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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

5th April 1941, Page: 305, Column: 1

Miss-Fired Shots

Extracts from paper presented at the meeting on the 11th March, of the Manchester Geological and Mining Society,

By H. Stafford, M.Sc, Ph.D.

In recent years miss-fires have become of more importance than they were formerly. When coal was hand worked it was no great hardship to leave a place for a time until the miss-fire was recovered, but on a conveyor face such delays are serious, and in an extreme case a delay because of a miss-fire in a loader gate ripping may mean the loss of a turnover. The recovery of miss-fire shots is not entirely without danger, and on occasions miss-fired shots have been exploded by a drill. Accidents due to charges of explosive sent out in coal are not unknown.

Miss-fires are of particular importance in simultaneous shot-firing, for in such circumstances they may pass undetected with consequent risk to persons employed. Fortunately the proportion of miss-fire shots is steadily decreasing as is shown by statistics published in the annual reports of H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines. The proportion of miss-fires by fuse or squib is greater than when firing by electricity and the electric detonator or fuse is indicated as being the most reliable method of shot-firing.

The decrease in the rate of miss-fires is no doubt due to improvements in detonators, to a higher standard of shot-firing, and to better care and maintenance of exploders and cables. It is probable that the rate will decrease further.

One object of this paper is to show how improvements might be made. The work described was done under the general supervision of the Shot-firing Sub-Committee of the Explosives in Mines Research Committee, and it is published by consent of the Safety in Mines Research Board.

Tests of Miss-Fired Detonators.

The first series of tests was made on approximately 600 detonators recovered from miss-fires prior to 1932 and very little was known about them. The examination consisted of (1) a visual examination, (2) insulation test of leads, (3) measurement of fusehead resistance, (4) firing test with single shot exploder, (5) firing test with stronger exploder and (6) a firing test on 200 volt mains. The probable faults in these detonators, however, are classified having regard to subsequent experience.

The second series of tests was concerned with miss-fires up to the end of 1933. For this work a tool was designed which enabled the detonators to be dismantled in safety, and in all subsequent work all detonators which were in the least respect abnormal were dismantled for examination.

Discussion of and conclusions from the results of tests :—

(1) Many miss-fires are due not to faults in detonators but to badly maintained exploders and cables. The collieries concerned were advised of this and the proportion of normal detonators at many of the collieries steadily decreased. This decrease continued in spite of the introduction during the period of approved exploders which in many cases were less powerful than the older type.

(2) With regard to those detonators which were normal except for damaged leads it is probable that these were damaged during recovery of the miss-fire. Leads broken or stripped during the operation of stemming the shot may cause miss-fires, but subsequent research on the subject has shown that it is very difficult indeed to cause miss-fires by deliberate bad stemming.

(3) The faults due to short circuits were not high except for low tension detonators reported in 1935. They were higher in the case of low tension detonators than high tension. This may be accounted for when it is realised that the difference in resistance between a normal and a short circuited detonator is approximately 1 ohm and the detonator may pass the tests unnoticed, whereas the difference in the case of a high tension detonator may be 30,000 ohms. These miss-fires include faults of an intermittent type. Sometimes the short circuit is caused by a loose bead of solder and the detonator may have appeared all right on the factory test.

Short circuits in low tension detonators, however, are a serious matter in connection with simultaneous shot-firing. Such a detonator when connected in series with a number of others would cause a miss-fire and no precautions which could be taken in the mine would guard against it. If it is assumed that the average rate of miss-fires for the whole country is 1 for 10,000 shots, with low tension detonators, and the percentage of failures due to short circuits is 15 per cent., then the chances of miss-fire from this cause would be 1 for every 66,666 shots. For this reason the shot-firing sub-committee asked that detonators supplied for simultaneous shot-firing should be specially check-tested in the factory in an attempt to pick out any faulty detonators which might inadvertently have passed the previous test unnoticed.

