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3rd June 1939, Page: 369, Column: 1 Commission's Miscellaneous Pointers — IAccidents from Electricity. Separate figures for electrical accidents first became available in 1919. During the last twenty years, whether measured by the horse-power of motors installed, or by the number of coal-cutting machines in use, or by the output of mineral got by electrical machine mining, the underground fatalities due to electricity (other than ignitions of firedamp) exhibited no corresponding increase but were on the contrary more or less constant in number. Above ground both the fatal and non-fatal accidents are decreasing. Only the underground non-fatal accidents show an increasing tendency, but while the increase was until recently more or less proportional to the increased rise, it appears, according to evidence supplied by Mr. J. A. B. Horsley, H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines, to have been nearly checked in the last five years. These conclusions are noted in the Safety in Coal Mines Commission's Report,* in which it is pointed out that the annual average number of non-fatal accidents disabling for more than three days represent a very small fraction indeed of the total three-day accident figures — less than one in 3,000 for the five years 1931-35. Nearly all the accidents from electricity other than ignitions of firedamp are the result of electric shock, and the majority of these when occurring below ground are associated with flexible cables, plugs and switchgear. Attention has been directed to the Commission's recommendations in regard to the duties and competence of the electrical staff employed at mines which should have considerable influence in ensuring a higher standard of maintenance, and which in turn should be reflected in a reduction of the risks involved in the use of electricity both below and above ground. It is also necessary that electrical plant should be kept up-to-date in the matter of quality, and in the adoption of modern mechanical or automatic safeguards. The Electricity Regulations have stood in their present form since 1913 and are now due for revision, although, having regard to the state of the art at the time they were drafted and the improvements in technique and practice which have since been effected, it must be agreed that they have stood up very well to the test of adaptability to changing circumstances. The feeling of the Commissioners was that the detailed examination of the Electricity Regulations was outside their terms of reference and could be better undertaken by a small committee of electrical engineers. The Commissioners recommended that such a committee should be set up. This has already been done, the chairman of the committee being Professor William Cramp, D.Sc., Messrs. J. A. B. Horsley, A. M. Bell and A. B. Connell constituting its members, with Mr. R. Crawford acting as secretary. There are certain matters of general principle which have been particularly impressed on the Commissioners and which they think might receive the committee's special consideration. These general matters they have summarised as follows :— (i) The desirability of using both below and above ground apparatus, cables and materials conforming to a standard not less than that laid down in the appropriate British Standard specification, if any, in force at the time of installation, subject to a suitable period of grace being allowed for the replacement of apparatus and cables that fall short of this standard. (ii) The importance of greater stringency in the requirements for the automatic protection of circuits, including the use when practicable of remote control, and the earthing of the neutral point of alternating-current systems. (iii) The desirability of requiring the use of metallic screens for flexible cables employed with portable apparatus. (iv) The desirability, as regards installations on the surface, of imposing snore specific earthing precautions and of applying the requirements of the Electricity Commission as to the construction of overhead transmission lines. It will be for the committee to consider among other things the extent to which these provisions can properly and usefully be applied to direct-current systems, and the practicability of adopting some specified minimum standard of insulation resistance with which electrical apparatus in use in mines must comply. In general the above principles received support from all the witnesses who gave evidence on the subject of electricity. Some witnesses referred to the danger of electric shock to persons working at the coal face, especially when engaged on moving up conveyors ("pan-shifting") if live trailing cables were lying on the floor in connection with coal-cutting in progress on some other part of the face. As indicated in the report, it does not appear to be practicable to propose a general rule that such work shall not be done except when the cables are dead, nor does it seem to be feasible in every instance to require the cables, if live, to be suspended, or otherwise kept out of harm's way — though that is admittedly a matter of good supervision which should be seen to by the deputy or electrician whenever possible. In the opinion of the Commissioners, the use of screened cable should go a long way towards overcoming the danger in such circumstances, and they recommend that, if alternating current is in use, pan-shifting in the vicinity of live trailing cables shall not be permitted unless the cables have an earthed metallic screen surrounding the live conductors, in conjunction with leakage protection and an earthed neutral. Accidents from Explosives. The risk of accident involved in the handling and use of explosives, other than from ignitions of firedamp, appears to be decreasing, due no doubt to constant effort on the part of all concerned to secure better compliance with the provisions of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, the increased use of permitted explosives which (except for the additional risk involved in handling the detonators required for use with them) are in themselves safer to handle and are only handled by relatively experienced persons, the improvements in detonators and fuse resulting in a much lower rate of miss-fires, and the elimination some years ago of explosives that had to be thawed in cold weather. In view of the intrinsic danger of the operations involved, the accident rate is low, but the fact that an improvement by nearly 25 per cent. has been achieved in the last ten years provides grounds for the expectation that the rate might be still further reduced if the effort to do so is continued and intensified. The majority of the accidents under consideration arise from projected fragments, owing to failure on someone's part either to give warning or to take proper shelter. This cause accounts for