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IV. EVENTS IN THE AFTERNOON SHIFT UNTIL THE TIME OF THE EXPLOSION

The pre-shift inspection of the Lower Three Quarters district was made about 12.30 p.m. by the dayshift deputy, Matthew Reed, who reported it to be in order and free from inflammable gas. At this time the dayshift drifters were in their respective drifts and a team of surveyors was in No. 4 Stenton. Both auxiliary fans were running, as was the case when the drifters and surveyors went outbye shortly afterwards at the end of the shift.

The deputy in charge on the afternoon shift was Joseph Grierson Banton. and the team of drifters for the Main Drift consisted of Joseph Lancaster Armstrong, Robert Humphrey Peters, and Joseph William Mitcheson. Banton and Armstrong died as a result of the explosion.

William Wilkinson, Thomas Pearson and Joseph Hayton were the drifters employed in the Back Drift.

According to the evidence of Peters and Mitcheson their team of drifters travelled inbye along the Main Drift and reached No. 4 Stenton shortly after 2.30 p.m., then finding that the Main Drift fan was not running.

Wilkinson and his mates found that the Back Drift fan also was not working on their arrival at No. 4 Stenton about the same time.

Without attempting to restart the Main Drift fan, the three Main Drift drifters proceeded about 57 yards inbye of No. 4 Stenton to a refuge hole at which they normally undressed for work. There they ate some of their bait and Peters went outbye to the fan, which started at once when he switched on the power. Peters rejoined his mates and after resting for about five minutes they undressed and proceeded towards the face of the drift, Peters in the lead carrying a flame safety lamp. After they had walked about 50 yards the lamp, when held about 4 feet above the floor. showed a cap which reached into the bonnet. Peters was successful in keeping it alight and they all returned to the refuge hole to allow time for the fan, which was running, to clear the atmosphere. After waiting for about 10 minutes they decided to go inbye. Armstrong this time leading with the oil lamp.

Some 15 yards beyond where Peters had reached, the lamp was extinguished by inflammable gas whilst Armstrong was testing, and the three shifters again retreated to the refuge hole. Leaving Armstrong and Mitcheson there, Peters went to the Back Drift where the drifters agreed to exchange lamps after testing their place and finding no trace of firedamp.

Soon after Peters’ return, Armstrong again led the team towards the face and, on this occasion, they did not detect firedamp outbye of the face of No. 5 Stenton where, however, a cap, estimated at 1 per cent. methane, was visible on the lowered flame of the lamp when held near the roof.

The men began to lay "sweeps", or rail turns, from the drift into No. 5 Stenton, but the fan stopped before they had completed this work. From the evidence available it would appear that the stopping of the fan was due to an overload on the transwitch unit from which the supply to the fan was derived.

Mitcheson was sent back to the fan to restart it, and was told to remain there until he could do so. He had not returned, nor had the fan been restarted, before the laying of the “sweeps” was completed, so the two men went outbye to him. He noticed then that the borrowed oil safety lamp was no longer lit.

The power was restored about 10 minutes later and the fan was restarted.

The three men were on the point of returning to the face when they noticed someone’s light coming inbye along the Main Drift and they waited. It was the deputy, Banton, who told them that the electric power had been off. They all started to go inbye and at the bait refuge hole the deputy told the three men to wait there whilst he went further in. On his return he gave no information about his inspection, but told them to eat their bait and then replace the unlit oil lamp by going for the one in the possession of the haulage driver outbye, whilst he went to look for the overman, William Heyhurst.

As the deputy had not returned by the time the men had finished their bait and had brought the lit flame lamp from the hauler, they decided to go towards the face again, Armstrong testing as they went and stating "it isn’t too bad".

Soon after they reached the face, the deputy and the overman arrived and after testing for gas at the faces of the Main Drift and of No, 5 Stenton, they allowed the drifters to commence drilling 13 shotholes to complete the number required for a round of shots at the face of the Stenton.

The deputy and overman left within a short time, together visiting the Back Drift before the deputy returned to the Main Drift, where he remained until the explosion occurred.

When the last hole had been drilled, the deputy remarked that it was 8 p.m. but that there was just time to fire the round before the end of the shift. The drifters helped him in the charging and stemming of the round of 26 shotholes. Towards the end of the operation Peters removed the drilling equipment backbye out of range of the shots and Mitcheson was sent to the Back Drift to return a drill borrowed earlier, and at the same time to warn the drifters there that a round of shots was about to be fired in No. 5 Stenton.

According to Mitcheson. the deputy told him not to come inbye on his return from the Back Drift, but to remain at the firing station at No. 4 Stenton. There, he was to take the exploder from its case, connect the outer ends of the shotfiring cables to it and to wind the handle, but he was not to press the firing button until he, the deputy, shouted that they were ready for him to do so.

Mitcheson is quite definite that he was so instructed and that he had in fact attached the cables to the exploder and wound it by the time that Peters reached the firing station on his way to the Back Drift to make sure that those drifters had withdrawn.

He is also definite that he heard a shout from the deputy to the effect that all was ready, and that accordingly he pressed the firing button. Thereupon, there was a loud explosion, and he and Peters were blown a short distance from the firing point along No. 4 Stenton towards the Back Drift.

 

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