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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

27th January 1940, Page: 225, Column: 1

Accidents And Their Prevention

These notes are based on the Mines Inspectors' Reports for 1938. The price of each Report is 1s. net. Copies are obtainable through H.M. Stationery Office.

Improved Record, But —

It is pleasing to note the North Midland Division report on the 1938 record showing 38 deaths and 218 persons reportably injured due to falls, reductions of 22 and 28 respectively compared with the previous year. Nevertheless, classification of the accidents indicates that 39½ per cent. could be described as avoidable, and it is for this reason that the Divisional Inspector, Mr. G. Cook, says that continued study of the question and concentrated effort is required on the part of all responsible persons in an endeavour to find a solution to the problem. Much research work has been, and is still being done in efforts to find remedies and much remains to be done, but the most pressing matter of the moment is to translate the accumulated knowledge into practice. The large percentage of avoidable accidents shows that, even with present practice, the number of accidents could be greatly reduced if more attention was given to the proper setting of supports, to doing so without delay, and to the positions taken by workmen when performing their work. Analysis shows that 166 of the accidents took place on conveyor faces and 51 on other faces. The proportion of conveyor-filled coal of the total output for the Division was 78 per cent. As the accidents from falls of ground on conveyor faces were 76 per cent. of the total there does not appear to be any marked difference on the output basis between conveyor and other faces in the liability to accidents of this nature.

Short descriptions of some of the accidents due to falls of ground, which are typical of many that have taken place during 1938, are included in the report to indicate where attention can be given in order to reduce the number of avoidable accidents from this cause. Extracts are appended.

Working Face Falls.

Two rippers had dressed the ripping lip after firing a shot and then proceeded under the lip to build the packs. A fall of roof took place and one of them was injured and afterwards died. Although the men as well as the shot-firer had examined the place and considered no support was necessary, this accident shows that experienced men can be deceived and that supports should be set under all roofs no matter how good they may appear to be.

In another case a ripper withdrew the supports from under a ripping in preparation for a shot. After he had done so he went under the lip to get a boring machine left near the coal face. As he was returning a large stone fell from the ripping and killed him. The man should not have gone under the area from which he had withdrawn the supports without re-timbering to make it secure.

At another mine where the normal practice was to clean out the cut after the timber was set behind the machine a gummer disregarded the rule and went beyond the timber and was injured by a piece of roof coal which broke down behind the machine. There was no reason why he should have done so, and he should either have put up the support himself or waited until the recognised timberman had done so.

There is a tendency to delay the erection of permanent supports until the loose coal over long lengths of face has been cleared away. This the Inspector describes as a dangerous practice, especially where the lower portion of the seam has broken down leaving the upper section in position, as this entails considerable delay in securing the roof.

The roof over cut coal should be supported as quickly as possible, and the proper procedure should be to fill away only sufficient coal to allow the permanent timber to be set and then continue working along the face from that point, erecting the supports as this proceeds.

A collier was about to take down a piece of top coal, supported on two sprags, which had already broken off the face at the back of the cut. He knocked out one of the sprags and then passed in front of the coal to obtain a ringer. Whilst he was passing the coal fell and struck him. His tools should have been at hand before withdrawing the sprag. In any event, the report adds, he showed lack of ordinary caution in going in front of the coal after he had removed the sprag.

In a mine where the seam is worked in two sections, a filler, after clearing away the bottom section, withdrew two sprags to allow the top coal to fall. As it did not fall immediately he went under the coal to relieve it with his pick and did not re-set the sprags. The coal fell over and inflicted fatal injuries. Whilst in the act of taking out the sprags he was visited by the under-manager who instructed him to use a ringer to bring down the coal.

Hints on Withdrawing Supports.

Clearly, Mr. Cook says, the withdrawal of supports should be carried out with the utmost care if accidents are to be avoided. Unfortunately this is not always the case, and greater attention is demanded of all persons engaged in the performance of supervision of these operations. Although extended use is being made of sylvesters for this work be says there are still cases where they are not used, sometimes because they are not readily available, but more often because it appears to the man engaged on the work that it can be done without using the appliance and he proceeds to use a hammer, often with serious results to himself.

In view of the continued frequency of this type of accident it is again repeated that withdrawal of supports should only be effected by means of a suitable appliance irrespective of the nature of the ground or the part of the workings where such withdrawal is to take place. It is only by strict adherence to such a rule that these accidents can be prevented.

Typical accidents are cited, and the Inspector proceeds to say that when props are being withdrawn from wastes the operations can be carried on with greater safety if two chains are provided with each sylvester. This allows one chain to be attached to the prop in advance of that being withdrawn in each case, and therefore the man has no need to go within the danger zone. The sequence should be that before any supports are disturbed the chains are attached to props numbered one and two. After number one prop has been withdrawn the chain is taken and attached to prop number three before prop number two is taken out, and so on until the whole of the props are withdrawn. The chains should be long enough to reach well outside the waste in order that they can be attached to the sylvesters in safety.

