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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

28th October 1938, Page: 751, Column: 1

Explosion At Markham No. 1 (Blackshale) Colliery

The report* on the causes of and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Markham No. 1 (Blackshale) Colliery, Duckmanton, near Chesterfield, Derbyshire, on May 10, 1938, by P. E. Sandlands, O.B.E., K.C. (commissioner), has been published by the Mines Department. We abstract the following :—

The explosion occurred between 5.30 and 5.33 a.m. on May 10, 1938, half-an-hour before the end of the night shift, which began at 10 p.m. on May 9. Of the 171 men who were engaged below ground on that shift in the Blackshale seam, many were on their way out to the pit bottom when the explosion took place, but even so, no less than 79 lost their lives and 40 were injured; of the latter, all but one have recovered.

The Markham No. 1 Colliery is owned by the Staveley Coal and Iron Co.. Ltd., and is situated about four miles east of Chesterfield. Mining work began at this site about 1882, but the Blackshale seam, with which alone the inquiry was concerned, was not reached till the years 1924 or 1925. This seam, some 690 yd. below ground, has been worked regularly since 1927 and is ventilated by two shafts — No. 1 downcast and No. 4 upcast.

Since 1934 coal getting has not taken place in any district near these two shafts, and at the time of the explosion it was being carried on in the more easterly sections of this part of the mine. Going inbye in a northerly direction along the main road, known as the North Plane (the return airway and travelling road runs parallel with this North Plane at a distance of some 55 yd. to the south) the haulage engine house is reached in about 550 yd. Thereafter this road proceeds as the East Plane east-north-east, with the return airway still parallel, to a turn known as the Roller Turn-about 730 yd. from the engine house. It then bears slightly more to the east to nearly due east and runs straight for some 1,090 yd., passing the transformer house at 260 yd. from the Roller Turn. The plan of fig. 1 shows the material section of the East Plane and the workings to which it gives access, viz. : On the north side of this plane to units known as 5's, 7's, 9's, 11's and 2's, and on the south side of this plane to units known as 4's and 6's. It is important to bear in mind (1) that no work in connection with coal turning at any material time before or up to the explosion was being done at all in units 4's or 5's, and (2) that on the night shift, that is, from 10 o'clock on May 9 to 6 a.m. on May 10, no coal-cutting machine was in operation anywhere in this seam.

In 1937 there was in this mine, and in this particular seam, an explosion on January 21 and an underground fire on November 24. These events have, in my view, no connection at all with the explosion of May 10, and afford no assistance in the present inquiry.

General Conditions at the Mine.

This mine is controlled or managed in the following way. At the head of affairs, as a consultant and general adviser, is Mr. John Hunter. Mr. R. Ringham is the chief agent for all the Staveley Coal and Iron Co.'s collieries, and the agent for this particular pit is Mr. Kirk. The manager, Mr. William Henry Fry, who had previously been with the same company as under-manager at their Warsop Main Colliery, had as under-manager Mr. Arthur Wilde. In addition, there were on the day shift one overman and five deputies, and on each of the afternoon and night shifts one overman and four deputies.

It is very pleasant to note that everyone interested agreed that this mine was exceptionally well-managed and extraordinarily well equipped with safety devices, and the survivors united in praising the working conditions. Both Mr. Wynne and I were fully satisfied that of those who appeared as witnesses the deputies were conscientious and capable, the overmen experienced, able and full of concern for the safety of the men, and the men themselves careful for the safety of all who work in the pit. No one who heard the evidence given by the workmen of all grades, could doubt for a moment their skill as workmen, their care for the discipline of the pit, their courage, their modesty in recounting what those who were at all able to do rescue work did in that respect, and their independence. It is certain that if the men had any cause to complain of anything below ground which affected their safety they would have brought it to light fearlessly. The men at this mine, as at other mines owned by the same company, had formed a safety committee, which consisted of three underground workmen, one surface workman, representatives of the deputies, the management and the ambulance brigade. Every month this committee inspected some part of the mine and recorded in writing the result of its inspection, and meetings were held frequently to discuss all questions which might affect the safety of the mine and those working in it.

