Logo Museum
Museum
Friends of Durham Mining Museum
Events Calendar
e-Books and Books for sale
Photograph Gallery
Document Archive
Main Document Archive
Newspaper Articles
Articles by date
Articles by colliery
Personal name index
Local Record Extracts
D.M.A. Document Archive
Transactions of I.M.E.
Miners' Welfare
N.C.B. Archive
The Colliery Engineer
The Colliery Guardian
Mine & Quarry Engineering
Mining Journal
The Science and Art of Mining
Coal Magazine
Coal News
Coke and Gas
Master Name Index
What's new in the site
Mining
Mining History
Colliery Index
Colliery Maps
Company Overviews
Who's Who
Mineral Information
Managers Certificates
Educational Material
Bibliography
Statistics
Workers/Employee Lists
Notes for Family Historians
War Service information
Disasters
Disaster Reports
Names of those killed
Disasters in the 1700s
Disasters in the 1800s
Disasters in the 1900s
Memorials
Awards for Gallantry
On this day ...

Links to other sites of interest
Industrial Heritage Days Out
Former www.pitwork.net web site

Index to site

Contact and address details

Share Page with Social Media

Share on Facebook

Share with Reddit

Share on Delicious


 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

5th November 1938, Page: 129, Column: 1

Markham Colliery Explosion

Report of Independent Commissioner

The proceedings in connection with the inquiry into the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred on 10th May at Markham No. 1 (Blackshale) Colliery, near Chesterfield, occupied in all twelve days, and eighty-three witnesses were examined. The explosion occurred half-an-hour before the end of the night shift, and of the 171 men who were engaged below ground on that shift in the Blackshale Seam 79 lost their lives and 40 were injured, of whom all but one have recovered.

In the official report by Mr. P. E. Sandlands, O.B.E., K.C., and published by H.M. Stationery Office (Cmd. 5849, 2s. 9d. by post), the independent commissioner explains that the Blackshale Seam, some 690 yards below ground, was the third one to be developed, the two others being the Top Hard Seam, at a depth of 307 yards, and the Deep Hard Seam, at 565 yards. The Blackshale Seam has been worked regularly since 1927 and is ventilated by two shafts — No. 1 downcast and No. 4 upcast. Since 1984, coal getting has not taken place in any district near these two shafts, and at the time of the explosion it was being carried on in the more easterly sections of this part of the mine.

In 1937 there was in this mine, and in this particular seam, an explosion on 21st January and an underground fire on 24th November. The former was found to be a firedamp explosion (the firedamp came from a break in the roof and accumulated in the face owing to a fall in the return airway which obstructed the air-current) ignited by an electric spark due to a defect, known by the man in charge to exist, in an electric coal-cutter. In consequence a flame, set up by a spark inside the coal-cutter, escaped through a gap three-sixteenths of an inch wide in the flanges of this machine and so caused the explosion. Coal dust played but little part in it. The fire was believed by the investigators to have been caused by some breach by a workman of the provisions of Section 35 of the Coal Mines Act, viz., the use of some spark or light-producing object.

These events have, in the Commissioner's view, no connection at all with the explosion of 10th May, and afford no assistance in the Inquiry. In the first place, no coal-cutting machine was in use on any night shift and no danger from this source could arise. Secondly, contraband was by common consent eliminated as an igniting agent here.

It is very pleasant to note that everyone interested agreed that this mine was exceptionally well-managed and extraordinarily well-equipped with safety devices, and the survivors united in praising the working conditions. Of those who appeared as witnesses the deputies were conscientious and capable, the overmen experienced, able and full of concern for the safety of the men, and the men themselves careful for the safety of all who work in the pit. The men at this mine, as at other mines owned by the same Company (Staveley Coal and Iron Co., Ltd.), had formed a Safety Committee, which consisted of three underground workmen, one surface workman, representatives of the deputies, the management and the ambulance brigade. Every month this Committee inspected some part of the mine and recorded in writing the result of its inspection, and meetings were held frequently to discuss all questions which might affect the safety of the mine and those working in it.

Stress is laid on the independence of the workmen and on their praise of the working conditions in this mine, and the definite statement is made : "We are convinced that no foundation exists for any attack here on the trustworthiness of the testimony of the workmen as to the conditions in the mine, or for any suggestion that there was any lack of care for their own safety, either on their own part or on the part of the owners or mine officials,"

At the inquiry Mr. Sandlands had the assistance of Mr. F. H. Wynne, C.B.E., B.Sc., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, as Assessor.

Causes of the Explosion.

All possible causes of the explosion were considered, and many were investigated. The view that the explosion was mainly a coal dust explosion was held, the Commissioner thinks, by every experienced person who was called as a witness.

