the flanges of the latter affording a convenient place for its deposition. This dust was raised in dense clouds by the explosion, and as already stated caused much inconvenience to the persons exposed to it, and had the flame reached the haulage road the loss of life would have been very great, as probably all the morning shift, amounting to 180 persons in-bye of the "friction-gear," would have lost their lives.

The following breaches of the Coal Mines Regulation Acts, 1887 and 1896, appear to have been committed

1. Breach of General Rule 1, Section 49, of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, in respect that ventilation was not constantly produced in No. 6 Drift so as to dilute and render harmless noxious gases.

2. Breach of General Rule 4, Section 49, of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, in respect (a) that on some occasions the competent person (the deputy) did not inspect that part of the mine situated beyond the station at the entrance to No. 6 Drift and make a true report as to its state before allowing workmen to pass such station ; (b) that workmen were in the habit of passing such station before the competent person had made the prescribed examination. These breaches refer to the practice after the interval on Sunday.

3. Breach of General Rule 12 (d), Section 49, of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, as amended by Section 5 (3) of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1896, in respect that the provision that "only clay or other non-inflammable substances "shall be used for stemming" was not observed as regards one of the holes.

4. Breach of General Rule 12 (g), Section 49, of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, in respect that shots were fired in No. 6 Drift while inflammable gas had been reported to be present in the ventilating district in which the shots were fired at the last four inspections under General Rule 4, and such gas was not reported to be cleared away, and the explosive used was not of such a nature that it could not inflame gas.

The breach of the rule on the part of the deputy in allowing workmen to pass the station on the Sunday nights before they had made the statutory examination of the drift has some justification as regards the men required to assist in working the fan. It was not the fault of the deputy that gas was allowed to accumulate, and they took advantage of the only means of removing it by working the fan.

Their wisest course would have been to have taken advantage of General Rule 7 (withdrawal of workmen in case of danger) which, although not strictly applicable to the case, as there were no men to withdraw, yet prescribes a course that would have relieved them of any responsibility; they should first have examined the drift and made a true report as to its state, then allowed the persons necessary to work the fan to come past the station, and when the drift was clear of gas have reported again to that effect and allowed the remainder of the workmen to pass the station.

In any case they were clearly not justified in allowing the body of the workmen to pass the station until the drift had been found by them to be in a safe condition.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

R. A. S. REDMAYNE.

 

Prev Page Return to Top of Page Next Page

 

mail
Mail:
Webmaster
Back
Back
Home
Home
Open Government Licence   Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors
Registered Charity No: 1110608
Page last updated: 31 Dec 2022

Privacy Policy
 
Terms & Conditions
 
Search
Search
Print
Print