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24th September 1937, Page: 566, Column: 2 The Holditch ExplosionOfficial Inquiry ConcludedOn Thursday of last week, Mr. Laurence Whitfield, assistant manager, giving evidence in the inquiry into the explosion which occurred at the Holditch Colliery on July 2, asked by Mr. Frazer if he heard any remark about the change of procedure from the stoppings at "Fives" cross-cut said only from Mr. Davies. Asked what he himself thought of the position of the stoppings, witness said he thought that Mr. Cocks was right. Asked if he thought that there was an excessive number of persons in the district, considering that there had been some explosions, and that there had been a fire, witness said no, not to do the work that ought to have been attempted. Mr. Whitfield agreed that there must have been between 50 and 55 men there. He did not consider this number excessive because he never anticipated a major explosion. He heard no one suggest that there were too many men down the pit, but he had heard the manager attempt to restrict the number to the minimum required for the purpose. Mr. Bourke then questioned witness about his opinion as to the cause of the fire. Witness said he thought sparks were the most unlikely cause, and that the most likely was something in connection with the chain and jib of the coal cutting machine. The jib probably got hot, and a pick in the chain might have got wedged in between the chain itself and the jib. In reply to Mr. F. Collindridge (representing the Mineworkers' Federation of Great Britain) witness said that the development scheme at the colliery was a big scheme, and would require a lot of money spending to carry it out. There was a further reference to the lamp in the episode of June 6, and Mr. Wynne stated that it had been tested, with a rather negative result, though they (the inspectorate) had no doubt that the breaking of such a lamp could cause a fire. In reply to Mr. Wynne, Mr. Whitfield said that when they came out of the right-hand carving they told Mr. Cocks of their plan to put stoppings in at "Fives" cross-cut. He made no observation on this plan, but Mr. Cocks told witness to see to materials coming to the bottom end, so witness took it that he had thrown the plan overboard. Witness said they were not being pressed for output in the Four-feet seam. Witness agreed that by putting a stopping in the intake, and another in the return crut, and another in the left-hand carving, they would preserve the seam for the development of a new face pretty quickly, and that that would not apply if the stoppings were put in the cruts. Mr. J. O. Davies, manager of the colliery, was the last witness to be called, and a brief summary of the evidence he gave on Thursday of last week was published in the last issue of the Colliery Guardian. He said he had heard the evidence given by Mr. Whitfield, and agreed with it as to fact. He said that when he went down the crut first thing in the morning and got to the "Fives" cross-cut, he decided then to put in two stoppings, just below the cross-cut, as he thought it was the best place to seal the district off. When Mr. Cocks came down, witness continued, he decided to put in three stoppings, to the bottom of the dip, between the heading and the cross-cut; one between the cross-cut and the right-hand carving; one in the back dip, on the inbye side of the crosscut; and one in the left-hand carving. Witness objected to this decision and said if the stoppings went in there it was all loose ground and not airtight. Mr. Cocks, however, over-ruled witness's objection. Witness said there were about 50 men under-ground between 9 and 10 a.m. Of these, about 10 or a dozen would be rescue men and inspectors. He took it that the inspectors, with whom Mr. Cocks was, were searching for the missing men. All the others were engaged in the work connected with stoppings or haulage. Considering the change of plan which necessitated three stoppings at the bottom he thought all these men would be required. After his examination in the morning his mind was made up that the three missing men were dead. Dealing with the previous fire of June 6, Mr. Davies said that this was reported to him on the morning of June 7 by the fireman, Jesse Moore. The fireman told him that the ignition persisted for some minutes, but that they extinguished it immediately. This he reported only to Mr. Cocks, who told witness to leave it to him. Witness did not know whether Mr. Cocks reported it to the inspectors or not. He investigated the circumstances connected with the fire, and was quite certain that the ignition was due to a broken lamp. There was no connection between the incident of June 6 and the explosion and fire of July 2. They were distinctly different occurrences. Witness was questioned by Mr. Frazer about the statutory report books, which, he said, he had to countersign. he knew, he said, that the only air measurements taken in connection with the Four-feet seam were taken for many months in the return airway, and that all the requirements of s. 77 were not being observed. The explanation was that when they started to drive those cruts 17 ft. steel arches were used, and it was practically impossible to get a reading in those arches. He thought the better place — to he sure that an adequate amount of ventilation was passing into the crut — was to take the readings in the return airway. where the area was much narrower. He was satisfied in his own mind that there was the required adequate amount of ventilation going through the pit. Asked by Mr. Frazer why there was a change made in the method