about two-thirds of the total. About one-eighth of the total is the result of miss-fires or delayed explosions, and the remaining quarter falls under a variety of miscellaneous heads. The principal remedy against these accidents proposed in the evidence submitted to the Commissioners was the elimination of fuse and squib firing in favour of electric firing by authorised shot-firers. About one-quarter of the total number of shots is fired by fuse or squib, and where these forms of firing can be practised it is permissible for any workman to fire his own shots, while, in mines where shots are fired electrically, the E.C.M.O. requires the firing to be done either by persons specially authorised in writing by the manager for the purpose (Clause 2 (h), or, if permitted explosives are used, by competent "shot-firers." The basis of the belief that improvement would follow from the substitution of electric firing by shot-firers for fuse and squib firing by workmen is clearly the supposition that the employment of men trained specially for the purpose would have some effect on the reduction of accidents from failure to take proper shelter as well as of accidents from other causes. The Commissioners agree that in theory this is what one would have reasonable cause to expect. But an examination of the figures does not bear out the expectation. As stated, the proportion of electric firing to firing by fuse and squib is almost exactly in the proportion of three to one, and during the three years 1934-36 the numbers of persons killed and injured by projected fragments were 300 in electric firing and 90 in fuse and squib firing, or rather more than three to one. Moreover, the distribution of this type of accidents among the inspection divisions is found to be more closely related to the total volume of shot-firing in the division than to the amount of firing by fuse and squib. Fuse and Squib Firing. The accidents from miss-fires, delayed explosions and other causes, on the other hand, do appear to be particularly associated with fuse and squib firing, for the Northern and Scotland Divisions account for 86 per cent. of the accidents from miss-fires and delayed explosions, and for 78 per cent. of the remainder, although the percentage of total shot-firing is only 53. In these two divisions the number of shots fired by fuse or squib is 87 per cent. of the total. But the Commissioners doubt whether they should be justified in recommending such a sweeping reform as the abolition of fuse and squib firing, even if, as is unlikely, all such accidents were thereby eliminated, in view of their relatively small number as compared with the unknown effect of the resulting upheaval in long-established practice. It is suggested that the most practical line of attack on these accidents is by way of better supervision by the under-officials. Statistics do not support the view that squib-firing is more dangerous than firing by fuse. In Scotland the amount of squib-firing is negligible, while in the Northern Division more than half the shots not fired electrically are fired by squib. Nevertheless the accident rate in Scotland from non-electric firing is very much higher than in the Northern Division, although the rate from electric firing in the two divisions is about the same. In both fuse and squib firing, however, many of the accidents from projected fragments, and some of the accidents ascribed to "delayed explosions," are the consequences of lighting, or attempting to light, several shots at a time in the same place. There may, for instance, be a difficulty in igniting one of the fuses or squibs, or one may have gone out (or be thought to have gone out) ; in the first instance the workman remains in the place too long, and in the second he may foolishly return to it, with the result in either case that he gets caught by the blast from the other shot or shots. There is at present no limit on the number of fuse or squib shots that may be lighted at one time in the same place. In the Special Rules for the Cleveland (Ironstone) Mines there was a rule (No. 59) providing that "no miner or shot-firer shall light up more than one shot at one time" and that "a squib shall not be put into any other hole than the one which is being fired." The Commissioners recommend that these provisions be revived and be made of general application as regards shots fired by squib. As regards shots fired by fuse, they also think that some limitation would be desirable, but they feel that to restrict fuse firing to one shot at a time would be too drastic for fuse firing they recommend that the maximum number of shots that may be lighted at one time should be three. The above paragraph provides the probable explanation for the fact, disclosed by the statistics of accidents attributed to failure to take proper shelter from projected fragments, that in electric firing by shot-firers the risk to persons other than those engaged in firing the shots is much greater than to the shot-firers themselves, while, in fuse and squib firing by workmen, the reverse is the case. As suggested by a table covering the years 1934-36, in electric firing the proportion of accidents to other persons is 2.4 to 1, while in fuse and squib firing it is 1 to 2.2. It seems clear that in neither case, but more especially in the case of electric firing, is sufficient attention paid to the requirements of Clause 2 (e) of the E.C.M.O., which provides that — "The person firing the shot shall, before doing so, see that all persons in the vicinity have taken proper shelter, and he shall also take suitable steps to prevent any person approaching the shot. He shall also himself take proper shelter . . . ." The Commissioners hope that improvement in this respect will result from their general recommendations as to the better training of shot-firers, the closer supervision of work at the face and the limitation on the number of shots in any hour which any particular shot-firer may fire during his shift, which should give him more time for observing the necessary precautions. But they also think it desirable that the clause in question should specify more clearly what the person firing the shot is expected to do in this matter, and they suggest that the first sentence should be modified on the following lines :— The person firing the shot shall, before doing so, decide upon the danger zone which the firing of the shot may create. He shall take steps to secure that all persons retire from that danger zone and take proper shelter, and that access to such danger zone is prevented either by stationing persons at suitable points to prevent such access or, where sufficient persons are not available, by erecting suitable fences marked with a danger signal of a type approved by the manager. A person so stationed shall not leave his place after a shot has been fired until the person firing the shot has given him a