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15th June 1940, Page: 385, Column: 1 Accidents And Their PreventionThese notes are based on the Mines Inspectors' Reports for 1938. The price of each Report is 1s. net. Copies are obtainable through H.M. Stationery Office. Use of Explosives. "Seeing" Better than "Shouting." At the coal mines in Scotland, as shown by Mr. T. Ashley in his report for 1938, four persons were killed and five were injured in four accidents caused by blows received from projected material in all of which a large number of shots had been fired "simultaneously." In two of the accidents, a more careful examination of the ground after the debris had been cleared might have revealed that one of the charges had miss-fired. In a reminder the Inspector says the person firing a shot is required, before firing it, by the Explosives in Coal Mines Order to see that all persons in the vicinity have taken proper shelter and to take suitable steps to prevent anyone approaching the shot. In naked light mines where miners light their own shots, and especially in seams which are very thin, it is not always easy for this rule to be fully complied with. It must not, however, be assumed that warning by shouting covers the obligation imposed by this Order and arrangements should be made by the management for a proper system of warning to be put into force. The danger to anyone, and especially to officials whose duty it is to travel the mine, of coming upon a live shot is a very real one. At a mine in West Lothian a seam 19 inches thick was undercut by machine, and before the machine cuttings were filled away the travelling height along the face was reduced to 12 or 14 inches. A fireman crawling along the face had nearly reached the next road (roads 36 feet apart) when he was killed by coal projected from a shot. It would appear that the miner who lit the shot had twice shouted "fire" and that he was under the impression he had received a reply from the men working in the place from which the fireman came. One of these men had, in fact, shouted "hullo" in reply to a shout. At first sight it might be considered that the miner had failed to take suitable steps to prevent anyone approaching along the face, but the conclusion of the Inspector is that the fault lay in the system which allowed "shouting" to take the place of "seeing." Efficient Guarding of Shots. Forty-three other persons were injured by blows from projected material. 16 of these being due to taking insufficient shelter. In a minority of instances ordinary precautions were taken by the injured persons to be out of the way of danger, but in the majority they would have been immune from injury if they had taken a little more trouble to go round an adjacent corner. The efficiency of the guarding of shots on conveyor faces, where normally access can only be effected from two directions and where shot-firers are employed, would be improved, Mr. Ashley avers, if the stripper whose shot was to be fired was instructed to go along the face in one direction, and the shot-firer himself went along the face in the other direction. The common practice is for the stripper to accompany the shot-firer and to leave the other direction to lie guarded by another stripper further along the face, but this man, of course, has his own work to do and is not interested in the shot. The Inspector briefly describes two accidents that occurred due to the shot-firer coupling up the detonator wires to the wrong cable. The Remedy Indicated. In Yorkshire there were no fatalities from the use of explosives, which the Divisional Inspector, Mr. H. J. Humphrys, regards as highly creditable when one remembers that about 8,000,000 shots were fired during the year. There were, however, 14 persons injured, all by material projected from the shot-hole at the time the shot was fired. These accidents were all due to the failure of the injured person to take proper shelter and to that of the shot-firer to see that he did so, both obligations imposed by the Explosives in Coal Mines Order. In three instances the shot-firer himself was injured. The remedy for this class of accident is (1) The use of sufficient stemming of good quality; (2) the use of smaller charges; (3) the fixing of a minimum distance to which all persons shall be withdrawn during shot-firing. It is unquestionably a fact that the stemming is wholly or partly blown out in a great many instances. The use of not less than 20 inches of sandclay stemming, suitably prepared, would prevent this. Mr. Humphrys is convinced that the amount of explosives used at many collieries could be materially reduced, probably from 10 to 15 per cent., by the use of proper stemming and in other ways. More Explosives Used. There has been a marked increase in the amount of explosive used in the past ten years. There appears to be no sufficient reason to justify this increase and in view of the potential dangers it is recommended that the alternatives, namely, hydraulic bursters and pneumatic picks, should be more closely considered. Their introduction involves study of the conditions and proper attention to details to keep the appliances in proper working order, but where this is forthcoming excellent results have been obtained. It is reported to the Inspector that far too many "pop-shots" are fired. The increased use of sheathed explosive is mainly responsible for the marked diminution in the number of ignitions of firedamp by explosives, and he would strongly advise its use