At the close of the inquiry not one witness had been found to express the opinion that there was any trace of a firedamp explosion; and the overwhelming view was that there was no firedamp explosion at all. The Commissioner is "quite satisfied that there was no firedamp explosion."

He also expresses himself as satisfied that the explosion originated about the area of the tub smash. After the explosion, eleven tubs were found piled up at a place a little outbye of 2's junction. They were the apparent source of the dust cloud. Whether the tubs were in 2's gate at all just before the explosion, or, if so, whether they were insufficiently or insecurely lockered and so ran away, or whether they moved because, as is perhaps just possible, a locker broke, no one may be certain. But the piling up of the tubs at the smash appeared to be the sort of piling up that would follow from a runaway of 11 tubs down such an incline and round such a curve as in fact existed ; and the Commissioner thinks this is almost certainly what happened.

Proceeding with the inquiry as to what constituted the igniting agent, reference is made in the Report to an electric cable which was carrying current to supply six motors working in 11's and 2's units. This cable was supported from the roof arches or rings by ties of spun yarn every few yards. From a point some 30 yards or so outbye from the scene of the tub smash this cable was a 0.05 square inch 3-core fibre insulated, vulcanised bitumen cable with double wire armouring. Each of the three cores was composed of some 19 strands of copper wire, and each core was completely and separately insulated. The specification of this cable was B.S.S. No. 7 of 1926. At about this same point a joint occurred in the cable. This was made by means of an Ellison link-box — a box with a fairly substantial cast-iron cover — in which the three cores from the end of one cable are connected firmly with three separate stems or pins in one part or end of the box. These stems or pins are joined by copper strips or plates to three other stems in the other part or end of the box, and these latter stems are in turn connected with the three cores of the next length of cable. When all this has been done the interior of the box is filled with bituminous insulating material and the cover is then fastened over it. The joint-box is then completely flameproof, so long as it remains intact. This joint-box was suspended from the roof by ties attached to the cables it joined. After the explosion, this joint-box was found broken, the cover was in pieces, the two cables themselves remaining fixed to the stems in their respective ends.

Mr. Sandlands says he is driven to the conclusion that "there was arcing or sparking caused momentarily at the time, or just after, the joint-box was broken by the collision with the runaway tubs, and at the time when a cloud of coal dust thrown from some of those tubs was about, and that in this way the explosion originated."

The disturbance or turbulence of air created by this explosion would cause the dust on the East Plane haulage road to rise, and as for some reason the stone dust dressing on the road failed to prevent entirely the propagation of the explosion, this explosion spread to a far greater extent than any person experienced in these matters could ever have thought possible.

The Commissioner is satisfied that the question of overload has no possible connection with the explosion, and that the cable was able to carry a current of 116 amperes continuously in the mine, which current it would rarely, if ever, be called on to carry.

Exposure to Risk.

Introducing his general remarks on the lessons, if any, that may be learned from the explosion, Mr. Sandlands says that no important part of the life of our people which involves movement, either of individuals or of large objects, can be expected to be entirely free from risk. The traffic on our highways produces, weekly, a lamentable number of deaths and a terrifying number of injuries, but no one would venture to say that by reason of this no motor vehicles should be allowed to travel on our roads. All that can be done is to try and reduce the number as well as the severity of the accidents.

Coal mining from its very nature must involve some danger, and all that can be done is to use every practicable device or method that prudence, foresight and skill may devise in order to avoid or lessen the various risks to which the workers in this industry are exposed. It will be realised that each one of the following matters was connected with this misfortune (i) Runaway tubs containing coal dust and other debris, which had been standing on an incline. (ii) A joint-box of usual design in common use in mines. (iii) The position of the cable and joint-box in the mine, suspended in a position clear of the road and tubs, and believed to be for that reason safer than usual. (iv) Coal dust in no abnormal quantities. (v) Stone dust — (a) distributed by methods in common use; (b) in quantities beyond those specified in the Regulations ; and (c) subjected to tests from samples taken in accordance with recognised practice.

Observations on Points Raised.

Mr. Sandlands makes some observations on the points raised in the following terms :—

"The Runaway Tubs. — There are several points that call for consideration here (a) The place where tubs are loaded or assembled should not, as a rule, be on an incline at all. (b) It may be well worth while considering whether special covers capable of being securely fastened should be provided for those tubs which are used to transport sweepings from gearheads, conveyor belts or loader ends out of the pit. If such covers were provided, should the tubs run adrift and be overturned, their contents would not he split so as to form a dust cloud. (c) Provision might well be made for the more frequent cleaning up of places where coal dust spillage most frequently occurs. (d) Efforts should continue to be made to design some form of mechanical device which would deal with the dust produced at such places by sucking it into specially made containers, and so to prevent its accumulation in the roadways. (e) More strict attention should be paid to juts or tub catches so as to prevent any serious running away of tubs on inclines — it is recognised that inclines are bound to exist in any pit.

