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 Newspaper Articles Index Newspaper Articles 

31st July 1937, Page: 23, Column: 1

Report On Wharncliffe Explosion

On Thursday, 6th October, 1936, an explosion occurred at the Wharncliffe Woodmoor Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Colliery. Fifty-seven men were killed outright and the only survivor died later. This colliery is situate some two miles north-north-west of Barnsley and adjoins the North Gawber (Lidgett) Colliery, where an explosion occurred in September, 1933. Both collieries are under the same control.

The Lidgett Seam, in which this explosion also occurred, is about two feet four inches thick and is reached by drifts from the Haigh Moor Seam some 34 yards above it. The depth from the surface to the Haigh Moor is about 280 yards at the shafts. The districts in the North-East section were developed from the North-East bord which was driven almost to the full dip — 1 in 11 — of the seam. The distance from the haulage engine house at the top of the North-East bord to the face at the bottom was, at the time of the explosion, about 1,600 yards. The coal in the four districts —18's, 9's, 2's or Blackett's, and 1,s — was undercut by machines and filled on to conveyors which delivered on to loaders at the inbye ends of 18's, 9's and l's levels and the middle of the Blackett face. This machinery was all electrically driven. Electricity was also the motive power for haulage, which on the North-East bord was by endless rope, and along 18's, 9's and 1's levels by main and tail rope. With the exception of 18's level, all the mechanical haulage roads were intake airways. All, including 18's, were traversed by the explosion.

Cause of the Explosion.

From the Mines Department Report (Cmd. 5503, 2s. net, H.M. Stationery Office) by Sir Henry Walker, C.B.E., LL.D., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, who inquired into the causes and circumstances of the explosion, the following extracts are made:

"The attendant of the haulage gear at the top of the North-East bord was the only man to be brought out alive from the section of the mine affected by the explosion and he died in hospital five days later. But, within 48 hours of the occurrence of the explosion, the whole of the workings comprised in the section had been explored and it is from the evidence of what was then, and during subsequent inspections, seen that the cause of the explosion has to be deduced. In my judgment, the crucial parts of that evidence were: (1) The two doors separating the intake airway known as 1's level from the main return airway were found uninjured and wide open; (2) Shots were not fired on 1's face during the night of 5th-6th August; and (3) The commutator cover of the motor of the loader near the inbye end of 1's level was found on the floor and the cover of the starting switch of this motor was found to be loose.

"(1) The facts that the overcast, of which the two doors on the high side and the one door on the low side of 1's level formed a part, was destroyed, and that the one door on the low side was smashed to pieces and blown thirty to forty yards down the return airway whilst the two doors on the high side were undamaged, are proof that these last-named doors were wide open when the explosion occurred. The doors being wide open, their edges would present a comparatively small area to the force of the explosion and for that reason they were undamaged . . . These two doors were the only ones in the section left undamaged by the explosion.

"The question why these two doors were open now arises and the answer, in my judgment, is as follows: Two men were engaged cleaning up 1's top return airway, and to do this work they had to take empty tubs from 1's level, push them through the two doors, fill them with rubbish in 1's top return airway and. then push them back to 1's level. Apparently, the doors were a hindrance to them, and they spragged each of them wide open by putting a brick between the rail and each door. Naturally there was some demur on the part of the representatives of the Yorkshire Mineworkers' Association in accepting the evidence given on this point, but it was conclusive. How long the doors had been open could not be ascertained; there was only the evidence of Headman that some time between 11-30 p.m. and midnight on the Wednesday night they were closed.

"The effect of leaving these doors open would be that most of the ventilation reaching 1's level would pass straight into the main return and little, if any, go into 1's face, with the result that firedamp would accumulate in that face and eventually extend outbye along 1's level towards the overcast.

"(2) In this connection it may he significant that no shots were fired on 1's face during the night of 5th-6th August as was intended to be done.

"(3) The evidence bearing on the circumstances attending the loader motor was to the effect that an electrician had been instructed to make a general overhaul of the electrical apparatus in 1's district, which meant that he would remove the covers and examine the commutator and the starter of each unit. His instructions were that before removing such covers at the loader motor he would see that the gate-end switch was out and the cable between it and the starting switch was disconnected, and he would not run the motor with these covers off. After the explosion the starting switch was found in the "off" position and the gate-end switch, being fitted with a no-voltage release and the current having been cut off at the surface of the mine shortly after the occurrence of the explosion, was, of course, also found "off," but the cable between these two switches had not been disconnected from either.

