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19th October 1940, Page: 118, Column: 1 The Valleyfield ExplosionReport of InquiryCmd. 6226. H.M. Stationery Office. Price 1s. 6d. net. The Report on the Causes of and Circumstances attending the Explosion which occurred at Valleyfield Colliery, Culross, Fife, on the 28th October, 1939, issued by the Mines Department, is signed by the Commissioner, Mr. R. P. Morrison, K.C. Sir Henry Walker, C.B.E., LL.D., was in attendance as Assessor. Extracts from the Report are appended. The Explosion and Casualties. Valleyfleld Colliery is one of a group of fourteen collieries owned by the Fife Coal Company. The two shafts were sunk about the year 1908. The output from the colliery is approximately 850 tons per day. During the night shift on 28th October, 1939, work in the Culross district was proceeding in No. 2 Diamond section at a longwall face about 370 feet in length. Three development headings, named (after the contractors whose men worked them) "McKeeman's," "Cairns'" and "Dodds'," were also being worked in coal in order eventually to form another longwall face. Off McKeeman's level there is situated "Dodds' stone mine." The stone mine was standing at the time of the explosion. It had been worked by Dodds and his men until 18th October, when they succeeded Cairns and his men in the development of what then became known as Dodds' heading. The explosion occurred during the night shift at about 3-45 a.m. It originated in Dodds' heading, but spread extensively and violently to other parts of the mine. Thirty-three men were killed immediately, two men died subsequently as a result of the injuries which they received, and two other men were very seriously injured. A further twenty-four men were affected by afterdamp. Both the agent (Mr. K. H. McNeill) and the manager (Mr. Robert Aitchison) had long experience of mining and were qualified for their positions. Oversmen were appointed by the manager to supervise the work during all shifts. The colliery is well laid out, and well equipped with plant of the latest and best type. After the explosion the electrical equipment was carefully examined and — apart from damage caused by the effects of the explosion — was found to be in good order. The possibility that the explosion was caused by a defect in the electrical apparatus was explored but was negatived by the evidence. The Fife Coal Co. has a safety and research department, and has appointed an official known as a safety engineer. At each colliery belonging to the company there is a safety officer and at some collieries safety committees. It is apparent that the company — apart from providing good equipment — has voluntarily and with encouraging results done much over and above statutory requirements to promote the safety of the men employed in its collieries. The company has also endeavoured to educate its officials and men into an exact appreciation of the object and effect of the Regulations and their responsibilities thereunder. These voluntary efforts have led to a considerable decrease in the number of accidents per man-shift. Cause of Explosion. The origin of the explosion was an ignition of gas at the time of the firing of a shot in the face of Dodds' heading. When the explosion occurred Dodds' heading was a place 12 feet in width and 8 feet 9 inches high, being driven to the rise in coal. The method adopted of bringing down the coal was to fire five or six shots in the bottom coal and then one or two shots in the top coal. Examination of the face after the explosion disclosed an indentation in the top coal which — supported by other evidence, such as the number of detonators used by the fireman during the shift —demonstrated that the last shot (i.e., the shot in the top coal) had caused the ignition of gas. Two somewhat unusual features were found to be present in the coal at the coal face when it was examined after the explosion. In the first place, while "backs" were a fairly common occurrence in the seam, the presence of a "slickenside" (or glazed) back was disclosed. In the second place, the normal horizontal bedding of the seam had been displaced into a series of curves. This condition of inverted lamination indicated that the coal at the face was softer than was normal. There was no suggestion that the inverted laminations were visible prior to the firing of the last shot. But there was a conflict of evidence as to whether the "slickenside" back was or should have been visible prior to the firing of the last shot. The Commissioner does not consider that it was proved that the back was visible prior to the firing of the last shot. It is not, in his opinion, established that there was any unusual condition of the face which should have been seen by a person preparing or firing the last shot. The presence of soft coal — due to pressure, the inverted lamination being evidence of that pressure — makes it very probable that the last shot was overcharged for the work it had to do, that consequently a "blow-out" occurred, and gas was ignited and exploded. This theory was substantially accepted by all the expert witnesses. At the place where the explosion began (the face of Dodds' heading) indications