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13th July 1940, Page: 1, Column: 1 Accidents And Their PreventionThese notes are baaed on the Mines Inspectors' Reports for 1938. The price of each Report is 1s. net. Copies are obtainable through H.M. Stationery Office. Shaft Mishaps. Shaft accidents do not figure prominently in the list of reportable casualties, but the possibilities should not be disregarded, and the study of features of some of the occurrences as given in the reports of H.M. Inspectors of Mines may indirectly add to the safety of conditions already regarded as very satisfactory. Extracts are appended. Why Brake Failed to Act. In the report for Scotland Mr. T. Ashley instances a case of a winding engine brake failing to act because the piston rod actuating the brake became fast in the oil cylinder cover and stuffing box ; neither the engineman nor the automatic controls could operate the brake. An emergency brake with which the engine was originally fitted was not in operation. The engineman shut off the power but the ascending cage, in which there were two men, went up into the bell where it was held ; and the descending cage, in which one man was riding, came to rest at an old bottom, 30 feet below the new hanging-on level where the "bearers" had by then not been fitted. The drum was electrically-driven through gearing and the winder was fitted with the "Lilly" controller and slow banker, the whole being newly installed nine months prior to the occurrence. The clearance between the hole in the oil cylinder cover and the piston rod connected to the brake lever was so fine that a slight eccentricity between the cylinder and its cover, which had been fastened slightly out of place, caused the piston rod to jam. The clearance was increased and a spigot and faucet joint made between the cover and the cylinder top to prevent the smallest movement of the cover. Type of Capping Required. At a mine in Ayrshire the winding rope broke at the mouth of the capel or hose after 11½ months' service while winding coal, and in connection with this Mr. Ashley quotes as under from the report of the Wire Ropes Research Committee of the Safety in Mines Research Board :— "The capel was of the white metal type but was a long socket (12½ inches) of the dimensions usually employed with bent back wire capels. The cone of white metal was removed from the socket and it was found that the metal had reached a point about one inch from the small end of the socket. Most of the wires had broken within the socket, that is, within one inch of the white metal. Copper was found in the capping metal which reduced the fluidity of the white metal. The rope failed in the mouth of the socket as a result of localised corrosion-fatigue deterioration. The long narrow shape of the socket and the poor fluidity of the capping metal prevented the metal from reaching the small end of the socket and consequently a cavity was left at the mouth of the socket in which water collected and caused local corrosion of the wires. The fact that some, at least, of the wires had not been properly cleaned during capping would allow these wires to escape their share of the load and other wires would thus become more highly stressed. Thus the conditions were suitable for deterioration by corrosion-fatigue. The failure was largely due to the use of a wrong type of socket. For a white metal capel the cone should be shorter and of larger diameter at the wide end. The use of a copper-bearing metal of poor pouring properties was a contributory cause of failure and the British Standard capping metal should be used. As a further precaution a heavy grease should be run on the rope, where it leaves the capel, with a view to filling any small cavities." The Inspector says this occurrence draws attention to the requirements of No. 8 of the General Regulations (Winding and Haulage) of 2nd March, 1937, namely : "No mode or type of capping shall be used which fails to withstand, for a winding rope, a load of at least seven times the maximum static load." He suggests that the best means to effect compliance is either to use a recognised type of cap made by firms who will guarantee that the cap gives the required strength or to have the types of caps used actually tested and certified. Owners who have a number of shafts could then adopt a standard type for each size of rope they use, and by only using these types they would satisfy themselves the regulation was being complied with. When Confusion May Arise. The Northern Division Inspector, Mr. J. Charlton, reports that a shifter was entering a cage to descend the shaft, when the cage was lowered, and he was fatally crushed between the cage and the flatsheets. The banksman who usually gave the signals to the winding engineman from the opposite side of the shaft had, for adequate reasons, changed places with his assistant. When the banksman shouted for men to come forward the assistant mistakenly thought the cage was loaded and gave the signal for it to be lowered, with fatal consequences. This accident is an example of confusion which often arises when workmen change jobs. After the accident the signalling boy was moved to that side of the shaft where the men entered the cage. Two cases of breakage of winding gear, fortunately without any personal injury, may be quoted from Mr. Charlton's report. Thus— An overwind during coal drawing operations resulted in the breakage of two bridle chains on the overwind cage and slightly bent hangers on the other. For some unexplained reason, an experienced winding engineman failed to cut off the electric power and the ascending cage tripped the overwind prevention device which was set to operate when the cage was about two feet above normal decking level. The overwind prevention gear functioned but failed to arrest the motion of the engine and cage before the detaching hook entered the bell and released the rope. When the cage was at flatsheet level there was a distance of about seven and a half feet between the detaching hook and bell. In another instance extensive damage was caused by an overwind during coal drawing. The detaching hook of the bell supports gave way and it was fortunate that the loaded cage was held by the keps. With a view to averting a similar accident, a small but important alteration was made in the overwind and overspeed prevention device and the method of support of the detaching