Tweet

6. There is no evidence that, down to the moment of the explosion, there was any ground for apprehending danger. All parts of the mine had been inspected in the ordinary course and reported safe. No part had been subject to any observed disturbance, nor was there any reported issue of gas. There was nothing unusual in the recorded condition of the barometer, thermometer, or water gauge. The ventilation was in full operation. No alarm was given by any of the 231 persons who were underground. The following are the latest records, taken at 1 a.m. on the morning of the explosion, or about an hour and a half before it occurred :—

Barometer, underground	31.10.
Thermometer	66°
Water gauge	2.1.

The barometer appears to have stood (underground) at 31.35 at 4 a.m. on the day preceding the explosion, to have fallen to 31.07 at 4 p.m. on the same day, and to have risen again to 31.7 by 9 p.m., and further to 31.10 as above stated an hour and a half before the explosion.

The book containing the records of the water-gauge in the downcast appears to have been destroyed by the explosion.

7. After the explosion the downcast shaft was found to be in a wrecked condition, and the explorers who descended by the upcast and by an auxiliary underground staple or shaft called the Main Coal Staple, which connects the Main Coal seam with the Hutton seam, found nearly every part of the mine in each direction for a long distance from the shaft bottoms greatly shattered, damaged, and blocked by falls. The ruin extended far into the main intakes of the three districts which radiate from the downcast, — the Maudlin to the north-east, the No. 1 Hutton to the south, and the No. 3 Hutton to the west. It had not extended to the more remote workings in either district. There is reason to believe that some of the persons in the distant workings in No. 1 Hutton lived for some time, it is known that several of those in the Maudlin survived for many hours, and four persons escaped from the workings in No. 3 Hutton.

8. All the witnesses agreed and the evidence conclusively proved that the explosion did not originate in the distant parts or working faces of No. 1 Hutton to the south, or No. 3 Hutton to the west. The closing of the Maudlin prevents certainty with respect to that district, but all the observations made during its partial exploration, as well as the fact of the survival, for a considerable period, of the persons who were in it at the time of the explosion, lead strongly to a similar conclusion. All the witnesses agreed that the explosion began within about half a mile of the downcast shaft.

9. All the witnesses further agreed and the evidence was very strong to show that the explosion occurred m one or other of the main intake galleries near the shafts, and not in any of the return airways. The stoppings, doors, and crossings were blown from the intakes and not from the returns, which were little damaged except at the places where they were so blown in. This fact is of great importance as at once excluding the supposition that the explosion was caused by the fouled air of the returns igniting at the ventilating furnaces. At the same time it constitutes the great difficulty of the case. Had the explosion begun in the returns in which the air is fouled by all the gas liberated at the working faces or imperceptibly exuding from the goafs, broken work, and newer galleries throughout the mine, or even if it had begun in the more distant parts of the intakes nearer to the goafs and working faces, there might have been no difficulty in accounting for a more or less inflammable or explosive condition of the air. But it is very difficult to account for the presence of gas in sufficient quantity in these main intakes near the shafts, — spacious and ancient galleries with hard and firm roofs, swept by strong currents of clean air fresh from the downcast, and having no communication with the returns except by strong and well constructed double or treble separation doors, the most important of which were kept locked, and the leakage through which pulled strongly into and not from the returns, and which no one could have any motive for fixing open, or could in this part of the mine have fixed open without being at once observed.

10. Before discussing the different theories with respect to the exact place of origin of the explosion, it will be convenient to describe shortly the general nature of the indications observed in the area of principal disturbance. On referring to the sketch plan III., or to the detailed plan appended to this report, it will be seen that from the downcast shaft one intake or arm radiates due south into No. 1 Hutton district, another nearly due west into No. 3 Hutton district, and a third in a north-easterly direction into the Maudlin district. The manner in which these three arms are connected with their common centre, the downcast shaft, is important to be noticed, and may be understood from the sketch III.

