5th April 1941, Page: 305, Column: 1
Miss-Fired Shots
Extracts from paper presented at the meeting on the 11th March, of the
Manchester Geological and Mining Society,
By H. Stafford, M.Sc, Ph.D.
In recent years miss-fires have become of more importance than they were
formerly. When coal was hand worked it was no great hardship to leave a place
for a time until the miss-fire was recovered, but on a conveyor face such
delays are serious, and in an extreme case a delay because of a miss-fire in a
loader gate ripping may mean the loss of a turnover. The recovery of miss-fire
shots is not entirely without danger, and on occasions miss-fired shots have
been exploded by a drill. Accidents due to charges of explosive sent out in
coal are not unknown.
Miss-fires are of particular importance in simultaneous shot-firing, for in
such circumstances they may pass undetected with consequent risk to persons
employed. Fortunately the proportion of miss-fire shots is steadily decreasing
as is shown by statistics published in the annual reports of H.M. Chief
Inspector of Mines. The proportion of miss-fires by fuse or squib is greater
than when firing by electricity and the electric detonator or fuse is indicated
as being the most reliable method of shot-firing.
The decrease in the rate of miss-fires is no doubt due to improvements in
detonators, to a higher standard of shot-firing, and to better care and
maintenance of exploders and cables. It is probable that the rate will decrease
further.
One object of this paper is to show how improvements might be made. The work
described was done under the general supervision of the Shot-firing
Sub-Committee of the Explosives in Mines Research Committee, and it is
published by consent of the Safety in Mines Research Board.
Tests of Miss-Fired Detonators.
The first series of tests was made on approximately 600 detonators recovered
from miss-fires prior to 1932 and very little was known about them. The
examination consisted of (1) a visual examination, (2) insulation test of
leads, (3) measurement of fusehead resistance, (4) firing test with single shot
exploder, (5) firing test with stronger exploder and (6) a firing test on 200
volt mains. The probable faults in these detonators, however, are classified
having regard to subsequent experience.
The second series of tests was concerned with miss-fires up to the end of 1933.
For this work a tool was designed which enabled the detonators to be dismantled
in safety, and in all subsequent work all detonators which were in the least
respect abnormal were dismantled for examination.
Discussion of and conclusions from the results of tests :—
(1) Many miss-fires are due not to faults in detonators but to badly maintained
exploders and cables. The collieries concerned were advised of this and the
proportion of normal detonators at many of the collieries steadily decreased.
This decrease continued in spite of the introduction during the period of
approved exploders which in many cases were less powerful than the older type.
(2) With regard to those detonators which were normal except for damaged leads
it is probable that these were damaged during recovery of the miss-fire. Leads
broken or stripped during the operation of stemming the shot may cause
miss-fires, but subsequent research on the subject has shown that it is very
difficult indeed to cause miss-fires by deliberate bad stemming.
(3) The faults due to short circuits were not high except for low tension
detonators reported in 1935. They were higher in the case of low tension
detonators than high tension. This may be accounted for when it is realised
that the difference in resistance between a normal and a short circuited
detonator is approximately 1 ohm and the detonator may pass the tests
unnoticed, whereas the difference in the case of a high tension detonator may
be 30,000 ohms. These miss-fires include faults of an intermittent type.
Sometimes the short circuit is caused by a loose bead of solder and the
detonator may have appeared all right on the factory test.
Short circuits in low tension detonators, however, are a serious matter in
connection with simultaneous shot-firing. Such a detonator when connected in
series with a number of others would cause a miss-fire and no precautions which
could be taken in the mine would guard against it. If it is assumed that the
average rate of miss-fires for the whole country is 1 for 10,000 shots, with
low tension detonators, and the percentage of failures due to short circuits is
15 per cent., then the chances of miss-fire from this cause would be 1 for
every 66,666 shots. For this reason the shot-firing sub-committee asked that
detonators supplied for simultaneous shot-firing should be specially
check-tested in the factory in an attempt to pick out any faulty detonators
which might inadvertently have passed the previous test unnoticed.
