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20th April 1940, Page: 321, Column: 1 Accidents And Their PreventionThese notes are based on the Mines Inspectors' Reports for 1938. The price of each Report is 1s. net. Copies are obtainable through H.M. Stationery Office. The Problem of Explosions. Precautions that should be Observed. No one was killed and only one person was injured in the Yorkshire Division by an explosion attributed to electricity. Referring to the occurrence Mr. H. J. Humphrys, the Divisional Inspector, says it points to the need for efficient and constant ventilation, and where electricity is used at or near the face, for the apparatus to be certified and efficiently maintained. At mines in the Division there were six other explosions or ignitions of firedamp, none of which, fortunately, caused personal injury. The possibility of serious accident or disaster resulting from these small ignitions cannot, however, be overlooked. Two occurred whilst sealing off spontaneous heatings and one each by naked light, shot-firing, electricity and sparks from the picks of a coal-cutting machine. In view of occurrences at two of the collieries Mr. Humphrys considers it well to re-state the precautions that should be observed to prevent explosions when stoppings are built to seal off a district — precautions which have been successfully adopted many times in recent years — as follows :— 1. The stoppings should be commenced about 20 to 30 yards from a road along which a good current of air will be flowing after the stoppings have been completed. The purpose is to ensure that men working at or examining the stoppings may speedily reach fresh air should an explosion occur, and also to prevent the possibility of a large accumulation of firedamp on the outbye side of the stoppings which might be fired by an explosion from within. 2. If the area enclosed is large it is generally desirable to site the stoppings at a considerable distance from the working face so that a small explosion will not involve those engaged on building them. 3. Strength and speed are the essentials in the primary stages. The question of seal can be deferred until the later stages. The first length of stopping should be about eight yards in length and well reinforced by girders, rails, etc. 4. Both stoppings (if there are two), or at least two (if there are more than two), should be built with a hole through, large enough to circulate, within the area being sealed, sufficient air to keep down the firedamp percentage to 2 per cent. or less. An observer should be stationed constantly at the return stopping to ensure this, and samples should be taken periodically. 5. A 200-yard length inbye the stoppings should be thoroughly well stone-dusted. This applies particularly to the intake stopping, which is more liable to be blown out than the return stopping. 6. The two stoppings should be plugged simultaneously, sufficient sandbags having been accumulated on the spot to enable this to be done expeditiously. This part of the work should not occupy more than two hours. Occasionally small steel doors have been provided and built into the stoppings. Where this is done the length of plug can be less. 7. After the stoppings have been plugged it is advisable to withdraw for at least 24 hours to see what happens. The officials and men will need a rest, and if they find the stoppings undisturbed when they return, their further strengthening can be done more deliberately. 8. When the stoppings are completed the air pressure on them all should be equalised, as only by that means is the circulation of air within the sealed-off area likely to be prevented. 9. Samples of the air within the sealed-off area should then be regularly taken by means of pipes passing through the stoppings, unless it is definitely decided that sampling would give no information of value, for example, where the district is not to be re-entered. Machine-cut Ignitions. At another colliery, whilst an electrically-driven chain coal-cutting machine was about to be turned round after undercutting a short longwall face, the trailing cable came into contact with the revolving picks. Firedamp was ignited and it continued to burn for 3½ hours over the coal which had settled down and parted from the roof. It was extinguished by stone dust and ten buckets of water. Mr. Humphrys says that ignitions of firedamp in the machine-cut have been infrequent in Yorkshire in recent years. They have occurred during the actual coal-cutting operations or during shot-firing. Sometimes a fire has been caused which has involved. sealing the district. An open flame such as any of those just mentioned, he adds, can only be regarded as a serious danger in a safety-lamp mine. Means to avert such ignitions are (1) sharp picks ; (2) keeping the front of the cut clear so that firedamp is not imprisoned in it (3) an attachment for automatically removing the gummings and (4) the discharge of carbon dioxide into the cut with a view to rendering the atmosphere in