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Jury's Recommendations. — This brings me to the recommendations of the Jury given on page 4 of this report, and I will deal with them in the order set out in the findings (a) "We think the term "wet throughout" should be further defined." I am of opinion that, as the present Regulations stipulate that under water treatment there must be at least 30 per cent. by weight of water in intimate mixture, by inference, a mine is not wet throughout if such an intimate mixture does not exist.

I have already pointed out that, under the Regulations, a belief that a mine is "naturally wet throughout" does not relieve a manager of the obligation to verify that belief by making the prescribed tests, though the exemption of such mines from the provisions of Regulation 4 has no doubt caused an excusable confusion in the minds of managers. I therefore recommend that this exemption should be specifically revoked. If this were done, a specific obligation would be placed upon the management of every mine, however wet, to comply with Regulation 4, that is to say, to make representative tests monthly and post the results at the pithead. If, and so long as, the results showed a moisture content throughout the mine in excess of 30 per cent., no watering or stone dusting would have to be carried out.

This does not seem to me at all an onerous requirement; indeed, there is already a corresponding obligation under the Regulations in the case of mines the dust of which may contain naturally a high percentage of incombustible matter in excess of 50 per cent. Such mines are not exempt from the Regulations, and the management has therefore to comply with Regulation 4 however safe the roads may appear to be. The management of "wet" mines should be placed under the same obligation.

As in the course of the Inquiry considerable doubt was expressed whether 30 per cent. by weight of water in intimate mixture was sufficient to render the dust innocuous in such circumstances as are present at the Haig Colliery, I recommend that this point be referred to the Safety in Mines Research Board for advice.

(b) "Safety Lamps: from the evidence given we do not feel ourselves justified in making a recommendation." In the Haig Colliery all the workers were supplied with electric lamps, which do not indicate the presence of firedamp. The only lamps (known as flame safety lamps) which indicate firedamp were those supplied to the officials. On the morning of the disaster there were only two of these lamps in the affected workings and these were in the possession of the deputy and shot-firer respectively. Such lamps are required to be issued to such officials to enable them to make their statutory examinations. Certain questions put to witnesses by Mr. Herbert Smith suggested that, since by the Regulations of the Mine workmen engaged at the coal face are required to examine their working places and to withdraw in the event of gas being discovered by them, it was desirable, and even obligatory, that there should be a flame safety lamp in addition to the electric light in each working place. The question of installing flame safety lamps in places where electric lamps are in use has been the subject of much controversy among mining men. It has not been lost sight of by the Mines Department, and, by way of finding a solution, the problem was some time ago referred to the Miners' Lamps Committee, who have taken much evidence on the point and will shortly issue their report. As I understand that this report will make certain recommendations, and as I myself gave evidence before the Committee, I refrain from making any further observations at this stage.

(c) "Ventilation: Satisfactory according to the evidence given." The mine was equipped with efficient ventilating apparatus, and if the air-current was properly conducted into the working places — and there was no definite evidence to show that. the ventilation was inadequate when the miners started to work on the morning of the explosion--the ventilation could not be classed as normally inadequate. I do consider, however, that in workings making " gas where it is necessary to use brattice cloth (as in the Haig Colliery) or air pipes to carry the air current to the working faces, such cloth or air pipes should be kept closer to the face than 6 or 7 yards, which was said to be the distance between the end of the brattice cloth and the coal face in Moore's place when inspected by Deputy William Thompson between 5 and 7 on the evening of the 4th September. It was probably the case that the air circulating proved to be inadequate when the explosion actually occurred, but as abnormal conditions were apparently set up by a sudden outburst of gas, no charge could he sustained in respect of inadequate ventilation.

(d) "Deputies: We think that there should be a spare deputy on each shift, that no deputy should be allowed to work overtime, and that there should be greater inducements to men to take deputies' positions." This question arose at the inquest, when it was discovered that, at the time of the explosion, the deputy, Weightman, had been on duty twelve hours, and that he and another deputy named Thompson had been working twelve-hour shifts since the 24th August, the date on which the third deputy, T. K. Beck, went on holiday. The Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908, as amended by the Coal Mines Act, 1919, fixes the hours of a deputy at eight, though it is permissible to allow him to remain below ground for a longer period for the purpose of rendering assistance in the event of accident or for meeting any danger or apprehended danger, or for dealing with any emergency or work uncompleted through unforeseen circumstances which requires to be dealt with without interruption in order to avoid serious interference with ordinary work in the mine.

It seems that Mr. Beck gave the Manager notice of his intention only on the day before he went away on holiday, and although there was another man in the pit who had a Deputy's Certificate, the Manager "thought it was safer to overlap" — meaning that two regular deputies should do the work between them — "that the men who knew the district would take more precaution or more care, than making another shot-firer or deputy who had no previous experience so far as I was aware." It appears that it had not hitherto been the practice for a deputy to be absent so long on holiday, but it seems to me that, since deputies, like other people, fall ill sometimes, it was the duty of the Manager to do what is invariably done in well regulated pits; that is, to have a spare deputy or two — ordinarily employed on other work — who might be called upon to take duty as soon as possible in case of necessity. I therefore endorse the Jury's recommendation on this point, subject of course to the proviso that there may be unforeseen cases — accidents for instance — when it would be excusable, and even the duty of the deputy, to render what assistance he could, and in doing so he would not violate the stipulation of the Act.

As regards the latter part of the recommendation, that there should be greater inducements to men to take deputies' positions, if this refers to the wages paid as it evidently does, I think that it will be generally agreed that, as the position of a deputy carries a good deal of responsibility, his pay should certainly be commensurate with that responsibility.

Before leaving this subject, I would add that, in my view, a twelve-hours' shift is too long for a deputy to work underground over a period of consecutive working days, and since the deputy, Weightman, had been on duty close on twelve hours, I question whether he was still really fit to carry out the important duties assigned to him.

(e) "Searching: We recommend that a more careful method of searching be adopted." The men were searched in the pit bottom by searchers appointed for the purpose on every shift. These searchers were the three onsetters, one for each shift, but, as already recorded, notwithstanding this search a match was found in a man's pocket and a cigarette in the coat of another worker after the explosion. There was no suggestion whatever that the match and cigarette had anything to do with the disaster, or that the men concerned intentionally took these articles into the mine.

On the morning of the disaster 32 persons descended the shaft and were searched by the onsetter. As only a quarter of an hour was taken to lower these men, and as the onsetter had also to attend to the shaft signals, it is not unlikely that the search was more hurriedly made than was consistent with thoroughness.

Section 35 (2) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, requires every person, "or such of them as may be selected on a system approved by the Inspector of the Division, to he searched in the prescribed manner after or immediately before entering the mine" As no system of selection had been approved by the Inspector of the Division, every man required to be searched. It was said that every man was searched, but the finding of a match and a cigarette in clothing afterwards certainly suggests that the search was not satisfactorily performed.

No doubt a proper search can be made underground if sufficient time and assistance is allowed, but personally, I am much in favour of its being done on the surface immediately before persons enter the shaft cage. Some managers, also, prefer this system and adopt it.

The moral to be drawn from this finding of smoking material is that, whatever system of search is adopted, it should be carefully done and not carried out in a hurried or perfunctory manner.

(f) Explosives: "We recommend that as far as the Haig Pit is concerned no explosives be used in procuring coal." As has already been stated this point had already been dealt with by the Owners.