"Everyone who expressed an opinion was satisfied that the initial explosion was one of firedamp, and that it had originated near the inner end of 1's level; the only question undecided was the cause of ignition. In view of all the circumstances, appearances certainly point to the starting switch or the commutator of the loader motor having been the cause and, although there is no absolute proof, I have no doubt that sparking at the one or the other was the cause.

Propagation of the Explosion.

"It has already been stated that the witnesses were agreed that the explosion originated near the inner end of 1's level and extended into each district of the North-East section of the mine by way of the haulage roads, all of which, except 18's level, were intake airways. 12's level was the intake airway for 18's face, and 18's level the return. 18's level was also the haulage road. The explosion passed inbye to the face along 18's level. but did not enter 12's level. The fact that the explosion was confined to the haulage roads is significant, they being the roads on which most coal dust is deposited; and is, of itself, a reason for considering that coal dust was responsible for the extension of the explosion away from its point of origin. At the same time the possibility of firedamp being present in the intake air has to be considered.

General Remarks.

"Discipline. — Discipline in this mine on the night shift was not good, for example: (i) Ventilation doors propped open, contrary to the requirement of General Regulation 18; (ii) Cover of commutator removed without first disconnecting the cable, in accordance with instructions given under Section 74 of the Act; (iii) Shots fired in main haulage roads contrary to the requirements of Clause 7 of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order; and (iv) Use not made of the detector lamps issued in compliance with the General Regulations.

"Stone-dust. — In my Report on the explosion which occurred at the Haig Pit, Whitehaven Colliery, on 29th January, 1931, I stated that that explosion was extended throughout the district because of dampness causing the limestone dust to bind, and not rise and intermingle with the fine coal dust which lay upon it. I believe this Wharncliffe Woodmoor explosion spread along the haulage roads for the same reason . . . I think that whilst limestone dust may be an effective dust to use in deep and hot mines, it is not one which is suitable for use in comparatively shallow mines, which, especially during the summer months, are apt to be damp. Also I think stone dust would be more effective if it were blown into the air-currents, by means of com pressed air, from tubs or bunkers placed at the sides of the roads, rather than by being spread by hand,"


Names mentioned in this article

 

 Name  Age  Occupation  Notes 
Walker, Henry, Sir    H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines  Whos Who Page



Links to Collieries/Mines mentioned in this article

 

Wharncliffe Woodmoor Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Colliery  Wharncliffe Woodmoor Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Colliery



Related Articles

Pub.
Date
Article (Newspaper)
06 Aug 1936  53 Yorkshire Miners Entombed, Heavy Roof Falls Follow Explosion, Desperate fight to reach trapped men (Dundee Evening Telegraph)
07 Aug 1936  Explosion At Wharncliffe Woodmoor Colliery (The Colliery Guardian)
14 Aug 1936  Wharncliffe Woodmoor Colliery Explosion, Fifty-Eight Victims (The Colliery Guardian)
15 Aug 1936  The Wharncliffe Woodmoor Disaster (The Science and Art of Mining)
21 Aug 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, Yorkshire (The Colliery Guardian)
04 Sep 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, Yorkshire (The Colliery Guardian)
11 Sep 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, Yorkshire (The Colliery Guardian)
18 Sep 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, Yorkshire (The Colliery Guardian)
16 Oct 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, Yorkshire (The Colliery Guardian)
24 Oct 1936  Wharncliffe Woodmoor Inquiry (The Science and Art of Mining)
24 Oct 1936  Coroner's Advice To Jury (The Science and Art of Mining)
21 Nov 1936  Automatic Alarms (The Science and Art of Mining)
21 Nov 1936  Further Stone-Dusting Research Suggested (The Science and Art of Mining)
04 Dec 1936  Notes from the Coal Fields, Yorkshire (The Colliery Guardian)
05 Dec 1936  Educational Grant from Fund (The Science and Art of Mining)
16 Jul 1937  Wharncliffe Pit Explosion (The Colliery Guardian)
23 Jul 1937  The Wharncliffe Woodmoor Explosion, Sir Henry Walker's Report (The Colliery Guardian)
31 Jul 1937  Report On Wharncliffe Explosion (The Science and Art of Mining)

Links to related pages

 

Colliery Page  Main page for Wharncliffe Woodmore
Disaster Page  Accident/Disaster Page

 

 

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