(4) The most prolific cause of open circuits was broken fuse-head foils and, largely because of improvements in other respects, the proportion of failures from this cause showed a marked increase. Detonator manufacturers were aware of this, and research, which is in continuous progress at the factories, was devoted to this particular problem. Improvements have resulted in the entire elimination of broken foils.

(5) The leads broken in the seal and indeed some of the broken foils may have been caused by the violence of the relieving shots, and the original cause of failure may have been a weak exploder.

(6) The low tension detonator with a broken circuit is not so serious in connection with simultaneous shot-firing. Such a fault would be detected in the circuit test and the faulty detonator could be isolated. If the test were omitted the whole of the series of shots would miss-fire and there would be no risk of an undetected miss-fire.

(7) The low tension detonator results show a fairly high proportion of broken bridge wires. In the light of subsequent information it is unlikely that this was the cause of all the failures, and many of these should be classified as match-head faults. It is probable that the initial failures were due to phlegmatised fuseheads, and continued attempts to fire the detonators resulted in the fusing of the bridge wires.

(8) High tension detonators with abnormally low resistance can also be classified with the phlegmatised match-heads. Most of the miss-fires from this cause were due to either the use of old stocks or bad storage. A fusehead is said to be phlegmatised when in the case of a low tension detonator the passage of a normal current in a bridge wire fails to fire the fusehead or causes it to smoulder or decompose at a temperature below that required to ignite the explosive composition in the detonator. In the case of a high tension detonator the fusehead is phlegmatised when the application of a normal P.D. at the poles of the fuse-head fails to fire it or causes it to smoulder or decompose at a temperature below that required to ignite the explosive composition in the detonator. These failures are due to chemical and sometimes physical changes in the priming composition which may be brought about by contamination with oil or water, or by storage at high temperature.

Recent Research.

A new series of tests was made commencing at the beginning of 1937. Whereas miss-fired detonators were previously collected at random thenceforth they were collected from all the miss-fires at about 30 collieries in Yorkshire and particulars relating to each miss-fire were, obtained. Miss-fires in the firing of approximately 2 million shots annually were examined, and this is a fair sample since the total number of shots fired electrically in the mines of the United Kingdom is 50 million.

Notes on results of this work :—

(1) There is still a very high proportion of normal detonators which is difficult to account for, having regard to the improved methods of testing exploders now employed at the collieries. The names of the shot-firers concerned are known and it cannot be proved that any one man is more prone to have miss-fires than other.

(2) A very high proportion of failures is due to short circuits by solder bridging the foils ; this is particularly true in the case of the low tension detonators. The proportion is increasing, but that is no doubt due to improvements in other respects. These results show the desirability of check-tested low tension detonators for simultaneous shot-firing.

(3) With regard to broken circuits the chief point of interest is failure due to broken foils. A new type of brass foil was introduced into low tension detonators about the middle of 1938 and since then there have been no broken foils. The brass foils were not generally introduced into high tension detonators until late 1939 and there has been only one broken foil subsequently.

(4) Phlegmatised fuseheads still account for a large proportion of failures, but the figure for 1940 is higher than for the previous years because of difficulties associated with a new method of assembly and these are not likely to be repeated.

(5) There were no miss-fires duo to faults in the detonating compound.

Improvements in Detonators.

Having regard to the cost and to the amount of work and scientific control involved in the manufacture of electric detonators, the number of faults was never high and the position is steadily improving.

One improvement was the development of a non-inflammable seal for detonators used in safety-lamp mines. The original sealing material was sulphur, but it was reported from one or two collieries that blue flames characteristic of burning sulphur had been seen after shot-firing. In order to avoid the risk of ignitions of gas from this cause, the Home Office asked detonator manufacturers to consider the replacement of sulphur by some non-inflammable compound. After much experimental work a fractional grade of chlorinated naphthalene was found to be very suitable. This was known by the trade name of See Kay wax. It has a melting point of 130°C. and is non-inflammable. So far as is known this change had little effect on the incidence of miss-fires.