the cut non-inflammable. Markham Explosion Recalled. There were two explosions in 1938 in the North Midland Division, resulting in the deaths of 79 persons and injuries to 57 others. The explosion in the Blackshale seam at Markham Colliery on the 10th May unfortunately was of great magnitude, 79 persons being killed and 40 receiving injuries, with 16 suffering from shock. The causes of this explosion, and the circumstances attending it, were the subject of a special inquiry extending over twelve days, during which eighty-three witnesses were examined. The conclusions arrived at are given fully in the report on the inquiry, of which an extensive summary appeared in No. 9 Vol. 49 of this journal. Repetition here is unnecessary. It will he sufficient to state briefly that the explosion was one of coal dust alone which was ignited by an electric arc formed when a joint-box of a cable was broken by runaway tubs. As Mr. P. E. Sandlands, O.B.E., K.C., the Commissioner said, he was driven to the conclusion that there was arcing or sparking caused momentarily at the time, or just after, the joint-box was broken by the collision with the runaway tubs, and at the time when a cloud of coal dust thrown from some of those tubs was about, and that in this way the explosion originated." Firedamp in Roof Cavity. An explosion of firedamp slightly injured a workman at a Notts. colliery. A carrying girder was being replaced at a junction on a road about 30 yards from a newly opened face. Preliminary work of raising the girders across the road had been done, the ends of the girders on one side being supported by props to the floor, and the other ends by short props set on the old carrying girder. Covering wood had been placed on the girders but there was a cavity in the roof above this timber. Two men were sent to put in the new carrying girder. Fortunately for them they had moved away from the junction to await assistance to lift the girder just before the roof collapsed. The fall brought down an electric cable hanging on the girders and trapped it against the top of a tub. The cable was damaged. Although the precaution of taking down the cable and protecting it had been taken when the preliminary work was done it was not thought to be necessary at the later stage. If this had been done Mr. G. Cook, the Divisional inspector, says it would not have been damaged. This occurrence also shows that firedamp may accumulate in a cavity in the roof even when there is a good ventilating current. In this case 18,500 cubic feet of air per minute were passing along the road. All cavities should be filled in. Further, the practice of supporting girders by short props and without struts between them, leaving the ends free, may result in the whole structure collapsing and should be avoided. The Inspector comments upon two persons being suffocated by natural gases. The occurrence, he says, is another reminder that when a road is abandoned it should be stowed up completely wherever possible and, if that cannot be done throughout, the entrance at least should be stowed, or built off, so that it cannot be entered. The erection of fences should not be relied upon as these, however well erected, may still not prevent a person passing through them. The leaving of rails and other material in a gate and the recovery of them piecemeal is to be deprecated. They should be withdrawn immediately the road ceases to be required when the conditions are most favourable. Until they can be stowed up such roads should be ventilated and kept clear of gases and regularly inspected. Adequate Ventilation Vital. Under the sub-head ventilation Mr. Cook remarks that the importance of adequate ventilation both in quality and quantity cannot be overstressed; it is vital for the safe working of any mine. Concentrated methods of mining, which are a special feature, necessitate large quantities of air passing through the workings to dilute the quicker emission of firedamp from such workings, and airways and splits should be set out with this in mind. At one mine, tests were taken at hourly intervals over a 24-hours cycle on two cutter faces which showed that in each case the variation in the emission of gas was in the ratio of 1 to 4 during the period. A similar test on a hand-got face showed a variation of 1 to 1.4. Although the total amount of gas emitted per ton of output was not less under hand-got conditions, the rate of emission was more uniform without high peak periods; the hand-got face was considerably longer than were the machine-cut faces. At this mine a pressure survey has been carried out, and the improvement of the airways as the result of this test has enabled the fan speed to be reduced from 110 to 95 revolutions per minute, and the water-gauge lowered from 5.1 inches to 3.7 inches without affecting the total quantity of air circulating underground or the amount of air passing through the faces. Point Sometimes Overlooked. No explosion causing loss of life occurred in the North Western Division during 1938, but