|
16th November 1940, Page: 152, Column: 1 Report On Mossfield Colliery ExplosionThe Report (Cmd. 6227) on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred on 21st March, 1940, at the Mossfield Colliery, Longton, Staffordshire, has been issued and is obtainable at 1s. net through H.M. Stationery Office. The inquiry was held by Mr. F. H. Wynne, C.B.E., B.Sc, H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, under Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911. The explosion caused the deaths of eleven persons and injury to one other, the verdict of the Coroner, who sat without a jury, being that the men "perished from injuries caused by an accidental explosion in the Cockshead seam of the Mossfleld Colliery." The Cockshead Seam. In his description of the workings in the Cockshead seam Mr. Wynne says :— Mossfield Colliery is situated on the outskirts of the town of Longton at the south-eastern end of the North Staffordshire Coalfield. There are two shafts, both sunk to a depth of 440 yards, which is about 20 yards below the Cockshead seam in which the explosion occurred. This seam dipping to the South West at about 1 in 3 is recovered by a level crut, 60 yards long, from the downcast shaft. Other seams, both above and below the Cockshead seam, are worked from the shaft, but these seams were in no way affected by the explosion. The Cockshead seam at this colliery is comparatively thick, there being from 7 to 8 feet of clean coal with a parting 1½ to 2 feet from the roof and an intermittent band of pyrites nodules 2 inches thick at about 5 feet from the floor. The immediate roof consists of 2 feet of "Hussle," a black and very friable carbonaceous shale. Immediately above the "Hussle" there is a thickness of 2 feet of dirt (a soft coal measure shale) and this is followed by a stratum of strong shale with ironstone bands. The seam gives off firedamp freely so that safety-lamps and Permitted explosives, only were allowed to be used in the workings. Generally, the working of the seam produced much dust, and large quantities of stone dust were required to neutralise the coal dust, the volatile content of the coal being upwards of 35 per cent. That large quantities of stone dust were, in fact, applied is shown by the analysis of samples taken on 15th March in 15's Level. The samples contained respectively no more than 5.8 and 8.7 per cent. of combustible matter. The Cockshead seam at this mine has an unenviable reputation, inasmuch as from its earliest days the workings in it have been dogged by troubles arising from spontaneous heating. Indeed, fifty-one years ago, on 16th October, 1889, to be exact, an explosion initiated by a gob-fire caused the loss of 64 lives. In a report on the accident, dated 15th March, 1890, the late Sir W. N. Atkinson wrote: "The Cockshead seam at Mossfield Colliery is subject to 'gob-fires,' caused by spontaneous combustion. Considerable portions of the workings had been sealed off at different times on account of gob-fires breaking out." The loss of life in the 1889 explosion was catastrophic compared with the present occurrence. There is little or no doubt that this was because that explosion Was propagated by coal dust into the workings of a second seam, the Seven Feet Banbury, which was worked off the same level as the Cockshead seam. There is also little doubt that the effects of the recent explosion would have been greatly magnified but for the fact that the roadways were copiously treated with stone dust. As it was, the explosion was limited both in extent and violence. Experience in the intervening half century has amply confirmed Sir W. N. Atkinson's description of the seam. On account of the liability to gob-fires special methods of working were adopted, and except for the accident in 1889 had been substantially successful until the present unfortunate occurrence. Such special methods involved, fundamentally, the avoidance, as far as possible, of leakage of air through the packs, the systematic withdrawal of roof supports, and the prevention of accumulations of bituminous matter in the wastes, backed up by working in separate panels with only one way of ingress and one of egress for the ventilation, thus affording facilities for rapid isolation in any emergency. 15's longwall face, 90 yards in length in all, was for practical purposes completely mechanised, the coal being cut to a height of 2 feet 6 inches from the floor by compressed air driven coal cutting machines ; shotholes were bored by compressed air driven percussive boring machines ; the coal was delivered to the loading point in the level by a compressed air driven shaker conveyor. To the dip of the level there was a short length of about 5 or 6 yards of face which was hand filled directly into tubs. On account of the weak nature of the "hussle" and the 2 feet stratum of dirt next above it, a thickness of coal 2 feet 6 inches was left up to form a safe roof in the longwall face. The strip packs were built up to this coal roof; the top coal, however, fell in the wastes, whence as much as possible of it was recovered and sent out. Generally, although it was not always the case, the collapse of the stronger stratum of roof followed fairly close (within 10 yards or so) the advance of the coal face. Debris from this fallen roof provided the bulk of the material for building the packs. Observations. Following the narrative of events leading up to and the events immediately subsequent to the explosion, Mr. Wynne reviews factors that might have special significance in connection with the occurrence, and the methods and practice. In his observations he refers to the character and history of the seam, and proceeds to say :— "It was well known to be liable to gob-fires, and, as far as one is able to judge from the evidence of many witnesses from the manager downwards, the officials were experienced in, and competent to deal with, this danger. The somewhat picturesque account by Birks (overman) of the events on Friday, 15th March, leaves little room for doubt about this. "The next point is the method of working. The general scheme or layout calls for no adverse criticism. In fact, it appears to have been admirably adapted to present-day methods of machine mining and the physical conditions of the seam. "There was, however, some suggestion of a defect in the system as applied in 15's face. The facts would appear to substantiate this suggestion. The apparently very considerable leakage of air which was discovered on the morning of Friday, 15th March, at the far end of No. 3 waste and not more than some 15 to 20 feet from the rib side, was a bad feature in conditions where, to avoid danger, the prevention of leakage was a vital matter. The cause of the leakage cannot, in my opinion, be dissociated from the occurrence of the overlap fault and the heading which was driven downwards from the return airway in the process of development beyond that fault. That heading was supported by steel girders which are said to have been withdrawn before the strip packs were set away from the rib side. Even