As every disaster is apt to give rise to many rumours, sometimes detrimental to men and masters alike — rumours originating more often in misunderstanding or exaggeration than in malice or a spirit of mischief — so here, information of some such rumours was quite properly brought to our notice by some of the parties interested, with the concurrence of the others. In order to see if there were any substance in this, I, with the assessor, caused inquiries to be made, and indeed had two persons before us in private to see if they could give any evidence in public which would be of any assistance in this matter. We are convinced that no foundation exists for any attack here on the trustworthiness of the testimony of the workmen as to the conditions in the mine, or for any suggestion that there was any lack of care for their own safety either on their own part or on the part of the owners or mine officials.

It may be convenient to indicate a few of the main points to which, if explosions are to be prevented, care and attention must be given in a mine and how it is dealt with in this particular mine.

Ventilation. — All persons interested agreed that the ventilation in this mine was excellent, that the statutory precautions were fully complied with, and, indeed, the evidence on this point was entirely satisfactory and was undisputed.

Detector Lamps. — Approved firedamp detectors were issued to the workers at the coal face considerably in excess of the requirements of the relevant Regulations, and included among them were numbers of automatic firedamp detectors or indicators. Since, however, when the explosion occurred all the workers, in the face had left the working faces and were on their way out, carrying with them the automatic indicators, the question of the utility or efficacy of these indicators as a safeguard to the workers does not arise on this occasion, and no evidence as to their use was adduced except in so far as evidence was given that a number of the detectors were tested after the explosion and found to be in working order.

Electrical Equipment. — So far as is material, this subject is dealt with in more detail subsequently.

Explosives. — All parties interested agreed that there were no shots fired in the mine at any time material to this explosion, and I am entirely satisfied by the evidence that shotfiring may be eliminated altogether from the category of possible ignition agents.

Stone Dusting. — All provisions were complied with, and a much smaller percentage of combustible material than the 50 per cent. permitted by the Regulations was always worked for, and, indeed, was practically always found on sampling the dust from this mine.

Inspections. — In this mine work was so arranged that the necessary inspections required to be made were duly made, and proper records were kept of such inspections. These records show that from a period of some six months before the explosion 2,834 reports were made, of which 358 alone showed any firedamp present. Of these 358 no less than 312 related to firedamp arising in 2's Old Gob Gate (see plan, fig. 1), where for some months — November 19, 1937, to March 24, 1938 — firedamp was found. This gate was completely stopped up by filling by April 19, 1938, and no trace of firedamp has ever since been found coming from it — it was very carefully tested shortly after the explosion as well as periodically before. I am satisfied that one may safely eliminate any firedamp from this Old Gob Gate as a cause of this explosion. Twenty-six more of these reports related to firedamp in 4's lefthand airway, where firedamp was found issuing from a roof break, between December 13 and 23, 1937. This emission had entirely ceased long before the explosion and may be disregarded, for subsequent tests at this spot showed there was no firedamp being given off. Of the 20 reports that still remain to be mentioned, all save two related to small escapes of firedamp, all occurring before March 11, 1938; and of the last remaining two, one was on March 23, 1938; the last one, of which more hereafter, dealt with an escape at the junction of 11's and 2's faces and occurred during the night shift of May 9, indeed, very few hours before the explosion. The history of this seam shows no abnormal trouble due to firedamp.

Of the other main provisions for safety, it will suffice to say that no question was raised as to any lack of care in connection with the necessary examinations of the mine, and its machinery, or the taking of barometer and thermometer readings, or the visits by the inspectors of the Mines Department. I am satisfied that all these requirements were properly and carefully complied with.

Events Preceding and Accompanying the Explosion.

On this shift there was some firedamp found to be coming from a small break in a pothole in the roof at the junction of 11's right-hand face and 2's left-hand face, and at the extreme northeast corner of the district (see plan, fig. 1). This firedamp was discovered at about 1.30 a.m. by the deputy (Carter, who was not a survivor) when testing with a flame safety lamp. He caused a brattice cloth to be erected so as to direct the air current into this pothole, and it was found to clear quite quickly. This appears quite certainly from the partly burned report for that shift of the deputy himself, from the evidence of two workmen who survived, and from the evidence of Mr. A. W. Fitz (the night shift overman, who holds a first-class manager's certificate), who visited this break only some three-quarters of an hour before the explosion occurred, and who, on testing this pothole, found it to be quite clear of firedamp.