of measuring the ventilation in June last, witness replied it was not necessarily a change. It was just that they recognised and realised what they had been doing. He agreed with Mr. Frazer that they took an air measurement near the face in the intake, but did not take an air measurement in the intake near the beginning of the intake. It was an oversight on the part of himself and the assistant surveyor. Mr. Frazer then questioned witness about the incident of June 6. Witness said he thought Moore complied with the regulations by reporting the lamp, and did not think the fireman ought to have included the ignition in his daily report as another source of danger. With regard to the withdrawal of the men, witness agreed that the fireman was so occupied in putting the fire out that he had no time to withdraw the men, and that by the time he had a little spare time, there was no occasion to withdraw the men. Answering Mr. Bourke, witness said that his reason for advising the fireman to put the report of June 6 into writing was so that he (witness) should have a proper report to give to Mr. Cocks. In answer to Mr. Bourke, witness said that supposing he had been solely responsible, he would consider that this incident of the lamp and fire of June 6 should have been reported to the inspector. And if he were fully responsible, he would consider it right, that on the occasion of a fire occurring, from any cause, the men should be withdrawn and the cause of it, as far as possible, investigated. Witness agreed that top cutting would be an improvement which it was hoped would obviate roof trouble, but not that the disaster would have been avoided had it been adopted some time ago. In reply to questions about packing, witness said solid packing was always better in a pit, and it would be possible at that pit, because a good deal of dirt was being sent up. In further cross-examination, witness said he favoured fire extinguishers being kept underground for the use of men working the coal-cutting machines. He also thought it would be good to keep about 50 gal. of extinguisher liquid in the district. When the inquiry was resumed on Friday of last week, Mr. Wynne recalled Mr. Whitfield, assistant manager, and questioned him further with regard to the proposed stoppings. Witness agreed that, before Mr. Cocks arrived, he had found gas 40 yd. from the face in the right-hand carving, and that the new position of the intake stopping was to be somewhere near the entrance to the right-hand carving. When he decided that Mr. Cocks was right in putting the stopping there, he took into consideration the fact that the right-hand carving was full of gas at that time. He thought that the gas would do no harm as long as the main current was going down the main dip and over the face. As the stopping was erected, those conditions would certainly tend to become worse, and it was quite likely that there would be an explosive mixture of gas and air just inside it. That would apply, however, no matter where the stopping was put. Mr. Wynne said it applied very forcibly at that particular spot. Witness replied that it applied equally so at "Fives" cross-cut. He did not think they would have got away with it so easily at "Fives" cross-cut had an explosion occurred. He thought it would be more violent there, as it would bring more gas into the district. The road would no doubt, start to fill up from the first lot of gas that accumulated behind the stopping in the return dip. Then, when an explosion took place, it would have more fuel to feed it, and it would have been more violent. Witness explained that he was suggesting that gas would have collected in the return. Mr. Wynne said he was not talking about the return at all. He was talking about the explosive atmosphere which was already collecting in the right-hand carving, and which would continue to collect, probably with more speed, as soon as they put the stopping on in the intake. Witness agreed but thought that would apply in any case, no matter where the stoppings were. Mr. Wynne said that in the case of the stopping in the crut, there would have been 800 yd. more of road to fill up. Witness said he did not think that would have altered the conditions at the face. Mr. Davies was recalled, and was then cross-examined by Mr. W. Hartley Shawcross, who represented the owners and the manager. In regard to staffing and organisation at the mine, he said he had the advice and assistance at all times of Mr. Cocks, as agent. Mr. Cocks was a certificated man and a very experienced mining engineer. He (witness) would go into the Four-feet seam four times a week. Under him were Mr. Whitfield as assistant manager, and Mr. H. L. Adkins as a kind of acting overman, who both acted under his instructions and supervision. They would give orders on his behalf, and he would accept responsibility for such orders. Both were certificated men, first-class. Under them were two overmen. On an average, he would have 60 to 70 men working each shift in the Four-feet seam. The rate of advance of the face was about 24 ft. a week. On the day shift, there were three firemen and a shotfirer who had a fireman's certificate. On the afternoon shift there were three firemen and an overman for the whole pit. On the night shift there were two firemen and an overman who spent most of his time in the seam. In addition there was a bratticer, Salt, who held a fireman's certificate and acted under the general control of the fireman in the district. He did not think it would be a good thing to do away with the bratticer. The ventilation of the seam never gave him the slightest anxiety. He accompanied