A practice which is particularly dangerous and it is stated should never be allowed, is that of withdrawing the prop from under the face end of a bar first and then attempting to loosen the bar by wriggling it off the top of the prop at the waste end.

Poor practice was the cause of this accident: A packer was endeavouring to withdraw a steel prop by hooking it into the flange instead of taking it round the prop in a loop. The hook slipped off the prop and it whipped back and struck him on the head.

Roadway Falls.

Referring to falls of ground on roadways Mr. Cook points out that the majority of these accidents occurred where repairs or enlargements of the roads were taking place. He again emphasises the necessity of putting in sufficient temporary supports on both sides of the part of the road under repair, and also of ensuring that the ground is dressed down as far as possible before any of the original supports are interfered with. There is always a danger that, when old supports are disturbed or withdrawn, some ground resting on them will fall, and all possible steps should be taken to ensure that the fall is confined and not allowed to spread, thus becoming a source of danger to the persons engaged on the work.

Systematic support of all roads would reduce the risk of accidents caused by fails of roof. Although some roads may have been considered safe without supports and may for long periods have stood without them, the Inspector avers it is unwise to assume that supports are unnecessary, especially if, for any reason, work has been done which interfered with the surrounding ground.

Faulty methods of work often lead to accidents. One of these is illustrated by the following: Overhanging coal to the extent of two feet had been left by the fillers at the end of their shift. A team of machinemen followed and cut under this overhanging coal — taking out some sprags to do so — and, having completed the cutting of the face, left the machine beneath it. The machine chargeman set a short sprag from the top of the machine — where it must have been insecure — to the coal and then left the face. A gummer behind the machine was cleaning away the cuttings when the coal fell and he was injured. Such a sequence of events, in the view of Mr. Cook, indicates want of observation and care on the part of officials as well as workmen on each of the various shifts, and also lack of discipline.

Inspector Says Accidents Deplorable.

Whilst in the North Midland Division improvement in "falls" was clearly shown, in the North Western area 52 persons were killed and 180 seriously injured, the respective increases being 21 and 35, or 68 and 24 per cent. In view of 1938 being a year of declining output Mr. E. H. Frazer refers to the record as being "deplorable." The avoidable accidents are shown to have risen by 10 per cent.

The Inspector puts in figures showing how much more dangerous are conveyor faces in this Division, on a tonnage basis, adding that on a man-shift basis the figures would be still more striking, because conveyors are put in to reduce the number of persons per million tons.

To discover the reason for the big increase in accident rates in conveyor faces he says one might study the differences in the systems operating against conveyor faces. Amongst these are increase in noise ; methods of packing ; and the lessened sense of responsibility of men working in gangs.

The effects of noise are more suitable for discussion in a medical report than here, the report says, but there may be cases where an initial warning is unheard amidst the general din. It should not be necessary for a man to have to depend on his hearing and agility to escape falls they should not occur, is the conclusion.

In regard to packing, a hand-loaded face has gates at short intervals and these need gate-side packs. In conveyor faces there may be only half the number of gates and packing is neither so good nor plentiful. Roof control is inferior.

The Personal Factor.

Observation and analysis of reports show, however, that the personal factor has more connection with the accident rate than any other matter, and this is the most difficult to alter.

A man working alone feels he is responsible for his own safety: he makes examinations and takes precautions accordingly. When a set or three or four men work in a longwall face, filling tubs by hand, there is less self-dependence, but still there is a feeling that it is one's own working place and a certain amount of pride in keeping it right. But in a conveyor face, Mr. Frazer explains, a man has no settled place of work: he does one operation and others, on different shifts, do the rest. He does not feel answerable for general safety: he may only have to put so many yards of coal on to the pans or belt. His sense of responsibility is blunted and his self-reliance is to a large extent destroyed, because he is only one of a crowd. That is, possibly, why so many accidents are "avoidable by ordinary care." Unless miners can be trained to look more after their own safety, he concludes that supervision will have to be doubled or trebled.

How Some Accidents Occurred.

As an example of an accident due to a man's failure to look after his own safety, one that took place at a Lancashire mine is quoted. A collier in a conveyor face was killed by a fall of sandstone roof when he was setting a bar. He had filled out machine-cut coal until he had exposed an area of roof requiring two other supports in addition to the bar he was erecting, in order to comply with the timbering distances fixed by the manager. He was taking advantage of what he considered good roof. The fireman last examined the place 2¾ hours before the accident and, in the circumstances, the Inspector considers he had been too long away.