at least in safety-lamp mines. It should not be delayed until an ignition actually occurs, as has happened. At the same time, sheathed explosive should not be used in seams where one would hesitate to use an unsheathed permitted explosive. All the advantage of the sheathing should be thrown into the balance on the side of safety. Cap — Sign of Danger. At some collieries it was reported that a cap, which persisted for some two or three minutes, could be detected on a flame lamp after the firing of a sheathed explosive. The cap was attributed to the sheathing material as the places were found by analysis to contain only a trace of firedamp before and after the shots were fired. The matter was discussed with members of the Safety in Mines Research Boards staff, who stated that, whilst the presence of dust from sheathing materials would make a firedamp cap more easily visible, in the absence of firedamp it would also tint the parts of an ordinary testing flame above the yellow tip. The result might be confused, by anyone unfamiliar with such appearances, with a tinted firedamp cap. It is advisable, therefore, that shot-firers should be instructed that it is unsafe to fire a second shot so long as a cap of any description is discernible. Point the Shot-firer Overlooked. As in Yorkshire so also in the North Midland Division, there were no fatal accidents during the year, but there were 16 reportable non-fatal accidents, causing injury to 17 persons. Fifteen of these were caused by blows from projected material, 14 of which were due to the fact that insufficient shelter was taken by the insured persons, in some instances the shot-firer having failed to see that persons in the vicinity of the shot had gone to a place of safety before firing the shot. Brief accounts are given by Mr. G. Cook of two accidents from this cause. In one, a shot-firer, after charging a shothole, sent a man to guard the place on one side and told the remainder of the men to retreat with him to the other side. After running out the cable, and without looking to see if there were any men behind him, he fired the shot. One of the men who should have followed the shot-firer had delayed so doing in order to put away his tools and bad only reached a point ten yards from the shot when it was fired and he was injured. In the other case, where an overman was injured, a shot-firer had instructed three men working in the gate to guard the entrance to the face whilst he fired some shots on the face. He did not detail any one man as guard nor did hc tell them how many shots he was going to fire. The overman visited the three men and proceeded on to the face, taking them with him for ten yards, where he left them at work. He then travelled a further 40 yards along the face and arrived Opposite a shot as it was fired. The men afterwards stated that the overman had complained about their work, and when he moved them to the face they forgot about the shot-firing and did, not warn him. Since this accident the manager has gone carefully through the Explosives in Coal Mines Order with all deputies and shot-firers and explained its provisions and, in addition, has issued detailed instructions as to the guarding of approaches. Shot-firers should detail one man specially to guard each approach and also say how many shots are to be fired before leaving him. If the instruction is given to a number of men each may rely on the other and it may be neglected by all. In order to obtain increased supervision of shot-firers the manager at another mine has instructed the overman in each seam to stay with each shot-firer or deputy at least once per month and take careful note of his methods, etc., and afterwards make a special report on the proceedings. Less Explosive with Picks. The use of pneumatic picks is increasing, especially for getting coal. At one mine a face which formerly had been undercut by machines has been changed over to hand-getting with pneumatic picks. Although the number of shots remains practically the same the amount of explosive used per shot has been reduced from 5.5 oz. to 3.8 oz., and the output per day per lineal yard of face has increased from 1.92 tons to 2.12 tons. Closer Examination Would Reduce Risk. Three persons were killed and twenty-three injured in the North Western Division. The most serious accident happened in a cross-measure stone tunnel at the start of a Saturday night shift. One man was fatally injured and three others damaged. Seventeen shots had been fired on Saturday morning and six trimming shots on Saturday evening. When the night shift commenced work the face was cleared of loose stones, but not carefully plucked. A charge-hand began to bore with a compressed-air drill at the left side but could not get a proper start, as the face was cracked. He moved towards the centre, intending to start at 45 degrees and then swing round on the line of advance, but had barely begun when there was an explosion. The drill had struck an unexploded cartridge in the last hole to be fired on Saturday morning. All holes had been charged and fired singly with an approved single-shot exploder. There was no miss-fire, because the shot-firer heard all the 17 shots explode, but there must have been a single cartridge of the last charge unexploded but compressed into the socket of the hole in such a way that it appeared to be part of the rock and was not detected. No blame was assigned to any particular person in respect of this affair, but the Divisional Inspector, Mr. E. H. Frazer, says