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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

30th July 1938, Page: 20, Column: 1

Markham Colliery Explosion

Official Inquiry

When the inquiry into the cause of the Markham Colliery explosion was resumed on Monday, 18th July, Mr. Van Oss, for the Mines Department, handed in the report of an official test (made by Dr. M. A. Hogan) of the broken steel haulage rope, which showed that in one sample of the rope the tensile strength had been reduced to 53 per cent. of the normal strength. The conclusion he (Dr. Hogan) reached was that the rope broke at a point where it was heated to between 600 and 700 degrees centigrade. Only a couple of inches were raised to this temperature.

Mr. William Whitehouse, Junior Inspector of Mines, was asked about a shot-firing operation in one unit of the mine which was stated to have had "a shattering effect." He said that he saw no evidence that would suggest shot-firing had anything to do with the explosion.

Mr. Arthur Willis Fitch, colliery overman, who was in charge of the pit on the night of the explosion, said that he was of opinion that the tub smash which it had been suggested might have caused the disaster occurred before the explosion. He thought that the tubs had run away on their own, but he agreed that it was possible that the explosion had released the lockers which kept the tubs stationary.

Professor Harry Cotton, Professor of Electrical Engineering at University College, London, said there was nothing in the electrical equipment that could have been a source of danger in the pit, and if electricity was the source of ignition then it must be something which happened as the result of the breaking of the joint box.

Evidence was given on the 19th and 20th July by the manager of the pit, Mr. William Henry Fry, who said that if stone-dusting was an adequate safeguard against a coal dust explosion, that safeguard should have existed in the Markham pit, where instructions regarding this measure were always carried out. After describing some of the damage done by the explosion, he said the area appeared to have been stone-dusted a very little time before the explosion.

In the opinion of Mr. Fry there was no sudden emission of gas before the explosion. All the samples of air taken before the explosion came well within the old safety regulations, and only a small minority would not have come within the new draft regulations not yet in force. He later said his opinion was that the tub smash occurred before the explosion. Hargreaves's body was found in a position indicating that he had heard the tubs coming and had sufficient time to take cover. He thought that the coal dust propagated into the air from the tubs played a prominent part, and that when the explosion happened the stationary tubs were driven forward by the blast.

Asked if he had considered the advisability of substituting compressed air for electricity in the mine, Mr. Fry said that the company had a small number of machines worked by compressed air and the noise was considerable. Noise was a danger. It prevented the hearing of indications of breaks in the roof, and the greatest percentage of accidents in mines occurred from roof falls. He proceeded to say that in his view the immediate cause of the explosion was the tub smash and the broken cable-joint box. He thought the tubs displaced the steel arches supporting the roof, and the weight of the arches brought the cable down with sufficient impetus to break the joint box. The combustible matter which started the initial explosion was the coal dust dispersed in the atmosphere at the time of the smash. The source of ignition might have been more than one thing, including electrical sparks or sparks caused by the runaway colliding tubs.

Mr. A. R. Chaytor, an independent expert, who, since 1912, has been intimately concerned with electrical equipment in mines, said he had found in one electrical cable signs of internal heating, the primary cause of which was internal. He recognised the cause, as the result of experience, to be a particular type of fault which was not particularly prevalent. He found signs of overloading.

Resuming his evidence on the 21st July Mr. Chaytor said that one of the problems of cable-makers which they had been unable to solve was to discover some homogeneous material that would insulate uniformly throughout the length of the cable. He was not surprised, therefore, that instability should appear at certain places, and not uniformly.

Mr. J. A. B. Horsley, Chief Electrical Inspector of Mines, said he was satisfied that the damage to the cable was not due to overloading but to external heating. He was not satisfied that if there had been overloading it would have been carried to a degree that could have been a possible cause of the explosion. Answering Mr. Hanna, for the Staveley Company, Mr. Horsley said that it was possible that ignition took place when, if they did, the tubs hit the roof and the box was broken, and that immediately afterwards the broken parts of the box were subjected to further violence, but it would be almost a fantastic theory to have produced the results shown by the condition of the box.

Professor Ira C. F. Statham, Professor of Mining at Sheffield University, who was called for the colliery company, said that after the explosion he took a number of samples of air before ventilation was fully restored, and the results of the analysis indicated that in normal conditions the pit would be very free from gas. Subsequent examinations led him to the conclusion that firedamp played no part in the explosion. He found ample evidence of liberal applications of stone dust.

The theory advanced, that the runaway tubs caused an electrical breakdown, as a result of which coal-dust was ignited, Professor Statham said, was a definite possibility. His view was that a cloud of coal dust was ignited by an electrical spark at one point and that the flame was propagated along the pit. That was the origin of the explosion. There was enough coal dust in the tubs to give rise to a cloud sufficient to cause propagation, he was in favour of keeping cables away from main roadways wherever possible, lie was given serious thought by the fact that a self-propagating flame went up-wind in the main intake roadway. There was no experimental evidence dealing with an explosion going against the air-current in a pit.