11. At what may be called the very centre of disturbance, namely, at Brown's shot "B," and thence for about 80 yards along the curve to its junction with the Maudlin travelling way, there was hardly any damage or disturbance. There were two other singular exceptions from damage, namely, the middle portions of the two travelling ways shown in the sketch and leading into the Maudlin and No. 1 Hutton respectively, parallel with the respective engine planes. The whole of the rest of the intakes shown in the sketch was greatly damaged and disturbed, and the violence appears to have extended in each of them for some distance beyond the area shown in the sketch.

As has happened in other cases, the effects of the explosion were apparently extremely capricious, and the indications of direction frequently uncertain or even contradictory. This was the ease in the No. 1 intake. There were many evidences of violence directed inwards from the downcast into this intake; and many others of violence directed outwards from the intake towards the downcast. It appears to be useless to enumerate these indications, upon the significance of which the witnesses were sharply divided. All the witnesses called on behalf of the proprietors, including Mr. Stratton, Mr. Lindsay Wood, Mr. R. Forster, and Mr. Baker Foster, were of opinion that the result of the indications was that the force had originated about the point "C," where Ramshaw's body and the pieces of his lamp were found, and had thence blown partly inwards and southwards into the farther No. 1 workings, but mainly outwards past the downcast, and so into the other districts, the Maudlin and No. 3 Hutton. These witnesses, however, spoke with very different degrees of confidence, ranging from absolute certainty as expressed by Mr. W. Armstrong (who, however, had not examined the colliery until five weeks after the explosion, when many of the lighter indications had been removed), to a slight balance of opinion as expressed by Mr. R. Forster, and by Mr. Stratton in his cautious and valuable evidence of the result of explorations continuously carried on by him from the morning of the explosion. On the other hand, the Inspectors, Mr. Bell and Mr. Willis, and their assistant, Mr. Atkinson, all of whom had from the first assisted in the explorations, and had made themselves masters of every detail, expressed a decided though not entirely confident preference for the view that the explosion did not come out of or originate in the No. 1 intake, but passed into it from the direction of the downcast. They explained the conflicting indications as being the effects of the reverse blast which generally or often follows an explosion, and which may in sonic cases be the effect of the air which the blast has driven before it, and compressed into confined workings, expanding again to fill the space exhausted of air by the combustion which constitutes or accompanies the explosion. Conversely, the witnesses for the proprietors pointed out that the indications opposed to their own view might be explained by the action of fresh air rushing in from the downcast to supply the same exhausted space. The witnesses called on behalf of the miners (Mr. Forman should be particularly mentioned) and also two of the back overmen of the No. 1 Hutton, were strongly of the opinion that the view of the Inspectors was correct, and that the explosion had not come out of but had gone into the No. 1 Hutton. It is to be particularly observed that a similar and perhaps even greater complication and opposition of indications occur in the No. 3 Hutton intake, in which all agree that the explosion did not originate, and that a similar complication and opposition occurred also in the Maudlin intake. In each of the intakes it is remarkable that the apparent centre of contradictory indications was at a distance of about 400 yards from the spot hereafter mentioned as the locality of Brown's shot from which the three intakes may be said to radiate like arms of a star fish. This observation does not make against the negative view of the Inspectors and miners, but it does to some extent make against the view of the proprietors by showing that the indications on which they rely to establish a theory exists in other cases in which that theory is agreed to be inapplicable.