if the girders were withdrawn the leakage indicates that solidification of the packs, which was so essential between No. 3 waste and the main level, had not taken place. In any circumstances, it is not unreasonable to suggest that normal strip packing against a rib side is not adequate. There should be several yards of continuous solid pack made as nearly as possible impervious by filling sand and/or stone dust between the larger lumps of debris. There is a possibility, I could not justify the use of any stronger term, that the explosion would not have occurred if such a pack had been in existence here. As regards its width, dogmatism is dangerous, but I venture to suggest that a pack of at least double the width of the heading was needed. "The next matter is the steps taken to stop the leakage of air when it was discovered. These followed established practice and no criticism is called for either as regards the actual plan or the celerity with which it was put in hand and finally completed. "The next matter is the smell which was found along by the pack at the rise side of the No. 3 waste. A great deal was said about this smell and, incidentally, about the hussle, the very friable carbonaceous shale lying immediately above the coal seam. No one, except the fireman Seaton who said it was definitely gob-stink, was prepared to admit that the smell was unusual. It was said to be a smell normally experienced in the workings of this seam, except that it was stronger in this instance than usual. It must, however, have been fairly strong and out of the ordinary, for the day fireman Carson noticed it when he was only a short distance (10 yards) down the face from the top end. It was generally described as an oily smell commonly associated with the hussle. With a view to confirming this description a sample of the hussle was produced at the inquiry but this sample, if it is typical, has failed in its purpose. At normal temperature a very faint and slightly aromatic smell is discernible, but it is no more than that. To be specially noticeable among the numerous other peculiar smells to be met with in underground workings the smell would have to be very much stronger than the smell from the sample . . . The only logical conclusion to come to as regards the smell is that it was a symptom of spontaneous heating either of carbonaceous matter somewhere in the pack, or of the top coal, which is left in over the packs. The small fault to which reference has already been made may have been a factor contributing to the heating. "It seems clear from the evidence of Birks and others that, although it was the smell that first directed attention to No. 3 waste and the discovery of the leakage of air, more concern was caused by the latter than by the smell. Indeed, the manager, as well as several of the under officials, denied most emphatically that the smell caused them any concern at all. In fairness to them it should be stated that this was mainly because there were no indications of temperature rise and sweating which experience in the past has taught them to expect as essential symptoms of incipient heating. It is to be noted that the measures adopted to stop the leakage of air also appeared to have dealt effectively with the smell. "Although the seam is gassy, it is not surprising that in this face firedamp was rarely found in quantity. From time to time its presence was detected in the Wastes, especially at the lip of the first fall of top coal and hussle. On several occasions before and subsequent to the appearance of the smell on Friday, 15th March, small accumulations of firedamp had been detected but they were effectively dealt with by brattice sheets. Nevertheless, firedamp must have been present in considerable quantity at higher horizons in the cavities from falls of the upper roof. Shortly after the explosion the manager went through the face testing for firedamp as he went. He found none — not even at the holes that had been made in the packs across the front of Nos. 1 and 2 wastes, and from which a strong smell of burning, but no smoke, was issuing. "Whether or not the incipient heating at the pack in the No. 3 waste was the source of the ignition of firedamp on Thursday, 21st March, is entirely a matter of conjecture. The observed facts would appear to suggest that the ignition is more likely to have occurred in one or other of the two lower wastes. "The observed facts would also suggest that a considerable volume of firedamp was ignited, that it exploded with considerable violence which was, however, mainly dissipated in displacing portions of the 8 feet thick barrier packs across the ends of Nos. 1 and 2 wastes. "This brings us to the consideration of the reason for the accumulation of so large a volume of firedamp. It was, of course, due firstly to sealing off the leakage of fresh air through the No. 3 waste and secondly to the further obstruction to the circulation of air offered by the barrier pack. Coincidentally, there would be a temperature rise within the now confined area tending to destroy the balance which previously existed between heat production by oxidation and heat dissipation mainly by conduction, and so to promote more and more heating until active combustion started. "No allegations of breaches of statutory requirements were made at the inquiry and none were revealed by it. "It remains only to discuss measures the adoption of which might help to prevent a similar occurrence in the future. Reference has already been made to the observance of the precautions necessary in working a seam liable to spontaneous combustion. With the exception of the omission of a rib side pack, no adverse criticism was made at the inquiry and none appears to be called for here. At the same time, in fairness to the management, it should be noted that a rib side pack was not part of the routine practice, and previous experience had not shown that such packs were necessary to ensure safe working. "As to the fact that persons working in the face and in the return airway at no time experienced any inconvenience from, or showed any of the symptoms caused by, breathing air contaminated by carbon monoxide, this, of course, does not mean that there was no contamination by carbon monoxide ; it merely means that the concentration of that gas in the general body of the air was never high enough to cause the symptoms. This prompts the suggestion that valuable information might have been obtained by taking air samples, firstly, in the return airway as soon as the smell was noticed, and later, by means of one or more small bore pipes, from the atmosphere inside the packed off goaf. Samples from the goaf would have served a dual purpose by affording information regarding (1) oxygen consumption due to incipient combustion and (2) oxygen reduction due to its replacement by firedamp.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
![]() |
||||||||
|
Mail: Webmaster |
Back |
Home |
Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors Registered Charity No: 1110608 Page last updated: 28 Nov 2022
|
Search |
|
|||