it is possible that when contract jobs are being rushed to such an extent that Saturday afternoon and night shifts are worked there is a definite inducement to workmen to consider progress first and safety a long way behind. More careful clearing of the loose ground and more meticulous examination for unexploded remnants would indubitably reduce the risk of a similar accident occurring. A Million to One Chance. One of the two accidents classified as pure mischance was a remarkable ricochet. As Mr. Frazer explains a fireman was struck by a stone from a ripping shot 30 yards away in a road parallel to the one where he was sheltering. The missile was propelled up one brow along a level and down a companion brow, passing round two right angle bends. The marks of the ricochet were clearly seen on three wooden props. It was a million to one chance. The other mischance occurred when a fireman was testing a shot-firing cable with a high tension exploder. The cable was run out along a wet tunnel, a tunneller held the two ends next the face whilst the fireman attached an exploder to the remote end and turned the handle. The tunneller was expected to tell by the shock if the cable was all right, but it proved defective. It was turned end for end and tried, but was still defective. Five yards were cut off and another test made. This time the cable was right but it exploded the 20 oz. charge and blew off the tunneller's left hand. One explanation is that in some way, through the pit water, a circuit was completed. An experiment was made by cutting two grooves in the earth (above ground) and filling them with pit water. In one end of each a bared end of the shot-firing cable was placed and at the other end a wire from a detonator, so that a foot of water separated each cable-end from the corresponding detonator lead. When the exploder was operated the detonator fired, through two feet of pit water. With clean water no explosion took place when the gaps were only half an inch. Though this accident was called unavoidable, because one would not expect such an occurrence, the Inspector says it could have been prevented by testing the cable at- some place remote from the charge. A Shot-firers' Competition. An idea first put into effect by Mr. Frazer at a Scottish colliery was elaborated by Messrs. Manchester Collieries, Ltd., who organised a large scale shot-firers' competition in which 248 firemen and shot-firers took part. The preliminary rounds were held at local centres, the semi-finals at Walkden and Leigh and the final at Walkden, before large gatherings of miners and friends. A model coal face was erected, complete with steel props, steel cutter blocks for the undercut, and a concrete shot-hole. Only the entrance to the shot-hole was visible to each competitor but, behind the scenes, the concrete block could be opened and the cartridge, detonator wires and stemming exposed. Each candidate, provided with all the necessary equipment — safety hat, knee pads, electric cap lamp, flame safety-lamp, explosives canister, detonator case, cable, exploder and key. bucket of sand-clay stemming, chalk, scraper and stemming stick — was given 12 minutes to fire the shot in accordance with all the provisions of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order. The standard shown in the semi-finals and finals, which the Inspector attended, was excellent. There were a few slips, dire to nervousness, that would not have occurred in a mine, such as forgetting to attach the cable to the detonator wires, but otherwise the excellence of the work must have made the task of the judge no enviable one. One thing was obvious — that competitors, working at top speed, with stone dust applied for them, making an examination for a few yards only and explaining that they would extend it to 20 yards in all directions, merely saying that they would see all persons in the vicinity to a proper shelter, and adopting all other time-saving devices permissible in the competition, were nearly all caught by the gong before they completed their work. There could not have been a simpler shot-firing task, yet it would have required at least 15 minutes to do it properly, which, concludes Mr. Frazer, exactly confirms what H.M. Inspectors have often found in actual practice. Practice that May Lead to Accidents. Referring to the report of Mr. P. S. Lea on the Swansea Division, it is seen that one man was killed and ten injured by accidents during the use of explosives in 1938 as compared with 13 persons injured in 1937. A brief description of the fatal accident is given below :— A collier drilled a shot-hole, 2 feet 9 inches to 3 feet deep in shale rippings. This was charged with eight ounces of Polar Dynobel — in four two-ounce cartridges — and a No. 7 high tension detonator, and was stemmed with ordinary clay. The shot-firer went to lay out his cable while the collier drew a prop from under the edge of the ripping. The collier used a hammer and, as he knocked out the prop, the shot went off and killed him. The cable was not run out and was 16 yards away at the time and the detonator leads were not attached to the prop or other supports. It is suggested that when the prop was knocked out the charge was fired by compression due to movement of the strata. It is difficult to ascribe the firing of the shot to the settlement of the ripping, but this theory has been advanced in the past in other cases. Mr. Lea wishes to draw attention to a practice which is common in anthracite mines