H.M. inspectors when they visited the seam. Mr. Bloor visited it on February 8 and May 24, and Mr. Jenkins on June 1. He had no adverse reports as a result of these visits. The dust samples taken were fairly representative of the roads. There were no indications of coke dust in the cruts, which he examined after the disaster with a magnifying glass. Prof. Granville Poole was with him. Questioned about the fire of June 6, witness said that in the case of a small ignition which the official on the spot thought could be extinguished before it became dangerous, he saw no reason to withdraw the men. To do so, indeed, instead of putting out the fire, as Moore did, might be fatal — suicidal — because it would give the fire time to rage and gain vigour. Concerning July 2, witness continued, in reply to Mr. Shawcross, he had no previous experience of a fire of this kind. Mr. Cocks had such experience. Mr. Cocks volunteered to attend to the actual work of erection of the stoppings himself, and witness went back to control the organisation of materials, rescue work, and so on. In further reply to Mr. Shawcross and to Prof. A. M. Bryan, of Glasgow University and Royal Technical College (for the National Association of Colliery Managers), Mr. Davies said he retained control at the base so to speak, leaving Mr. Cocks in control at the point where the stoppings were to be put. Two of the inspectors were inbye, presumably with Mr. Cocks, for three-quarters of an hour before the big explosion occurred. As far as he knew, they did not dissent from what was being done there. He had a conversation with the inspectors at the pit. He told Mr. Bloor what had happened, and sketched on a wagon a plan showing the position. He told them of the alteration by Mr. Cocks of his plan for stoppings at the "Fives" cross-cut. Mr. Bloor said that in his opinion the cross-cut was the proper place for them. He reminded the two inspectors that there had been four explosions, but they went down, and he never saw them alive again. Mr. Wynne then questioned Mr. Davies about his meeting with the overman E. Clarke (captain of the Holditch rescue team), who said he thought witness was annoyed with something. Witness admitted that he was annoyed at his opinion being overruled by somebody else. In reply to questions about dangerous occurrences, witness said that Mr. Cocks, as the agent, was his superior, and be must do as he was told. He had always had to do that. If the agent told him to do anything obviously wrong, he (witness) would have to consider resigning. That was the only alternative. The daily output from the Four-feet seam was between 200 and 300 tons, and from the whole pit about 800 tons. There was no special pressure for coal from the Four-feet seam. They were heading out with a view to cutting a new face on the right-hand side. This was eventually to increase the output from the seam by about 100 per cent. If they had put stoppings at the "Fives" cross-cut, witness agreed that it would have stopped any development at all in the Four-feet seam, for a time ; but the stoppages which they were told were planned by Mr. Cocks left the development for the new face. In reply to Mr. Wynne, witness said that when he decided the best spot for the stoppings was "Fives" cross-cut, he did not take output into account at all. In reply to further questions, witness said it would have taken about nine months to recover the seam if they had put the stoppings at "Fives" cross-cut. This concluded the evidence and, before the submissions were made, Mr. Frazer, replying to a point by Mr. Collindridge, said that the number of inspections at the Brymbo Colliery were less than the average because it was regarded as a good pit. Replying to Mr. Jones, Mr. Wynne said that the occurrence of June 6 was not reported to the Ministry of Mines. Mr. Shawcross said it was clear that, owing to some oversight, it was not reported; but they had dozens of reports by Mr. Cocks of dangerous occurrences relating to other collieries. Mr. J. F. Bourke, for the North Staffs Miners' Federation, opened with a moving tribute to the heroism displayed in the mine on the morning of the disaster. With regard to the question of how far the management might be really blamed, he contended that there was a failure in duty on the part of this management. It was his argument that air readings, for instance, were quite wrong for three months out of four in respect of the places where they were taken. In the fourth month, there was an improvement, for some reason which they could only guess. It had been said by witness after witness that they thought the ventilation was perfect because it was blowing so, or they used their discretion. The nature of this coal face producing so much gas — as it obviously did — illustrated how necessary it was that both the letter and the spirit of the Act should be observed. In the result, there was no such taking of air samples throughout the two months prior to the disaster as would have or could have informed the management whether a given place was in a fit state for working. With regard to dust samples, he contended that these were not so taken as to be representative of the normal position of dust throughout the roads within the meaning of the proper regulations. Mr. Bourke said his federation considered the position as regards the firemen's reports to be of very great importance — and unsatisfactory, in that case. The legislation, in its wisdom, stated that gas found should be reported, however quickly it might be dealt with, and that the place should be available for inspection by inspectors, management and men. As to