(4) The most prolific cause of open circuits was broken fuse-head foils and,
largely because of improvements in other respects, the proportion of failures
from this cause showed a marked increase. Detonator manufacturers were aware of
this, and research, which is in continuous progress at the factories, was
devoted to this particular problem. Improvements have resulted in the entire
elimination of broken foils.
(5) The leads broken in the seal and indeed some of the broken foils may have
been caused by the violence of the relieving shots, and the original cause of
failure may have been a weak exploder.
(6) The low tension detonator with a broken circuit is not so serious in
connection with simultaneous shot-firing. Such a fault would be detected in the
circuit test and the faulty detonator could be isolated. If the test were
omitted the whole of the series of shots would miss-fire and there would be no
risk of an undetected miss-fire.
(7) The low tension detonator results show a fairly high proportion of broken
bridge wires. In the light of subsequent information it is unlikely that this
was the cause of all the failures, and many of these should be classified as
match-head faults. It is probable that the initial failures were due to
phlegmatised fuseheads, and continued attempts to fire the detonators resulted
in the fusing of the bridge wires.
(8) High tension detonators with abnormally low resistance can also be
classified with the phlegmatised match-heads. Most of the miss-fires from this
cause were due to either the use of old stocks or bad storage. A fusehead is
said to be phlegmatised when in the case of a low tension detonator the passage
of a normal current in a bridge wire fails to fire the fusehead or causes it to
smoulder or decompose at a temperature below that required to ignite the
explosive composition in the detonator. In the case of a high tension detonator
the fusehead is phlegmatised when the application of a normal P.D. at the poles
of the fuse-head fails to fire it or causes it to smoulder or decompose at a
temperature below that required to ignite the explosive composition in the
detonator. These failures are due to chemical and sometimes physical changes in
the priming composition which may be brought about by contamination with oil or
water, or by storage at high temperature.
Recent Research.
A new series of tests was made commencing at the beginning of 1937. Whereas
miss-fired detonators were previously collected at random thenceforth they were
collected from all the miss-fires at about 30 collieries in Yorkshire and
particulars relating to each miss-fire were, obtained. Miss-fires in the firing
of approximately 2 million shots annually were examined, and this is a fair
sample since the total number of shots fired electrically in the mines of the
United Kingdom is 50 million.
Notes on results of this work :—
(1) There is still a very high proportion of normal detonators which is
difficult to account for, having regard to the improved methods of testing
exploders now employed at the collieries. The names of the shot-firers
concerned are known and it cannot be proved that any one man is more prone to
have miss-fires than other.
(2) A very high proportion of failures is due to short circuits by solder
bridging the foils ; this is particularly true in the case of the low tension
detonators. The proportion is increasing, but that is no doubt due to
improvements in other respects. These results show the desirability of
check-tested low tension detonators for simultaneous shot-firing.
(3) With regard to broken circuits the chief point of interest is failure due
to broken foils. A new type of brass foil was introduced into low tension
detonators about the middle of 1938 and since then there have been no broken
foils. The brass foils were not generally introduced into high tension
detonators until late 1939 and there has been only one broken foil
subsequently.
(4) Phlegmatised fuseheads still account for a large proportion of failures,
but the figure for 1940 is higher than for the previous years because of
difficulties associated with a new method of assembly and these are not likely
to be repeated.
(5) There were no miss-fires duo to faults in the detonating compound.
Improvements in Detonators.
Having regard to the cost and to the amount of work and scientific control
involved in the manufacture of electric detonators, the number of faults was
never high and the position is steadily improving.
One improvement was the development of a non-inflammable seal for detonators
used in safety-lamp mines. The original sealing material was sulphur, but it
was reported from one or two collieries that blue flames characteristic of
burning sulphur had been seen after shot-firing. In order to avoid the risk of
ignitions of gas from this cause, the Home Office asked detonator manufacturers
to consider the replacement of sulphur by some non-inflammable compound. After
much experimental work a fractional grade of chlorinated naphthalene was found
to be very suitable. This was known by the trade name of See Kay wax. It has a
melting point of 130°C. and is non-inflammable. So far as is known this
change had little effect on the incidence of miss-fires.