six men were injured in two explosions. In his report the Divisional Inspector, Mr. E. H. Frazer, says that at a Lancashire colliery a tunnel rising 1 in 3 was being driven through almost level strata from the Rams Seam towards the Crumbouke Seam and had touched, but not penetrated, the thin seam known as the Top Rams. Five holes had been left ready for firing by the afternoon shift and the oncoming night shift bored two more. The night shift fireman charged two breaking-in shots and fired them simultaneously. Three side holes were then charged separately and fired individually. The sixth hole was charged and the three tunnelers and the fireman gathered at the bottom of the tunnel for safety. When it was fired an explosion occurred; all the men were thrown about but not burned. One man's injuries were so slight that he never went on compensation. As explained, the exploder was intended for five shots in series and was capable of developing 35 volts. Such an appliance, though not of approved type, was not illegal in a stone tunnel. It was examined at the Mines Department Testing Station and found to be capable of igniting an explosive mixture of firedamp and air by sparking at the remote end of a shot-firing cable. An oscillograph record indicated that after the operating handle had closed the circuit at the end of its travel a shot would be fired in 0.005 second and thereafter the rotor continued to travel and produce voltage for approximately 0.76 second. It was clear that the break flash produced by the jangling together of the detonator leads, when flung back violently by the explosion of the shot, could ignite firedamp. The balance of probability was that the exploder current was the cause of the accident. Afterwards the colliery management decided to fire all shots singly with an approved type single-shot exploder. One point, which the Inspector points out is sometimes over-looked, arose in connection with this affair. The shot-firing cable consisted of separate lengths joined together, but the joints were not insulated. General Regulation 133 (b) requires that shot-firing cables shall be covered with insulating material. The joints, it is added, should not have been left bare. A Word of Praise. Dealing with the ignitions of firedamp which were not accompanied by personal injury, Mr. Frazer discusses the most serious of the series, which occurred in the Trencherbone conveyor face of one of the mines. It is explained that a coal-cutting machine was at the return end of the face, holing in a hard cannel coal of inferior quality under the seam. Normally the picks required changing about every 11 yards and on this occasion the machine had cut ten yards since the last change, so it is a fair assumption that the picks were blunt. Suddenly flames burst through the cuttings under the holed coal and, despite the application of 10 or 12 bags of stone dust, continued burning. Apparently a feeder of firedamp, through a vertical break in the coal, had been ignited. Wisely the officials did not attempt to restrict the ventilation — increased by the heated fumes in the return airway setting up a big natural current. Any restriction would have resulted in an accumulation of firedamp, with the possibility of an explosion. Everyone was withdrawn and stoppings were inserted near the pit bottom in the two main airways. As was expected, explosions occurred when the air was shut off but the stoppings were able to withstand them with only minor displacement. The way this dangerous fire was tackled by the whole of the officials, workmen and rescue brigades evoked Mr. Frazer's highest admiration. He has no hesitation in saying that, although the district was lost a serious disaster was avoided and not a soul was injured. The sandbag stoppings were built 18 feet thick, but two 18-inch diameter air pipes were left open to feed the district with air until the final closure. Then came the problem of packing tight such a length of pipes from one end only, but it was solved by the workmen seizing one diminutive fellow and sliding him repeatedly in and out of the pipes with sandbags until he had blocked them up. They used him as a human stemming stick and, when it is understood that the velocity of air in the pipes was so great that the little man had to be held back at first lest he be sucked through, his fortitude in sticking to such a job was outstanding. Suggested Solution to Problem. There are many seams in the North Western Division where the outflow of gas is greater than local blowers, but it bleeds from innumerable points. The problem of ventilating such mines is difficult because of the many factors involved. High velocities of air in working faces render conditions unpleasant: the amount of dust raised irritates eyes and nostrils, forcing men to wear goggles which rapidly become coated with dust and require frequent cleaning: dust is lifted and disseminated through return airways when it ought to be filled with coal and sent out of the pit. It has been proposed in one mine