of violence were remarkably slight. Stemmers were left standing up, but the explosion increased in violence as it traversed the heading and spread very extensively and violently to other parts of the mine. The overcast across the Culross Five-Foot dook about 900 yards distant from Dodds' heading was disrupted, and dust was raised at the downcast shaft more than 1,500 yards away. Use of Explosives. In pursuance of their policy to promote the safety of miners in the pit, the persons responsible for the management of the mine had directed — as a precaution over and above the statutory requirements — that sheathed explosives only were to be used in coal. At the time of the explosion a permitted — but not a sheathed — explosive, viz., Samsonite, was in use in Dodds' heading. This breach of a rule of the colliery arose because the contractor (Dodds) had previously been employed in driving the stone mine, where the use of Samsonite was allowed, and he and his men continued to draw Samsonite from the magazine keeper after they began to work in coal. Special instructions for the issue of Samsonite to men who required it were given to the magazine keeper by the manager, and such instructions were given in the case of Dodds when he began to work in stone. These instructions were not countermanded when Dodds and his men were transferred to coal development. The firemen apparently considered that as the explosive had been issued they were entitled to use it. The manager relied upon the firemen, and said that the rule of the colliery against the use of Samsonite in coal (which was certainly, in the Commissioner's opinion, wise in the conditions prevailing in the mine) was well known to the firemen and others employed. Three shifts were employed at Dodds' heading. As all the men (including the fireman Thomas Kerr) on the night shift were killed, there was no direct evidence as to the method of shot-firing adopted by Kerr on that shift. Evidence was, however, given by the firemen and men employed on the other shifts. There was some evidence, which the Commissioner saw no reason to reject, that the practice of the night-shift fireman did not differ from that of the others. The manager, in the course of his evidence, deposed that the fireman in charge of the work in Dodds' heading in each shift was well qualified to perform his duties. He (the manager) trusted to the firemen to carry out the provisions of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, and though he visited the heading nearly once a week, he never happened to be present during the preparation of the firing of shots. The evidence did not disclose any occasion upon which an official of the pit superior to the fireman was present at such a time. The manager and other superior officials were not aware that breaches of Regulations occurred. Breaches of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, 1934 (as amended), in connection with the firing of shots in the heading were clearly established. Certain of these were of no importance in connection with the explosion, except in so far as they demonstrated a general lack of care on the part of those responsible for them. General Conclusions. The Commissioner discusses the question of gas being found, examines the cause of the spread of the explosion, and surveys' the position as regards stone-dusting. Summarising the general results of the investigation, he says it is in his opinion established— (1) That the initial cause of the explosion was an ignition of firedamp during the firing of a shot in the top coal. (2) That the spread of the explosion was caused by coal dust which had accumulated in certain roads. (3) That certain roads through which the explosion spread were insufficiently stone-dusted. (4) That had the discovery of gas after the firing of almost every round of shots in the headings been reported, as it ought to have been in accordance with the Regulations, it is at least possible that steps might have been taken which would have prevented the explosion. (5) That a number of other breaches of Regulations in relation to shot-firing were also proved. Such breaches were not, however, proved to be casually connected with the explosion. But in the view of the Commissioner they suggest an absence of proper supervision Over the work in the headings. Mention was made of the fact that for some time prior to the explosion serious difficulties had occurred in the work at the Diamond longwall face, and that these difficulties and additional work as a result of the war took up much of the time of the superior officials. The investigation has not in the Commissioner's opinion disclosed that it is necessary or that it is desirable that the existing Regulations should be amended or supplemented. Suggestions were made by Mr. W. T. Miller, who appeared for the Federation of Colliery Deputies, that ventilation by means of auxiliary fans was undesirable, and that stone dust should be suspended in shelves near the roofs of roads. But the evidence led at the investigation was not sufficiently directed to these points to enable the Commissioner to express a concluded view upon them.
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