The next improvement was made in the ignition composition
of the low tension fusehead, and this change is of some importance
in connection with simultaneous shot-firing. Copper acetylide
had been used as the ignition compound for many years and is
in fact still used in high tension electric detonators. It is very
liable to deterioration with age if exposed at any time to damp
and hot storage conditions. For this reason irregularities sometimes
arise in the behaviour of electric detonators tending to
prejudice the series firing characteristics. Copper acetylide has
now been replaced in low tension electric detonator work by the
lead ??? of mononitroresorcinal (L.M.N.R.), This replacement,
together with certain improvements in the bridge wire, has
produced much greater regularity in series firing current with
the consequent lowering of the current required.
At the same time, however, a most important improvement in the incidence of
miss-fires was made by strengthening the fusehead. The original fuseheads
employed thin foils of nickel which were rather brittle, and these were
cemented on to the insulating cardboard, by means of a water soluble glue.
Under the heat of the soldering iron the glue was liable to weaken, allowing
the foil to buckle in places. Again after much research a brass foil rolled to
0.0015 inch in thickness was obtained. Other difficulties associated with the
sticking of this foil to the insulator were encountered. The method now
employed is first to etch the brass with a chemical solution and use a
synthetic resin as the adhesive. The adhesive process is carried out under hot
presses. Brass foils were introduced in low tension detonators in 1938, but
other difficulties had to be overcome before the brass foil was introduced to
high tension detonators in 1939. There has only been one class of failure due
to broken foils since the introduction of the brass foils.
The most recent development in detonators was probably hastened by the war, and
was due to the scarcity of mercury, but it would have taken place in any case.
The explosive composition in the modern detonator is tetryl primed with a
mixture of lead azide and lead styphnate. The detonator is actually stronger
than the one containing fulminate of mercury. A safe form of lead azide is
employed, nevertheless it is important when this compound is used in copper
tubes that the detonator should be entirely waterproof. It was for this reason
that a new seal was developed. The seal now used is a synthetic rubber known as
neoprene (polymerized dichlor-butadiene). This is an excellent substance having
good storage properties ; it is impervious to oil and is of low inflammability.
It is probable that the new detonator will have a favourable influence on the
avoidance of miss-fires. The results of this research show a marked improvement
during the year 1940 ; the new detonator has been in use for about half the
year.
The Avoidance of Miss-Fires.
(1) The most obvious and the most important precaution against miss-fires is
care in the maintenance of exploders. The power of magneto type exploders was
necessarily restricted to ensure that the machines would not fire gas, but
there is ample power for single shot-firing if they are maintained as they can
be in a condition equal to new. The official test for the efficiency of new
exploders is as follows : the low tension exploder must be capable of firing a
normal L.T. fusehead with 15 ohms additional resistance in the circuit. The
high tension exploder must be capable of firing a normal H.T. fusehead with a
shunt resistance of 300 ohms across the terminals of the exploder. This test,
though not required by Regulations, should be applied to all exploders sent out
of the pit for repair and examination, and no exploder should be returned to
the pit which will not pass it.
A routine test of exploders is of greater value if a log is kept. Each exploder
should be numbered and a complete record of every test and repair should be
made. As to magneto exploders, most of these fail because of dirt in the
mechanism and lack of oil. In order to obtain the maximum efficiency the
armatures in these machines must revolve at the rate of 5,000 to 10,000
revolutions per minute, and this is almost impossible if the gearing is dirty
or the bearings dry.
(2) The next important factor is the use of good shot-firing cable. It is
cheaper to use good cables and to renew them frequently than to have
miss-fires.
(3) Storage of detonators is of great importance, and in general detonators
should not be kept in stock for longer than is reasonably necessary and not
more than three months. In this connection numbered detonators were a liability
and the Author is of the opinion that the advantages of using numbered
detonators do not compensate for the length of time some of them were of
necessity kept in the colliery store. In addition to storage at the collieries,
manufacturers were compelled to lay in large stocks of numbered detonators to
satisfy colliery orders. Most of the miss-fires described as being due to
phlegmatised fuseheads are caused by long or bad storage.