and which is calculated to lead to accidents. In accounts of the explosions of inflammable gas which occurred during shot-firing operations and of the fatal accident which involved a collier drawing a prop from under a ripping, it is noticed that two-ounce cartridges were used. In addition to these cases, when only four cartridges were used to make up a charge, Inspectors have found instances where more than this number was used ; in one case an Inspector saw a ripping shot, consisting of 20 ozs. made up of ten two-ounce cartridges, fired. The use of ten cartridges means nine joints in the charge — nine opportunities to get bad detonation, burning or unexploded cartridges. Risk When Using Naked Light. There were two explosives casualties which were due to causes other than blows from projected material. They were simple in origin and the injuries caused were slight, but they both occurred at the same colliery where naked lights are in use. In one case a collier was about to charge a shot-hole with compressed gunpowder when his acetylene lamp fell off a prop and ignited the powder. In the other case a boy was carrying a canister containing compressed gunpowder and an acetylene lamp when he fell. The lid of the canister came off and some of the powder was fired by the flame of the lamp and he was slightly burned. These two accidents illustrate the risk attached to the handling of explosives while using a naked light. All Might have been Avoided. The use of explosives in the Midland and Southern Division accounted for eleven accidents during the year — a decrease of 23 as compared with the average of the last three years. The Divisional Inspector, Mr. E. Rowley, is glad to say that none had a fatal result, but on the other hand an analysis shows no cause for satisfaction, as it becomes clear that all might have been avoided with a little more care and strict observance of the Regulations. Nine of the accidents were caused by blows from stones projected by shots, and seven of these occurred at conveyor faces, the following being a typical case :— A shot was charged in a piece of top coal. When it exploded a piece of coal flew along the face and struck a man 38 yards away, although there was a projecting buttock between him and the shot. Possibly it ricochetted off the conveyor pan. Obviously it is unsafe to depend for shelter on some slight projection of the coal face and, where possible, it is better to take refuge behind a pack. It must be remembered that the Explosives in Coal Mines Order requires that the person firing the shot shall, before doing so, see that all persons in the vicinity have taken proper shelter, and that he shall also take suitable steps to prevent any person approaching the shot. In an earlier report Mr. Rowley had occasion to direct attention to these requirements of Clause 2 (e), but as it still appears that the implications are not always realised, he directs attention to the Report of the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines, where it is proposed that "the person firing the shot shall, before doing so, decide upon the danger zone . . . he shall take steps to secure that all persons retire from that danger zone, and take proper shelter, and that access to such danger zone is prevented either by stationing persons at suitable points to prevent access, or where sufficient persons are not available, by erecting suitable fences marked by a danger signal of a type approved by the manager. "A person so stationed shall not leave his place a after a shot has been fired, until the person firing the shot has given him a signal approved by the manager." Unusual Accident on Double-unit Face. Mr. Rowley concludes the section on explosives as follows : Owing to carelessness on the part of two shot-firers, a somewhat unusual accident occurred on a double-unit face. A shot-firer (A) who worked on the left-hand face, had four shots to fire in the coal a little way from the roadhead of the middle gate, and having posted guards on either side he proceeded to fire the shots one — by one from the shelter of this gate. He had fired two and had gone to connect up the third, when a shot-firer (B) from the right-hand face, having passed the guard posted by (A), came to the middle gate to fire a shot in the coal a little way to the right of the roadhead. This shot missed fire and, without waiting the prescribed period of ten minutes, (B) returned to the face to examine the connections, leaving his battery and cable behind. Whilst he was so engaged (A) came out to the gate to fire his third shot. It so happened that in his absence a small fall had covered his battery and cable, but seeing (B)'s battery and cable and knowing nothing of the latter's activities, he coupled up and fired the shot which had previously missed fire. By good fortune (B) was not seriously injured, but lie might well have been killed. "The circumstances reflect most unfavourably on (B), and to a smaller degree on (A). The latter should have taken his battery with him when returning to couple up his different shots, and in any case one would have expected him to know where he had left it. (B), however, not only left his battery behind, but passed the guards posted by (A), failed to wait the statutory period of ten minutes before returning to a miss-fire, and failed to take suitable steps to prevent a person approaching a shot. Had he done the latter (A) would of course have known what was going on."
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