It is quite obvious from this and from the fact that even after the explosion, when but little air current was moving at this point — because all the doors connecting with the return airway were blown out so as to short circuit the ventilating air current — no material percentage of firedamp was found in the general body of the air in this face, although a very little was found in close proximity to the pothole itself. This small quantity readily dispersed when the ventilation was partly, though only very slightly, restored.

The evidence showed that towards the end of the shift a good deal of stone dusting had been done at all the loader gates and gearheads. No firedamp other than that just referred to had been found, although thorough tests had been made. Tubs of material, partly from roof and sides and partly from the cleaning up of coal dust and spillage on the roads from the conveyors; gearheads and gate-end loaders, were standing in 2's junction and in various places along the East Plane, where they had been brought from the several main gates or junctions.

There appears to have been some delay in getting the tubs of material away that night. One of those in charge of the haulage was heard by a survivor (F. Tomkinson) to say that the movement out of tubs — which usually is finished by 5.45 or 6 a.m. — would not be completed that night till 7 a.m., and Mr. Fitz also speaks of a jam at one of the junctions in the East Plane which he noticed on his way to the pit bottom shortly before 5.30 a.m. The practice in the pit was to start moving the tubs out from the outbye end of the haulage road and then to move those more inbye, finishing with those that were furthest inbye. From the evidence of several survivors, there seem to have been, fairly late in the shift, tubs, many of which were filled or partly filled with coal dust, standing on the incline in 2's gate or on the East Plane somewhere about 2's junction. In the ordinary way they would stand lockered in 2's gate at and below the junction, and when the proper time came they would be lowered down to the main haulage road — the East Plane — where they would again be lockered or else clipped on to the stationary rope, when a jut or catch would, if correctly in position, prevent them from running further along the East Plane.

About 5 a.m. most of the men began to prepare to leave, and by 5.30 all save those engaged in or in connection with shotfiring or ripping or haulage work were on their way to the pit bottom. At about 5.32 or 5.33, of those who were on their way out and who survived, most heard a noise like a heavy bump, some saw a cloud of dust (one described the cloud as a blue wave), whilst others merely felt a rush of air and dust, so strong in many cases as to knock them down, and, according to their positions and distance from the pit bottom they were rendered unconscious. Of those who at the time of the explosion were inbye of 4's main gate junction, only two survived (J. A. Smith and T. C. Watkinson). Both were overcome by carbon monoxide, but fortunately recovered after being attended to by the rescue parties and treated subsequently in hospital. All others, some indeed further outbye than these two, died. All those who so unhappily lost their lives died from carbon monoxide poisoning, and although many showed signs of burns without having been subjected to any very direct flame, and others appeared to have sustained injuries due to violence, Dr. Fisher, H.M. medical inspector of mines, was of opinion that these injuries occurred after, or at the very moment of, death. In the pit bottom office, the overman, Mr. Fitz, who was there at the moment, noticed no more than a slight banging of the nearby separation doors, coupled with a hissing noise as if wind were escaping through the partly open doors into the return airway.

Rescue Work.

Prompt steps were taken by all the responsible officials to deal with this occurrence. By about 6.5 a.m. a rescue party formed from officials and mine workers of this colliery, went down the pit, following the overman and others who had already gone inbye to see what could be done before rescue appliances arrived. By 6.25 a.m. the Chesterfield Rescue Corps arrived at the pit (a six mile journey); by 6.32 a.m. the Mansfield Rescue Corps were at the pit (a 10 mile journey), and the Ilkeston Rescue Corps who had merely been asked to stand by and were not called till 7.7 a.m., arrived at 7.50 a.m., having travelled nearly 28 miles in the 43 min.