the June 6 fire there was, in his submission, a clear departure from duty in the letter and spirit of the Act of Parliament. It was not reported to any inspector; it was not reported to the manager himself for 10 hours; when it was reported, the fireman responsible was allowed to go without reprimand for the delay. There was no record of that matter as a dangerous occurrence. Apart from derelictions of duty which one could refer to particular sections or regulations, he had to accuse the management of this : As to the June 6 incident, they disregarded a serious and obvious warning. The management knew of the presence of pyrites. They knew of its aptness to cause sparks in the use of a machine cutter, and, though the managers may deny it, the evidence of at least three men was to the effect that the management had known about the sparks, as well as about the pyrites. With that knowledge, they allowed this machine cutter to be used, and they took up the position that it was all right, that they were entitled to do it because they had read in one of Prof. Wheeler's books that it would not cause firedamp ignition. Mr. Bourke contended that Prof. Wheeler did not, at any one point, suggest that ignition could not be caused by sparks from pyrites, without a qualifying clause — such as that it could not have been caused in the experiments because the sparks were too quickly dissipated. The management did nothing whatever about the ignition on June 6 because of their over-confidence in regard to the cause of the accident. They jumped to the conclusion that it was this broken lamp. He did not accept that theory of the broken lamp, and he did not think the management should have accepted it. Had the management acted in accordance with their statutory duties, and called off the men and had the face examined, it might well be that the presence of pyrites would have been found. Had they had the lamp properly and promptly examined at the Department's station for that purpose, it might well have eliminated the lamp itself as a possible cause. The management did nothing except a trivial reform in the matter of cap lamps. What a calamity that they did not then think of the things they now agree ought to he done! How deplorable that, after that accident, they did not start roof cutting, or did not go to the small expense of having at least fire extinguishers and a supply of carbon dioxide, as is now agreed to be proper. Had they done these things, or either of them, can one doubt they would have escaped the disaster of July 2? In the light of what was known, the circumstances of coincidence between the two accidents were quite irresistible. There was no lamp this time to explain the matter away. Could one now, in the light of after events, avoid questioning this lamp theory, and deploring the fact that the earlier accident was not properly investigated by the management as a part of their imperative duty? Mr. Bourke went on to speak of suggestions the federation had considered to make for future safety. He rejoiced to hear from the management that they were in favour of supplying fire extinguishers with apparatus near the working of this sort of machine. He said he was glad of the suggestion that roof-cutting was to be adopted as a permanent thing in connection with a seam of that sort. He would like to suggest that water might be brought to the coal face in operations of that kind. He was informed that it was done in some cases, and that in some cases the compressed air pipes could be alternatively used for that purpose. In response to a question by Mr. Bourke, Mr. Shawcross gave an undertaking that the coal cutter, when reached, would not be moved or interfered with until the men's representatives and the inspectors had had an opportunity of examining the position. Mr. G. H. Jones (for the Midland Miners' Federation) in his address, said that the inquiry would have served its purpose if the mining world accepted that iron pyrites sparks might cause an explosion. Mr. Collindridge (Mineworkers' Federation of Great Britain) said that if the idea was prevalent in the company that such an incident as that of June 6 should not be reported, there should be regulations that would make the necessity less in doubt. His Federation contended that a valuable opportunity of investigating was lost. Here was a warning that was unheeded, and it brought one to a belief that there was more concentration on winning further output than on investigating that particular occurrence. He suggested that handpicks were safer, and that if such a pick did strike a stone that caused a spark, the person in charge of the pick could prevent the possibility of future sparks. The Federation held the view that dual loyalty to the Mines Act on the one hand, and to output on the other, was difficult to follow out, and they put forward the view that firemen should be free from such dual loyalty. Mr. W. Frowen said his organisation, the General Federation of Colliery Firemen's, Examiners' and Deputies' Associations of Great Britain, did not accept that firemen should consult the manager before they made their reports. With regard to the brattice man Salt, he had a very dangerous roving commission, which should not be tolerated. Mr. W. Hartley Shawcross then made submissions on behalf of the owners and manager of the pit. He said the inquiry had been unique in so far as it had been unnecessary for the owners to call any witness at all to reply to any attack, because it had not been possible to sustain any sort of attack on the owners or management. It appeared that the phrase used by one of the witnesses on the first day of