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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

7th February 1942, Page: 225, Column: 1

Colliery Explosions

Reports of Official Inquiries

At Crigglestone Colliery, Yorkshire, an explosion occurred at 7-20 p.m. on 29th July, 1941, whereby 22 persons lost their lives and three others were injured. The inquest occupied seven full days and was conducted by Coroner C. J. Haworth, sitting without a jury; it was searching and exhaustive. The Mines Department has issued a report (Cmd. 6327) on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion, written by H. J. Humphrys, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines, and published by H.M. Stationery Office (price 6d. net). Extracts are appended.

Description of Crigglestone Colliery.

The colliery is situated 3½ miles to the south-west of Wakefield, and the seams worked are the Top and Bottom Haigh Moor. The explosion occurred in No. 1 West District, Top Haigh Moor seam, which is there 256 yards deep. The Bottom Haigh Moor seam, about 11 yards below, has not been worked anywhere near. The No. 1 West District was opened out by taking forward a narrow bord face from which end faces were developed to the right and left. The coal was first produced from these two faces on 29th April, 1941, and they were 100 and 110 yards long respectively at the time of the explosion. The seam in the district is nearly flat. It is 3 feet thick with a blue bind roof in which are bands of ironstone, and it was undercut in a 4-inch band of dirt. Over the seam is a 4-inch dirt band which generally comes down with the coal.

The district was fully mechanised and electricity was used for coal-cutting, drilling, face conveyors, gate conveyors, haulage, a loader, and signalling. Direct current at 500 volts was used for haulage and alternating current at 400 volts for the remainder of the electrical plant. On the day shift coal was loaded. On the afternoon shift the face conveyors were dismantled, the seam undercut to a depth of 5 feet 6 inches, shotholes were bored 7 feet to 9 feet apart in the coal and as required in the various gate ripping lips, the ripping shots were fired and the packs built. On the night shift shots were fired in the coal, the face conveyors were reassembled and the gate conveyors moved forward. There were two deputies in No. 1 West District on the day shift, one deputy and one shot-firer on the afternoon shift, and one deputy and two shot-firers on the night shift.

The quantity of air passing into the district on 30th June, 1941, was 10,600 cubic feet per minute, of which 6,450 cubic feet per minute reached the south conveyor face. It is well known that the quantity of air circulating in a district, and consequently the percentage of firedamp in the air-current, varies considerably during the 24 hours, especially in mechanised districts in thin seams. These fluctuations result from the different kinds of work performed during the cycle and are independent of leakages at doors due to deficiencies or to their being left open. Subsequent to the explosion 7,129 cubic feet per minute were measured at the entrance to the district, of which only 3,958 cubic feet per minute reached the south conveyor face, although in the meantime a brick wall with door inset had been built to prevent direct leakage between intake and return and a door erected in the west main gate.

The explosion occurred during the sixth hour of the afternoon shift, and it was confined to the one district, in which there were 25 persons at the time. The four rippers in the north loader gate had completed the gate side packs and had only to erect another steel arch to finish their task for the shift. The deputy and the shot-firer were with them. The four rippers in the south timber gate had nearly finished their gate side packs, whilst the five rippers in the south loader gate, having completed their ripping and packing, were in the act of erecting a girder at the gate end. These latter were all found in a heap under the girder, and it is significant that they were struck down where they were working while all other men in the district appear to have had some little warning and were a few yards away from their place of work before being overcome by afterdamp. There were only one or two small falls and no evidence of any great violence, although many of the timber supports had been blown out. Coal dust played no part in the explosion. There was no lack of able and eager volunteers ; the high reputation of the miners' officials, workmen and union officials alike for coolness and courage at such times was fully maintained.

Recommendations of the Coroner.

Mr. C. J. Haworth, the coroner, found, in accordance with the medical evidence, that the men died as the result of extensive burns or injuries and carbon monoxide poisoning following an explosion of firedamp and that they met their death by misadventure. In his summing up he criticised the ventilating arrangements, especially the unventilated fast ends and the leakages. He favoured the split system of ventilation, and thought that there should have been more doors. He mentioned the persistent gas reports by the deputies and the occasions on which the workmen smelt firedamp, and commented that the shot-firers must have considered the steps they took to remove the gas before shots were fired as satisfactory as they were not likely knowingly to risk their own lives. He stated that the evidence as to the supply of firedamp detectors, whether automatic or flame lamp, was exceedingly unsatisfactory, and also criticised deputies who did not report gas because it cleared. He mentioned the view expressed in the evidence of H.M. inspectors, which he saw they held strongly, that shots should not have been fired in or near the rippings on the south side under the conditions prevailing. As to the cause of ignition, he ruled out naked lights and electricity and drew attention to the four theories mentioned in evidence without expressing a definite opinion in favour of one or other.

He made the following further recommendations :—

(1) That the statutory regulations as to the supply of flame lamps or detectors should be rigidly complied with everywhere, particularly where the workings were electrified and intensively worked.

(2) That every man, deputy or other, should carry out the requirements as to reporting impurities in the air.

(3) Leakages should be tightened up, and additional doors provided where necessary.

