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8. Gas had been found in different parts of the workings, but never in any considerable quantities, and where discovered in the working faces of the coal or in the air passages alteration in the position of the brattice had been always sufficient to remove it. The mine, however, although considered a safe one, was treated as being a fiery mine, the inspections being made under General Rule 2 of the Act of 1872, and the special rules and the regulations with regard to safety lamps being in accordance with the provision relating to fiery mines. The provision of General Rule 2, however, do not appear to have been in all cases strictly complied with, and one of the witnesses, whose duty it was under this rule after each inspection to make a written report on the state of the mine, admitted that he made no report or entry in his book when he found gas in any part of the workings and was able to remove it by altering the position of the brattice or by other means.
9. The deputy whose duty it was to examine the workings on the night of the 17th, a few hours before the explosion took place, stated in evidence that at that time the air was rather sluggish and the barometer low, but not to such an extent as to create any feeling of alarm in his mind, and, as far as the evidence went, there was nothing to show the mine was in any unusual state or in any way unsafe at the time the explosion took place.
Three theories were put forward as to the locality where the explosion originated, but in no case was the evidence in any sense conclusive, and although the jury came to a conclusion in favour of one of the three suggested explanations, it must remain doubtful which, if any, of the three, is the true solution to the question. The following are the three theories put forward, the first being the one which the jury adopted in their verdict :–
| (1) |
A sudden escape of a large quantity of gas, set free by a fall of stone from a trouble which crosses No. 6 way, in the west workings the fall extending for some distance along the main intake on each side of the point where the trouble crosses it.
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This point, at the time of the explosion, a set of 50 tubs was being drawn in by the hauling engine near the foot of the west shaft, by means of a double rope, the hauling rope being fastened to the innermost tub and passing round a pulley at the landing some distance further along the No. 6 way, and the tail rope, by which the set of tubs when filled would be drawn out, being fastened to the outermost tub. The tail rope consequently at that time was being drawn in after the 'set.' Six men were riding in the tubs, and a naked light was being carried by one of the men. The fall of stone completely covered the last 12 tubs, and four of the men who were riding in them at the time. The other two men were found a short way further in than the fall. All the six bodies were badly burned, and the doctor reported that death in each case was caused by burning. The tail rope of the set was found broken off close to the set of tubs, one of the links of the coupling chains being forced open while the hauling rope was unbroken. The drum on the hauling engine by which the tail rope was worked was also broken. The suggestion put forward by the owners was that, as the set of tubs was being drawn in, by some accident either one of the timbers was knocked out of its position, or something happened to disturb the supports at the point where the trouble crossed the rolley way, and by that means the fall took place setting free a large quantity of gas, which would be ignited by the naked light carried by one of the men. Against this explanation there are the two facts of the state of the hauling gear, and the condition of the bodies which were found burned and charred, although covered by an enormous mass of stone and refuse which, according to this explanation must have fallen at least simultaneously with, if not before, the escape of gas, and consequently before the explosion took place. These two facts, independently of the indications of the direction taken by the explosion, as shown by the position in which the timber and other articles were found, which were very conflicting, appear to point rather to an explosion coming into No. 6 way from the direction of the Alma Bank, striking the rear of the set of tubs and so breaking the coupling chain of the tail rope and the drum of the engine to which it was attached, and causing the damage to the timber, which would account for the fall, and at the same time be consistent with the condition in which the bodies were found.
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| (2) |
A shot fired at a point in the main intake of the Sunderland Bridge way about 60 yards short of the turning to the Shieldfield way. At this point there was a stenton leading from the main intake or rolley way into the return, and in this stenton there were double doors. It was intended to enlarge the door ways, and for that purpose on the night of the explosion two men were employed to drill and fire a shot in the stone in the roof of the stenton. Michael Rivers, the master shifter, who had examined the district in question shortly before the explosion, on his way out of the shaft passed the men who were then preparing the hole for the shot. The explosion occurred about half an hour after he had passed the place, but he was unable to say whether that time would have elapsed before the two men could have been ready to light the fuse. At all events it was clear, from subsequent examination of the locality, that the shot was fired, and that Rivers did not himself hear the shot, and the fact that the bodies of the two men were found at about the distances at which they would be had they removed from the drill hole after setting fire to the fuze, strongly points to the conclusion that the firing of the shot and the explosion were simultaneous. The difficulty in the way of this explanation of the origin of the explosion is to account for the presence at this point of a sufficient quantity of explosive gas. The point were the shot was fired was only three or four yards off the main intake along which a current of fresh air from the shaft estimated at 23,898 cubic feet per minute, was or should have been passing. The point itself is only some 500 yards from the shaft, and it is difficult to see how such an accumulation could have taken place.
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It was suggested by Mr. Bowey on behalf of the men that there might have been an accumulation of gas between the two doors in the stenton, and that the firing of the shot, which was pointed outwards from the doorway towards the intake, would have had the effect of drawing and igniting the gas from this position, and so causing the explosion. It is, however, difficult to see how any considerable quantity of gas could remain in such a place, as from the position of the stenton there must have been a strong "drawing" of air past the point of the shot from the intake to the return passage.