An accident to two Lancashire colliers happened in a hand-got conveyor face where a fault of about six inches displacement was visible in the roof. A projecting bulge of coal had been left and a fireman sent two colliers to remove it, so that the conveyor could be moved up. A length of 20 feet was not barred, probably on account of the fault making the roof uneven. When the men had been working an hour and had set one temporary prop near one end of the wide space, a stone, 17 feet long, fell on both of them, killing one and badly injuring the other. The temporary prop was reeled out. Commenting on this accident Mr. Frazer says: The miners should have set a row of safety props, between the fault and the face, to compensate for the absence of bars. The fireman was to blame for not instructing the men what to do. He had seen the place and should have known it needed more support when there was a fault.

In a North Staffordshire mine, the report says, an experienced fireman was sitting on a coal-cutting machine with his back to and within three feet of the coal face, conversing with an overman when a stone, pig-back in shape, fell from the roof on to the machine and struck him on the back. He died a week later from a fractured spine. The overman had told him a few minutes before the fall occurred that he intended to have the stone secured or pulled down. The fireman agreed that the stone was unsafe his action, therefore, in sitting immediately in front of it was indefensible.

A seam about a yard and a half thick had been undercut 4½ feet by machine. During the coal-filling shift a collier set three inclined sprags to a length of three yards of coal, removed the holing blocks and worked off the bottom coal to the back of the cut, leaving 26 inches of top coal with only the slanting sprags for support and they only gripped the top 16 inches. He was working under the tops when a layer, 10 inches thick and of 40 square feet area, fell on him. The inclined sprags were only for preventing coal rolling off the face and could not be expected to sustain the portion that fell.

A North Staffordshire crutter (a man who drives stone drifts) was enlarging the entrance of a level trial cut, and had almost cleared away all the dirt dislodged by two shots fired in a side, two hours before, when a stone weighing about a ton fell from the ripping brink and pinned his head beneath. After firing the shots, the fireman had instructed the crutter to clear sufficient dirt to enable a prop to be set under the edge. Had he done this, instead of first attempting to clear away all the dirt, the accident might have been averted.

The morals, which Mr. Frazer agrees would do equally well for all places in mines, are that there should be no delay in erecting supports, and that the most experienced men can be mistaken in the strength of strata, because both the fireman and the crutter tested the stone and considered it perfectly secure, though the fireman ordered a prop to be set as a routine precaution. No doubt the unfortunate crutter genuinely believed himself to be safe and took the fireman's order as a piece of friendly advice.

Minute Inspections Necessary.

During the year 1938 in the Swansea Division 20 fatal accidents were caused by falls of ground at the face, an increase of one compared with 1937, but the number of reportable non-fatal accidents was reduced by 21, the figures being 59 and 80 in 1938 and 1937 respectively. Of the fatal accidents 14 were due to falls of roof and six to falls of side. but Mr. P. S. Lea, the Divisional Inspector, notes that none of the letter occurred on conveyor faces.

A collier was working in the vicinity of a fault on a conveyor face in a seam three feet thick. The fault bad a throw of 2 feet 6 inches and ran approximately at right angles to the face. He had taken out the butt of a face slip for a distance of eight feet from the fault, the coal being supported by two sprags. To get the coal down he knocked out the sprags with a hammer and as the coal was pulled over, it was followed by a fall of overlying clod which knocked out two props, resulting in a fall of roof which buried him. He was dead when got out. The fall was 11 feet long, 5 feet wide and 1 foot 10 inches thick and reached to the fault. The face slip, contrary to experience, ran up through the clod into the roof and this gave the portion of roof which fell two loose ends. Only one sprag should have been taken out at a time and a prop-drawing appliance should have been used.

An accident involved an assistant collier, aged 16, who was in a kneeling position at the roadhead loading his curling box when he was fatally injured by a fall of ripping. The fall consisted of one large stone 10 feet long, 1 foot wide and 1 foot 7 inches thick, and came from a slip on the left side, an induced break across the road and a very smooth roof parting. Two props were set under it but it apparently fell by sheer weight as it was lying more or less loose on the props. The presence of the slip and the break was known to the collier and also to the fireman, who had made an inspection a few minutes before the fall, but they took no action. This stone should have been got down and not left insecurely supported by two props. This accident, the Inspector avers, shows the utmost necessity of both colliers and officials making minute inspections and making every place safe before anything else is done.

Slip Cleavage.