(4) The system of packing should receive every consideration (especially in view of Dr. Phillips' evidence).

(5) That every explosion, however small — even if no one is hurt — should be treated as a matter of major importance.

(6) Every precaution should be taken by management and men to see that all regulations are enforced.

Cause of Explosion.

In this section of his report Major Humphrys says : The fundamental cause of the explosion was the inability of the ventilation to meet the demands made upon it.

The responsibility upon those working a gassy seam intensively by the extensive use of electricity and shot-firing is a heavy one, and the system of ventilation must be the main consideration in laying out a district. It is not sufficient to adopt the best possible system of ventilation that a given layout permits. Unless the highest standard of ventilation can be maintained, the layout should be ruthlessly scrapped and another substituted. Intensive mining demands intensive ventilation, and it is a matter for consideration whether all layouts in mechanised mines should not be submitted by the manager to ventilation experts.

The system of ventilation adopted in this district was, in the Inspector's view, unsound. The pull of air was away from the south face, and the tendency would be to short-circuit directly into the return. . . . The ventilation could have been split or the working of the north side deferred until the south side was finished. The latter had only a few weeks' life remaining when the explosion occurred. The need for the greatest care was enhanced by the faults bounding the district.

In view of these considerations attention is drawn to the following recommendations of the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines, which were also given prominence in the inquest proceedings : (a) Systematic Sampling of Mine Air. The proposals are summarised on page 489 of the report. (b) Ventilation of Headings and Fast Ends as proposed on page 234 of the report, (c) Prevention of Leakage as outlined in the paragraph on page 228 of the report.

It is suggested that the recommendations as to main airways could with advantage be extended to all airways in districts where mechanised mining is employed. This is the second explosion in Yorkshire last year involving the loss of life in which ventilation of the affected area has depended on a single door.

The Point of Origin. — A close study of the indications and direction of force and other considerations associated with the explosion led Major Humphrys to agree with the general opinion that the explosion originated at or near the inbye end of the south loader gate.

Source of Firedamp. — In his opinion firedamp accumulated in cavities in and between the beds above the seam and was forced into the workings on the south side through roof breaks in the gates and at fault sides as the result of the subsidence of the beds. No timber was withdrawn from the wastes and this would tend to interfere with normal subsidence.

It is not possible to say when this increase in the feeders occurred nor how far the explosive mixture extended. It is possible that the increase occurred only a few minutes before the explosion and the firedamp had not time to reach the north side, or if it occurred earlier that the firedamp was diluted by leakages along the main gate so that the atmosphere was inexplosive on the north side at the moment of ignition. On the other hand, firedamp may have lain near the roof throughout the district . . . bodies in all parts of the district were extensively burnt, and in Dr. Fisher's opinion the nature of the burns gave the impression that tongues of flame spread throughout the district . . .

It may be asked why the men did not smell the firedamp and immediately withdraw. There are two explanations. On the one hand the only men working in the moving air-current at the moment of the explosion were engaged at ripping lips, where the roads were 8 feet or 9 feet high, and the explosive mixture would lie near the roof above their heads. On the other hand, it will be remembered that firedamp had been present at the ripping lips on the south side for some days and the men had smelt it and continued work. Major Humphrys does not think that the quantity of firedamp which contributed to the explosion was so large that it could not have been diluted to a point where it was inexplosive had the amount of air circulating been moderately increased.

Source of Ignition. — There was no evidence of contraband articles.

Examination and tests of the electrical plant, including signalling bells and magneto exploders, revealed no evidence of electrical defects likely to cause open sparking.

Examination of the safety-lamps recovered from the district revealed no defect to which an ignition of firedamp could be attributed. . . .

In the Inspector's opinion firedamp was ignited in a break by a ripping shot fired in the south loader gate some 2½ hours prior to the explosion, and it continued to burn unseen until contact was made by the flame with an explosive mixture. This shot consisted of Plastex (sheathed) and the shothole, which was 4 feet 6 inches long, passed through a break halfway along its length which, with others, could be traced right along the face and was found later to contain 52 per cent. and 60 per cent. of methane. The flame of firedamp ignited in this way can travel a considerable distance and burn for days. In his report on the cause of an explosion at North Gawber (Lidgett) Colliery on 12th September, 1935, the Commissioner, Sir Henry Walker, then H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, mentioned on page 23 that such a flame at Crigglestone Colliery on 4th November, 1930, travelled 67 yards, and he gave an instance at another colliery where flame caused in this way burned for at least 96 hours. In attributing that explosion to a shot fired some time previously, he said that his opinion was not capable of proof but was based on experience and not on speculation. This held good in the present instance.

In conclusion, Major Humphrys desires to endorse the remarks and recommendations of H.M. coroner, and he draws attention also to the need for a better form of break detector than that provided here and elsewhere.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Fisher, —, Dr.      
Haworth, C. J.    Coroner  
Humphrys, Herbert John    H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Phillips, —, Dr.      
Walker, Henry, Sir    ex-H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Crigglestone Colliery  Crigglestone Colliery



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Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Crigglestone
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page
Report Page  Text of the official report into the incident

 

 

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