signal approved by the manager. Shafts. In the 20 years preceding 1912 the death-rate from shaft accidents averaged 0.12 per 1,000 persons employed, while in the succeeding 20 years it was more than halved, having been reduced to an average of 0.05 ; in the four years 1933-6 the average rate was still further reduced to 0.035 per 1,000 persons employed. Similarly the rate for killed and injured together per 100,000 man-shifts show a steady reduction from 0.4 in 1922-6 to 0.3 in 1927-31 and to 0.2 in 1932-6. The Commissioners say that these figures provide striking testimony to the adequacy of the safeguards already provided against accidents in shafts, and, so far as the safety of men being wound in shafts is in the control of the winding enginemen, to the steadiness, skill and reliability of that class of men. Some of the accidents are due to persons or things falling down shafts, and in order to diminish further the risk from such causes they recommend — (i) That all cages should be provided with proper gates or an approved arrangement of bars which cannot open outwards or be accidentally displaced (at present Section 40 (7) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, permits the use of "other rigid fences" which may be only an iron bar or a couple of iron bars, and accidents have occurred through persons slipping under or over such bars), (ii) That persons working in shafts shall be provided with safety helmets and also with suitable safety harness, which shall be used wherever practicable. (iii) That onsetters and other persons regularly working at shaft bottoms or landings should be required to wear safety helmets. Seeing that new regulations as to winding ropes only came into force on 1st March, 1937, and as to overwinding on 1st January, 1938, it is too early to draw any conclusions as to their effect, and the Commissioners have no reason to suggest any further modifications, except that they recommend that all winding ropes and capels installed after a certain appointed date should be required to conform to the appropriate British Standard specification in force at the time of installation, and that the material used for cage chains and other suspension gear should be of British Standard material or other material approved for the purpose by the Board of Trade. A good deal of evidence was tendered to the Commissioners with a view to some change being made in the qualifications and conditions of employment of winding enginemen. As regards qualifications, the present law (Section 57 (1) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911) requires that the winding engineman shall be a competent male person not less than 22 years of age appointed in writing by the manager. In law the manager is the sole judge of what constitutes competency, but in practice the man who wishes to become a winding engineman can only do so by arranging to get his training from an experienced winding engineman, and in most districts the trades unions concerned are able to exercise a substantial measure of control over the grant of a certificate for applicants to be trained. In some districts, e.g., in Durham, a certificate of efficiency is granted after training, which is countersigned by the manager as well as signed by the three winding enginemen who conducted the training. Subject to reservations by Mr. E. O. Forster Brown, Mr. W. H. Telfer and Mr. John Walker, the Commissioners recommend that no person shall be allowed to wind persons otherwise than under the supervision of a skilled winding engineman until he has had adequate experience of working a winding engine under such supervision, and a certificate that his experience is adequate should be incorporated in the written appointment which has to be made by the manager under Section 57. That does not necessarily involve the issue of a formal certificate signed by the winding enginemen who exercised the supervision, but the possession of such a certificate would clearly constitute the best possible evidence for enabling the manager to certify that the condition had been complied with, and to that extent the existing voluntary arrangement in the Durham coalfield and elsewhere would receive formal recognition and its extension to other districts where it does not at present operate would be encouraged. Hours of Work. Another question raised related to the statutory hours of work of winding enginemen. The Commissioners have carefully considered the case put forward, and they find it difficult to recommend a general reduction in the winding enginemen's hours of work on grounds of safety and health alone. There is no evidence before them that either the safety of the men employed below ground, or the health of winding enginemen as a class, have been prejudiced by the hours normally worked at present. At the same time they feel that there are sufficient general grounds for not exposing winding enginemen to the strain and fatigue of either working seven days a week or else undertaking in turn long extra hours in order to get a week-end off periodically, and in any case they think that the manager of each mine should be required to have sufficient competent men either on regular duty or available to undertake duty in the event of one of the regular men being away for any reason; the provision for longer shifts being worked in case of illness or accident could then be limited to cases of exceptional emergency, such, for instance, as occasions on which two of the winding enginemen are ill or absent at the same time. The Commissioners suggest that this could be effected by imposing on the present eight-hour day an overriding limit on the total number of hours worked in a week (subject to exceptions for special emergencies of the kind instanced above for accidents, and for particular classes of mines such as small mines and mines where there is not a continuous succession of shifts or where winding is infrequent, as provided in No. 6 of the present regulations on the subject), and leaving the actual distribution of these hours at individual mines to be settled by local arrangement. They suggest a weekly limit of 52 hours, which would give five days of eight hours, and one of 12, and would so permit of weekly changes being made in the times of duty. At mines where three men are at present employed on continuous shifts, this proposal would necessitate the employment of a fourth at week-ends, but during the week this fourth man would normally be a "spare" available for other duty. In arranging the hours of duty, managers should be required to fix the hours at which the winding enginemen begin and end their shifts so that the winding of persons is not normally undertaken at the end of a shift, nor immediately the engineman comes on duty at the beginning of his shift. * Cmd. 5890 7s. 6d. net. H.M. Stationery Office.
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