Concluding his evidence on the 22nd July Professor Statham said that the explosion was comparatively mild. The really serious part was the after-damp caused by the explosion, from the effects of which all the 79 men died. Answering the chairman, Mr. P. E. Sandlands, K.C., he said his conclusion was that the accident occurred without anybody being at fault.

In the course of evidence Mr. Thomas Needham Mason of the S.M.R.B. said experiments he had made in an underground roadway at the Safety in Mines research station at Buxton suggested that the explosion might have been initiated by the direct ignition of a preformed coal-dust cloud by an electrical arc. No experimental justification for a more positive statement than this had yet existed. He added that "One of the most important and most difficult problems presented by this puzzling explosion is the origin and composition of the dust cloud from which the flame was propagated over so great a distance."

The composition of the dust cloud from which the explosion propagated was not the same as that of the normal road dust. After the explosion much of the dust already lying there would he carried in advance of the explosion, and added to it might be coal dust from tubs at various positions which might have been overturned and the contents thrown into the air shortly before the flame reached them. Yet these factors could hardly, in his opinion, be held to account for the whole of the increase in the combustible matter content. Experiments had shown that before an admixture of this coal dust and stone dust would propagate flame one ounce per cubic foot of air was sometimes necessary, and dust clouds of several times this density could be sustained in turbulent air and carried a considerable distance. On this calculation it was possible that six tons of this dust might have been suspended in the air in this ease.

Mr. Mason was satisfied that shot-firing was not the cause of the explosion, and agreed the matter now to be considered was how to use stone dust to the best advantage, and answering a question by Mr. J. Hunter he said of an inch of coal dust deposited on top of the stone dust might be sufficient to propagate a very general explosion over a limited distance, but stone dust must inevitably rise and eventually quench the flames. He was of opinion that stone dust was blown into the air with the coal dust during the explosion. The fact that it did not quench the flame was not because of insufficient stone dust but because more coal dust came from somewhere.

On Saturday, 23rd July, the eleventh day of the inquiry, counsel for the various parties addressed the Commissioner. For the Derbyshire Miners Association Mr. Geoffrey Wilson said the conclusion seemed to be that the only possible way in which safety could be guaranteed from these appalling coal dust explosions was to concentrate far more on the prevention of the accumulation of coal dust than in neutralising its effects once it had spread. For the colliery officials Mr. H. S. Houldsworth, K.C., suggested that the Commissioner should stress in his report the necessity for continued and rapid exploration of the subject of preventing as well as limiting the sphere of activity of a coal dust explosion. Mr. John Hunter, for the colliery company, said they had made great efforts to reduce the deposit of coal dust, and as soon as there was an efficient plant for reducing dust at the coal face loaders they would be the first to adopt it. He asked the Commissioner to recommend the Mines Department to set up a special committee of practical men and research experts to investigate the problem at once, and to give colliery managers some guidance as to what they should do. For the Mines Department, Mr. Trustram Eve, K.C., did not want it to go out that stone-dusting was no good at all. Whether the Commissioner adopted the suggestion of an ad hoc committee or not, "The Mines Department are, and have been for some time, anxiously considering the question of the new regulations and would welcome any suggestions from the inquiry."

Closing the inquiry Mr. P. E. Sandlands, K.C., remarked "If ever there was a pit that ought never to have had an accident this is the one. However, there it is, and we must do our best to see if we can prevent anything further like it."


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Chaytor, A. R.      
Cotton, Harry, Prof.      
Eve, Trustram    K.C.  
Fitch, Arthur Willis    Overman  
Fry, William Henry    Colliery Manager  
Hanna, —      
Hogan, A. M., Dr.      Whos Who Page
Horsley, James Arthur Bennett    H.M. Chief Electrical Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page
Houldsworth, H. S.    K.C.  
Hunter, John      
Mason, Thomas Needham    S.M.R.B.  
Oss, Van      
Sandlands, P. E.    K.C., Commissioner  
Statham, Ira Cyril Frank, Prof.      Whos Who Page
Whitehouse, William    H.M. Junior Inspector of Mines  
Wilson, Geoffrey      



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Markham No.1 Blackshale Pit  Markham No.1 Blackshale Pit



Related Articles

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Date
Article (Newspaper)
21 May 1935  Markham Pit Disaster (The Science and Art of Mining)
04 Jun 1938  Markham Inquiry Opened (The Science and Art of Mining)
02 Jul 1938  Markham Disaster Fund (The Science and Art of Mining)
16 Jul 1938  Markham Colliery Explosion, Official Inquiry at Chesterfield (The Science and Art of Mining)
30 Jul 1938  Markham Colliery Explosion, Official Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
08 Oct 1938  Markham (No. 1 Blackshale) Colliery (The Science and Art of Mining)
14 Oct 1938  Notes From The Coal Fields, Notts and Derbyshire (The Colliery Guardian)
05 Nov 1938  Markham Colliery Explosion, Report of Independent Commissioner (The Science and Art of Mining)
05 Nov 1938  Markham Inquest Verdict (The Science and Art of Mining)
25 Mar 1939  Markham Survivors Cared For (The Science and Art of Mining)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Markham No.1 Blackshale Pit
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page

 

 

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