to risk doubling the firedamp percentage by reducing the amount of ventilation, so as to abate the dust nuisance somewhat, but Mr. Frazer avers a better solution lies in splitting air-currents far more than is done at present. Though it is contended that a single-unit conveyor face cannot be divided into two splits, it is not impossible if an extra road is packed to the centre of the face. Firedamp in Shallow Fireclay Workings. There were two explosions of firedamp in the Midland and Southern Division during the year, one man being burnt in each, though fortunately not seriously. One of the explosions occurred in a fireclay mine worked by inclines dipping from the surface, and having a maximum cover of 70 yards. Ventilation was natural except that during working hours a steam pump operated in one of the inclines, The method of work was pillar and stall, levels being driven off the inclines at intervals of 22 yards and the pillars formed by driving "splits" on the full rise of 1 in 3 from one level to the next above. The mine was one in which firedamp was said to be unknown, but the fireman was supposed to make his inspections with a safety-lamp, and insisted that he had done so an hour before the accident. Although it was not possible to say that an inspection had not been made, an examination of the lamp showed that it was practically useless for detecting firedamp, as the oil was insufficiently volatile. The Divisional Inspector, Mr. E. Rowley, deems the case of interest as showing that firedamp does occur even in shallow fireclay workings, and that the ventilation should be properly conducted as close as possible to the working face. In this case there was quite a good current of air in the main circuit, but the site of the accident was some 28 yards off the circuit. The natural conditions were such as to render stone-dusting unnecessary. A Word on Ventilation. The mines in the Midland and Southern Division are, on the whole, not gassy, and it is therefore a comparatively simple matter to comply with the existing requirements of the law. These requirements are generally met, as one would expect in the circumstances, but Mr. Rowley says there are still too many mines in which the general layout of the ventilation system, and the details thereof, are not all that could be desired. The most common faults are :— (a) Too few splits resulting in the ventilation of a number of districts in series. This is particularly the case in Warwickshire — a surprising condition of affairs in view of the known liability to spontaneous combustion of the seams in that area. More consideration should be given to this aspect. (b) Loop ventilation — this is a variant of (a), a split being taken off a main intake and brought hack again a little further inbye. (c) Failure to properly conduct the air into fast ends and narrow headings. (d) Failure to maintain the advance of back rippings with that of the face. A number of mines are now regularly making tests with the McLuckie apparatus and keeping records of the results. Such records studied in conjunction with air measurements set out in an easily assimilable form will often provide most useful information, Mr. Rowley says. A very interesting example of the practical value of an intelligent study of ventilation records occurred at a colliery where this system is used. It was noticed, as stated in the annual report, that there had been a falling off in the total volume of air passing near the pit bottom. Leakage was at first suspected, but when everything had been done to cut this down with but little improvement in the position, attention was turned to the fan. An examination showed that the fan blades were choked with a thick deposit of dirt which of course altered the design. When this dirt was cleared off, the volume of air passing was increased by over 10,000 cubic feet per minute — a gain in the quantity of air equivalent to 19 horse-power, at the expense of an increase of but four horse-power at the fan motor. Some experiments have been made at a Cannock Chase colliery with the object of overcoming the tendency for firedamp to collect in the undercut on a machine-cut face. As far as the experiments have progressed, they tend to show that an improvement may he effected by thoroughly cleaning out the cut, and by a reduction in its depth. Mr. P. S. Lea reports that the ventilation of mines in the Swansea Division is, on the whole, satisfactory, but officials in many cases do not pay sufficient attention to details, and the air available is not used to the best advantage. There is delay in the erection of brattice cloths or air pipes, and in the substitution of doors for brattice between airways. Brattice cloth having been erected is allowed to become dilapidated, resulting in excessive leakage of air. There should also be more attention to the ventilation of narrow places and fast ends. These are elementary details, he adds, but it is unfortunately necessary to emphasise them.
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