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CONCLUSIONS.

The accident was caused by working coal up to the outcrop at a point where the surface deposits were so saturated with water that they gave way and poured into the mine, the quantity being estimated by the manager to be about 90,000 cubic yards, forming a subsidence or cavity on the surface extending over 9 acres, and with a depth of 49 feet.

Owing to the steep character of the workings, the inflowing materials readily passed downwards into the mine, and extended a distance of 2,240 yards by the shortest route to the bottom of the exploring dip, from the point of inflow, but some of it would travel a greater distance, cutting off the retreat of the three men whose lives were lost.

Two of these men, officials of the mine, could easily have escaped, but in their devotion to duty and anxiety to secure the escape of all the persons under their charge, lost their lives.

There is no provision in the Coal Mines Acts or Special Rules founded thereon, specially dealing with precautions to be taken in working coal under the condition which led to this accident.

It was indeed suggested at the Inquiry that General Rule 13, which provides for precautions as regards boring when approaching a dangerous accumulation of water, might apply, but this, [think, would be putting a construction on the rule it will not bear.

But there are many dangers incident to mining which are not and which, perhaps, cannot with advantage be provided for by special regulations as they do not commonly arise, and it would be both difficult and cumbersome to provide rules for every contingency.

Notwithstanding this it is incumbent on me to make some remarks on the prudence of the operations which led to the disaster.

It appears to me that the officials of the mine did not appreciate sufficiently the effect which standing water has on peat or moss in its vicinity in rendering it fluid and capable of flowing. The necessary precautions were taken as regards working the coal under the surface exposure of the water in the tarns, but the influence of the water on the moss and other surface deposits in their vicinity had not been sufficiently taken into account.

It is true that in this case a substratum of clay reposed on the solid strata, but if one conceives the clay to form the bottom of a basin filled with fluid moss, and that the fluid moss is really more dangerous than water when once it commences to flow, it is evident that special precautions were necessary to keep the bottom of the basin intact, particularly as surface deposits are notoriously variable in character both as regards composition and depth, and differ in this respect from the solid stratified rocks on which they repose, and in this case it appeared that the clay became more sandy in its nature in passing from the boreholes to the whin dyke, and was, therefore, not so capable of withstanding pressure from above.

Peat or moss when free from water is incapable of flowing, as can be seen by the hummocks of dry moss on any moor; on the other hand, saturated with water moss and known as bogs has been known to move forward en masse, even flowing up hill, causing great destruction to the surrounding country; such bogs are sometimes known in the northern counties of England as "flows."

Many of these bogs are on the site of old lakes having a clay bottom which confines the water.

A consideration of these facts clearly points to the necessity of special precautions when working coal up to the outcrop under such surface deposits.

Safety would have been attained by leaving sufficient solid coal next the outcrop.

But while suggesting this I do not mean it to be inferred that its necessity was present in the minds of the mine officials before the accident although they had all the facts before them; it is due to them to say that the Colliery was well managed, and during the 15 years it has been established no previous fatal accident had occurred.

Apart altogether from the regrettable loss of life, it is certain that had the possibility of the accident been anticipated no coal would have been worked up to the outcrop under the moss. The result of the accident is the loss of the colliery, a serious pecuniary loss to the owner.

 

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