The next improvement was made in the ignition composition of the low tension fusehead, and this change is of some importance in connection with simultaneous shot-firing. Copper acetylide had been used as the ignition compound for many years and is in fact still used in high tension electric detonators. It is very liable to deterioration with age if exposed at any time to damp and hot storage conditions. For this reason irregularities sometimes arise in the behaviour of electric detonators tending to prejudice the series firing characteristics. Copper acetylide has now been replaced in low tension electric detonator work by the lead ??? of mononitroresorcinal (L.M.N.R.), This replacement, together with certain improvements in the bridge wire, has produced much greater regularity in series firing current with the consequent lowering of the current required.

At the same time, however, a most important improvement in the incidence of miss-fires was made by strengthening the fusehead. The original fuseheads employed thin foils of nickel which were rather brittle, and these were cemented on to the insulating cardboard, by means of a water soluble glue. Under the heat of the soldering iron the glue was liable to weaken, allowing the foil to buckle in places. Again after much research a brass foil rolled to 0.0015 inch in thickness was obtained. Other difficulties associated with the sticking of this foil to the insulator were encountered. The method now employed is first to etch the brass with a chemical solution and use a synthetic resin as the adhesive. The adhesive process is carried out under hot presses. Brass foils were introduced in low tension detonators in 1938, but other difficulties had to be overcome before the brass foil was introduced to high tension detonators in 1939. There has only been one class of failure due to broken foils since the introduction of the brass foils.

The most recent development in detonators was probably hastened by the war, and was due to the scarcity of mercury, but it would have taken place in any case. The explosive composition in the modern detonator is tetryl primed with a mixture of lead azide and lead styphnate. The detonator is actually stronger than the one containing fulminate of mercury. A safe form of lead azide is employed, nevertheless it is important when this compound is used in copper tubes that the detonator should be entirely waterproof. It was for this reason that a new seal was developed. The seal now used is a synthetic rubber known as neoprene (polymerized dichlor-butadiene). This is an excellent substance having good storage properties ; it is impervious to oil and is of low inflammability. It is probable that the new detonator will have a favourable influence on the avoidance of miss-fires. The results of this research show a marked improvement during the year 1940 ; the new detonator has been in use for about half the year.

The Avoidance of Miss-Fires.

(1) The most obvious and the most important precaution against miss-fires is care in the maintenance of exploders. The power of magneto type exploders was necessarily restricted to ensure that the machines would not fire gas, but there is ample power for single shot-firing if they are maintained as they can be in a condition equal to new. The official test for the efficiency of new exploders is as follows : the low tension exploder must be capable of firing a normal L.T. fusehead with 15 ohms additional resistance in the circuit. The high tension exploder must be capable of firing a normal H.T. fusehead with a shunt resistance of 300 ohms across the terminals of the exploder. This test, though not required by Regulations, should be applied to all exploders sent out of the pit for repair and examination, and no exploder should be returned to the pit which will not pass it.

A routine test of exploders is of greater value if a log is kept. Each exploder should be numbered and a complete record of every test and repair should be made. As to magneto exploders, most of these fail because of dirt in the mechanism and lack of oil. In order to obtain the maximum efficiency the armatures in these machines must revolve at the rate of 5,000 to 10,000 revolutions per minute, and this is almost impossible if the gearing is dirty or the bearings dry.

(2) The next important factor is the use of good shot-firing cable. It is cheaper to use good cables and to renew them frequently than to have miss-fires.

(3) Storage of detonators is of great importance, and in general detonators should not be kept in stock for longer than is reasonably necessary and not more than three months. In this connection numbered detonators were a liability and the Author is of the opinion that the advantages of using numbered detonators do not compensate for the length of time some of them were of necessity kept in the colliery store. In addition to storage at the collieries, manufacturers were compelled to lay in large stocks of numbered detonators to satisfy colliery orders. Most of the miss-fires described as being due to phlegmatised fuseheads are caused by long or bad storage.

