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NARRATIVE OF THE DISASTER.

Of 619 persons who descended the mine on the morning of the 27th November, 88 entered the Ten Quarters Seam, including two Deputies, since, as already mentioned, the workings in this seam were divided into two districts. Those workings on the right of the four main self-acting inclines were in charge of James Johnstone, who descended the pit about 5.30 a.m., the inspection before the commencement of work in the day shift having already been made by the night shift Deputy. Johnstone also had some three places on the left side of the incline, but the remaining places on this side were under the charge of a second Deputy.

All seems to have gone well until about noon, when a stoneman named Farish. who with three other workmen was making ready for putting up a wooden door on the top of No. 4 Brake, heard the sound of an explosion coming from the direction of Dixon's Gateway in Ditchburn's Level. The report appeared to him as something like a shot, but when he saw reek and "stume" (dust) advancing he concluded that something extraordinary had occurred. The explosion had put out his flame safety lamp but the party had an electric lamp which continued to burn, and so they went down the incline and there met the Overman, Fell. This official was at No. 3 Brake top at the time of the explosion and experienced a gush of wind and dust. After taking some panic-stricken boys down to the bottom of No. 3 Brake, and getting some canvas doors open to clear the brake of dust, Fell proceeded to the top of No. 4 Brake and came across Robert Nicholson and George Davidson, junior, who had come out of Ditchburn's Level seriously injured.

He placed them in the the charge of two other workers named Edwards and Thompson, and then, after failing in an attempt to get into the affected area by Ditchburn's Level where the air was too foul, he retraced his steps down No. 4 Brake and entered by the level below, having by this time secured the assistance of William McMaster, a coal hewer, and another worker named Thwaites. Together they proceeded into Davidson's place from the intake side and found another victim in the person of Johnstone the Deputy. Johnstone was placed in fresh air under the charge of McMaster and Thwaites, while Fell went for further assistance. He succeeded in organising two other parties, each of four persons, one party entering by Wilkinson's Level and the other by Ditchburn's Level (in which the air had become clearer) whereupon the bodies of the three remaining victims, J. Davidson, T. G. Featherstone and G. Davidson, senior, were recovered. Plan No. 2 shows the positions in which these bodies were found. The three workers previously rescued alive unhappily succumbed later to their injuries.

ORIGIN OF THE EXPLOSION.

The six flame safety lamps in the possession of the six victims at the time of the explosion and subsequently recovered were of the Prestwich Patent Protector type, a type approved for the purposes of Section 33 of the Act, and they were forwarded to the Mines Department Experimental Station, Eskmeals, for examination. Dr. Wheelers report on their condition will be found in Appendix II. It will be seen that five were in good order, but that the outer gauze of the sixth lamp (No. 429, which belonged to G. Davidson) was defective at the rim of the crown, owing to several of the strands of wire having parted at the fold. The inner gauze however, was sound, and, despite the defect referred to, the lamp when tested in currents of an explosive mixture of petroleum ether and air of 1,200 feet per minute withstood the test. in these circumstances the safety lamps can he eliminated as a possible cause of the disaster.

No matches or cigarettes were found. There were no indications of fire due to spontaneous combustion. No electrical power was in use in the affected area. There was a consensus of opinion that the explosion originated in blasting operations in Dixon's road.

The evidence given at the inquest and Inquiry clearly shewed that the point of origin was in the top brushing of Dixon's road about 3 feet from the coal face. This road was level and fully 8 feet high when brushed. The top brushing consisted of shale 3½ feet thick, while the bottom brushing was a coarse coal 2 feet thick; and it was clearly shown that three shots of Tees Powder (a "Permitted" explosive) — two in the top brushing and one in the bottom brushing — had been fired on the morning of the explosion.