The courage, discipline and capacity of all those who took part in the work of rescue, from manager to workmen, from rescue brigade superintendents to stretcher bearers, whether members of the rescue corps or not, are beyond praise. Before the first rescue corps arrived, some of the persons overcome by carbon monoxide had been removed, at some risk to their rescuers, into a position where more air was available and where carbogen treatment was given by men of the pit under the supervision of the chief agent, Mr. Ringham; the manager, Mr. Fry; the overman, Mr. Fitz; and the assistant safety engineer, Mr. Hibberd. In the result some 40 men who might otherwise have perished were saved by one or other of these rescue parties : and in addition, much good work was done by rescue brigades, ably assisted by other willing workers, in putting out fires in various parts of the mine, in the observation of danger points, and in locating the bodies of those who had unfortunately died.

Causes of the Explosion.

The view that the explosion was mainly a coal dust explosion was held, I think, by every experienced person who was called as a witness.

It is generally accepted that an explosion of firedamp is the most likely cause of coal dust explosions. This, coupled with the fact that it is not by any means easy to arrive at the place of origin of the explosion from the post explosion signs, or to say whether those signs clearly negative an earlier explosion followed by a second or later one, made imperative a careful and exhaustive investigation. I am satisfied in the first place that there was no escape of firedamp at any material time sufficient to have been exploded, even if a suitable ignition agent had been available. Any firedamp that was escaping from the break or pothole at the corner of 11's and 2's face was very small in amount. The ventilation, exceedingly good and brisk, would quickly dilute escaping firedamp and carry it out along the return airways. In no circumstances could it get down 11's main gate and to the East Plane. There was no fresh break in any face or roof found after the explosion, and, as I have said already, neither before nor after the explosion was any dangerous quantity found, even at a time when, by the explosion, the ventilation was almost completely disorganised. And lastly, for it is not altogether insignificant, there were no signs whatever of any violence travelling from any face outbye along any main gate.

In the second place, no coal cutting was taking place during this shift. No conveyor belt was running near either of 9's, 11's or 2's faces after 5 a.m., and accordingly (there being then no workers in the faces) there was no igniting agent which could operate to explode any firedamp. There was no shotfiring. The signalling apparatus and telephones were all found without blemish after the explosion. All lamps in this area were proved to be perfectly safe. There were no fires before the explosion. There was no strata movement which could have ignited firedamp. At the close of the inquiry not one witness had been found to express the opinion that there was here any trace of a firedamp explosion; and the overwhelming view was that there was no firedamp explosion at all. I am quite satisfied that there was no firedamp explosion.

Any preliminary firedamp explosion, then, being eliminated, one may turn to the question : Can any spot or place be indicated as being the centre of the explosion that did take place? Evidence weighty, and in my judgment conclusive, on this point was given by several witnesses including Prof. Statham and Mr. George Cook. Signs of violence proceeding in a direction towards the pit bottom were found from a point some 60 or 70 yd. outbye of 2's junction with the East Plane; these signs showed that violence passed along that plane as far as the Roller Turn, or a little beyond it, and also travelled along and by several main gates to the faces to which they gave access, petering out along the return airways from those faces. Arms supporting insulators for signalling wires were in this area bent outbye. Separation doors between the intake and return airways were destroyed by forces acting in the direction of the return airways (see fig. 1), i.e., at the entrance to No. 4's unit near the Roller Turn, in 6's counter level and in 9's counter level; there was also an extensive fall of roof caused by it at the end of 6's main gate. Signs of violence, most marked in 11's main gate, showed that from the same place (just outbye of 2's main gate) the main force had proceeded inbye along 11's main gate towards the face, thence along both faces with diminishing force inbye; along 2's main gate, blowing out all the doors there: and also inbye along the remainder of the East Plane, blowing out the doors there. Substantially all signs, of violence, coking and burning which are marked on plan, fig. 1, were proved at the inquiry, and a careful study of it, so established by evidence, will make the position readily understandable. I am satisfied that the explosion originated about the area of the tub smash indicated on plan, fig. 1.

(To be continued.)

* Cmd 5849. H.M. Stationery Office. Price 2s. 6d. net.


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Carter, —      
Cook, George      
Fisher, —, Dr.      
Fitz, A. W.      
Fry, William Henry      
Hibberd, —      
Hunter, John      
Kirk, —      
Ringham, R.      
Sandlands, P. E.      
Smith, J. A.      
Statham, —, Prof.      
Tomkinson, F.      
Watkinson, T. C.      
Wilde, Arthur      
Wynne, —      


 

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