One apparently strong argument against the view adopted by the Inspectors and by the miners deserves mention. On turning to sketch III. and following the No. 1 Hutton intake from the downcast southwards, it will be seen that at some distance (about 400 yards) south from the downcast shaft a separate travelling way branches off from the main road or engine plane, and rejoins it again below (about 1,000 yards further south). If the blast came from the northward into No. 1 Hutton intake, as the Inspectors and the miners suggest, it might have been expected that the blast would divide itself and pass with equal or nearly equal force southward along the travelling way as well as the engine plane. But, in fact, the blast appears not to have gone through the travelling way at all, but only to have entered it for a short distance from both ends, which is just what was to be expected on the opposite theory that the explosion commenced in the engine plane about the point "C." Too much weight must not, however, be attached to this circumstance. The apparently capricious and uncertain action of explosions in mines has already been noticed. Further, this travelling way appears to have been more wet and less dusty than the engine plane — facts the significance of which will become manifest hereafter. Again, the comparatively tortuous course and sharp turns of the travelling way might offer a momentary resistance to the passage of the blast, so that the main stream of the blast would have time to pass along the engine plane to the southern mouth of the travelling way and turn up into that mouth, in which ease the simultaneous contrary pressures from the northern and southern mouths might balance each other, and might be resisted and stopped by the imprisoned air between the two pressures. Further, the sectional area of the travelling way is very considerably smaller than the sectional area of the engine plane (in the proportion of about 52 to 88 on the average and 44 to 58 at the smallest sections), and it appears to be not only possible but probable that the blast would prefer the larger gallery as offering the least resistance, and the same result might happen as has been suggested might follow from the crookedness of the travelling way. Lastly, a similar phenomenon, though perhaps less marked, was distinctly observed in the case of the Maudlin travelling way shown in the sketch, and is in that case admitted to be consistent with the blast having passed inwards from the downcast shaft.

And if this difficulty is opposed to the view of the Inspectors and miners a difficulty of at least equal weight is opposed to the contrary view. For about 80 yards in the immediate neighbourhood of Brown's shot ("B" on the sketch) and thence to the curve there was little, if any, perceptible damage or disturbance. Timbers were not displaced, tools leaning against the wall were not even thrown down. This is consistent with a view that the explosion commenced at or near Brown's shot, and thence radiated into all the three intakes, because colliery explosions often exert but little force at the point of their origin. It is hardly consistent with the view of the proprietors. Even the caprice of explosions can hardly explain how a section of 80 yards could escape injury in the main pathway of a blast which (on the proprietors' view) had ruined a mile of gallery on one side of this section, and after passing it ruined in even a greater degree more than half a mile of galleries on the other side of it. No solution of this objection to the proprietor's view has been suggested. On review of all the opinions of the witnesses together with the special difficulties last mentioned, it appears to me that on this part of the case (namely, the inferences to be drawn from the indications of damage) taken by itself there is some preponderance in favour of the view taken by the Inspectors and miners, but perhaps not sufficient to justify a decided conclusion.

12. No witness was found to suggest that the indications pointed to the explosion having originated either in No. 3 Hutton, out of which four persons escaped alive, or in the Maudlin, in which several persons survived for many hours, and which was penetrated and explored for a distance of more than half a mile before it was sealed up. It cannot, indeed, be said to be certain that it may not have originated in one or other of these districts; and when the Maudlin can be again opened it is possible that an altogether new light may be thrown on the matter, but there is at present no reason to anticipate this, and the observed indications, so far as they go, are, in the opinion of all the witnesses, very strongly against any suggestion that the explosion commenced in either of those districts. There remains for consideration the line or section of gallery about 500 yards in length commencing with the curve near the downcast shaft, and passing westward in the direction of No. 3 Hutton, and terminating in the neighbourhood of the main coal staple ("D"). In this section the Inspectors and the miners fixed the place of origin, and the scientific and other witnesses called by the proprietors all agreed that the place of origin was here if it was not in No. 1 Hutton. Shortly stated, the ground of this opinion is that from Brown's shot ("B") eastward the indications of force radiate strongly towards the east and south, and that from about the main coal staple, a little west of Venner's shot ("A"), the indications are strongly into the west or No. 3 Hutton, from which facts it is inferred that the centre of force was somewhere between those two points or at one of them. So far as the mere indications of force are concerned, there were not, in the opinion of the witnesses, any strong grounds, with one exception, for preferring either of the two ends of this section to the other. The exception Is the circumstance that there was little or no disturbance in the immediate neighbourhood of Brown's shot ("B"), a circumstance which, as has been stated, is consistent with the theory that the explosion began there, whereas if the force began at or about the point A it is very difficult to explain how this one length of about 80 yards in the main path of the blast escaped the ruin which was caused by the blast both before reaching it and after passing it.