the inquiry, describing the pit as one of the finest in the country, was not exaggerated. It seemed now to be conceded that efficiency, safety and proper conditions were achieved in the pit, right up to the time of the disaster. It was not disputed that the arrangements made for supervision of work in the district where the disaster occurred were very ample. It had been suggested that the firemen might have found themselves in a difficult position from having to accept orders from Mr. Whitfield, who had no direct legal responsibility under the Act-that they had a kind of dual loyalty to obey him, and, at the same time, to obey the Act. The difficulty which it suggested arose had not been established by any evidence, and that it was a difficulty at all was something which existed only in the imagination of Mr. Collindridge. It seemed that not only was there nothing objectionable in the arrangement, but that it worked to the satisfaction of everybody concerned. Referring to alleged breaches of regulations by the management of the pit, Mr. Shawcross said that he was not concerned with those who chased the shadow of a broken regulation and lost, perhaps, a substance of more importance. In this case, it was agreed on all sides that the air velocity was sufficient, and the ventilation not only adequate, but ample. Referring to the discovery of gases in the wastes by a brattice man, Mr. Shawcross said that whether gases discovered in that way should be matters for report in the fireman's book was a matter f or speculation. He might think, and the owners might agree, that gas found at any time and place should be mentioned in the report book. But it seemed to be clear that that was not the law at the moment. The fireman in this pit adhered entirely to what the Act required of him. Mr. Shawcross referred to the fire on June 6, and said it had been suggested that a lesson could have been learned from this, and the disaster of July 2 avoided. But on June 6, the man on the spot put the fire out, and he and those with him were satisfied that ignition was caused by a lamp breaking. What further investigation they could have made, he did not know. It was well accepted that electric lamps of that kind could ignite firedamp if they were broken. No evidence had been called to suggest any other view. In the absence of evidence, there had been some speculation as to iron pyrites causing a spark. If the explosion of July 2 was caused by sparking from iron pyrites, it was the first instance of any explosion in this country being so caused. It would be a most deplorable thing, he continued, if it went out that in any fire, however small, the men should be withdrawn from the pit. It was by no means inevitable that a gas explosion followed a fire in a mine, and if that fact had been fully appreciated by Payne and Beardmore on the morning of July 2, it might be that other steps would have been taken. Fifty minutes of fierce fire went by before there was any explosion. But on June 6 the fireman Moore acted rightly and, had he not acted so, they might have had on June 6 the events they had on July 2. Mr. Shawcross said the Act divided the obligation to report a dangerous occurrence. Mr. Davies was sure Mr. Cocks would report the episode of June 6. Why he did not do so, unfortunately, they would never know. Referring to the possibility of sparking from the coal-cutter picks having caused ignition on July 2, Mr. Shawcross said experiments conducted up to now showed that iron pyrites never caused ignition of gas. If the July 2 fire was due to that cause, the whole field of investigation and experiment would have to be re-explored moreover, it would be that sparks from a hand-pick would be as dangerous, if not more so, than those from a machine-pick. If Moore had been on the intake side of the fire on July 2, or if there had not been the unfortunate coincidence of an unfired shot complicating the position for him, it might have been no more serious than the one on June 6. Mr. Shawcross said he did not propose to comment on the exact position of the stoppings. It is very easy to be wise after the event. What was done seemed, in the judgment of men of experience, the proper thing to do. Mr. Davies had frankly told them that he had no experience of stopping up a fire of this kind. He was content to be guided by Mr. Cocks in that matter. It was quite clear that Mr. Cocks was acting properly and within his statutory powers when he took up the position he did. The dominant motive in Mr. Cocks' mind at that time appeared to have been, not any question of saving the coal face for development but of saving life. The last words Mr. Cocks was known to have spoken were : "We must get those three men out." The body found nearest to the fire, nearest to the danger, and, as it turned out, nearest to death, was the body of the managing director of the company, Mr. Cocks. Mr. Bourke said there were, in fact, recorded instances of machine-cutters causing ignition in holings, through iron pyrites. He referred Mr. Wynne to them. Prof. Bryan said he agreed almost entirely with what Mr. Shawcross had said. Mr. Frazer, referring to the suggestions that if men had to be withdrawn during a fire, however small, the fire would increase while this was being done, said the meaning of the Act was not that both the withdrawal of the men and the extinguishing of the fire should be done by the same man. Mr. Wynne, closing the inquiry, thanked all concerned for their "willing co-operation"; and Mr. Shawcross for the owners and management, thanked the inspectorate for their help.
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