"Whether the matters referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (c) and (e), or any of them, can be dealt with by General Regulations or not is a matter which needs investigation. My own view is that they would best be dealt with by giving a power to the Inspectors of Mines to require in any particular mine some particular thing in connection with any of them to be done. This requirement could be made subject to the safeguard of an appeal to a Referee or other specially appointed tribunal, in case an objection was made to it by or on behalf of the mine owners or mine workers. Each mine differs in so many respects from any other, that it is very difficult to frame General Regulations on matters which may affect one pit very differently from another. It may be that the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines, whose report is expected in the near future, may deal more particularly with these matters.

"Joint-box Design. — The joint-boxes might very well be made with more sturdy covers, possibly of some material less brittle than cast-iron.

"The Position of the Joint-boxes and Power Cables. — I think a great deal of attention ought to be paid to the question whether power cables ought not to be placed on roads other than haulage roads ; in any case, joint-boxes should be placed in recesses, or their position protected by very stout barriers.

"Coal Dust. — It has been pointed out many times that coal dust should not be allowed to accumulate to any great extent. It is far better to clear it away than to deal with it merely by spreading stone dust on its surface; and no doubt this will he dealt with when the new draft Regulations are being considered. It must not be thought that I am suggesting that there would normally be any undue accumulation in the Markham Blackshale Mine.

"I have mentioned the provision of mechanical devices by which coal dust can be segregated and not allowed to remain on the floors or sides or roofs near any conveyor belt, gearhead or loader gates. When such effective devices are on the market, the question whether their use should not be enforced in those mines where the coal worked has an unusually high volatile content, will require serious consideration.

"Stone-dusting. — I think attention should be paid to the following matters in connection with this subject :—

(a) Sampling Zones. — These should not include places, say within 30 or 40 yards of gearheads or loader gates, or places where the spillage of coal dust in the normal working of the mine usually occurs. Each of such places should be separately sampled, and it may well be that more frequent sampling here than in other parts of the mine is required. Stone-dusting should then follow to the extent shown by such samples to be needed.

(b) Frequency of Stone-dusting. — It may very well be that more frequent stone-dusting of main haulage roads, even though slightly less dust he applied on each occasion, should take place.

(c) Method of Sampling. — Samples should, I think, be taken of the dust from the floors of haulage roads in a mine at a less depth than heretofore. The maximum depth of one inch contemplated by the new Regulations might even, possibly, be reduced. In this particular explosion, while stone dust was found undisturbed in some places on several of the roads, it was never found to be caked, or not to be readily dispersible by the application of a moderate current of air. It may be that some way of taking samples on roads other than by sweeping with a brush might he devised, so as to make it difficult to take, for sampling, any dust which was not from the upper layer of the deposit on such roads.

(d) Again, it may very well be that the spreading of stone dust by some mechanical means would prove much more effective than the method of stone-dusting by hand now generally in operation.

"While the feeling of dismay expressed by nearly all parties interested at the failure of the stone-dusting to prevent the spread of this explosion can readily be understood, I think it would be wrong if anything like despair were to replace the confidence which up till recently had accompanied the use of this neutralising element. The explosion in this mine would, I am convinced, have been much more violent and much more extensive but for the stone dust that had been applied along its roads. The death roll might have been nearly doubled."


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Sandlands, P. E.    Commissioner  
Wynne, Frederick Horton    H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Markham No.1 Blackshale Pit  Markham No.1 Blackshale Pit



Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
21 May 1935  Markham Pit Disaster (The Science and Art of Mining)
04 Jun 1938  Markham Inquiry Opened (The Science and Art of Mining)
02 Jul 1938  Markham Disaster Fund (The Science and Art of Mining)
16 Jul 1938  Markham Colliery Explosion, Official Inquiry at Chesterfield (The Science and Art of Mining)
30 Jul 1938  Markham Colliery Explosion, Official Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
08 Oct 1938  Markham (No. 1 Blackshale) Colliery (The Science and Art of Mining)
14 Oct 1938  Notes From The Coal Fields, Notts and Derbyshire (The Colliery Guardian)
05 Nov 1938  Markham Colliery Explosion, Report of Independent Commissioner (The Science and Art of Mining)
05 Nov 1938  Markham Inquest Verdict (The Science and Art of Mining)
25 Mar 1939  Markham Survivors Cared For (The Science and Art of Mining)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Markham No.1 Blackshale Pit
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page

 

 

mail
Mail:
Webmaster
Back
Back
Home
Home
Open Government Licence   Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors
Registered Charity No: 1110608
Page last updated: 28 Nov 2022

Privacy Policy
 
Terms & Conditions
 
Search
Search
Print
Print