bells was improved. Delusive Appearance of Safety. Examining Mr. H. J. Humphrys' report for Yorkshire it is seen that extensive damage occurred at a shaft 750 yards deep where there is a large conical winding drum. The cages were standing in the shaft, one near the surface, when the engineman decided to run the engine in order to bed in new brake blocks which had been put in that morning. He forgot that the cage he was about to raise was the one nearer the surface and gave more steam than he would have done had he realised it. The consequence was that the upgoing cage overwound at a speed, according to the recording tacheometer reading, of 33 feet a second, detached at 31.6 feet a second, carried on at a speed of 28 feet a second, and struck and fractured a girder carrying the cast-iron detaching hook bell which was broken into five pieces. When the cage stood on the keps the distance from the detaching hook to the bell was 35 feet, which is a one-third revolution of the drum at this position of the cage. The cage fell down the shaft and was smashed. The downgoing cage was also badly damaged. Mr. Humphrys says that Dr. M. A. Hogan assisted in the investigation which established— 1. The undesirability of using cast-iron detaching hook bells, to which attention has been drawn many times, and which, as this accident shows, only give a delusive appearance of safety. 2. The advantages of headgear keps, which have also been recommended in previous reports. 3. The existence of a "blind spot" in the speed control between the last point on the ordinary overwinder and the first on the "slow banker" at 2 5/8 and 1½ revolutions from the end of the wind respectively. Tubs had Become Uncoupled. As regards shaft safety rates in the North Midland Division, Mr. G. Cook shows that 8,638,000 shifts were worked below ground per casualty and 16,536,000 tons per casualty. One person was killed and one reportably injured. It appears that the fatal accident occurred to an assistant onsetter working at the off-going side of the shaft. The full tubs had been run on to the cage and had displaced the empty ones. The onsetter then dropped the catches and the cage was signalled away. As the cage ascended the full tubs in it caught the empty tubs and drew them into the shaft together with the onsetter who was manipulating them. The empty tubs and one of the full tubs in the cage fell on the sump boards, the man falling with them. The tubs were fitted at both ends with fixed couplings with hanging hooks as well as open links. The Inspector concludes that if the onsetter had attempted to close the shaft gates before giving the "all clear" signal he would have seen the tubs had become coupled. "Familiarity Breeds Contempt." In the North Western Division shaft mishaps caused the death of two persons and injuries to fourteen others. As regards the fatal cases Mr. E. H. Frazer says in his report:— "One fatality took place when a shaft was being fitted up. A shaftsman, wishing to cross the pit to adjust a wooden frame, attempted to do so by stepping across a series of girders spaced at three feet intervals, but missed his footing and fell 25 feet to the bottom. It was a case of familiarity breeding contempt for danger. Plenty of planks were handy for his use as a gangway or he could have walked on the wooden frame. "The other fatality occurred at a pit top when a banksman was pushing full tubs out of a cage. The winding engineman had raised the cage slightly too far and was proceeding to drop it back, but, as he released the brake, some pent up steam in a cylinder moved the engine more than he intended. The banksman was caught between the cage and pit bank and so crushed that he died in 12 hours." Four Rope Guides Broken. Commenting on the fact that four rope guides broke during winding operations, fortunately without harming anyone, Mr. Frazer says that one was over 33 years old, so it had given good service. Another was 25 years old and was known to have been reduced from 1½ inches to 1 1/8 inches in diameter, that is, it had lost almost half its original metal. A third rope guide was eight years old, but it was in a wet shaft and badly positioned at the pit bottom so that all the wear came on one side. The cage shoes were only six inches long and were of cast-iron, notorious for abrasive properties. The shoes should have been of brass and of greater length for a three-decked cage. A winding-drum shaft, 12 inches diameter, broke after 50 years service. The place of fracture was inside a pedestal and only open to inspection occasionally. Still, the Inspector remarks, it might have been realised that the shaft could not last for ever, and it might have been examined with a magnifying glass at regular intervals to detect incipient cracks, for it is worth taking trouble to avert a long stoppage of a pit employing nearly 2,000 persons underground. Winding Regulations. Referring to the coming into force on 1st January, 1938, of Regulations 1 to 4 of the Coal Mines General Regulations (Winding and Haulage), 1937, Mr. P. S. Lea, in his Swansea Division Report, says the principal requirement was the provision of an automatic contrivance to prevent, when persons are being raised or lowered, a descending cage from being landed at the pit bottom or other permanent landing at a speed exceeding five feet per second, and also to control the movement of the ascending cage in such a manner as to prevent danger to persons riding therein. No. 5 of these Regulations, the Inspector proceeds to say, stipulates that cage chains and detaching hooks shall be annealed or given proper heat treatment once at least in every six months. He refers specially to the heat treatment of detaching hooks, but his remarks apply also to cage chains. Suitable equipment for doing this work properly was not provided at the large majority of mines and attempts were made to do it in open fires. This, he says, is calculated to do more harm than good. Attention is drawn to references to heat treatment made in S.M.R.B. Paper No. 100 on the "Metallurgical Examination of Colliery Haulage Drawgear," by Messrs. Andrew, Jeffery and Johnson, as they apply with even greater force to cage chains and detaching hooks. They say "Ideally, material should be heated uniformly to the correct temperature, out of contact with free air or the fuel, and cooled uniformly. Clearly this condition can only be met in a specially constructed