In the accounts of accidents at the face given by Mr. Lea, slips in the coal and natural joints (slants) in the roof, as distinct from induced breaks, are often referred to. The cleavage in South Wales, he says, differs from that in other parts of the country and is known as "slip-cleavage." Although in parts of the Swansea Division, particularly in the anthracite area, the direction and dip of the dominant slips vary they fall into two main classes, namely: (a) those running roughly north and south and (b) those running east and west. Those in class (a) run roughly parallel with the main normal faulting of the coalfield and they are usually from 1 foot 6 inches to 2 feet apart. In most parts of the Division these slips dip, with reference to the bedding plane, from 50 to 60 degrees to the west, but there are areas, however, where they dip to the east. In the vicinity of major normal faults, in troughed regions and in cases of overthrust and folding, they may dip both east and west, thus on any particular working face slips dipping in opposite directions may be found.

The slips in class (b) run approximately east and west and are parallel with the lines of overthrust and folding. They are nearly always present in normal inclined seams but they are of greater importance near overthrusts and folds and may even exclude those in class (a). They dip generally to the south and are accompanied by minor parallel crush-fractures dipping north and south.

These slips are usually confined to the seam but occasionally run up into the roof at irregular intervals. Their presence in the roof, however, is often not known until it is too late.

Under such circumstances Mr. Lea is of opinion that props and lids are not adequate support and this is specially so where, due to local disturbances, slips of more than one kind are present.

Of the accidents from falls of ground 70 per cent. are classified in the report as unavoidable under the conditions prevailing, and this high percentage suggests that men are working under conditions which should be drastically altered. Mr. Lea has tried to give some indication of the physical conditions and suggests this alteration could be effected by the use of bars. Each manager knows the conditions prevailing in the seam or seams worked and should be able to draw up a system of support by means of bars which would prevent many of the accidents now occurring.

Where props and lids are used, Inspectors often complain of the poor quality of the latter. When a collier is expected to make his own lids he often uses the first piece of wood that comes to hand, but every lid should be of adequate length and its width should be at least the diameter of the prop. The best way to ensure this in the opinion of Mr. Lea is for managers to provide proper lids.

Observations on Roadway Accidents.

A collier's stall road passed a fault having an upthrow of 2 feet 6 inches. A weight occurred and two bars on the inbye side of the fault were affected. The fireman arranged with the collier to take these bars out at the end of the shift, told him where he would find a sylvester prop-drawing appliance, and instructed him to use it. The afternoon shift fireman also saw him and repeated the instructions. He was found an hour or more later under a fall and was dead. He had used the sylvester appliance but had secured it to a prop only five feet from the one he wished to pull out. The fall was 9 feet long, 9 feet wide and 2 feet thick and came from the fault side. The collier had started work on the outbye pair of timber, did not set any temporary timber, and did not go sufficiently far away when using the sylvester appliance, although he had a chain 25 feet long. He was described as a competent workman and neither of the firemen deemed it necessary to give him more detailed instructions.

Four hauliers sat having food, one of them on the left-hand and the others on the right-hand side of the road. Without warning a stone 2 feet long, 1 foot 6 inches wide and 1 foot thick, fell from the side four feet above the man sitting alone. It struck him on the chest, fatally injuring him. The road was supported by bars set at intervals of four feet, but at the site of the accident a piece of abnormally hard side had been left overhanging. A portion of this fell from natural joints affected by moisture due to condensation of warm air. The side had been in the same condition for several months and the men had used the place daily. The remaining overhanging side was afterwards blasted down.

A collier walking along a stall road was injured by a fall from a roof cavity. On the previous shift a party of repairers was engaged in getting down some broken roof and left a cavity 9 feet 6 inches long, 7 feet wide and 2 feet 6 inches high. The roof and sides of this cavity were unsupported in any way and stones from it fell on the collier. The cavity was timbered afterwards but the Inspector remarks that it is obvious it should not have been left without support.

In considering accidents from falls on roadways reference is frequently made in the report to induced breaks, natural joints, slips or slants as in the ease of falls at the face. Again, it is pointed out, the only remedy is a system of intensive support, as much care being given to the lagging of bars or steel arches as is given to the setting of these major supports.

In one case quoted a bar was used for a second time, and although it appeared to be suitable it proved to be weak. The use of old timber for important road work is reprehensible and should be forbidden. In another case a bar collapsed after being in use for some time. It was still good to all outward appearance but after its collapse it was found to be rotten internally. This bar was on a shaft level and Mr. Lea suggests such places should always be supported by a more durable material than timber. As he says, these suggestions have been made repeatedly but it is still necessary to reiterate them.

This short series on falls of ground based on the publications prepared by the Divisional Inspectors will be concluded in following issue, conveying some of the lessons to be gathered from the Midland and Southern and Cardiff and Forest of Dean reports.

The second series will be on haulage and transport.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Cook, George    H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Frazer, Edgar Hamilton    H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Lea, Paul Salthouse    H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page



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