When working operations commenced in Dixon's road that morning, the bottom (coal) brushing was about 14 feet from the coal face, and the top (shale) brushing about 12 feet from the same point. Soon after the start of work, a horizontal shothole (which will be referred to as No. 1) was drilled in the top brushing at a time when 2 per cent, of firedamp was known to be present. This percentage was found at 4.30 am. by the Night Deputy and was recorded in his report made prior to the entry of the day shift. It was still there when the Overman, R. Fell, visited the place about 7 a.m., and he then and there told the miner Nicholson that he would not get the shot fired. Shortly after this visit, the Overman saw the Deputy, Johnstone, and told him that there was a hit of gas in Nicholson's brushing, and that he was not to fire the shot until the gas was removed he also suggested that in order to clear the gas Johnstone should either move forward the hurdle screen already up or else put up another one. Whether this suggestion was carried out or not there is 110 evidence to show. But it is definitely known that the shot was fired about 9.15 a.m., for a labourer named Holywell, while on his way to another part of the pit, heard the report of a shot, and saw that it had been fired in the top brushing, and that there was a brattice up close to the brushing face. Subsequent examination by several witnesses showed that this hole had been drilled along the roof in an oblique direction pointing to the heft side of the "caunch," and that when fired it left some overhanging stone on the right.

The sequence of events in Dixon's road following the firing of shot No. 1 could only be deduced from inspection of the place after the disaster, because the workmen and deputy were all victims of the explosion.

Another shot (which I will refer to as No. 2) had been fired in the bottom brushing. It had been drilled to a depth of 4 feet 6 ins, in coal 2 feet thick, and had done its work well, just loosening the coal, which was afterwards filled away so that the shot could be examined.

The overhanging stone left by No. 1 shot was undoubtedly partly displaced by a further shot (which, for convenience of reference, I name No. 3), for there w as evidence of a hole having been drilled up vertically a distance of 2 feet 9 ins., or as far as the usual ripping height. Judging from the amount of small material on the floor it was estimated that about 2 feet of side was blown off by this shot, and, although the amount of explosive used is unknown, the hole was evidently overcharged for the work it had to do. The remains of clay in this and other holes showed that surface clay had been duly used for stemming.

What interval of time elapsed between the firing of Nos. 2 and 3 shots will never be definitely known, but the last shot was evidently fired about noon, for it was at that hour that the explosion occurred. The position in which the firing battery was found, and the manner in which the firing cable was stretched out along the coal face between Davidson's and Dixon's roads, together with the position of the deputy and shot-firer, Johnstone, close to the battery. proved conclusively that the explosion was caused by the firing of a shot in firedamp in Dixon's roadhead. In my opinion, that shot was No. 3, viz., the shot in the vertical hole previously described, which, as I have said, had been overcharged for the work it had to do.

It is necessary to consider at this stage what were the probable conditions in Dixon's place as regards ventilation, firedamp and coal dust.

Plan No. 2 shows that on the 27th November Dixon's road and Davidson's road (the latter having branched off the former) were practically parallel with one another, there being 10 yards of pack wall and waste between them. The ventilating current entered Davidson's road from the lower side, passed up the coal face as far as Dixon's roadhead, and then divided into two; one part passed up to the rise side while the other travelled out along Dixon's road and thence up a split, the two parts reuniting in a parallel air course formed along the upper rib side. This coursing of the air was attained by airdoors in both Davidson's and Dixon's roads.

In Dixon' s road, at a point about 5 yards from the coal face, a "breaker" existed on the low side, and a hurdle screen had been erected prior to the entry of the day shift men to convey a current of air into the brushing and past the entrance to the "breaker." This breaker really formed a cavity at Dixon's roadside 1 ft. 5 in. high, level with the top of the timber supports, and it extended over the pack wall down into Davidson's road, where it formed a fairly open cavity fully 3 ft. high above the timber (vide Plan No. 3).

There was no evidence to show that the normal current of air available for ventilating all parts of the affected area was in any way interfered with before the explosion occurred. And as regards the hurdle screen referred to, it is not known whether the Deputy Johnstone carried out the instructions of the Overman either to move it forward or to put up an additional one. The only evidence available on this point was that of Holywell, who stated that at 10 a.m. there was a "brattice at the forehead" close to the "bink" after No. 1 shot was fired. What the position of that screen or brattice was two hours later could not be stated, but whatever its position at the fatal moment of firing the last shot, it is evident that there was present in the top brushing and in the vicinity an accumulation of firedamp sufficient to account for the explosion

The explosion was local in its effects. It was practically confined to Dixon's and Davidson's roads, including the coal face, although signs of force were discovered in the displacement of timber part of the way along the level leading to these places, or a distance of about 100 yards from the point of origin.

Within 50 yards of the same point there were indications of coked coal dust on some of the timbers in Dixon's road, also at the coal face and on a bar near Davidson's roadhead, but these indications were of so very slight a character as to warrant the conclusion that coal dust played practically no part in the explosion.