Fuseheads are affected by heat and detonators are best kept in cool dry
magazines. Quite recently there were six miss-fires in one day at one colliery.
They were due to phlegmatised fuse-heads. It was subsequently found that one
packet of detonators had been stored on a shelf near a hot water radiator.
There was evidence of heating in that the paraffin wax on the leads appeared to
have been melted. Any detonators contained in bags or boxes having grease spots
should be suspect.
(4) Another important precaution against miss-fires is care in handling the
detonators. The leads should not be folded more than is necessary, and the
practice of unfolding the detonators in the powder store, which is sometimes
employed in order to fit them into a special container, is to be avoided.
When straightening out the leads the shot-firer should not pull on the
detonator but should instead hold the leads near to the detonator. Miss-fires
due to leads broken inside the detonator seal may have been due to rough
handling.
Miss-Fires in Relation to Simultaneous Shot-firing.
The chief disadvantage of simultaneous shot-firing is the risk of an undetected
miss-fire. Faults in detonators such as cause miss-fires of single shots will
also cause miss-fires if a number of detonators are connected in series. The
only serious faults, however, are short circuits inside the detonator and
phlegmatised fuseheads. Any other faults would be detected when the circuit was
tested, or failing that, the whole of the series would miss-fire.
Miss-fires due to short circuits in detonators will be very much reduced by the
provision of specially check-tested detonators, and miss-fires due to
phlegmatised fuseheads can be avoided by the use of none but fresh detonators.
Detonator manufacturers may be asked to date boxes containing check-tested
detonators and add some other distinctive mark.
However, miss-fires may occur when all the detonators are normal. A current of
0.45 ampere is sufficient to fire one detonator, but owing to chemical
inequalities in the ignition composition of fuseheads a current of 1.0 ampere
should flow to ensure the safe firing of six fuseheads in series. Any current
of less than this value might fire the most sensitive fuseheads and break the
circuit, before sufficient head had been generated to fire the least sensitive
fuseheads.
Exploders for simultaneous shot-firing, therefore, must be capable of providing
adequate current, and that current must be available at the instant the
shot-firing circuit is completed. Magneto and dynamo types of machines are
unsuitable as their output usually depends on the rate at which a handle is
turned, and if the handle is turned slowly miss-fires will result.
A dry battery type exploder was designed to do the work. This exploder has been
approved for use in safety-lamp mines. Any factor which might prevent the
current given by the exploder from reaching the detonators will also cause
miss-fires. The use of suitable or defective cable may cause miss-fires. A
cable of high resistance may so limit the flow of current as to cause
miss-fires. For this reason only detonators with copper leads should be used,
for the difference in resistance of iron and copper leads in a six-shot circuit
may be as high as 10 ohms. A failure due to high resistance is guarded against
by making the circuit testing indicator on the exploders to register as an
ohmmeter. If the circuit resistance is too high the indicator registers as if
the circuit was not complete, and no attempt should be made to fire the shots
until the fault is rectified.
A dead short circuit on a cable would prevent any of the shots firing, but a
shunt made by the loose contact of strands of wire may be such as to share the
available current with the detonators, thus causing some only of the shots to
fire. The only safe type of cable, therefore, is two single core cables, and
these might conveniently be laid down either side of the roadway. The use of
two cables also simplifies connections at the face and breaks in single cables
are much more easily detected than in a twin cable.
Exploders for simultaneous shot-firing should be maintained in good condition,
and it is desirable that they should be tested weekly. The principle of the
proposed test is that they should fire 6 detonators through a total resistance
of 20 ohms. A piece of apparatus employing fuseheads has been designed for this
test. Dry batteries are liable to deterioration even when not in use, and no
battery should remain in service after 3 months from the date of manufacture. A
log of the exploder testing should be kept in an appropriate book.
In well conducted simultaneous shot-firing, miss-fires should be few, and an
undetected miss-fire very rare indeed.
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Names mentioned in this article
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| Name | Age | Occupation | Notes |
| Stafford, H. | | | |