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| (3) |
A large accumulation of gas from the goaf at the western end of the Alma Bank, forcing its way down to a lantern at the caution board by the landing on the Alma Bank. It was admitted that a considerable quantity of gas would naturally be given off by the goaves, which, as will be seen from the plan, cover a large extent at this point, but that if the ventilation was in good order any ordinary amount of gas so given off would be taken along the return air course to the shaft, and so cause no danger. The ventilation, however, of this part of the workings depended on the single doors already mentioned between the main intake and the return near the turning into No. 6 way, and had any accident, such as a fall for instance, taken place so as to injure either of these two doors, the current of air necessary to carry off the gas would in all probability have been diverted, and there would be nothing to prevent the gas from making its way down the Alma Bank in the direction of the caution board, where during the day shifts an open lantern was placed. The position of only one of the two single doors is indicated on the plan, and The existence of the other was only discovered in the cross-examination of one of the witnesses. It was the duty of the night-shift deputy to extinguish this lamp, after the men under his charge in this part of the working had passed out by the caution board, on their way to the shaft, and it was stated by Ralph White, the deputy in question, that he had blown out the lamp on the night of the explosion a few minutes before 12 p.m. In this he was corroborated by one of the men, Connor Foster, who was the last to pass out, but whose evidence did not altogether agree with that of the deputy. Foster stated that he saw White blow out the lamp, while White stated that he blew it out while Foster was on the other side of the door, through which he (White) had just passed. The evidence on this point rested solely on the statements of the two men White and Foster, and was not, in my opinion, altogether satisfactory.
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11. So far as the indications on the timbers and supports in the mine, of the direction which was taken by the explosion, can be relied upon, they appeared to be equally consistent with the theories No. (i.) and No. (iii.), so that not much light was thrown on the solution of the question by their consideration, but in each of the suppositions there were strongly conflicting indications, so as fully to bear out the opinion, in which the scientific witnesses concurred, that in the absence of other evidence these indications could not with any degree of confidence be relied upon. These conflicting indications may possibly be accounted for in some instances as the results of the original explosion travelling from its starting point, and of a back wave from some part of the mine into which the force of the explosion had penetrated without finding a possible exit. This explanation, however, does not account for the contradictory appearances in all cases, and so little is known of the nature or of the progress of the force which is produced by an explosion, that they must remain for the present at least a mystery.
12. The unequal effect of the explosion in different parts of its course is shown in a somewhat remarkable degree in the present case, for supposing the origin to have been, as found by the jury, the six men Nos. 33, 36, 37, 19, 31, and 32, who were at the very point of ignition, were charred and burnt so as in some cases to be unrecognizable, as would naturally expected except from the fact that the bodies were found under a great mass of débris ; another, No. 4, about 250 yards from the spot, but at a place over which the full force of the explosion must have passed, was not burnt at all ; while others such as Nos. 25, 24, 23, and 22, at a distance of at least 2,500 yards from the fall, were badly burnt and charred. The same inequalities are apparent in a greater or lesser degree whatever point is fixed upon as the origin, so that the same remark applies to any inference that might be drawn from these effects of the explosion, as has already been made with reference to the indications of direction. It has been suggested that the force gathers strength and destructive power as it proceeds, either from gas drawn from the coal or goaves, or from the accumulations of coal dust which are found in greater or lesser quantities in every coal mine, but this explanation is given to account for effects otherwise inexplicable, rather than as the result of scientific observation.
13. It is important to see what practical result has been obtained from the exhaustive inquiry into the causes of the explosion, and for this object it is unfortunate that the investigation has led to no more definite conclusion as to the origin of the destructive force. If, however, the view of the owners, that the originating point was at the fall in No. 6 way, is the correct one the fatal disaster will naturally raise the important question whether even in a mine like Tudhoe, not reputed to be a dangerous mine, naked lights should be allowed at all in the workings. This would also apply to the theory that the point of ignition was at the lantern at the Alma Bank. If the other view is the true one the urgent necessity will be apparent for more stringent rules prohibiting the firing of shots while any large number of men are in the mine.
14. As the result of the inquiry, which was in my opinion was conducted, both on the part of the owners and on behalf of the men, in a thorough and satisfactory manner, with every desire to make it exhaustive, and to arrive at the true solutions of the questions under consideration, I think it right to submit the following conclusions as justified by the evidence :–
| (1) |
The mine was generally well and carefully managed, with every desire to provide liberally for the safety of the men employed.
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| (2) |
The general system of ventilation was good and effective, with the exception of the two points already referred to, (1) the too great reliance placed on single doors for the ventilation of any part of the mine ; (2) the length of the goaf face along which the air current had to pass in the Coldstream way before reaching the last working place in that district.
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| (3) |
More care should be taken to insure a thorough knowledge and understanding on the part of the overmen and deputies of the rules applicable to their respective duties, especially with reference to the reports of gas wherever found, and however small the quantities may be.
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Arnold Morley.
1 July 1882.
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