furnace, the temperature being controlled by means of pyrometers. Tests, with pyrometers, of the annealing temperatures obtained in a number of wood fires of the kind frequently employed at collieries for the heat treatment of chains and other gear have shown wide variations of the maximum temperature attained in different parts of the fire. These maxima varied in one case from 600° to 1,000°C. and in several others over a range of 300°C. The general effect of such variations is to produce, in the material, regions which may have a deficient structure." Mr. Lea remarks that to place detaching-hook plates in an open fire, raise them to some unknown temperature, and then cool them in whatever way happens to be convenient, is certainly neither annealing nor proper heat treatment. He added that if a manager cannot install a proper furnace he should either send his detaching hooks to the makers, or to some firm with proper facilities, to be annealed. Opening and Closing Shaft Gates. Three persons were killed and one injured in shaft accidents in the Midland and Southern Division. One was attributed to lack of signals, and Mr. E. Rowley, the Divisional Inspector, says that two of them were due to men falling from mid-insets and were caused by a combination of absent-mindedness and a failure to observe the requirements of General Regulation 21 (a). In a comment he adds : "I am afraid that the practice of opening shaft gates before the arrival of the cage is widespread, and indeed one suspects that in some cases they are not closed at all during coal winding. Managers cannot but be aware of this practice, and I call upon them to enforce the provisions of General Regulation 21 (a)." Important Points to Remember. A non-fatal accident occurred at the bottom of a shaft some 1,000 yards deep. A new guide rope weighing about eight tons had been suspended from the headgear by a Reliance gland of the "over-frame" type, and three men were in the sump preparing to put on the cheese weights. Before they could do so, however, the guide pulled through the clamp and fell down the shaft. Two of the men who were in a small cage suspended below the main cage were tipped out, and one of them fell into the shaft bottom but fortunately escaped with a fracture of the ribs. The other was thrown on to the weights of another guide a short distance below and was uninjured. The third man who had been standing on the weights which were to be attached to the new guide, saw it begin to move, and jumped on to a ledge in the shaft side. He was completely untouched, and very pluckily went to the rescue of his mate who had been knocked into the sump, as soon as the guide came to rest. Reliance glands had been in use at the colliery from the time it was first sunk, and no previous trouble had been experienced. It was said that the suspension of the guide had been carried out in precisely the same way in which it had always been done, and nothing unusual came to light to account for the mishap. But it is of importance to remember, Mr. Rowley says, that glands of this type hold the rope by friction between a pair of grips, grooved on the inside to fit the rope, and wedge-shaped on the outside to correspond with the inclined inner surfaces of a split socket. The compression is developed in the first place by driving down rings over the tapering outside surface of the socket, and subsequently by the wedge-shaped grips which are drawn down by the pull of the rope. Obviously, unless the friction immediately developed between the rope and the grips is sufficient to draw the wedges down, the rope will pull through. It is necessary, therefore, to ensure : (a) That the rings are driven down hard — a compressive force equal to about four times the rope tension being necessary to develop the required friction ; and (b) That the surfaces of the wedges are clean and lubricated. Lessons of Dangerous Occurrences. In Mr. Rowley's Division there were seven reportable dangerous occurrences in connection with shafts and winding apparatus, two of them — cases in which guides broke — are regarded as showing the need for a better standard of inspection. The Inspector says it is incumbent upon managers to satisfy themselves that the persons appointed to carry out inspections are competent for their work, and have time to, and in fact do, carry it out thoroughly. In both these cases suitable steps were taken subsequently to ensure that proper inspections were made, but it ought not to be necessary for something untoward to happen to bring this about. In the second case the guides were suspended from tension screws fixed in the headgear. This, remarks the Inspector, is not good practice as slack rope is not automatically taken up — indeed, in the case in question it was not taken up until the end of the shift. Furthermore, when it is taken up the stress placed on the rope is a matter of guesswork. The brake ring of a winding engine was broken when a test was being carried out after the installation of a new slow-banking device and brake gear. The brake ring, 13 feet 3 inches in diameter, was keyed directly on to the drumshaft in between the two rope drums. Originally, the brakes, of the "post" type, were of wood, but to comply with the new Winding Regulations modern steel brakes of the horse-shoe type had been fitted in conjunction with a slow-banking device. During a final test of the gear by the maker, the controller was tripped and the brake applied with such force that the brake ring was fractured at three points on the rim and two on the boss. To the Inspector the moral seems to be that large single brake rings keyed directly on to the drumshaft are not suited to modern high-speed conditions. There should be two brake paths — one on either side of, and connected to, the rope drum. Two guide ropes were liberated, one of them falling down the shaft, whilst the other was caught by the cage at bank, when the pitch-pine balk, from which they were suspended in the wooden headgear, broke. The view of Mr. Rowley is that steel joists should be used instead of timber for this kind of work, but if heavy timber balks have to be used for any purpose they should be examined by boring into them with an auger. Obviously, he concludes, a pick point will only penetrate a fraction of an inch, and gives no indication of the condition in the middle of a large beam.
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