Fuseheads are affected by heat and detonators are best kept in cool dry magazines. Quite recently there were six miss-fires in one day at one colliery. They were due to phlegmatised fuse-heads. It was subsequently found that one packet of detonators had been stored on a shelf near a hot water radiator. There was evidence of heating in that the paraffin wax on the leads appeared to have been melted. Any detonators contained in bags or boxes having grease spots should be suspect.

(4) Another important precaution against miss-fires is care in handling the detonators. The leads should not be folded more than is necessary, and the practice of unfolding the detonators in the powder store, which is sometimes employed in order to fit them into a special container, is to be avoided.

When straightening out the leads the shot-firer should not pull on the detonator but should instead hold the leads near to the detonator. Miss-fires due to leads broken inside the detonator seal may have been due to rough handling.

Miss-Fires in Relation to Simultaneous Shot-firing.

The chief disadvantage of simultaneous shot-firing is the risk of an undetected miss-fire. Faults in detonators such as cause miss-fires of single shots will also cause miss-fires if a number of detonators are connected in series. The only serious faults, however, are short circuits inside the detonator and phlegmatised fuseheads. Any other faults would be detected when the circuit was tested, or failing that, the whole of the series would miss-fire.

Miss-fires due to short circuits in detonators will be very much reduced by the provision of specially check-tested detonators, and miss-fires due to phlegmatised fuseheads can be avoided by the use of none but fresh detonators. Detonator manufacturers may be asked to date boxes containing check-tested detonators and add some other distinctive mark.

However, miss-fires may occur when all the detonators are normal. A current of 0.45 ampere is sufficient to fire one detonator, but owing to chemical inequalities in the ignition composition of fuseheads a current of 1.0 ampere should flow to ensure the safe firing of six fuseheads in series. Any current of less than this value might fire the most sensitive fuseheads and break the circuit, before sufficient head had been generated to fire the least sensitive fuseheads.

Exploders for simultaneous shot-firing, therefore, must be capable of providing adequate current, and that current must be available at the instant the shot-firing circuit is completed. Magneto and dynamo types of machines are unsuitable as their output usually depends on the rate at which a handle is turned, and if the handle is turned slowly miss-fires will result.

A dry battery type exploder was designed to do the work. This exploder has been approved for use in safety-lamp mines. Any factor which might prevent the current given by the exploder from reaching the detonators will also cause miss-fires. The use of suitable or defective cable may cause miss-fires. A cable of high resistance may so limit the flow of current as to cause miss-fires. For this reason only detonators with copper leads should be used, for the difference in resistance of iron and copper leads in a six-shot circuit may be as high as 10 ohms. A failure due to high resistance is guarded against by making the circuit testing indicator on the exploders to register as an ohmmeter. If the circuit resistance is too high the indicator registers as if the circuit was not complete, and no attempt should be made to fire the shots until the fault is rectified.

A dead short circuit on a cable would prevent any of the shots firing, but a shunt made by the loose contact of strands of wire may be such as to share the available current with the detonators, thus causing some only of the shots to fire. The only safe type of cable, therefore, is two single core cables, and these might conveniently be laid down either side of the roadway. The use of two cables also simplifies connections at the face and breaks in single cables are much more easily detected than in a twin cable.

Exploders for simultaneous shot-firing should be maintained in good condition, and it is desirable that they should be tested weekly. The principle of the proposed test is that they should fire 6 detonators through a total resistance of 20 ohms. A piece of apparatus employing fuseheads has been designed for this test. Dry batteries are liable to deterioration even when not in use, and no battery should remain in service after 3 months from the date of manufacture. A log of the exploder testing should be kept in an appropriate book.

In well conducted simultaneous shot-firing, miss-fires should be few, and an undetected miss-fire very rare indeed.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Stafford, H.      


 

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